ercise of that susceptibility, by which we perceive the relations of things, sometimes called relative suggestion. Nor is this all that is necessary, as will hereafter more fully appear.

§. 354. The creations of imagination not entirely voluntary.

The opinion, that even persons of the most ready imagination can form new imaginary creations, whenever they choose, by a mere volition, however widely it may have prevailed, cannot be maintained. To will, or to exercise a volition, always implies a mental determination, a choice. In accordance with the common opinion, we will suppose, that a person wills, or chooses, to imagine an ocean of melted brass, or an immense body of liquid matter, which has that appearance. The statement itself evidently involves a contradiction. It is certainly impossible for a person to will to imagine any thing, since that precise thing, which he wills to imagine, must already be in his mind at the time of such volition. He wills, for instance, to imagine a sea of melted brass; but of what meaning or what utility is this volition, when he has already imagined the very thing, which this language seems to anticipate as future? Whatever a person wills, or rather professes to will to imagine, he has already imagined; and, consequently, there can be no such thing as entirely voluntary imaginations.

§. 355. Of imaginations not attended with desire.

The creations, which we form by means of the power of imagination are of two kinds, those attended with desire. and those which are not. It is the latter kind, which we speak of in this section.There is hardly any mind so wanting in intellectual wealth as not to find clusters of associated conceptions, groups of images often arising in itself. They seem to come upon us, as it were, unbidden; and to combine themselves in a variety of proportions, presenting new, and perhaps grotesque figures. But, although this varied presentation of floating imagery have the appearance of occupying the mind in an accidental

manner, it all arises, and is regulated by the laws of association. No image whatever occurs, which has not some connection with the state of the mind, which preceded it. In using these expressions however, we would not be understood to imply, by the connection asserted, any thing more than this, that one intellectual state, in certain given circumstances, follows another, agreeably to an original law or principle of our constitution established by its Maker. But although we truly have here instances of the exercise of imagination, it is not of that higher and effective kind, which gives birth to the creations of poetry, and painting, and the other fine arts.

§. 356. Of imaginations attended with desire.

While there are some combinations, the result of imagination, which are formed without any accompanying emotion of desire, there are some, where desire, or intention of some sort, clearly exists. It is of cases of this last mentioned kind that we are accustomed to think, when with those intellectual susceptibilities and states, to which, considered conjointly, we give the name of imagination, we associate the idea of effective power or the ability to create. It is this frame of mind, which exists in every attempt at composition in prose and verse, where the subject admits of lively images and appeals to the passions.

It may assist us in understanding this species of imagination, if we endeavour to examine the intellectual operations of one, who has sat down to write, whether the intended production be of a poetic or other kind.

A person cannot ordinarily be supposed to sit down to write on any occasion whatever, without having some general idea of the subject to be written upon already in the mind. He, accordingly, commences the task before him with the expectation and the desire of developing the subject more or less fully, of giving to it not only a greater continuity and a better arrangement, but an increased interest in every respect. And it may be the case, that many circumstances, indirectly relative to the effort of composition, such as the anticipated approbation or disappro

bation of the public, have an affect greatly to fix and increase the emotion of interest or desire. The feeling of desire, when compared with some other emotions, is found to possess a superiour degree of permanency. And as, in the instance which we are now considering, the desire or feeling of interest is intimately connected with the general conception of the subject before the mind, the effect of this connection is a communication of the permanency, originally belonging solely to the desire, to the general idea or outlines of the subject, which the writer is to treat

of.

The conception, therefore, of those outlines loses in this way the fleeting and ever-varying nature of other conceptions, and becomes fixed. The lineaments of the anticipated treatise remain in their length, breadth, and proportions, permanently held up to the writer's view.

Spontaneous conceptions continue, in the mean while, to arise in the mind, on the common principles of associa tion; but as the general outline of the subject remains fixed, they all have a greater or less relation to it. And partaking in some measure of the permanency of the cutline, to which they have relation, the writer has an opportunity to approve some and to reject others, according as they impress him as being suitable or unsuitable to the nature of the subject. Those, which affect him with emotions of pleasure, on account of their perceived fitness for the subject, are retained and committed to writing, while others, which do not thus affect and interest him, soon fade away altogether.

Whoever carefully notices the operations of his own mind, when he makes an effort at composition, will probably be well satisfied, that this account of the intellectual process is very near the truth.

It will be recollected, therefore, that the exercise of imagination in the composition of any theme, which admits of it, is not the exertion of merely a single intellec tual ability. It is the developement of various feelings and susceptibilities; of desire, of the principle of simple suggestion or association, and of judgment or relative sug gestions, in consequence of which a feeling of relative fit

ness or unfitness arises, on the contemplation of the conceptions, which have spontaneously presented themselves.

§. 357 Further illustrations of the same subject.

We first think of some subject. With the original thought or design of the subject, there is a co-existent desire to investigate it, to adorn it, to present it to the examination of others. The effect of this desire is to keep the general subject in mind; and, as the natural consequence of the power of association, various conceptions arise, in some way or other related to the general subject. Of some of these conceptions we approve in consequence of their perceived fitness to the end in view, while we reject others on account of the absence of this requisite quality of agreeableness or fitness.

For the sake of convenience and brevity we give the name of IMAGINATION to this complex state or series of states of the mind. It is important to possess a single term, expressive of the complex intellectual process; otherwise, as we so frequently have occasion to refer to it in common conversation, we should be subjected, if not properly to a circumlocution, at least to an unnecessary multiplication of words. But while we find it so much for our convenience to make use of this term, we should be eareful and not impose upon ourselves, by ever remembering, that it is the name, nevertheless, not of an original and independent faculty, which of itself accomplishes all, that has been mentioned, but of a complex state or of a series of states of the mind. A single further remark may be added in illustration of the process of the mind in literary composition. It has been seen, to how great a degree efforts of this kind depend on the laws of association. When, therefore, a person has sat down to write, it may be expected, that he has furnished himself with pen and paper, and that he has books around him. The presence of these and other things, subordinate to the writer's genral undertaking, constantly reminds him, by the operaion of the same laws, of the subject before him, and re

cals his attention, if he discover any disposition to wan der from it.

§. 358. Remarks from the writings of Dr. Reid.

Dr. Reid (ESSAY IV. ch. 4.) gives the following graphical statement of the selection, which is made by the writer from the variety of his constantly arising and departing conceptions.

"We seem to treat the thoughts, that present themselves to the fancy in crowds, as a great man treats those [courtiers] that attend his levee. They are all ambitious of his attention. He goes round the circle, bestowing a bow upon one, a smile upon another; asks a short question of a third, while a fourth is honoured with a particular conference; and the greater part have no particular mark of attention, but go as they came. It is true, he can give no mark of his attention to those, who were not there; but he has a sufficient number for making a choice and distinction."

§. 359. Grounds of the preference of one conception to another.

A question after all arises, on what principle is the mind enabled to ascertain that congruity, or incongruity, fitness or unfitness, agreeably to which it makes the selection from its various conceptions. The fact is admitted. that the intellectual principle is successively in a series of different states, or, in other words, that there are successive conceptions or images, but the inquiry still remains, why is one image in the group thought or known to be more worthy than any other image, or why are any two images combined together in preference to any two others The answer is, it is owing to no secondary law, but to an instantaneous and original feeling of approbation or disapprobation. Those conceptions, which, according to this original power of approving or disapproving, are found to be suitable to the general outlines of the subject, arr detained. Those images, which are perceived to posses a peculiar congruity and fitness for each other, are united together, forming new and more beautiful compounds