fumes to me, and excited in me a kind of additional selflove."

"Agitated by all these different sensations, and impelled by the various pleasures of my new existence, I instantly arose, and in arising perceived myself moved along, as by if by some unknown, some hidden power."

66

Hardly had I advanced one step, when the novelty of my situation rendered me, as it were, immoveable. My surprise returned; for I supposed that all the objects around me were in motion; to them I ascribed that agitation, which I had myself produced by changing place; and the whole creation seemed once more to be in disorder."

"I carried my hand to my head; I touched my forehead; I felt my whole frame. Then it was that I first conceived my hand to be the principal organ of my existence. All its informations were so distinct, so perfect, and so superior to what I had experienced from the other senses, that I employed myself for some time in repeating its enjoyments. Every part of my body, which I touched with my hand, seemed to touch my hand in turn, and actually gave back sensation for sensation."

"It was not long before I perceived that this faculty was expanded over my whole frame and before I began to discover the limits of my existence, which, at first, I had supposed of an immense extent, and diffused over all the objects I saw."

"Upon casting my eyes upon my body, and surveying my own form I conceived it to be of a size șo enormous, that all the objects, which had hitherto struck my eyes, seemed to be, in comparison, as so many luminous particles. I gazed upon my person with pleasure. I examined the formation of my hand, and all its motions; and the former appeared to me more or less large, in proportion as it was more or less distant from my eyes. On bringing it very near, it concealed, I found, almost every other object from my sight.”

"I began soon, however, to suspect that there was some fallacy in the sensation I experienced from the eye; and I therefore resolved to depend, for information, upon the

touch, which as yet had never deceived me. This precaution was highly serviceable. I renewed my motions, and walked forward with my face turned towards the heavens. Happening to strike lightly against a palm tree, I was dismayed, and laid my hand, though not without fear, upon this extraneous body; for extraneous I conceived it to be, as it did not return sensation for sensation, as my former feelings had done. Now it was that, for the first time, I perceived there was something external, something which did not form an actual part of my own existence."

"From this new discovery I concluded, that I ought to form my opinion with respect to external objects, in the same manner as I had done with respect to the parts of my body. I resolved, therefore, to feel whatever I saw ; and, vainly attempting to touch the sun, I stretched forth my arms, and found nothing but an airy vacuum. At every effort I made, as each object appeared to me equally near, from one fit of surprise I fell into another; nor was it till after an infinite number of trials, that I was enabled to use the eye as a guide to the hand, and that I perceived there were some objects more remote from me than others."

"Amazed and mortified at the uncertainty of my state, and at the endless delusions to which I seemed to be subjected, the more I reflected, the more I was perplexed. Fatigued and oppressed with thought, I seated myself beneath a tree, loaded with delicious fruit within my reach. On stretching forth my arm, the fruit instantly separated from the branches, and I seized it. To grasp in my hand an entire substance, which formed no part of myself, pleased me. When I held it up, its weight, though in itself trivial, seemed, however, like an animated impulse, to incline it to the earth. In conquering this resistance I found another, and a greater pleasure."

"I held the fruit near my eye, and I considered its form, and its colours. Its fragrance prompted me to carry it nearer and nearer, and with eagerness did I inhale that fragrance. The perfume invited my sense of tasting, which I found to be superior to that of smelling. What

savour, what novelty of sensation, did I now experience. Nothing could be more exquisite. What before had been pleasure, was now heightened into luxury. The power of tasting gave me the idea of possession. I imagined that the substance of this fruit had become a part of my own substance, and that I was impowered to transform things without me at will."

"Charmed with the idea of this new power, and incited by the sensations, I had already experienced, I continued to pluck the fruit; nor did I think any labour too great for the satisfaction of my taste. At length, however, an agreeable languor stealing upon my senses, my limbs became heavy, and my soul seemed to lose its activity. My sensations, no longer vivid and distinct, presented to me only feeble and irregular images. In the instant, as it were, my eyes became useless, closed; and my head, no longer borne up by the strength of the muscles, sunk back, and found a support upon the verdant turf beneath me."

§. 56. Of the senses considered as the foundation of belief

and knowledge.

It has already been remarked, that the senses are one source of belief and knowledge. This is allowedly one of those primary truths, which we continually receive as the necessary conditions of opinion, reasoning, and action. The conduct of men, as we daily and constantly behold it, warrants the reception of it as such. We are, therefore, led to observe in connection with the views hitherto presented in this chapter, that the contrary opinion, which has been maintained by a few persons, is founded on an errour, which can now be easily understood and illustrated. The errour, to which we alllude, is this; A MISTAKEN OPINION AS TO the APPROPRIATE FUNCTIONS OF EACH OF

THE SENSES.

Look at each of the senses separately, and see the truth of this remark. It is the appropriate business of the sense of smelling to give us ideas of odours. We may be led to look for the cause of these new sensations, but noth ing more. We do not learn from it what that cause is

It is not pretended, that this sense alone can give us the notion of an external, odoriferous body. The sense of taste is equally limited with that of smell, but both, as far as they go, are grounds of knowledge, and do not deceive. It might no doubt be said, that they may be diseased, and thus mislead us; but the remarks of this section go on the supposition, that the senses are in a sound state.When we come to the sense of hearing, we find, that the perceptions of sound have in part an acquired character. The reference of a particular sound to a particular external cause always implies the exercise of the sense of touch, also of that principle of the mind, which is termed association. But hearing, when in a sound state, is always a ground of belief and knowledge, as far as the mere sensation of sound is concerned; and so far can be most certainly trusted.

The sense of sight, against which the heaviest complaints have been made by the Sceptics, makes us acquainted with the colours of bodies. To say, therefore, that it, misleads us in respect to solidity, extension, size, direction, or distance, is but very little, or rather nothing to the purpose. These are acquired perceptions, and have their origin in another sense, that of touch.

And hence on the question, Whether our senses mislead us? we are to consider, to which of the senses the particular ideas under review appropriately belong. And also in our search after truth, it becomes us to call in the aid of all the senses, and not to consult one to the entire omission of the others. They all make parts of one great and wonderful system, and cannot be safely separated. When they are in a sound state, when the ideas, of which they are the origin, are properly discriminated, and further, when the intimations of one sense are aided by those of another and by the guidance of the reasoning power, which clearly ought not to be excluded, we may then confidently expect to be led by them into the truth, so far as our Creator designed, that it should be made known to us.

CHAPTER FIFTH.

INTERNAL ORIGIN OF THOUGHT.

§. 58. The senses are not the only source of our ideas.

THUS far we have traced the history of the mind; and perhaps with some degree of satisfaction. With cautious endeavours not to trespass upon those limits, which our Creator himself has set to our inquiries, we have found the mind awakening from its inactivity, and testing the untried strength of its powers. A fruitful subject has been opened before us; but thus far, it is to be remembered, we have seen the mind unfolding its susceptibilities only in connection with external impressions on the senses. A new view is to be taken of it.

"The natural progress of all true learning (says the author of Hermes) is from sense to intellect." Beginning with the senses, and first considering the ideas which we there receive, we are next to enter into the mind itself, and shall there discover a new and prolific source of knowledge. In thus doing, we tread, as we proposed to do, in the steps of Locke, whose general doctrine undoubtedly is, that a part of our ideas may be traced to the senses, and that the origin of others is to be sought in the intellect itself.

"The other fountain, (says Locke,) from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which