of matter, which makes a part of ourselves, than in those material existences by which we are asserted to be surrounded.

THIRDLY; whatever may be the idea of Sceptics on this point, the great mass of mankind believe in the existence of the Deity; a being of perfect truth as well as benevolence. But to create man so that he should be irresistibly led to believe in the existence of a material world, when it did not exist, to create him with high capacities of thought, feeling, and action, and then to surround him with mere illusive and imaginary appearances, does not agree with that notion of God, which we are wont to entertain.

FURTHERMORE; it must be admitted, as has already been stated, that there are certain original sources or grounds of belief in our constitution. To say otherwise would be to loosen and destroy the foundations of all knowledge, whether that knowledge concerned matter or mind. But what evidence is there, that there are such original sources of belief, or that any one thing in particular is the foundation of such belief more than any other thing? The answer is, our own internal consciousness and conviction, and this merely. But the intimations from the senses as effectually control our belief, as any other source of evidence whatever. Our consciousness, our internal conviction tells us, that our belief is as decisively regulated by the perceptions, derived through the senses, as by our intuitive or inductive perceptions; and that they are as much a ground of knowledge. We assert this with confidence; therefore, if the senses are not a ground of belief and knowledge, the way is fairly open for unlimited scepticism on all subjects. It will in this case be impossible to fix upon any thing whatever, which is to be received as evidence, and men must give up all knowledge of intellect as well as matter, and will be at once released from all moral obligation.

Admitting, therefore, the existence of the material world without further remark on the subject, we come to a FIFTH PRIMARY TRUTH, which will be found to enter very-extensively into all our investigations concerning the mind, viz.

§. 19. Confidence is to be reposed in the memory.

It has already appeared, that there are within us certain grounds or sources of belief. This subject was briefly considered in the last section, and also in one preceding.The senses, the mind itself in the exercise of its intuitive and inductive powers, and human testimony are some of these sources; the MEMORY is another, which is to be separately, though briefly considered here.

When we say, that confidence is to be reposed in the memory, it is not meant to be asserted, that we are liable to no mistakes from that source. It is merely meant, that' when we are satisfied, that our memory fully and correctly retains any perceptions of whatever kind of a former period, we receive such remembrances with as much confidence and act upon them as readily, as if the original perceptions were now present to the mind. Without this confidence in the memory we could hardly sustain an existence; we certainly could not derive any thing in aid of that existence from the experience of the past.

Our past life has been a series of perceptions or of different states of the mind, following each other in rapid and almost unbroken succession.

But if we are asked on what principle we are led to recognize our former states of mind as a part of the sum of our present and actually existing knowledge; all the answer, which can be given to this inquiry, is, that, in the original designation of those principles or tendencies, which were selected for the composition and effective action of our intellectual being, we are so constituted as to place a perfect reliance on the reports of that mental operation, which we term the memory; and this statement is equally satisfactory and the only satisfactory account, whether we consider the memory a simple or a complex exercise of the mind. Leaving this, last point to some subsequent opportunity of considering it, we are to assign, in this preliminary enumeration, the sixth and last place to this proposition, viz.,

§. 20. Human Testimony is to be received as a ground of knowledge.

It may be objected to the admission of this proposition, as a preliminary truth, that we are often led into mistakes by the statements of men. This is not denied. But then it may be answered, that the errours, into which we are led from this source, are analogous to those, into which we are sometimes betrayed by means of the senses, and even by the memory itself; and which were not thought sufficient to reject them from being considered grounds of belief and knowledge. In all these cases, we are not subjected to errours without the means of guarding against, and of correcting them; and in respect to human testimony in particular, we are by no means required to place confidence in it, without a regard to the circumstances, under which it is given. All, that is meant by the proposition laid down, is, that when we are satisfied a person has possessed ample means of information, and have no room to suspect the influence of interest or passion on his testimony, we are to receive, and to rely upon it. The propriety of placing confidence in testimony under these circumstances we regard as a primary truth, as something to be taken for granted in our inquiries. And we do this, without at present entering into the ground or origin of this confidence, since this is a subject, which can be subsequently considered, and however it may be settled, is not essential to the present assumption, provided the mere existence of such confident reliance be admitted.

It remains, therefore, to be briefly remarked, in support of the view of this subject, which is proposed to be taken, (1), That reliance on human testimony, or the reception of such testimony as a ground of belief and knowledge, is agreeable to the common sense of mankind. The conviction of the great mass of mankind on this subject, when it is fairly presented to them, is not merely prompt and deeply rooted, but is irresistible. If a person should seriously deny the truth. of a well attested statement in history, or question the well attested existence of a distant nation or city, merely because the evidence is

that of human testimony, he would be thought insane. Let it be noticed, (2), That without this assumption discoveries in the sciences would in a great measure cease, and in that of the Mind not less than in others. The sciences are built, not on the experience of an individual merely, but of many; and the conveyance of the multiplied experiences of different individuals into the common mass of knowledge, is by means of testimony. Many of the important conclusions, which we ascertain in the Science of the Mind, are founded on facts, derived from a multitude of individuals; and as these facts are given as the testimony of these persons, they are of no use, unless we admit human testimony to be an authoritative ground of belief.

§. 21. Of the distinction between primary and ultimate truths.

Such propositions or truths, as are here called PRIMARY, are sometimes spoken of as ultimate; nor is this last epithet improperly applied to them. But there seems, nevertheless, good reason for proposing the following distinction, viz. Primary truths may be always regarded as ultimate, but not all ultimate truths are primary. Primary truths are such as are necessarily implied in the various exercises of the reasoning faculty, and are antecedent to them; and being not only the necessary, but among the earliest products of the understanding, may also properly be called ultimate. But we also apply the epithet, ultimate, to those general truths, facts, or laws in our intellectual economy, which are ascertained by the examination and comparison of many particulars, and which are supposed to be unsusceptible of any further generalization. For instance, when the rays of light reach the retina of the eye and inscribe upon it the picture of some external object, there immediately follows that state of the mind, which we call sight or visual perception.Again, when we behold certain appearances in the external world, such as green fields, enriched with rivulets, and ornamented with flowers and trees, there immediately exists within us that pleasurable feeling, which is termed an emotion

of beauty. Supposing ourselves to have come in such cases as these, as Mr. Locke says, "to the length of our tether," and to be incapable of making any further analysis, we call such truths, facts, or laws, ultimate. For the existence of these ultimate truths or laws we can give no other reason than this, that we are so formed, and that they are permanent and original characteristics of the mind. All the inquiries, which we are hereafter to make, will continually imply the existence of such ultimate or original laws, and it will be one great object to ascertain what are truly such. But as the actual knowledge of these general facts is not an absolute prerequisite to the conduct of life, and in particular as it is not necessarily antecedent to the exercise of the reasoning faculty, we cannot call them PRIMARY in the same sense, in which that term has been applied to certain facts in our constitution already mentioned.

§. 22. Admission of primary truths agreeable to right feelings towards the Supreme Being.

The Supreme Being created the mind; he gave its powers, and erected its impassable limits. To have created the mind with the capacity of knowledge without limits, would have been the same as to have disrobed himself of the attribute of omniscience, and to have conferred it upon man. Possessed, therefore, of an intellect, circumscribed in its very nature and origin, it ought not to be considered strange, that we should find ourselves in the onset, under the necessity of taking certain principles for granted, as the conditions and auxiliaries of our subsequent inquiries. So that it is not too much to say, that, in altogether rejecting such preliminary principles, we not only unsettle the foundations of belief and reasoning, but offer violence to our moral, as well as intellectual nature. Because in attempting to pass those limits, which are always implied in the admission of preliminary truths, we show a forgetfulness and disregard of that Being, who has assigned them. Therefore, in assuming the protection of certain primary propositions, which are beyond the reach