the motions of the heavenly bodies. It is important, therefore, that he should understand the powers of that instrument, the grounds and certainty of his knowledge; and. a similar remark may be made in other cases.

But we leave these and all other considerations, tending to show the utility of this science, with a single reflection more, trusting that it will be enough to justify us in our pursuits.

§. 12. Teaches us to revere the wisdom of our Creator.

We are taught by this science to revere the wisdom of our Creator.We are frequently referred in theological writings to the works of creation, as a proof of his greatness and wisdom; and the remark has been made, not without reason, that the "stars teach as well as shine." The discoveries of modern astronomy not only assure us, that there is a God, but impart this additional assurance, that he is above all others, to whom the attributes of divinity may have been at any time ascribed.

But it must be added, that of all those created things, which come within the reach of our examination, the human mind is that principle, which evinces the most wonderful construction, which discloses the most astonishing movements. There is much to excite our admiration in the harmonious movements of the planetary orbs, in the rapidity of light, in the process of vegetation; but still greater cause for it in the principle of thought, in the inexpressible quickness of its operations, in the harmony of its laws, and in the greatness of its researches. How striking are the powers of that intellect, which, although it have a local habitation, is able to look out from the place of its immediate residence, to pursue its researches among those remote worlds, which journey in the vault of heaven, and to converse both with the ages past and to come.

It ought not to be expected that we should be intimately acquainted with a principle possessing such striking powers, without some reverential feelings towards him, who is the author of it.

§. 13. Of the mental effort necessary in this study.

In concluding these remarks on the utility of the Philosophy of the Mind, it ought not to be concealed, that our early intellectual habits present an obstacle to the easy and ready prosecution of it. We are so formed, that we naturally give our attention first to external things. The varieties of colour and sound, the pleasures of taste and touch are continually giving us new intimations, and drawing the soul incessantly out of itself to the contemplation of the exteriour causes of the perceptions and emotions, by which it is agitated. Hence, when we are called to look within, and as the Arabians sometimes say, 'to shut the windows, in order that the house may be light,' we find it to be a process, to which we are unaccustomed, and, therefore, difficult.

Although the direct mental effort be not greater in this, than in some other departments of science, it is, in consequence of the circumstance just mentioned, exceedingly painful to some, and certainly requires patience and resolution in all. And perhaps this is one cause of the unfavourable reception, which this department of knowledge has often met with.

But the advantages attending it are so numerous, it is to be hoped, they will overcome any disinclination to the necessary mental exertion. The fruits of the earth are purchased by the sweat of the brow, and it has never been ordered, that the reverse of this shall take place in the matters of knowledge, and that the fruits of science shall be reaped by the hands of idleness. No man has ever become learned without toil; and let it be remembered, if there be many obstacles in the acquisition of any particular science, that he, who overcomes a multiplication of difficulties, deserves greater honour than he, who contends only with a few.

CHAPTER SECOND.

IMPLIED OR PRIMARY TRUTHS.

§. 14. Importance of certain preliminary statements in Intellectual Philosophy.

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IT is often highly important, in the investigation of a science, to state, at the commencement of such investigations, what things are to be considered as preliminary and taken for granted, and what are not. If this precaution had always been observed, which, where there is any room for mistake or misapprehension, seems so reasonable, how many useless disputes would have been avoided;— the paths to knowledge would have been rendered more direct and easy, instead of being prolonged and perplexed. It is impossible to procced with inquiries in the science of INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, as it will be found to be in almost every other, without a proper understanding of those fundamental principles, which are necessarily involved in what follows.

Those preliminary principles, which are necessary to be admitted, and without which we are unable to proceed with any satisfaction and profit in our inquiries, will be called, for the sake of distinction and convenience, PRIMA

RY TRUTHS.

There would seem to be no impropriety in calling them TRUTHS, since they are forced upon us, as it were, by our very constitution; all mankind admit them in practice, however some may affect to deny them with their lips; and they are as plain and incontrovertible at their very first enunciation, as any discoveries in physics, or any demon

strations in geometry. We call them PRIMARY, because they are the ultimate propositions, into which all reasoning resolves itself, and are necessarily involved and implied in all the investigations, which we shall make on the present subject.The first of this class of truths, which will come under consideration, is this;

§. 15. There are original and authoritative grounds of belief.

Nothing is better known, than that there is a certain state of the mind, which is expressed by the term, BELIEF. As we find all men acting in reference to it, it is not necessary to enter into any verbal explanation. Nor would it be possible by such explanation to increase the clearness of that notion, which every one is already supposed to entertain. Of this belief, we take it for granted, and hold it to be in the strictest sense true, that there are original and authoritative grounds or sources; meaning by the term, original, that these grounds or sources are involved in the nature of the mind itself, and meaning by the term, authoritative, that this belief is not a matter of chance or choice, but naturally and necessarily results from our mental constitution, Sometimes we can trace the state of the mind, which we term belief, to an affection of the senses, sometimes to that quick, internal perception, which is termed intuition, and at others to human testimony. In all these cases, however, the explanation, which we at tempt to give, is limited to a statement of the circumstances, in which the belief arises. But the fact, that belief arises under these circumstances, is ultimate, is a primary law; and being such, it no more admits of explanation, than does the mere feeling itself. And further, this belief may exist as really, and may control us as strongly, when we are unable to give a particular and accurate account of the circumstances, in which it may arise, as at other times. We find ourselves continually compelled to act upon it, when the only possible answer we can give, is, that we are human beings, or that we believe, because we find it impossible to do otherwise.-—A second of this class of truths declares or takes for granted,

§. 16. The reality and certainty of our personal existence. Des Cartes formed the singular resolution, not to believe his own existence, until he could prove it.

He reasoned thus; Cogito, ergo sum, I think, therefore, I exist. This argument, which he considered conclusive and incontrovertible, evidently involves what is termed a petitio principii or begging of the question.

It is easy to perceive, that the very thing to be proved is assumed. COGITO is equivalent to the proposition, I am a thinking being; and ERGO SUM may be literally interpreted, therefore, I am in being. His premises had already implied, that he existed as a thinking being, and it is these very premises, which he employs in proof of his existence. The acuteness, which has generally been attributed to him, evidently failed him in this instance. The argument of Des Cartes was unsuccessful, and no one, who has attempted to prove the same point, has succeeded any better.

It is necessary to take different ground from that taken by this philosopher and his followers. We consider the belief of our existence a PRIMARY TRUTH. A few remarks may tend to show the propriety of thus doing.

There was a time when man did not exist. He had no form, no knowledge. Light, and motion, and matter were things, in which he had no concern. He was created from nothing with such powers and such laws to his powers, as his Creator saw fit to give.

We are called upon to mark the history of this new created being.In the earliest months or even weeks of its existence, we will suppose, that some external object is, for the first time, presented to its senses. The result of this is, that there is an impression made on the senses; and then at once there is a change in the mind, a new thought, a new feeling. But we hold it to be impossible for the child to undergo this newness of internal experience without a simultaneous conviction of the real existence of itself, as susceptible of this new thought or feel