pained. The most stupid peasant lingers to behold the clouds, that brighten in the setting sun; and at his rude. fireside listens with pleasure to old tales and ballads. As no man is without feeling, we all begin after a time to ascribe certain characteristics to objects, answering to We set those emotions, which have been excited in us. down some as pleasing, others as displeasing; some as beautiful, others as deformed; and others as possessing the marks of grandeur and sublimity. That is, we form a judgment of objects, founded on the emotions, which we experience. We do not ordinarily speak of the works of nature as objects of taste; they excite in us emotions of various kinds; but in general we employ the term TASTE, in reference to the fine arts.- -A man may be said to have a taste in the arts, who, from a careful study of the emotions, that have been excited in himself or others on various occasions, can tell, with a considerable degree of accuracy, what works will be found generally pleasing, or the opposite. This implies, that he will readily seize upon the great characteristics of the work, whatever it is, of which he judges; and being able to point out its prominent excellencies and defects, he can be expected to give the general character of the painter, poet, sculptor, &c. on whose production he may happen to be remarking. ers, Thus a man of taste in painting gives us the following idea of the character of Rubens. His figures, as we learn from him, were not always drawn with so much care and with such studied correctness, as those of some other paintHis superiority lies not in an attitude or any peculiar expression, but in the general effect, in the genius, which pervades and illuminates the whole. The works of some other painters are the effect of great labour and pains; and, with very few defects, are after all spiritless and insipid; but those of Rubens seem to have come from his hand with ease and freedom, and are full of spirit. The brilliancy of his colours, and their lively opposition to each other, the flowing freedom of his outline and the animation of his pencil keep alive the attention of the spectator, and make him feel a degree of that enthusiasm, with which the painter himself was carried away.This was Sir J. Reynold's opinion of Rubens. §. 369. Characteristics &c. of a good taste. In connection with the illustrations above given, we may lay down two characteristics of a good taste. The first is CORRECTNESS. The province of correctness of taste is the detection of blemishes. The taste, that has this quality, does not mistake deformities for beauty, and is not likely to be imposed upon by counterfeits, however well executed.-A second characteristic is DELICACY. A person of delicacy of taste notices those more refined beauties, which are perceived only by cultivated minds. It marks the latent, as well as the more obvious excellencies. It is worthy of notice, that the judgments, which a person of taste passes upon works of art, are rapid; he often forms an opinion of them instantaneously. When it is remembered, that taste is not a distinct faculty, but a power, which is acquired, this circumstance deserves some notice. It is explained, however, in the definition, which has been given, viz. Taste is the HABIT of judging correctly, &c. The influence of practice, in giving quickness to our mental operations, was considered in the chapter on Intellectual Habits. The skilful accountant can tell, by a mere glance of the eye, the sum of a long column of figures. The practised military engineer estimates with almost intuitive readiness the fitness or unfitness of a spot of ground for encampments and fortifications. It is the same in the decisions of TASTE. The person, who has this quality in a good degree, is impressed with the excellencies and defects of a production in the arts at once. That is, he takes into view the various circumstances, which go to constitute its beauty or deformity with such quickness, that it appears to be a single perception. CHAPTER THIRTY FIRST. OF WIT AND HUMOUR. E §. 370. Emotions of the ludicrous. We shall not be in a way to give a correct idea of wir and HUMOUR, without briefly examining another class of our feelings, viz. emotions of the ludicrous. It is difficult to give a precise definition of this feeling, although, when we analyze it, we find it to be complex, embracing an emotion of surprize, also of quick and playful delight. But the pleasing part of the emotion receives a peculiar modification, and one, which cannot be fully conveyed in words, in consequence of our perception of some incongruity in the person or thing, which is the cause of it. §. 371. Occasions of emotions of the ludicrous. But what are the true occasions of emotions of the ludicrous? In answer, we say, that this feeling is never experienced, except when we notice something, either in thoughts, or in outward objects and actions, which is unexpected and uncommon. That is to say, whenever this emotion is felt, there is always an unexpected discovery by us of some new relations.But then it must be observed, that the feeling in question does not necessarily exist in consequence of the discovery of such relations merely. Something more is necessary, as may be very readily seen. Thus, we are sometimes, in the physical sciences, presented with unexpected and novel combinations of the properties and qualities of bodies. But whenever we dis cover in those sciences relations in objects, which were not only unknown, but unsuspected, we find no emotion of ludicrousness, although we are very pleasantly surprized. Again, similes, metaphors, and other like figures of speech imply in general some new and unexpected relations of ideas. It is this trait in them, which gives them their chief force. But when employed in serious compositions, they are of a character far from being ludicrous. Hence we infer, that emotions of ludicrousness do not exist on the discovery of new and unexpected relations, unless there is at the same time a perception, or supposed perception of some incongruity or unsuitableness. Such perception of unsuitableness may be expected to give to the whole emotion a new and specific character, which every one is acquainted with from his own experience, but which, as before intimated, it is difficult to express in words. §. 372. Of Hobbes' account of the ludicrous. There has not been an entire uniformity on the subject of emotions of the ludicrous. It would seem, that Hobbes (HUMAN NATURE, CHAP. IX.) considered feelings of this kind, as depending on a modification of mere pride in a comparison of ourselves with others to our own advantage. He says of laughter, which, when considered in reference to the mind and independently of the mere muscular action, is nothing more than a feeling of the ludicrous, that it is "a sudden glory, arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly."-To this notion of the origin of this class of our feelings, there are some objections; viz.(1) In many instances we have the feeling in question, when there is evidently no discovery of any infirmity, either in the witty person, or in the subject of his wit, over which we can ourselves triumph with any good reason.(2) Further, if the doctrine, which resolves the emotions of ludicrousness into a proud compar ison of ourselves with others, were correct, it would follow, that the most proud and self-conceited men would be most inclined to mirth and sociability, which we do not find to be the fact.According to Hobbes' notion of the origin of these feelings, we have only to go into the company of the most ignorant and stupid, if we wish to be exceedingly merry. In such company we could not fail to be sensible of some eminency in ourselves, in comparison with the infirmities of others. We should here be in a situation, corresponding to his definition of laughter, but there can be no doubt, that multitudes would be but very little inclined to indulge that feeling in the midst of such associates. But while we cannot receive this writer's account of the feeling in question, we may undoubtedly be well agreed in respect to it, as far as this;--There is an emotion of surprize, combined with a quick and playful delight of a peculiar kind, and this emotion arises on the discovery of unexpected relations of ideas, and the perception or apparent perception of some incongruity. §. 373. What is to be understood by wit. We apprehend, that an emotion of the ludicrous is always, in a greater or less degree, experienced in all instances of WIT, as the term is generally understood at the present time. We are, therefore, led to this definition of it; WIT consists in suddenly presenting to the mind an assemblage of related ideas of such a sort as to occasion feelings of the ludicrous.--This is done in a variety of ways; and among others in the two following. §. 374. Of wit as it consists in burlesque or in debasing objects. The first method, which wit employs in exciting the feeling of the ludicrous, is, by debasing those things, which are pompous; that is, those things which have an appearance of greater weight and gravity, than they are truly entitled to. Descriptions of this sort are termed burlesque. An attempt to lesson what is truly and confessedly serious and important, has in general an unpleasant effect, very different from that, which is caused by true wit. In the practice of burlesque, as on all other occasions of wit, there is a sudden and uncommon assemblage of re |