the word in a wide sense, is the province of beauty; the intellectual, and the moral, as well as the material world.

But a remark is to be made here of some consequence, in connection with some of the numerous speculations, that have been at different times offered on the subject of beauty. It has been thought by some, that the application of the term to any other objects than those of external nature, is wholly metaphorical.—In reply it may be said, that we do truly feel a delightful emotion on the contemplation of intellectual works, and when we observe virtuous actions, no less than when our attention is fixed upon the pleasing appearances of the natural world. And there is such an analogy, such a resemblance in the feelings in all these cases, that, if the term beauty be proper to express one, it is no less appropriate to all. Instead, therefore, of considering this term as metaphorical, whenever applied to any thing other than the external appearances of nature, it is better to speak of it, as a common name, expressive of a variety of emotions, arising on different occasions, but always pleasing, and varying rather in the occasions of their origin and in degree, than in their real nature.

In particular, they agree in their nature as to this; We refer all the emotions, which come under the denomination of beauty, to the objects, whatever they may be, which are found immediately and constantly to precede them. The charm of the mind, which exists solely in ourselves, seems to flow out and to spread itself over the severest labours of intellect, over the creations of the architect, over the fictions of the imagination, over virtuous moral actions, and whatever else we call beautiful, no less than upon those forms of material nature, which fill us with delight.

Mind, mind alone-Bear witness, earth and heaven! "The living fountain, in itself contains

"Of beauteous and sublime!

§. 324. All objects not equally fitted to excite emotions of beauty. In view of what may be said, BEAUTY may be describe: (although not strictly susceptible of definition.) as a plea

ing emotion, excited by various objects, but which, in consequence of an early and tenacious association, is always felt by us, as if diffused over and existent in the objects, which excite it. An object, therefore, is called beautiful, when it is the cause or antecedent of the emotion of beauty. But no one can be ignorant, that not all objects cause the emotion; and of those, which'do, some have this power in a greater, and some in a less degree. This brings us to a very important inquiry. It is no unreasonable curiosity, which wishes to know, why the effect is so limited, and why all objects are not embraced in it? Why different objects cause the same emotion in different degrees? And why the same objects produce a diversity of emotions in different individuals, and even in the same individual at different times?

§. 325. A susceptibility of emotions of beauty an ultimate principle of our constitution.

In answering these questions, something must be taken for granted, there must be some starting point; otherwise all, that can be said, will be involved in inextricable confusion. That is, we must take for granted, that the mind has an original susceptibility of such emotions. Nor can we suppose, there can be any objection to a concession, which is warranted by the most general experience. We all know, that we are created with this susceptibility, beCause we are all conscious of having had those emotions, which are attributed to it. And if we are asked, How, or why it is, that the susceptibility at the bottom of these feelings exists, we can only say, that such was the will of the Being, who created the mind; and that this is one of the original or ultimate laws of our nature. (See §. §. 21, 22.)

Although the mind, therefore, is originally susceptible of emotions, as every one knows; still it is no less evident from the general arrangements we see both in physical and intellectual nature, that these emotions have their fixed causes or antecedents. We have seen, that these' causes are not limited to one class or kind; but are to be found under various circumstances; in the exercises of reason

ing, in the fanciful creations of poetry, in musical airs, in the experiments of physics, in the forms of material existence, and the like. As a general statement, these objects cannot be presented to the mind, and the mind be unmoved by it; it contemplates them, and it necessarily has a feeling of delight of a greater or less degree of strength.

In asserting, that this is correct as a general statement, it is implied, that some objects do not originally cause these emotions. And hence we are led to enter into more particular inquiries.

§. 326. Remarks on the beauty of forms.

In making that selection of those objects and qualities of objects, which we suppose to be fitted, in the original constitution of things, to cause within us pleasing emotions of themselves, independently of any extraneous aid, we cannot profess to speak with certainty. The appeal is to the general experience of men; and all we can do, is. to give, so far as it seems to have been ascertained, the results of that experience. Beginning, therefore, with material objects, we are justified by general experience in saying, that certain dispositions or forms of matter are beautiful; for instance, the CIRCLE.

We rarely look upon a winding or serpentine form, without experiencing a feeling of pleasure; and on seeing a circle, this pleasure is heightened. Hence Hogarth, in his ANALYSIS OF BEAUTY, expressly lays it down, that those lines, which have most variety in themselves, contribute most towards the production of beauty, and that the most beautiful line, by which a surface can be bounded, is the waving or serpentine, or that, which constantly, but imperceptibly, deviates from the straight line. This, which we frequently find in shells, flowers, and other pleasing natural productions, he calls the line of beauty. And was not Hogarth right in the opinion, that there is beauty in such outlines, whether they are the most beautiful or not? Refer it to any man's experience, and let him say, when he gathers on the seashore wreathed and variegated shells. or beholds through distant meadows the winding stream.

or pauses in pathless woods to gaze on the flowing features of the rose, does he not at once feel within him a spontaneous movement of delight? Is not the object, which is directly before him, in itself a source of this feeling? Although he may have a superadded pleasure from some other source, as we shall have occasion to see; still, considering the subject particularly in reference to the object before him, is not this the true philosophy? He sees, and he feels; he beholds, and he admires. It results, therefore, from the common experience of mankind, that objects, which are circular, or approach that form, or exhibit an irregular, but serpentine outline, have a degree of beauty.

For similar reasons, we may be led to suppose, that a SQUARE figure has some original beauty, or is a cause of emotions of beauty of itself, although less so than the circle. What the ground of the difference is, it is somewhat difficult to say, unless it be, that a circle, being more simple, makes a more direct and entire impression; whereas the attention is divided among the sides and angles of a square.

§. 327. Of the original beauty of colours.

We experience what may be termed an original emotion, which is pleasing, in beholding colours. We are able to allude to abundant sources in proof of this, without, however, entering into a full exposition of them.

(1) The pleasure, resulting from beholding the colour of objects merely, may be observed in very early life. Accordingly the infant soon directs its eyes towards the light, that breaks in from the window. The child rushes with extacy from flower to flower, comparing their brilliancy. He looks upward to the tree, that is most profusely loaded with blossom, or that is burdened with fruit of the deepest red and yellow. Unwearied, he pursues the butterfly, attracted by the brightness of its wings.

(2) It is found to be the same also universally among Savages. Hence they decorate their bodies by painting; they value whatever dress they may have, in proportion to

the gaudiness of its colours; they weave rich and variegated plumes into their hair. And the same feeling, which has been so often noticed in Savages, may be observed also, though in a less degree, among the uneducated classes in civilized communities. In persons of refinement, the original tendency to receive pleasing emotions from the contemplation of colours seems to have, in a measure, lost its power, in consequence of the developement of tendencies to receive pleasure from other causes.

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(3) We have another proof in persons, who have been blind from birth, but in after life have been restored by couching, or in some other way. "I have couched, (says Wardrop, speaking of James Mitchell,) one of his eyes successfully; and he is much amused with the visible world, though he mistrusts information, gained by that avenue. One day I got him a new and gaudy suit of clothes, which delighted him beyond description. It was the most interesting scene of sensual gratification I ever beheld."

But this person, it appears, had some faint notions of light and colours, previous to the operation, by which his powers of vision were more fully restored. And the facts, stated in connection with his exercise of this imperfect vision, are equally decisive in favour of the doctrine under consideration.

"At the time of life when this boy began to walk, he seemed to be attracted by bright and dazzling colours; and though every thing, connected with his history, appears to prove, that he derived little information from the organ, yet he received from it much sensual gratification. He used to hold between his eye and luminous objects such bodies, as he found to increase by their interposition the quantity of light; and it was one of his chief amusements to concentrate the sun's rays by means of pieces of glass, transparent pebbles, or similar substances, which he held between his eye and the light, and turned about in various directions. These too he would often break with

*As quoted by Stewart in his Account of Mitchell. See §. 77.