could not be had from things without; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds, which, we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings ideas as distinct, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself: And though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other SENSATION, so I call this REFLECTION; the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself."

§. 59. The great sources of our knowledge are twofold, external and internal.

The earliest sources or occasions of our knowledge, therefore, are two; (1) The affections of our senses by means of external objects; (2) The various operations of the mind itself, of which we are conscious. In other words, they are the world without and the world within; the external creation, between which and our bodily senses Providence has instituted a common and reciprocal adaptation, and the internal, mental creation, which no sooner commences its various and appropriate exercises, than we are furnished with another series of ideas, which never could have been received from the senses alone. The notions, which we receive from these two sources, are concisely known in Locke's Philosophy, as ideas of SENSATION and of REFLECTION. Nor does there seem to be any good reason, when its precise import is understood, why this phraseology, which is sanctioned by long use and respectable names, should not continue to be employed.

This great and characteristic point in the history of our intellectual experiences is fully recognized by a multitude of inquirers into this subject in different countries; and among others in certain writers on the Philosophy of the Mind, who have from time to time made their appearance among the Germans. This was clearly the opinion of the famous Kant, whatever degree of uncertainty and doubt

is found to rest upon other articles of his metaphysical system. He evidently gives us to understand, that the mental operations themselves, although the senses are the first occasions of those operations, furnish a new set of notions, which cannot directly be traced to any thing external. A somewhat peculiar phraseology, however, has been employed by these writers, which it is of some importance to retain in mind. Those ideas, which exist in consequence of some external affection of the senses, are called by them OBJECTIVE; those, which spring into existence solely in consequence of the mere nature and workings of the intellect, are termed SUBJECTIVE; the source of the one class being the objects without, and of the other the sentient principle within.* Such in brief is that theory, which will be found to be supported by facts; which claims to be true; and which opens up many new and ennobling views of the constitution and destiny of hu

man nature.

Denn

*NOTE. The two short extracts following go to confirm what is above stated.Der Zeit nach geht also keine Erkentniss in uns vor der Erfahrung vorher, und mit dieser fängt alle an. Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntniss mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht eben alle aus der Erfahrung. es könne wohl seyn, dass selbst unsere Erfahrungserkentniss ein Zusammengesetztes aus dem sey, was 'wir durch Eindrücke empfangen, und dem, was unser eigenes Erkenntnissvermögen, (durch sinnliche Eindrücke bloss veranlasst,) aus sich selbst hergiebt, welchen Zusatz wir von jenem Grundstoffe nicht eher unterscheiden, als bis lange Uebung uns darauf aufmerksam, und zur Absonderung desselben geschikt gemacht hat. Kant's Critik der reinen Vernunft. Einleitung, I..

On appelle, dans la philosophie Allemande, idees subjectives celles que naissent de la nature de notre intelligence et de ses facultes, et idees objectives toutes celles que sont excitees par les sensations. Mad. de Stael, de Allemagne, tom. 3.

§. 60. Writers who have objected to this twofold origin of our knowledge.

But it ought not to pass unnoticed, that there have been writers, who have objected to this twofold origin of our knowledge. It was the opinion of Hobbes, who preceded Locke, and was not without merit as a metaphysician, that all our knowledge might be traced to the senses, and that no other source need be sought. This was the opinion of Gassendi, and still later of Condillac, who supported it at length. They maintained, that we have no simple ideas, but such as exist in the mind directly by means of the senses. They further contended, that all those of a complex nature are made up of these simple ideas, and consequently that they may be considered a sort of transformed sensations." If we consider (says Condillac) that to remember, to compare, to judge, to distinguish, to imagine, to be astonished, to have abstract ideas, to have ideas of number and duration, to know truths, whether general or particular, are but so many modes of being attentive; that to have passions, to love, to hate, to hope, to fear, to will, are but so many different modes of desire; and that attention, in the one case, and desire, in the other case, of which all these feelings are modes, are themselves, in their origin, nothing more than modes of sensation, we cannot but conclude that SENSATION involves in itself all the faculties of the soul."

This sentence in its evident meaning, and as it is understood both by its author and his commentators, is clearly at variance with the doctrine of Locke, and entirely cuts off what has been variously termed the internal, reflex, or subjective source of our knowledge. According to this doctrine every thing may be traced back to the senses, not merely as its occasion but as its direct cause; every thing becomes material; we are utterly unable to form a conception even of the glorious Deity himself, except under the character of a sagacious and venerable old man. And in the same way every other idea, however spiritual and whatever it may relate to, must be capable of being followed back to some archetype in outward,

material existences.It is undoubtedly the tendency of this system to degrade the mind; not only to limit the range, but to depress the character of its powers. The propriety of receiving it, however, does not perhaps so much depend upon its tendency, as upon the direct evidence which may be brought in its support, in which it is found to be utterly deficient.

§. 61. Of what can truly be ascribed to the senses and what not.

In order to have a correct understanding of the point before us, we briefly revert to the nature of the soul itself. Granting the reality of its existence, we were led to see, in the first place, that a distinction might with good reason be drawn between the soul and its thoughts. It is true, that men become acquainted with the soul by means of its thoughts; but these latter can by no means be considered necessary to the soul's existence, except relatively to the human mind. It is because the soul would appear to us to have no existence, were it not for its thoughts or its modifications,, that we are so prone to identify the one with the other.

It appeared also, in the second place, that there are no innate or connatural ideas; for these were held by the supporters of that doctrine to be coetaneous with the existence of the soul, and therefore might, and would exist independently of any outward affection of the senses. But thought being neither the essential existence of the soul, nor coetaneous with that existence, nothing is more natural than to inquire, When and where our ideas have their origin? And when we have gone thus far, we rely upon the general experience and testimony of mankind, that their origin is immediately subsequent to some affection of those bodily organs, which we call the senses. other words, were it not for impressions on the senses, which may be traced to objects external to them, our mental capabilities, whatever they may be, would always have remained folded up, and in a state of fruitless inaction.

Hence the process, which is implied in the perception of external things, or what is commonly termed by Mr

Locke sensation, may justly be considered the occasion or the introductory step to all our knowledge. But it does not follow from this, nor is it by any means true, that the whole amount of it in its ultimate progress is to be ascribed directly to the same source. All that can be said with truth, is, that the mind receives the earliest part of its ideas by means of the senses, and that, in consequence of having received these elementary thoughts, all its powers - become rapidly and fully operative.

And here we come to the second great source of knowledge. The powers of the mind being thus fairly brought into exercise, its various operations then furnish us with another set of ideas, which, by way of distinguishing them from those received through the direct mediation of the senses, may be called subjective ideas, or more commonly ideas of reflection. These two sources of our thoughts, however they may have been confounded by the writers above alluded to, are entirely distinct. The ideas, which arise from the fact of the previous existence of certain mental operations, could not have been suggested by any thing, which takes place in the external world, independently of those operations. Of this last class, some instances, with illustrations of the same, are now to be mentioned.

§. 62. Instances of notions, which have an internal origin.

Among other ideas, which are to be ascribed to the second great source, are those, expressed by the terms, thinking, doubting, believing, and certainty. It is a matter of internal observation, (that is, of consciousness or of reflection, which are synonymous with internal observation,) that the mind does not, and cannot for any length of time remain inactive. Hence there is occasion given for the origin of that idea, which we denominate THINKING. The notion, which we thus call, is framed by the mind under these circumstances; the name is given, and nobody is ignorant as to what is meant by it. But then it is to be marked that its origin is wholly internal; it is to be ascribed to consciousness or reflection no less than the