CHAPTER TWENTY THIRD.

OF BELIEF AND EVIDENCE.

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§. 265. Of truth and the different kinds of it.

We enter now upon a series of topics of a somewhat different character from those, which have preceded; the nature and grounds of belief, reasoning, truth, knowledge, and collateral subjects. With respect to what goes under the name of TRUTH, it must be confessed, although no word is more frequently upon the lips of men, there is no small difficulty in giving a definition or description of it, which will be acceptable to all. This term, however, when applied to objects of whatever kind, seems to be only another name for the existence of those objects, and of their qualities and relations, as they really are. Hence it is evident, that Truth is susceptible of the division, which has been made by some writers, into necessary and contingent.

Necessary Truths are such as are descriptive of those properties in objects, which always exist the same, and can neither be caused nor annulled by the will of any being whatever. The proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, expresses a truth of this kind. Contingent Truths have relation to those things, which are not necessarily permanent. The proposition, that the world exists, expresses a truth of this description.

§. 266. Of truth in relation to the human mind.

But the truth of things may exist, when there are no minds to contemplate it. The properties of a triangle were the same, before they were discovered, as after; and the fact of the world's existence cannot be supposed ever to have depended upon the mere circumstance of its be ing known by men or not. Nevertheless, we apply the term under consideration to men, to their thoughts, rea sonings, conclusions. We often say in reference to a person, that his statements are true, that his views are true, or that he has truth on his side. If then we inquire into the nature of Truth, considered relatively to the human intellect, we must say, It is the cONFORMITY of our thoughts or mental states to things, as they actually exist.

Agreeably to this definition, we may say of any propositions whatever, whether expressed in words or merely mental, that they are true, whenever they represent things, as they are. And, consequently, all are necessarily true or false, being either conformed or not conformed to the nature and state of things.—And hence the reasonableness of the saying, that truth does not always depend upon belief. The proposition, that redness is a quality inherent in a soldier's coat, is no doubt, firmly believed by many, but it is not true in the sense, in which it is generally understood to be so. We have already seen, that this and other colours are sensations in the mind, or at least involve such sensations. The belief, which people have in regard to it, does not affect the truth of the proposition itself. We may have false belief, since we may have false, or at least imperfect perceptions, false or pretended facts, and false testimony, which are among the grounds or antecedents of belief. But this subject is further to be considered.

§. 267. Of the nature and degrees of belief.

BELIEF is the name of a simple idea, of a simple intel lectual state, with which we become acquainted, in the phraseology of Mr. Locke, from REFLECTION; that is, from internal observation, or what is otherwise called

sciousness. Not being a complex, but an uncompounded feeling, it does not admit of definition; although no one is supposed to be ignorant, either of its existence, or of its nature. As it is a simple idea, BELIEF is in its nature always the same; but it admits of different degrees. We determine these differences of strength in the feeling by means of that same internal consciousness, which assures us of the existence of the mere feeling itself. In other words, we are conscious of, or feel our belief to be sometimes weaker, and at other times stronger.

To these different degrees of this mental state, we give different names; a low degree is termed PRESUMPTION; a higher degree, PROBABILITY; and the highest possible belief is termed CERTAINTY.

The term, certainty, is sometimes qualified by an epithet, expressive of the antecedents of the state of mind, which we thus denominate. Thus when it has resulted from demonstrative reasoning, (which will shortly be explained,) it is called DEMONSTRATIVE certainty; when it is successive to a train of moral reasoning, it is termed MORAL certainty.When the mind is in that state, denominated certainty, we are said to know the thing, to which this very strong belief relates. So that knowledge and certainty are sometimes used as synonymous. But knowledge is ordinarily regarded and employed as a synonyme with Truth, when the latter term is used in relation to the human mind; because we find the highest possible belief is sometimes caused by imperfect or false evidence.

5.268. Of the grounds of belief or evidence in general.

That state of mind, which we call belief, is ordinarily preceded by something, which is its cause. And the belief will vary, being more or less strong according to the nature of the cause. The cause or ground of belief is Commonly known under the name of EVIDENCE, whieh literally signifies, (from the Latin EVIDENTIA,) clearness or perspicuousness; and hence by a common figure of speech as come to mean that, which makes perspicuous, or makes known.Evidence, therefore, (taking the term

in its widest or general sense,) is a general name fo any thing, which is naturally fitted to affect our belief

We here see, as in multitudes of other cases, the beau tiful economy of our mental constitution. The human mind is, on the one hand, so framed, that it necessarily believes, when evidence is presented; and on the other, our Creator has so ordered things within and without us, that there is no want of circumstances, which sustain an effective relation to the susceptibility of believing. If our Creator had not furnished the mind with the suscepti bility of belief in its various degrees, and had not appointed certain things in the constitution of nature as the antecedents or causes of these states of mind, it is evident, that man would have been lamentably deficient in those principles of action, which constitute him a moral being. The more so, when we consider, that those states of mind, to which we give the name of belief, precede volition, and are necessary to it; and that volition is requisite, in the view of all, to a moral being. Belief and evidence, therefore, may both be considered as having their foundation in the constitution of our nature; and as giving to that constitution a harmony and a power of action, which it would not otherwise possess.

§. 209. Of the evidence of the senses.

One ground of belief, which continually controls our conviction, and through that our actions, is the SENSES. li is in vain for us to attempt to release ourselves from the influence of what we hear, see, and touch. But it is said, that our senses sometimes deceive us. Whether they deceive us not, they certainly control our belief; and that is the point under consideration. But taken as a whole, and in their condition of mutual relationship and aid, it is not true, that they deceive us; provided always, they are in a sound and healthy state. When taken singly, and without the assistances, to which they are entitled from the comparing and judging susceptibilities of the mind, they at times unquestionably give an imperfect, a defective, (it can hardly be called, a false) view of things.

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they were not designed to act independently of each other and without aid from the mind; and the charge of defective or false information can be sustained only on that supposition.

By means of the senses, we have the highest possible belief, (that is to say, we have certainty,) of the existence of external objects. The conviction of their reality is not only strong; it may be said, if we may reason from men's actions, that it is universal. The belief of the internal feelings and exercises, of which we are conscious, is not stronger. If we doubt in one case, the way is fairly open for scepticism in both. And he, who doubts of the reality of the exercises of the soul, should, in order to be consistent, question the existence of the soul itself. (See §. 18.)

§. 270. Of internal observation or consciousness as a ground of belief.

When we turn our attention from the external to the internal world, from the mind as it is affected by matter to the mind as it is affected by its own operations; we discover another source of evidence. The notice, which the mind takes of its own operations, has already been mentioned as one source of knowledge; and it requires but little reflection to perceive, that whatever we know controls our belief more or less. From the nature of the case, our belief will vary with the extent of our knowledge, whenever the particulars, which we have treasured up, have a direct, or even remote relation to the subject under consideration. Hence INTERNAL OBSERVATION, (otherwise called reflection or consciousness,) furnishes evidence, or rather is evidence itself. We often yield our assent to propositions, when all we can say, is, that we are inwardly conscious of certain authoritative feelings, or that there is a voice within, which tells us to.The soul of man, first called into exercise by external objects, evolves from its own recesses, as it perceives, feels, and judges, new perceptions, new feelings, new judgments; as streams flow out from inexhaustible fountains. All these have at times a relation to, and control our belief.