of the reasoning power, but which are, nevertheless, its great supports and auxiliaries, we seem to act not unsuitably to the relation we sustain to Him, and to the humility of all true wisdom.

NOTE. The following are some of the works, which have treated more or less largely of the topics, which have been embraced in this chapter. The views, which they present, are not always consistent with each other and are sometimes very diverse, but are in general worthy of being consulted by those, who have leisure to examine what has been said by different writers.

Malebranche's Search after Truth, (Recherche de la Verite,) BK. I. Brucker's History of Philosophy, (Historia critica philosophia,) ART. Pyrrhonic Sect. Claude Buffier's First Truths, (Premieres Verites,) PT. I. Oswald's Appeal to Common Sense. Beattie's Essay on Truth. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Priestleys Examination of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald. Bishop Butler's Dissertation on Personal Identity. Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. VOL. II. CHAP. I., &c.Of the above works, Buffier's First Truths, of which a translation into English was published at London in 1780, is particularly worthy of the student's attention.

CHAPTER THIRD.

ORIGINAL STATE OF THE MIND.

§. 23. Of the thoughts of the soul in distinction from the soul itself.

AMONG other opinions of Des Cartes was this, that the soul always thinks; and he even hazarded the further assertion, that its very essence consists in the exercise of thinking; but says Father Buffier very justly, "it does not appear, that he had any invincible testimony of the matter." We consider it enough to say, that the soul exists; we suppose that no one seriously doubts it, or can doubt it; although it cannot be too often repeated, that we are absolutely ignorant of its essence. If it be asked then, What do we know in respect to the soul? The answer is, We know its existence; and further we know its modifications; that is, its acts, states, or ideas, together with the laws, which regulate them.

It is, therefore, deemed sufficient to say, that the soul makes itself known by means of thought, without asserting or believing, that thought is all that is meant, when we use the term, soul, or mind. And we not only contend, that there is a distinction between the soul and thought, but further suppose, that the distinct existence of the soul is always implied and taken for granted in the mere use of the term, thought, as its meaning is commonly understood. And this appears for these brief reasons. It is a conclusion of common sense, the dictate of the universal mind of man, that every action supposes an agent, and every quality supposes a subject, and every modification suppo

ses something which is modified. Now, whether thought be considered an action, or a quality, or a modification, the very language itself involves, that there is a really existent something, of which such act, quality, or modification can be predicated. And as will again be noticed in a future chapter, the modifications or acts, by which the thinking principle makes itself known, sustain the same relation to the mind or soul, which the properties and qualities of material bodies sustain to matter. This statement agrees precisely with many expressions, which are in common use, such as the soul has ideas, the soul thinks, the soul possesses or acquires knowledge, &c.

§. 24. Of original or innate knowledge.

It appearing that a distinction may be rightfully drawn between what may be termed the subjective existence of the mind and its mere modifications or thoughts, (although we know not what that subjective existence is,) we are thence led to inquire; When the mind first begins to think? or what is nearly the same question, What is the original state of the mind in respect to knowledge?—In reply it is particularly to be remarked, that our knowledge, originates in the senses; that is, by means of the senses or in connection with them. The evidence of this will hereafter more fully appear, although the knowledge, which thus arises, is subsequently the occasion of other knowledge, of which the mind itself is truly and exclusively the source. Believing, therefore, that the mind is capable of existing independently of the senses, and also that it puts forth its very first acts in connection with the senses, we infer, that it is originally destitute of knowledge, or at least relatively to that complex being, which we call ourselves. If it be objected, that we are unable to form a conception of the mind existing without thought, (even admitting it to be possible and even probable,) we still resort to the great fact in our mental history, which various circumstances combine clearly to establish, that no thought is ever developed in that complex being, which we call by the general name of man or ourselves, prior to the mediation and aid

of the senses. As far, therefore, as this point is of any consequence to men, or is ever likely to be satisfactorily inquired into, we hold to the above inference, and agree with Mr. Locke, that the primitive condition of the human intellect may be compared, in a certain sense, to a piece of white paper, and that it may truly be considered as originally without knowledge.

§. 25. Opinions on this subject before the time of Locke.

The publication of Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding has justly been considered as fixing an era in the science of Intellectual Philosophy. Before the publication of this work, which was in the year 1690, the doctrine of innate or connatural ideas was widely prevalent. By the phrase, innate, or, to use an expression less ambiguous, connatural ideas, is to be understood certain ideas and propositions, which were held to be wrought into their intellectual nature, and to be born with all mankind. It was maintained, that they were limited to no one class, neither to the rich nor the poor, neither to the learned nor the ignorant, to no clime and to no country, but all participated in them alike. These propositions and ideas, being coetaneous with the existence of the soul, and being there established at the commencement of its existence by the ordinance of the Deity, were regarded as the first principles of knowledge, and as the rules, by which men were to be guided in all their reasonings about natural and moral subjects. From these innate and original propositions the following may be selected as specimens of the whole;

§. 26. Enumeration of innate or connatural principles.

(1) Of the natural kind,

Viz., The whole is greater than a part; Whatsoever is, is; It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time and in the same sense.

(2) Of the moral kind,

Viz., Parents must be honoured; Injury must not be done; Contracts should be fulfilled, &c.

(3) Of the religious kind,

Viz., There is a God; God is to be worshipped; God will approve virtue and punish vice.

If these propositions are innate or connatural with the mind, then the ideas of which they are composed, must be innate; so that, whatever the number of propositions, there will be a yet greater number of innate ideas.

The doctrine of the existence of such innate ideas and propositions was supported by Des Cartes and Malebranche, names of such celebrity as to give at least a temporary currency to almost any opinion. The principal argument in support of this doctrine seems to have been this;

§. 27. Argument on the subject of innate knowledge. All mankind universally exhibit an acquaintance with, and give their assent to ideas and propositions of this description; hence they are innate.

This argument is considered inconclusive, because the statement, which is made in it, is justly maintained to be untrue. It is undoubtedly the fact, that a part of the human race remain ignorant through life of the greater number, if not all of the propositions in question. The history of Savage tribes teaches us this.

But admitting that all men are acquainted with them and assent to them, this by no means proves them innate, so long as we can account for this acquaintance and this assent in some other way. It is admitted by all, that the mind exists, and that it possesses the power or the ability to acquire knowledge. If, therefore, in the exercise of this ability, which all admit it to have, we can come to the knowledge of what are called innate or connatural ideas and propositions, it is quite unphilosophical to assign to them another origin, in support of which no positive proof can be brought.

Further; if the doctrine of innate knowledge be admitted, ideas and propositions of this kind may be multiplied to any extent; every one will imagine himself at liberty to add to the number; they will unnecessarily be brought forward on a variety of occasions, and a most per