gers, which threatened them; while celebrating the rights of man, they violated the plainest principles of justice; by arbitrary, capricious, and cruel acts they made even despotism itself desirable; and in the end, after great sacrifices and efforts, effectually defeated their own object.

It should be added, however, that the evils of enthusiasm are in general felt, only when it is excessive. A moderate share at least seems to be necessary, in overcoming the difficulties of all great undertakings.

§. 478. Prejudices of superstition.

SUPERSTITION, as the term is commonly employed, implies an excessive susceptibility of belief, arising from, or superinduced by fear. We do not often speak of a person as superstitious, unless we observe in him these two characteristics, excessive timidity on some subjects, combined with too great readiness of faith in respect to the same. The term, therefore, may be applied to the idolatrous worship of the heathen; to many of the mythological and other traditions of nations; to the belief in witchcraft and magic; to a regard for omens, whether of a political, religious, or domestic significancy; to an inordinate attachment to mere forms and ceremonies of whatever kind; to any object or subject whatever, where fears may be enlisted, and where belief follows chiefly in consequence of

such fears.

The prejudices or erroneous opinions from this source have been exceedingly numerous. It is superstition, which, much to the disturbance of men's happiness and to the hindrance of the progress of the truth, has peopled the world with fairies and satyrs, with hypogriffs and dragons, with witches and centaurs, with the host of mythological deities, with marvellous sights in the sky, and with unknown sounds and voices on earth. There is no end to the catalogue of what may be seen, and heard, and believed by men under its influence.--In the consulship of Posthumius Albus and Furius Fusus, "the sky, (says the historian, Livy,) appeared as on fire in many places, and other portents either occurred to people's sight, or were

formed by terrour in their imaginations." (Bk. 111. §. 5.)

"Before sun-setting, (says Josephus,) chariots and troops of soldiers in their armour were seen running about among the clouds, and surrounding of cities. Moreover, at that feast, which we call Pentecost, as the priests were going by night into the inner Court of the Temple, as the custom was, to perform their sacred ministrations, they said, that, in the first place, they felt a quaking, and heard a noise, and after that they heard a sound as of a great multitude, saying, Let us remove hence." (Jewish War, Bk. vi.)

§. 479. The prejudices of superstition contagious.

Of all the sources of prejudices, which exist in the mind, superstition seems to be the most contagious. When once fairly started, it rapidly goes from house to house, from village to village; and sometimes infects whole provinces. This was remarkably the case in the witchcraft delusions, which prevailed in New England about the year 1690. The muscular convulsions, by means of which there were such bodily contortions and extraordinary involuntary feats, were probably propagated from one to another by Sympathetic Imitation, as has been the case at other times. (See CHAP. XXXII.) But the ascription of these convulsions to the direct agency of the prince of evil spirits was a superstitious notion of that period. This erroneous opinion rapidly spread through the community, and thus without doubt contributed to the continuance of the evils, the origin of which it professed to account for.

All history affords instances, where this rapidity of mental infection has been experienced. When the superstition is thus extensive, there is a constant reciprocal action and reaction of the minds contaminated with it; and the evil, both in itself and in its results, is in this way greatly increased.

In the year 1812, the freedom of the whole state of Venezuela in South America came near being lost by the contagious influence of the prejudices arising from this In the early part of that year a most violent earth

cause.

quake was experienced, which was attended with very considerable injury to many large towns, and with the destruction of nearly twenty thousand persons. As this calamity happened on the day and hour of a great religious festival, it was interpreted by those, who were not favourably disposed towards the existing order of things, into a divine judgment, a manifestation of the displeasure of the Almighty at the wickedness of the people in attempting to secure their liberty. This idea was readily seized by the mass of the inhabitants, who were at that time ignorant and credulous. They joined in great numbers the Spanish army, that was acting against the republic; the patriots became discouraged; and after being defeated in a number of battles, Venezuela was again brought under its ancient masters. This disastrous result was owing to the prejudices of superstition.

§. 480 Of superstition in times of distress and danger.

The fact above-mentioned leads us to observe, that in all times of distress and danger the creations of a superstitious mind are greatly multiplied. Fear is one of the appropriate elements of such a mind; and when difficulties and dangers thicken around it, nothing can surpass the degree of its excitement. Under the influence of the excitement of such dark periods, it notices many things, which at other times would not have attracted attention. A violent thunderstorm, which in times of tranquillity and peace, would have been unnoticed, has an ominous significancy in periods of revolutions and wars. The flight of birds, the blowing of the winds, the rise and fall of the tides, the motion of the clouds, the darting of meteors, any of the commonest natural appearances arrest and fill with astonishment the minds of the superstitious at such seasons.

§. 481. Prejudices of personal friendships and dislikes,

If man were to choose a state of apathy and indifference, he would be unable to obtain it, at least permanently; it would be refused to him by the very elements, the original laws of his nature. He is destined not only to

act, but to feel; and his feelings in respect to others will vary, according as he has been more or less in their company, as he has received from them greater or less favours or injuries. Hence he has his sympathies and his dislikes, his favourable and unfavourable sentiments, his friends and his opposerɛ. And here we have another source of prej

udices. It is so well understood as to have become a common saying, that it is a difficult matter to judge, with perfect impartiality, either of friends or foes. A question arises, we will suppose, concerning the merit or demerit, the right or wrong in the conduct of a friend; of one, in whose favour our sympathies are strongly enlisted. In the deliberation upon the facts before us, which we attempt to hold, the mind is continually interrupted by the remembrance of those kind acts and excellent qualities, which have laid the foundation of our favourable partialities. They come before the eye of the judgment; we attempt to remove them, and they return again; they interrupt and cloud the clearness of its perceptions. And, hence, our judgments prove to be wrong.

We experience the same difficulty in forming a just estimate of the character and conduct of those, for whom we entertain a personal dislike.There is a continual suggestion of acts and of qualities, which are the foundations of that dislike. The effect of this is partly to divert the mind from the question properly before it, and partly to diffuse over it a misrepresentation, which has its origin solely in our own feelings of antipathy. Our dislike interposes itself, as in the other case, between the thing to be judged of, and the susceptibility of judging, and renders the mind unable to perceive so clearly the true merits of the question, as it otherwise would.

And here it may be further remarked, in connection with these views, that sympathy for sorrow, that the feeling of compassion for persons in distress has a tendency to perplex the judgment. It is true, that the perplexity and errour of judgment in such cases is an amiable prejudice, but it is not less a prejudice. How often people undertake the defence and justification of those, who are unfor

tunate and distressed, merely from feelings of sympathy! Afterwards when their cooler reason is permitted to decide, they learn to their mortification, that the subjects of those chivalrous feelings and partial judgments were altogether unworthy of such unreflecting kindness.

§. 482. Prejudices of custom or fashion.

The practices of different nations, and the prevailing notions in respect to them, differ from each other; nor are those of the same nation the same at different periods.--The modes of salutation in France are different from those of Russia; and those of both nations are different from the forms, which are commonly received in Oriental countries. There is no less diversity among nations in the fashions of dress, than in the methods of civility, and of polite intercourse. The dress of a Turk or of a Chinese would make but an ill figure on an Englishman; and the Englishman himself would reject with contempt the obsolete and neglected fashions of his own ancestors. The authority of fashion extends also to political and religious ceremonies, to the regulation and management of domestic affairs, and to methods of education. No two nations are alike in all these respects; and hardly one age, or one year agrees with another.

We find in the authority of fashion or custom a fruitful source of limited and erroneous judgments. Each nation passes its censure on the customs, that prevail abroad, but are not adopted at home; each age ridicules the practices of a preceding age,that have since become obsolete. We have great reason for considering these limited and premature judgments prejudices. We see no grounds, why one nation, especially where there is nearly an equal degree of mental improvement, should set itself up as an infallible judge of propriety and impropriety in the customs and ceremonies of another nation.But the fallacy consists not merely in ignorantly censuring others. The great body of people are found to be not more unanimous in censuring the opinions and fashions of other ages