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was communicated to the directors, the latter on the 28th Oct. passed a resolution forfeiting the shares. Mr. Justice Neville granted an injunction restraining the company from removing the plaintiff's name from the list of shareholders, and from otherwise acting on the resolution. His Lordship held that the call on the shares was a sum of money payable under a contract to which the moratorium applied and which did not become due until the 4th Nov., and that consequently the resolution of the 28th Oct was not effective as the debt was not then due.

(e) Effect of the moratorium on creditor's right to petition in bankruptcy.-In Re Sahler; Ex parte Mumford and Co. (138 L. T Jour. 84; (1914) W. N. 439) a debtor owed a sum to certain creditors in respect of goods purchased from them in April 1914. At a meeting of creditors on the 9th Sept. the debtor gave notice that he was about to suspend payment of his debts. The creditors in question relied on what took place at this meeting constituting an act of bankruptcy, and two days later they presented a bankruptcy petition. The question to be determined was whether, having regard to the moratorium proclamation of the 3rd Sept., the debt was a good petitioning creditor's debt within sect. 6, sub-sect. 1 (b), of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, the provisions of which are now re-enacted by sect. 4, sub-sect. 1 (b), of the Bankruptcy Act 1914. In other words, was the debt at the time, and notwithstanding the proclamations, "a liquidated sum payable either immediately or at some certain future date ? The court-Mr. Justice Horridge and Mr. Justice

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Rowlatt-held that it was.

(f) Writ issued prior to moratorium-Trial of action after cessation of moratorium.-In the case of Glaskie v. Petrie (1914) W. N. 410) the writ was issued at the end of July, just before the first moratorium proclamation. The action was to recover a sum of money on a promissory note which had been dishonoured. No interest had been paid on the note. The action was tried on the 29th Oct. It will be remembered that the moratorium proclamation of the 3rd Sept. extended the moratorium to the 4th Oct., and that the proclamation of the 30th Sept. further extended the moratorium to the 4th Nov., but that the last-mentioned proclamation provided that interest should be paid on the debt, if it was a debt that carried interest, as a condition precedent to this further extension. It was contended by the defendant that by the joint effect of the proclamations of the 6th Aug. and the 3rd Sept. the sum claimed ceased to be due and payable, and that, the writ having been issued before the first proclamation, the action could not be maintained. Mr. Justice Scrutton, however, held that the sum sued for was owing at the date of the writ and at the date of the trial, and that the fact that in the interval there had been a suspension of the defendant's liability was not of itself a good defence.



(a) Order for compulsory winding-up of a company not affected by the Act. This was the view taken by Mr. Justice Neville in the case of Re World of Golf Limited (noted 137 L. T. Jour. 542). A judgment creditor of a company presented a petition for the compulsory winding-up of the company. The judgment was in respect of an action against the company in the early part of this year, and was obtained prior to the commencement of the war; and a certificate of taxed costs was made before the end of July. Immediately previous to the making of the certificate a consent order was made appointing a receiver in an action commenced by the debenture-holders of the company, which was insolvent. The petition in question was actually presented on the 4th Aug. It was heard on the 13th Oct. and was unopposed, but the question arose whether the judgment creditor's right of having the company wound-up was affected by the Act, either because the winding-up was an execution within the meaning of the Act, or because the taxed costs was a sum of money to which the Act applied (see sect. 1, sub-sect. 1, par. (b). The learned judge did not consider that the Act applied.


(b) Effect of the Act on the remedies of mortgagees.-There have been three noteworthy cases on the position of mortgagees seeking to put their remedies into force. In Re Farnol, Eades,

Irvine, and Co. Limited; Carpenter v. The Company (noted 138 L. T. Jour. 11; (1914) W. N. 402) Mr. Justice Warrington held that the Act did not require a plaintiff in a foreclosure action to obtain leave to proceed with the action. The action was a debenture-holders' action to enforce the security. The writ was issued on the 2nd Oct., and the plaintiff, suing on behalf of himself and all other debenture-holders, moved for the appointment of a receiver and manager. The learned judge, in making the usual order for the appointment of a receiver and manager, observed that the things prohibited by sect. 1 of the Act, with the exception of that indicated by the word "foreclosure," all pointed to something done by a person independently of an order of the court. His Lordship pointed out that foreclosure was the act of the court in removing the right of redemption, and although there might be difficulties in construing the word " foreclosure," as used in the Act, his Lordship took the view that there was nothing in the Act to prevent the issue of a writ in a debentureholder's action for realising the security. As to the appointment of a receiver and manager, by that appointment there was no entry into possession. By such an appointment the court merely took possession through its own officers for the benefit of all parties.

(c) In Behagg v. Palmer (noted 138 L. T. Jour. 36; (1914) W. N. 416) a motion was made for judgment in a foreclosure action. It was objected that no order for foreclosure should be made except after a special application under the Act. But the same learned judge, referring to the last-mentioned case, held that it was unnecessary to make an application under the Act before proceeding with a foreclosure action for the usual order nisi. His Lordship stated that he had discussed the matter with other judges of the Chancery Division, and it was considered that the proper course was to insert at the end of the judgment the words "but no order for foreclosure absolute shall be made so long as the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 is in force except by the judge in person." His Lordship pointed out that what the Act meant was that no person should obtain an order for the final destruction of the equity of redemption unless an application was made under the Act for that purpose.

(d) In Re William Coward and Co. Limited (noted 137 L. T. Jour. 590) Mr. Justice Neville gave leave under the Act to the first mortgagees of certain leasehold property to go into possession, and directed that the costs of the application should be added to the security. The application for leave to re-enter was supported by subsequent mortgagees.

(e) Leave not necessary under Act for execution against alien enemy.—In the case Leader, Plunkett, and Leader v. Direction der Disconto Gesellschaft (31 Times L. Rep. 83) it was held that the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 did not apply in the case of an alien enemy. In that case the plaintiffs, who were a British firm, had an account with the Berlin office of a German bank, who also had a branch in London. After the war commenced, a licence was granted to the branch to carry on business. The plaintiffs commenced proceedings for payment of the balance due to them on their banking account, and the writ was served on the branch. Mr. Justice Scrutton held that the service was good, and that as the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 did not apply to alien enemies it was not necessary to ask for leave to issue execution.

(f) "Absolute discretion" to grant or withhold leave to proceed. -In Lyric Theatre (London) Limited v. L. T. Limited (noted 138 L. T. Jour. 106; (1914) W. N. 461) the Court of Appeal, although not deciding whether on appeal that court could under the Act interfere with the discretion given to the court by sect. 1, sub-sect. 2, of the Act, refused in the circumstances of that case to disturb the decision of Mr. Justice Scrutton, which that learned judge had come to in the case in exercise of that dis


(g) Practice under the Act in the Court of Appeal.-In the case of Evans v. Main Colliery Company Limited (noted 138 L. T. Jour. 162) the defendants had appealed from a judgment of Mr. Justice Horridge in an action tried by him without a jury. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision, and ordered judgment to be entered for the defendants with costs. The

defendants then applied under the Act for leave to proceed to execution or otherwise to enforce the judgment. The Court of Appeal laid it down as a rule of practice that the matter was to be referred to the master for him to inquire into the facts and to make a report to the Court of Appeal after hearing the evidence, and that the court would then act upon that report.

(h) Forfeiture of shares for nonpayment of calls.-In Burgess v. G. H. N. Gases Limited (noted 138 L. T. Jour. 58; (1914) W. N. 422), to which we have already referred on another point, Mr. Justice Neville held that the purported forfeiture by a company of shares allotted to a would-be shareholder, for nonpayment of calls, was an attempt to take possession of property in default of payment without leave of the court, contrary to the provisions of the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914.

(To be continued.)


The Concept of False Imprisonment.

AN allegation of false imprisonment-" one of the fundamental concepts of the English common law," as it was eloquently styled by Lord Moulton-came before the House of Lords in a distinctly novel guise in the recent case of Herd v. Weardale Steel, Coal, and Coke Company (111 L. T. Rep. 660). The doctrine, expressed by the maxim Volenti non fit injuria, has seldom been more forcibly exemplified than it was in that case For, as was said by the Lord Chancellor (Viscount Haldane), it is not false imprisonment to hold a man to the conditions which he has accepted. The question argued is not, perhaps. so free from difficulty as at first sight might be supposed, seeing that Mr. Justice Pickford, in the court of first instance, took a view of it which failed to commend itself to the majority of the learned judges of the Court of Appeal. There was, therefore, an equal difference in judicial opinion before the case found its way to the House of Lords. The learned Lords, however, were unanimous in affirming the decision of the majority of the court below. And they did so without adopting the customary course of taking time to consider their opinions -or "judgments," to use a misnomer which is fast superseding the more strictly accurate description. The alleged false imprisonment complained of was detention in a mine through the employers of a miner refusing to convey him to the surface on his demand. His terms were that he should work for a fixed period. And he ceased to work before the termination of that period, in breach of his contract. But as the Lord Chancellor said: "He had no right to call upon his employers to make use of special machinery put there at their cost, and involving cost in its working, to bring him to the surface just when he pleased." The notion that a miner can render his employers answerable for a charge of false imprisonment because they do not make it possible for him to come to the surface at any moment that he pleases-in defiance of the fact that he has stipulated to work during a fixed period of employment-found no favour with the learned Lords. "In the minds of laymen, and those who have not mastered thoroughly the elements of law," mistaken ideas as to the delimitations of false imprisonment are common enough, to quote the words of Lord Moulton. And doubtless such misapprehensions are very generally shared by those who are employed in mines. Among them, the present case has probably created a feeling of strong interest, or it would never have been taken to the House of Lords. But from an even wider point of view the decision must have probable application. For whenever a person has voluntarily contracted to perform certain duties, his inability to get away from them before the period agreed upon cannot be ascribed to the tortious act of the person by whom he is employed.

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himself constrained to follow that authority. His Lordship forebore, however, to express any opinion as to whether the principle thereof was right or was reconcilable with other authorities on the question with which he had to deal. But by his expressing a wish that the matter should be cleared up by some court which could disregard Bernard v. Aaron (ubi sup.),' the learned judge evidently considered himself hampered in the decision which he pronounced. It is no occasion for surprise, therefore, that the appeal to the Master of the Rolls (Lord Cozens-Hardy) and Lords Justices Kennedy and Swinfen Eady from Mr. Justice Pickford's decision has proved successful. Cases before the Court of Appeal in which one owner, or several co-owners, of a ship with the master thereof work it upon the 'thirds or sharing system have been somewhat frequent in the past few years in consequence of the application of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58) to seamen. The question whether the owner is the employer of the master or of some other member of the crew of a vessel has at various times been under consideration. Thus, in Boon v. Quance (102 L. T. Rep. 443), there was a decision that no contract of service existed in that case between the owner and the master, a decision that was explained in the later case of Jones v. Owners of the Alice and Eliza (3 B. W. C. C. 495). In Smith v. Horlock (109 L. T. Rep. 196), on the other hand, where Boon v. Quance (ubi sup.) was distinguished, the relation of master and servant was held to exist between the owner of a barge and the master thereof. Each case must, of course, depend upon its own particular facts. And there certainly seems to be no authority, as was pointed out by Lord Justice Swinfen Eady, to support such a general proposition as that where a ship is sailed on the "thirds' or sharing system, the arrangement amounts in law to a demise, bailment, or hiring of the ship, the master not being the agent or servant of the owner or co-owners, but charterer, and alone liable for goods shipped on board. As to Bernard v. Aaron (ubi sup.), the Master of the Rolls drew attention to the fact that it appeared never before to have been cited, and it has not been treated as an authority laying down any principle. But Steel v. Lester (37 L. T. Rep. 642; 3 C. P. Div. 121) was, his Lordship added, an authority directly in point, and had been recognised by the text-writers: (see Carver's Law of Carriage by Sea, 5th edit., s. 49). In all future cases, therefore, in which the facts resemble those of the present one, the owner, and not the master, must be treated as responsible to the shipper of goods on board a vessel worked on "thirds."

Suing Trustees of Friendly Society Branch.

IN delivering the considered judgment of the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Winter v. Wilkinson (noted ante, p. 161), the Master of the Rolls (Lord Cozens-Hardy) formulated in the widest possible terms the question that his Lordship conceived to be raised: "Can an action be maintained against the trustees of a lodge registered as a branch under the Friendly Societies Act 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 25); or must the matter be decided by the domestic tribunal of the lodge under sect. 68?" The decision in that case will doubtless be extremely useful in assisting in determining any such general question whenever it may happen to arise. But what had to be actually decided in the present case fell far short of a question of so abstract a character. The question was whether the trustees of a friendly society could bring an action against the trustees, secretary, and treasurer of a lodge, which was registered as a branch of the society, on the ground that funds had been used by the defendants in a manner not authorised by the rules of the society. In other words, was an action founded on an alleged breach of trust by the trustees and officials of the lodge maintainable? Or was the question between the parties a "dispute," and as such ought it to be referred instead to arbitration? Sect. 68 of the Act provides how a dispute" between an officer of a registered branch and the society of which the registered branch is a branch is to be determined. And in all cases in which the expression "dispute" is properly applicable, there is no doubt that the jurisdiction of the court is ousted. On that footing it was that the Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster held that all proceedings in the action must be stayed. But the

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Court of Appeal negatived the existence of any "dispute," so called. For if trustees, as Lord Cozens-Hardy remarked, apply funds in a manner not authorised, and consequently are guilty of a breach of trust, they are liable to be sued, not in their capacity of members-for, indeed, they need not be membersbut in their capacity of trustees in whom property is vested by Act of Parliament, to be held upon certain trusts. And that a 'dispute" to which sect. 68 applies must be between the society and a person in his capacity as a member appears from three authorities which were cited by the Master of the Rolls: (Morrison v. Glover, 4 Ex. 44; Prentice v. London, 33 L. T. Rep. 251; L. Rep. 10 C. P. 679; Mulkern v. Lord, 40 L. T. Rep. 594; 4 App. Cas. 182).

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Coal Mine- Minimum Wage Certificate that Workman is excluded-Production of Certificate as Condition precedent to suing for minimum Wage-Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act 1912 (2 Geo. 5, c. 2), s. 1.

Plaintiff's appeal from a judgment of the Divisional Court (Ridley and Bankes, JJ.). A workman sued in the County Court for 11s. 3d. alleged to be due as wages. The defendants, his employers, pleaded by their defence that the matter had been referred to L. H. H. in pursuance of the district rules, and that L. H. H. had certified in writing that the plaintiff was not entitled to the amount claimed. At the trial the following took place: The plaintiff went into the box; in the course of the opening, No. 8 of the district rules, which dealt with the decision of disputes by an umpire, was referred to. The plaintiff's advocate admitted that he could not put in the certificate of the umpire in support of his case, and admitted that Randle v. Clay Cross Company (109 L. T. Rep. 522; (1913) 3 K. B. 795) was fatal to him in that court; and on the application of the defendants judgment was entered for the defendants with leave to appeal. The Divisional Court

affirmed the decision of the County Court judge. The question raised by the appeal was whether, where a miner comes into court claiming payment of a sum due as the minimum wage, it is a condition precedent to his establishing his case that he should produce a certificate under sect. 1, sub-sect. 1, of the Minimum Wage Act 1912, which provides that: "It shall be an implied term of every contract for the employment of a workman underground in a coal mine that the employer shall pay" the minimum wage, "unless it is certified in manner provided by the district rules that the workman" is excluded, or has forfeited his right.'

Held, that the case must be sent back to the County Court judge for further hearing, with an intimation that the production by the plaintiff of the certificate in question is not a condition precedent to his recovering in the action. Semble, that if a dispute duly referred to the domestic tribunal is still sub judice, the judge should adjourn the trial until it is

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determined. Their Lordships differed somewhat in opinion as regards the question on which party it would lie to produce the certificate of the domestic tribunal when made.

[Barwell v. Newport Abercarn Black Vein Steam Coal Com pany Limited. Ct. of App: Buckley, Phillimore, and Pickford, L.JJ. Dec. 14 and 15, 1914.-Čounsel: for the plaintiff, Greer, K.C. and Parsons, K.C.; for the defendants, Scott Fox, K.C. and Harold Morris. Solicitors: Smith, Rundell, and Dods, for Morgan, Bruce, and Nicholas, Pontypridd; Bell, Brodrick, and Gray, for C. and W. Kenshole, Aberdare ] County Court-Appeal to Court of Appeal from Divisional CourtDeath of Defendant pending Appeal-Jurisdiction of Court of Appeal to add Defendant's legal Representative.

Plaintiff's appeal from a decision of the Divisional Court (Ridley and Rowlatt, JJ.) reversing a decision of the learned judge sitting at Kingston County Court. The defendant died after the appeal to the Court of Appeal had been entered. On the appeal coming on for hearing, the plaintiff's counsel applied for leave to make the legal personal representative of the defendant a party to the appeal, and to continue the proceedings against him. He contended that as the appeal had been entered in the Court of Appeal the application was properly made in that court (Blakeway v. Patteshall (1894) 1 Q B. 247); there was no provision in the County Court Rules which dealt with the matter. Counsel for the defendant made no objection to the application. The Court of Appeal granted the application. The appeal was dismissed on its merits.

[Haywood v. Faraker. Ct. of App.: Buckley, Phillimore, and Pickford, L.JJ. Dec. 16, 1914.-Counsel: for the plaintiff, A. E. Woodgate; for the defendant, Heber Hart, K.C. and A. L. Ellis. Solicitors: Peet and Manduell; Lewis W. Taylor.]

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL. Criminal Law-False Pretences-Count in Indictment for obtaining Credit-Charges to be tried separately-Larceny Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), s. 88-Debtors Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict c. 62), s. 13 (1).

Appeal against a conviction at Surrey Sessions for obtaining a mare by false pretences. The indictment contained a count for obtaining credit under the Debtors Act 1869, and the jury returned a general verdict of guilty on the indictment. For the Crown it was contended that the conviction was right inasmuch as the appellant obtained possession of the mare and also credit for the price by means of the false pretences alleged. It was not disputed that no reference was made in the summing up as to the difference between obtaining a chattel by false pretences and obtaining credit.

Held, that, though there was ample evidence to go before the jury on the charges preferred, it was very necessary that the jury should be directed as to the distinction between obtaining a chattel by false pretences and obtaining credit; that in the present case there was no such direction in the summing up; that in this and similar cases the accused should be tried on one charge only at a time; and that the court would substitute a verdict for the lesser charge of obtaining credit and reduce the sentence accordingly.

[Rex v. Norman. Ct. Crim. App.: Darling, Lush, and Atkin, JJ. Dec. 14, 1914.-Counsel: for the appellant, H. W. Rowsell, instructed by the Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal; for the Crown, Cecil Whiteley, instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions.]

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Harrogate, Friday, at 9
Hertford, Wednesday, at 10.30
High Wycombe, Thursday, at 10
Hitchin, Monday, at 10

Holt, Friday, at 10
Holyhead, Tuesday

Huntingdon, Wednesday, at 10
Jarrow, Tuesday, at 10

Leeds, Tuesday (R. By), at 11;
Wednesday (J.S. & A.O.), Thurs-
day, and Friday, at 10
Leigh, Friday

Lincoln. Thursday (R. By), at 3
Liverpool, Monday (By at 11),
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday,
and Friday (B., A., & W.C.), at


Llandilo, Thursday
Llandudno, Thursday
Llanelly, Monday
Llanrwst, Friday
Lowestoft, Wednesday

Maldon, Friday, at 11
Malmesbury, Tuesday
Mansfield, Friday, at 10
Matlock, Monday, at 10

Nantwich, Saturday, at 10
Narberth, Tuesday

Newark, Monday, at 10

Newcastle-in-Emlyn, Saturday

Newnham, Wednesday

Northleach, Saturday

North Walsham, Thursday, at 11

Nottingham, Thursday (R. By), at


Pembroke Dock, Wednesday

Peterborough, Tuesday, at 9.30
Portsmouth, Thursday, at 10.30
Ripon, Saturday, at 9.30

Rotherham, Tuesday and Friday, at 10

Ryde, Wednesday, at 10

Saffron Walden, Thursday, at 11
Seaham Harbour, Monday, at 9.30
Sheffield, Wednesday (J.S.), at 10
Shoreditch Friday

Southampton, Tuesday, at 10
South Shields, Thursday, at 10
Stafford, Friday, at 9.30
Stalybridge, Thursday, at 10
Stockport, Friday, at 10
Sunderland, Thursday (R. By)
Swaffham, Tuesday, at 10
Tadcaster, Wednesday, at 10
Thornbury, Monday

Tunstall, Wednesday, at 9.30
Wakefield, Thursday (R. By), at 11
Waltham Abbey, Thursday, at 11
Warrington, Thursday

Watford, Monday, at 10

West Hartlepool, Friday, at 9.30
Winsford, Wednesday, at 2
Wisbech, Monday, at 10
Yarmouth, Thursday and Friday
York, Tuesday, at 9.30.

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Jan. 15



Bideford, Wednesday, Jan. 6

Birkenhead. Friday, Jan. 8

Blackburn, Friday, Jan. 8

Bournemouth, Tuesday, Jan. 12
Bradford, Friday, Jan. 8

Brighton Monday, Jan. 4
Bristol, Monday, Jan. 4, at 10.30
Burton-upon-Trent, Friday, Jan. 8,
at 11

St. Edmunds, Monday,
Jan. 18
Cambridge, Thursday, Jan. 7
Carmarthen, Tuesday, Jan. 5
Chester, Tuesday, Jan. 5
Chichester. Tuesday, Jan. 12
Croydon, Friday, Jan. 8
Devizes, Monday, Jan. 4
Dudley, Friday, Jan. 8
Exeter, Tuesday, Jan. 5
Faversham, Monday, Jan. 4
Folkestone, Wednesday, Jan. 6, at

Great Yarmouth, Monday, Jan. 18, at 10.30

Grimsby, Tuesday, Jan. 12

Guildford, Saturday, Jan. 9

Hereford, Friday, Jan. 15

Hythe, Saturday, Jan. 9

Ipswich, Saturday, Jan. 9. 10.15

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Kingston upon Hull, Thursday,
Jan. 21

Leeds, Thursday, Jan. 7
Leicester, Monday, Jan. 4

Lincoln, Saturday, Jan. 9, at 10
Liverpool, Wednesday, Jan. 6
Maidstone, Saturday, Jan. 16, at


Margate, Tuesday, Jan. 5
Middlesbrough, Thursday, Jan. 7
Newcastle upon Tyne, Friday,
Jan. 8

Norwich, Monday, Jan. 11
Oswestry. Friday, Jan. 8
Penzance, Wednesday, Jan. 6
Plymouth, Friday, Jan. 8
Poole, Monday, Jan. 11, at 10.30
Portsmouth. Thursday, Jan. 7
Reading, Friday, Jan. 8, at 10.45
Ro be ham, Thursday, Jan. 7. at 10.30
Saffron Walden, Wednesday,
Jan. 13

Salisbury, Friday, Jan. 8, at 11.15
Sandwich, Friday, Jan. 8
Sheffield, Thursday, Jan. 7
Southampton, Monday, Jan. 11
Stoke-on-Trent, Tuesday, Feb. 2
Sunderland, Friday, Jan. 8
Tewkesbury, Monday, Jan. 4
Wenlock. Friday, Jan. 8
Wigan, Thursday, Jan. 7.

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The Epiphany Quarter Sessions for cases arising in the county of Middlesex will commence on Saturday next, at the Guildhall Westminster, at 10.30.

The Honourable Society of Gray's-inn have given 100 guineas, to the funds of the Professional Classes War Relief Council.

The west gate to the Temple, which has been closed since the commencement of the Christmas Vacation, is now open.

The Right Hon. Arthur Cohen, P.C., K.C., M.A., of 26, Great Cumberland-place, W., and of 5, Paper-buildings, Temple, E.C., for some years a judge of the Cinque Ports, counsel for the British Government in several arbitrations, who died on the 3rd Nov. last, aged eighty-four years, left estate of the gross value of £83,949, of which the net personalty has been sworn at £83,666. He left £100 to the Barristers' Benevolent Fund.


The Irish Executive.

THE approaching termination of the tenure by the Earl of Aberdeen of the great office of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, of which his Excellency has announced his resignation, which will take effect next month, directs attention to the fact that the Irish Executive has been always kept distinct, at least outwardly, from that of the rest of the United Kingdom. The Government of Ireland is formally vested in a Viceroy, usually styled the LordLieutenant, in abbreviation of his full official title of "LordLieutenant-General and General Governor of Ireland." The salary of a Lord-Lieutenant is £20,000 per annum; till the thirties of the last century, when the duties of the office were undertaken by the Duke of Northumberland, an immensely rich nobleman, the salary was £30,000 per annum. An incoming LordLieutenant is also given an allowance of £5000, for outfit. The Lord-Lieutenant is assisted by an Irish Privy Council, consisting of fifty or sixty members, whose sanction, like that of the English Privy Council, is necessary to give validity to many of the official acts of the executive. The Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland possesses nominally very extensive powers, but his actual freedom in their exercise is by no means commensurate with their ostensible extent. He acts under instructions from the Crown conveyed to him by the Ministry for the time being, whose business, it has been laid down, "is to direct him in his proceedings and to animadvert on his conduct if they see him act improperly or in a manner detrimental or inconvenient to the public service or displeasing to the Crown." The Cabinet Minister ordinarily responsible for advising and directing the conduct of the Lord-Lieutenant was at one time the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and it is presumed that theoretically the responsibility still attaches to him. But in practice it has now devolved wholly and, considering his subordinate title, somewhat anomalously on a functionary whose strict official style is that of Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant. The Secretary for Ireland, as he is popularly called, is all but invariably a Cabinet Minister, whereas the Lord-Lieutenant is very rarely-only on three occasions since the Union and never before the Union-a member of the Cabinet. The anomalous relation of the Chief Secretary to a Lord-Lieutenant becomes still more striking by the fact that the Chief Secretary is formally appointed by the LordLieutenant. It can, however, scarcely be supposed that anyone nowadays would share Sir Robert Peel's "grave objections " to making the Irish Secretary a Cabinet Minister on the ground that "it tended not only to disturb but to invert the relation of a subordinate to his chief (the Lord - Lieutenant not being in the Cabinet), and that it encouraged the Secretary still more to assume for himself the exercise of independent powers." The rise in importance of the secretaryship to the Lord-Lieutenant was owing to the reduction to a sinecure of the office of Irish Secretary of State, who represented the Government in the Irish Parliament. That post had been held by Sir Paul Davis, who sat in the Irish Parliament and discharged its duties in the reign of Charles 11. No Parliament was held in Ireland in the interval between 1661 and 1692. After the Revolution, Sir Robert Southwell, the successor of Sir Isaac Newton, was invested with the Irish Secretaryship of State, which was granted to him for life as a sinecure, and then to his son and eventually to his grandson, who died in 1755, when the post remained a sinecure till the Union. The first instance of a Secretary to a Lord-Lieutenant acting as a Minister in the Irish House of Commons in discharging the duties of a Secretary of State occurred in Oct. 1692 in the case of Mr. Pulteney, who, on a motion being made in the Irish House of Commons for the production of accounts of the civil and military establishment and of the state of the revenue, as one of the private secretaries of Lord Sydney, the Lord-Lieutenant, informed the House that the papers in question had been placed in his hands by his Excellency, and they were presented accordingly.


AT the time of writing, it has not been announced who the new Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland is to be. It is understood that the choice lies between Lord Wimborne and Lord Granard, and that a statement may shortly be expected on the subject.

IT is thus apparently taken for granted that Lord Granard, who is a Roman Catholic in religion, is now fully qualified to hold the office. This view is probably well founded in law, but it is a point on which opinions may differ. Sect. 31 (1) of the Government of Ireland Bill 1914 provides that "notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any Act, no subject of His Majesty shall be disqualified to hold the office of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland on account of his religious belief." This is now a statute of the realm, and the amending Act only declares that no steps shall be taken to bring the Act into operation during the war. This, however, appears to be operative without any steps being taken. The office goes back under varying names, King's Chief Governor, Lord Deputy, Governor-General, and Lord-Lieutenant, to the time of Henry II.

SENTENCES passed by Mr. Justice Kenny, who presided at the commission in Green-street, in some cattle-driving cases have come in for widespread and hostile criticism. The prisoners, seven or eight men of the farming class, had pleaded guilty, and it was assumed that the learned judge would consider that the ends of justice would be best served by putting the accused under securities to come up for judgment when called upon. The court, however, inflicted twelve months in one case and six months in all the others, with hard labour in all cases. Some of the daily newspapers have used strong language in reference to these punishments, and the curious thing is that the sentences of this judge have always been noted for their leniency heretofore.

THE Lord Chief Baron received many congratulations on Christmas Day on attaining his eighty-third year. Nobody suggests or thinks of his retirement; he is so active in mind and so equal to his work that it is almost contempt of court to express such an idea. Mr. Justice Boyd is two years his junior, but he has only thirty years' service on the Bench as against forty-one by his colleague. The next senior judges are Lord Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Madden, both of whom were born in 1840. Lord Justice Holmes has been on the Bench for over twenty-seven years.

THE Court of Appeal, consisting of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Baron, and Lord Justice Moriarty, gave judgment on the 18th inst. in the case of Ballymagoran Co-Operative Society v. County Councils of Cavan and Leitrim, alluded to in this column last week. The case was stated by Lord Justice Holmes, who accordingly did not sit at the hearing of the appeal. The point was whether compensation was payable where the property the subject of the claim was insured, and the learned Lord Justice in stating the case and his own determination against the claim, said: "It would be curious if a company which had received a premium for indemnifying the applicants against loss by fire could be relieved from its obligation by enforcing compensation from the ratepayers." The court unanimously reversed the decision of the learned Lord Justice. The Lord Chancellor thought it was clear from the statute that Parliament for which must be deemed right, had cast the primary liability to meet the loss on the innocent ratepayers. In one case the late Lord O'Brien in a considered judgment gave the applicant compensation though he had received payment


from the insurance company. The Lord Chief Baron in an elaborate judgment traced the history of compensation for malicious damage both in Ireland and in England since the days of Poyning's Law. In both countries the inhabitants were held primarily liable and were not entitled to the benefit of any indemnity. The amount of the insurance could not be taken into consideration. Lord Justice Moriarty in a considered judgment dealt with the statutes and the authorities and concurred with his colleagues.

THE lay newspapers comment adversely on the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Ballymagoran Co-operative Society Limited v. County Councils of Cavan and Leitrim. It is hard to understand how it can be determined that the owner can have his property insured, that the insurance company can be in receipt of the premiums, and yet, when a claim for injury arises, the people responsible are the innocent ratepayers of the locality. The Freeman's Journal says: "Judges and everybody else concerned know that in numerous compen

sation cases the applicant before the court was not the real applicant, and that by the decree of the court the obligation of the insurance company would be shifted on to the ratepayers. So the law will remain."

IN other articles it is demanded why the law should not be changed, and that in Ireland, as in any other country, owners should have cast upon them the responsibility of protecting and insuring their own property. A Bill, however, introduced with this object in the session of 1909 did not receive much support. It was felt that in some cases owners might be unable to secure insurance. On the other hand, there should be no great difficulty in procuring a Bill ensuring that where the property was insured the company should be primarily liable. This is the principle adopted in the English Riot Damage Act 1886, under which compensation may be obtained out of the local public rate for damage caused by rioters where the property injured is not covered by insurance. A Bill of this character should turn out to be non-contentious.


BILL TO REVOKE NATURALISATION IN FRANCE. LIKE ourselves, the French Government, in regard to naturalisation, have experienced the truth of Horace's dictum (Ep. I., 11, 27), Cœlum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt, so when Parliament assembled last week a Bill was presented to the Chamber by the garde des sceaux authorising the withdrawal of naturalisation granted to persons in the event of the country of origin of the person naturalised being at war with France. The measure will be only partially retrospective, and will not affect acts prior to the declaration of war. Further, it will only affect the person named, and not his wife and children, if any he have, unless they desire the withdrawal to extend to themselves, or unless they are affected by any of the provisions of art. 1. The Bill, or, as it is termed, the projet de loi, consists of five articles, of which the following is a translation:

Art. 1. Every decree declaring naturalisation of subjects of a Power which has become an enemy of France can be revoked by decree rendered in the Council of Ministers on the proposition of the Minister of Justice, and with the advice of the Conseil d'Etat with regard to:

(1) Those naturalised who have preserved or recovered their original nationality, or who have acquired any other nationality.

(2) Those who, in the service of their country of origin or of any other country, have borne arms against France. Those who, in view or on the occasion of a war with France, have rendered aid of any description to their country of origin, or to any other country.


(4) Those who in the case of war have left France to avoid the obligation of military service, or of any other obligation resulting from their position as a French citizen.

The decree revoking the naturalisation fixes the point at which it takes effect without the power of making it apply earlier than the date of the declaration of war.

Art. 2. The revocation of French nationality is special to the one against which it is pronounced, in virtue of the preceding article, and its consequences shall only extend to the wife or children as far as it is ordered by decree, rendered in the Council of Ministers and upon the advice of the Conseil d'Etat.

Art. 3. The wife shall be permitted to decline French nationality in the interval of a year from the date of the insertion in the Bulletin des lois of the decree revoking the naturalisation of her husband. If at the date of this insertion she is a minor, the interval allowed her shall only commence on the date on which she attains her majority.

The same power is allowed to the children in the same circumstances.

Moreover, the legal representative of the children who are minors, under the conditions provided in art. 9 of the Code Civil, shall be permitted to renounce for them the benefit of French nationality which they hold either by the decree of naturalisation of the father, or by an anterior declaration of nationality.

Art. 4. A regulation of public administration shall determine the conditions for applying the present law.

Art. 5. The present law is applicable to Algeria and to the colonies of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Reunion.

Regulations of public administration shall determine the conditions under which it shall be rendered applicable to other colonies.

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