and forms of speech, than in the constitution and exercises of the mind. Accordingly the difference between the two seems to be this; When the desirable thing is so placed within our reach and under such circumstances as to render our preference operative, we use the verb TO WILL; but when this is not the case, whether owing to the nature of the object itself or to the counteracting influence of other objects, we commonly use the verb TO DESIRɛ.

Hence it comports with the use of the language to say, we will to walk, but we desire to fly; we will to build a house, but we desire to create a world; we will to sail from Calais to London, but we desire to sail from Calais to the peak of Chimborazo, or to the mountains in the moon.

Agreeably to these views, the volition and the desire can never be directly opposed to each other; although they may be virtually co-existent, and, therefore, may be relatively opposed. A great number of attainable objects, which are successively, or perhaps simultaneously, contemplated by the mind, may all appear desirable; but volition can exist only in respect to one of them. There çan can be only one desire under these circumstances, which can be regarded as the greatest, strongest, or efficient desire; and this, the use of the language authorizes us to designate, as the volition.

When, therefore, it is said, that a man has a desire to build a house, but wills, or has a volition not to, it is to be explained in this way. There is in this case a co-existence, either actually or virtually, of desires or preferences. These desires, possessing relative degrees of strength, undoubtedly counteract or oppose each other; but it is a relative, and not a direct opposition. Unquestionably the building of the house is a desirable object; but the money, which is to be drawn out of his coffers to do it, is an object still dearer. He desires the one, but has still stronger desires for the other. Now as we call the prevailing desire, in respect to things within our reach, volition; it may be truly said, he desires a house, but wills not to have one; that is, in the conflict of desires, one is stronger than another.

§. 394. Nature and kinds of motives.

As volition is found to exist only in certain circumstances, it may, therefore, be considered an effect, and, consequently, must have a cause, which gives rise to it; using the term, cause, in the sense heretofore explained, viz. as implying merely a regular and constant antecedence. The causes of volition are motives; so that a motive may be defined to be any thing, which moves or excites the mind in putting forth volition. Without motives, that is, without some ground or reason of our choice, volition would never be exercised, and, consequently, there would never be voluntary action, since a voluntary action implies, and is preceded by volition.

Motives, in reference to their tendency to cause volition are spoken of, as either weak or strong. That motive, which has a less degree of previous tendency to move the will, or, what is the same thing, appears the less inviting, as it is presented to the view of the mind, is called the weaker motive. On the contrary, that motive, which appears to the mind the most inviting, and, therefore, has the greater tendency to move the will, is the stronger motive.

The strength of a motive is found to vary in two ways or from two causes. (1)—It will be found to vary, first, not only with the particular object, which is before the mind, but also with changes in its attendant circumstances. Many things, which once appeared eminently desirable, and strongly influenced our volitions, appear less desirable, and have less power over us, in consequence of being accidentally associated with other things. In other instances, the effect is directly the reverse, and the motive becomes stronger from the same cause. -(2) Things, that are placed before the view of the mind, have their tendency to move the will increased or diminished according to the nature and circumstances of the mind, which views them. The mind does not always continue the same, any more than the shifting scenes of the material world around it. It is continually calling into exercise susceptibilities, which had hitherto lain dormant; giving them new degrees

of strength or novelties of combination. Consequently the same thing will appear differently to different individuals, and also to the same individual at different times.

§. 395. Motives considered in reference to their origin. MOTIVES, in reference to their origin, may be divided into two classes, INTERNAL, and EXTERNAL.- -By the INTERNAL, we mean those, which are connected with our physical organization, such as hunger, thirst, and bodily pains and enjoyments; and also our passions or affections, whether good or evil. Accordingly in all languages, people speak of being impelled, of being moved, or excited to action in these ways.- By the EXTERNAL, we mean such as can be traced to external causes, and exist in something without us. All external objects, which please or disgust us, operate upon us as motives. It is true, they influence the will through the medium of the emotions and passions; but as the influence exercised may be traced to them, as the ultimate subjects of it, they may properly be termed the motive. As all external objects, which are not utterly indifferent, affect the will more or less, it is useless to attempt an enumeration of the motives from this source. In what way it happens, that certain appetites and passions, or that certain external objects, which appear to us pleasing and desirable, affect the will, and cause volition, cannot be explained. Nor can we give an explanation of any other instance of cause and effect; but of the truth of the fact, that the will is influenced by means of them, there is no room to doubt.

§. 396. Of the general nature of human liberty.

Volitions are always determined by the strongest motives. In other words, the WILL always is, as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable. To say otherwise would imply the direct contradiction, that the mind chooses, what it does not choose, and likes what it dislikes. Our voluntary actions correspond to our volitions; that is, the action will be as the volition is; and yet men under the circumstances stated, having their volitions.

in perfect correspondence with the motive, and the action agreeing with the volition, are justly said to act freely, or with liberty. But moral liberty, we apprehend, is not rightly considered a quality or property of man, analogous to his other mental and physical qualities, but a privilege.

If this be a correct notion, LIBERTY, in its full extent, is the privilege of acting according to our wishes, without being subject to any restraint. This definition coincides very nearly with the concise explanation of it by the unlearned, who commonly say, that liberty consists in choosing and doing, as one pleases. It will, indeed, be said, that there is an indissoluble relation between the volition and the motive. This is true. But the circum

stance, that nothing can have the character of a motive independently of our feelings, and that the efficient or strongest motive is never at variance with them, takes away from this fixed and inflexible relation the attribute of constraint.

§ 397. Human liberty of two kinds. Liberty of the will. Liberty, then, may be predicated of man in two respects, viz., liberty of WILL, and liberty of EXTERNAL ACTION.

As to the will, it may be said, that it always has liberty, is always free, using the terms in accordance with the above definition. When a person, looking upon a number of objects, makes choice of one in preference to another, he does it agreeably to his wish or inclination, and has the highest possible liberty; we can conceive of no greater. As, therefore, there is an inseparable connection between the volition, and the preference or the strongest inclination of the heart, (the latter always being implied in the former,) it is safe to assert, that there is no constraint on the volition, and that the will is always free. In support of the fact, that the volition, whatever its relation to the motive, is in the same direction with the preponderance of inclination, an appeal may be made to the common experience of men; and it can hardly be doubted, that on examination every one will find it confirmed by what takes place in himself. If they do not find this

to be the case, they will find, that the will is not always conformed to the strongest motive, which will lead to plain contradictions, if the terms are used in the sense here attached to them.

§ 398. Of the liberty which is external. There is also liberty of external actions. But while we say, that there is liberty in this respect, it cannot be denied, that it is subject to contingencies, which do not exist in relation to the freedom of volitions. In other words, the freedom of external actions is sometimes from various causes interrupted. For instance, a person has a desire to go to a certain place; he exercises volition or wills to go to that place; and the means, by which his determination is to be effected, is the motion of his feet. If there be nothing to prevent this motion, then his actions are free, as well as his will; but if he be bound or shackled, then there is a constraint, a deprivation of freedom in respect to the action. And it is the same in all analogous cases. There may be a freedom in the volition, while there is a constraint and hinderance in the performance; so that necessity can be predicated of external actions, but no necessity analogous to that, which is predicated of actions, can be predicated of the mental resolve. But in all outward actions, where necessity truly exists, men are not accountable. The responsibility rests with that extraneous force, whatever its origin, which makes the action contrary to the intention. The action does not properly belong

NOTE. The view of liberty above given seems to coincide essentially with that of M. Destutt-Tracy. He has the following remarks; Je dis que l'ideé de liberte nait de faculté de vouloir; car, avec Locke, j'entends par liberté la puissance d'executer sa volonté, d'agir conformement a son desir; et je soutiens qu'il est impossible d'attacher und ideé nette a ce mot, quand on veut lui donner un autre sens." (Elemens d' Ideologie, part 4, et 5, p. 99, 2d. ed.)