but the attention to them was so very slight, that he is unable to remember this distinct notice.)

Many facts of this kind evidently show, as we think, that memory depends upon attention or rather upon a continuance of attention and varies with that continuance. §. 227. Relation of this principle to the views of Reid and Hartley in respect to muscular habits.

In connection with what has been said on the principle, that the power of remembrance will vary with the degree of attention, we are naturally led to remark on the views of Reid and Hartley on the subject of certain habits. It seems to be the opinion of these writers, that bodily or muscular habits operate in many cases without will or intention on the part of the person, who has formed them; and that as they are without any attendant thought, without any preceding mental operation, such bodily acts are to be considered as purely mechanical or automatic. They endeavour to explain and confirm their views by the instance of a person, learning to play on the harpsichord. When a person first begins to learn, it is admitted by all, that there is an express act of volition, preceding every motion of the fingers. By degrees the motions appear to cling to each other mechanically; we are no longer conscious of volitions, preceding and governing them. In other words, there is nothing left but the motions; there is no act of the mind; the performance, admirable as it is, has the same merit with that of a machine.

§. 228. Objections to the views of Reid and Hartley.

In replying to these views, it may be safely admitted, that, in playing the harpsichord and some other musical instruments, we have not always a distinct remembrance of volitions, and consequently the muscular effort has sometimes the appearance of being independent of the will. But this mere appearance is not sufficient to command our assent to the doctrine advanced by these writers, until the four following objections be set aside.

(1) The supposition, that the acts in question are automatic, is unnecessary. In the preceding chapter it was

shown, there may be HABITS of volition. This implies, that they may be very rapid, and arrest our attention but for a moment. And we have shown the consequence of this slight attention to be, that they may exist without being remembered. These facts we regard as sufficient to explain the mere appearance, which is admitted to exist, but which Reid and Hartley attempt to explain by an utter denial of the putting forth of volitions at all.

(2) The most rapid performers are able, when they please, to play so slowly, that, they can distinctly observe every act of the will in the various movements of the fingers. And when they have checked their motions so as to be able to observe the separate acts of volition, they can af terwards so accelerate those motions, and of course so diminish the power, (or what may be regarded as the same thing, the time of attention,) that they cannot recal the accompanying volitions. This is the rational and obvious supposition, that there is not an exclusion of volitions, but an inability to recollect them, on account of the slight degree of attention. Any other view necessarily implies an inexplicable jumble of voluntary and involuntary actions in the same performance.

(3) If there be no volitions, the action must be strictly and truly automatic; that is, it must, from the nature of the case, be the motion of a machine. It must always go on invariably in the same track, without turning to the right hand or to the left. Possibly this may be the case in playing the harpsichord, but it is by no means probable. And it certainly cannot be supposed to be the case in the performances of the equilibrist and of the actors of the circus, which were considered in the last chapter. What ever may be the fact as to the player on the harpsichord, it is unquestionable, that the movements of the equilibrist, of the rope-dancer, and of the performer on horseback, do not succeed each other in a fixed and invariable order No doubt the ordinary steps of the singular feats, which they perform, are familiar to them; but the process is not an invariable one. It may be pronounced impossible for them to perform experiments, which agree, in every part

ticular, with preceding experiments. They are necessarily governed in their volitions and movements by a variety of circumstances, which arise on every particular occasion, and which could not be foreseen. Hence the muscular movements in these cases, being controlled by the will, are not mechanical; and as we have abundant reason to believe them often not less rapid in the performance than the muscular movements in playing the harpsichord, why should we consider these last mechanical and not voluntary?

(4) If the hypothesis of Reid and Hartley be true, then there is some general tendency or principle in our nature, by which actions originally voluntary are converted into mechanical actions. Nor will it be easy to show, why this principle should not extend further than mere bodily movements. It will be the result of this tendency to wrest all those powers which it reaches, whether bodily or mental, from the control of the will. In other words, when we consider the extent of its application, and its wonderful results, wherever it applies, we must conclude, that this principle will infallibly make men machines, mere automatons, before they have lived out half their days. In view of these objections, the doctrine of Reid and Hartley is inadmissible.

§. 229. Of attention in legerdemain and ventriloquism.

It has with no little reason been thought, that the dexterity of jugglers, in practising tricks of legerdemain or sleights of hand, illustrates and confirms in some measure the views, which have been given. These persons acquire the power of performing certain feats with astonishing rapidity by habit. The rapidity, with which they perform their feats, is undoubtedly the great secret of the impositions, which they are able to practice on the understandings of those, who observe them. The time, which they take up in going through their tricks of legerdemain, is so very short, that the spectator is unable to exert that degree of attention, which is necessary to lay the foundation of memory; so that the performance is the same to him, in consequence of his inability to remember any thing, as if he had never seen it.

It may not be out of place briefly to remark here in ex planation of VENTRILOQUISM, an art, by which persons can so modify their voice, as to make it appear to their audience to proceed from different distances and directions. The great requisite on the part of the ventriloquist is to be able to mimic sounds; and he will be likely to succeed nearly in proportion to his skill in this particular. The secret then of his acoustic deceptions will be sufficiently understood by referring to the statement in §. 40, viz. That, previous to experience, we are unable to refer sounds to any particular external cause.-The sound itself never gives us any direct and immediate indication of the place, or distance, or direction of the sonorous body. It is only by experience, it is only by the association of place with sound, that the latter becomes an indication of the former. Now supposing the ventriloquist to possess a delicate ear, which is implied in his ability to mimic sounds, he soon learns by careful observation the difference, which change of place causes in the same sound. Having in this way ascertained the sounds, which, in consequence of the associations men have formed, are appro priate to any particular distances, direction, or object, it is evident, whenever he exactly or very nearly imitates such sounds, that they must appear to his audience to come from such distance, object, or direction.-One part of the art, however, consists in controlling the attention of persons present,&in directing that attention to some particular place by a remark, motion, or some other method. If, for instance, the sound is to come from under a tumbler or hat, the performer finds it important to have their attention directed t that particular object, which gives a fine opportunity for the exercise of all those associations, which they have forme with any sound coming from a very confined place. A then, that remains for him to do, is, to give his voice a du modulation and on a low key, which we know from o experience to be the character of confined sounds. The there seems to be a voice speaking under a tumbler or ha and if any person should, either intentionally or unint tionally, lift these articles up, the ventriloquist immedia

atters himself on a higher key, like a person, who had been very much confined, on being readmitted into the free and open air. In all these cases, both of legerdemain and of ventriloquism, a great deal depends on the skill of the performer, in directing the attention of those, who witness the exhibition, to some particular object, or in diverting their attention from it; but in sleights of hand there is the still more difficult art of performing feats so rapidly as absolutely to prevent the degree of attention requisite for memory.

§. 230. Whether the mind can attend to more than one object at the same time?

In connection with what has already been said, we are in some degree prepared to consider the question, Whether the mind can attend to more than one thing at one and the same instant? The question can perhaps be stated more clearly thus; Whether the mind can attend at one and the same instant to objects, which we can attend to separately? The question, when proposed as here, without any limitation, hardly admits a discussion. If a rose is presented to us, we can handle it; we can inhale its fragrance, and behold its colours at the same moment. The mind exists in the states of seeing, smelling, and feeling at once; that is to say, it is in a complex state. Whereas if the question, as above stated, were answered in the negative, complexity in the states of the mind would be an impossibility.

But the question may be further simplified, and proposed thus; viz. Whether we can, by means of one and the same sense, simultaneously notice and attend to more than one object, which objects that sense is capable of attending to separately?-When the question is modified and stated in this way, it seems to be the general sentiment, that the mind notices only one thing at a time.

§. 231. On attending at the same time to different parts in music. But there are certain facts, which at first sight contradict this doctrine, however generally it may have been entertained. For instance, it is the opinion with very many