ment into court to prejudice the rights of the person paying it in. We are not extending the doctrine of retainer by allowing it in this case, but merely giving the executor the same right as he would have had if that had been done which ought to have been done."

In Re Rhoades; Ex parte Rhoades (sup.) the Court of Appeal (Lord Lindley, then Master of the Rolls, Sir F. Jeune, and Lord Justice Romer) held that the effect of an order made under sect. 125 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 for the administration of the estate of an insolvent testator, thereby vesting the estate in the official receiver, does not deprive the executor of his right of retainer.

Again, it has been held that Hinde Palmer's Act (32 & 33 Vict. c. 46) has not destroyed the executor's right of retainer: (see Wilson v. Coxwell, 23 Ch. Div. 764).

But it is conceived that the effect of the provisions of the first section of that Act upon the executor's right of retainer has not as yet been fully ascertained. If this suggestion be correct, it discloses a somewhat surprising state of affairs. For it is now many years since the Act was passed, and the cases in practice where questions arise as to the effect of the Act on the right must be frequently occurring.

The first section provides that in the administration of the estate of every person dying after 1869 no debt or liability of such person shall be entitled to any priority or preference by reason merely that the same is secured by or arises under a bond, deed, or other instrument under seal, or is otherwise made or constituted a specialty debt; and that all the creditors of such a person, as well specialty as simple contract creditors, shall be treated as standing in equal degree and be paid accordingly out of the assets of such deceased person whether such assets are legal or equitable. There is a proviso to the section to the effect that the Act shall not prejudice or affect any lien, charge, or other security which any creditor may hold or be entitled to for the payment of his debt.

Now, as we have already seen, the executor's right of retainer is a right as against co-creditors of equal degree, and it does not entitle, nor did it ever entitle, the executor to retain out of the assets of the testator which are in his hands the amount of the debt due to him from the testator, in such a manner as to prejudice the rights of creditors of a higher degree in priority. Does the Act, then, in destroying the priority of specialty creditors, improve the position of the executor? Thus, for example, suppose the debt due to the executor from the testator to be £2000 upon a simple contract; and the debts due to the specialty creditors to be £5000; and the debts due to the other simple contract creditors to be £6000. Suppose the assets in the hands of the executor to amount in value to £6000. Prior to the Act it is clear that the specialty creditors would have been entitled to receive the whole of their debts out of the assets and the executor's right of retainer would avail him only in so far as there was a balance. That is to say, he could retain the £1000 against his debt of £2000, while the other creditors would receive nothing. Is the effect of the Act to give to the executor his £2000, leaving £4000 for the creditors, both specialty and simple contract, whose combined claims amount to £11,000? The answer to this question appears to be in the negative; yet he will receive his £2000 as we shall proceed to show.

In Re Williams; Williams v. Williams (L. Rep. 15 Eq. 270) Vice-Chancellor Wickens, while fully recognising that the effect of the Act was to destroy the distinction between specialty and simple contract debts in the administration of the assets of deceased persons, held that a creditor who first takes legal proceedings against the legal personal representatives and obtains judgment is entitled to be paid his debt in full in priority to all other creditors.

In the light of this decision, if we revert to a consideration of the analogy upon which, as we have seen, much weight is usually placed when definitions of the executor's right of retainer are attempted, it would appear to follow that an executor might properly claim to be in, at any rate, as good a position as a creditor who has sued and recovered judgment. The executor cannot sue himself. That is the keynote of all authorities which uphold his right of retainer. He cannot sue Third Sheet

himself; therefore he may properly be put in the same position as if in fact he were Mr. A. B. suing the estate of the deceased. If a simple contract creditor who obtains judgment may be paid in priority to the specialty creditors whose priority has been removed by the Act, why should not the executor have the benefit of the Act as regards his right of retainer? In other words, on a parity of reasoning, in the example given above, the executor ought to obtain his £2000 by exercising his right of retainer, notwithstanding the fact that he could not have retained it prior to the passing of the Act. But there are other authorities to be considered.

In Wilson v. Coxwell (sup.), to which case reference has already been made, Mr. Justice Pearson directed division of the assets as follows: The assets were to be apportioned amongst all the creditors, whether specialty creditors or simple contract creditors. The dividend was then to be paid to the speciality creditor (there was only one) in full, and the representatives of the executor (who had died) were to be paid the debt due to them out of the residue, and the surplus (if any) was to be divided equally among the other simple contract creditors.

66

Again, in Re Jones; Calver v. Laxton (53 L. T. Rep. 855; 31 Ch. Div. 440) Mr. Justice Kay denied the executor the extension of his right of retainer which the Act might have been supposed to afford him. In that case the estate was found to be insolvent. There were specialty and simple contract creditors. The executrix was a simple contract creditor. A creditor com. menced an administration action. A receiver was appointed, such appointment being expressed to be without prejudice to the executrix's right of retainer, if she had any such right. She had in fact obtained possession of certain legal assets, and the question arose whether and how far her right of retainer had been affected under the circumstances. Here," said the learned judge, "the executrix who desires to retain is only a simple contract creditor, and the law that she cannot retain against specialty creditors remains, unless the statute must be read that for this purpose, amongst others, the specialty creditors are of equal degree with the simple contract creditors. The object of the statute was only to take away the priority of a specialty creditor over simple contract creditors, not to give any of them priority over him. Equity between them in case of distribution is the declared purpose." His Lordship then dealt with the question whether the Act had of itself abolished the right of retainer, and he expressed the view, which is now well established, that the statute had no such effect. "I cannot help the conclusion," continued his Lordship, "that the Act, having augmented the fund for payment of simple contract creditors, has to this extent enlarged the right of retainer." However, the learned judge made an order to the effect that, the assets being divided rateably among the specialty and simple contract creditors, the executrix might retain her debt against the dividends payable to the latter to the extent of the legal assets received by her.

Turning again to the example given above, it will be seen that the effect of the Act, according to the two last-mentioned decisions, is to make the £6000 which constitutes the assets of the testator assets for the rateable payment of debts amounting in all to £13,000, made up as follows: Specialty creditors, £500; simple contract creditors, £6000, plus £2000-the amount of the simple contract debt due to the executor. This would produce a dividend of about 78. 8d. in the pound, and the preferential payment of the dividend on the amount of the specialty creditors' debts would exhaust just under £2000 of the available fund, thus leaving just over £3000 as the sum of the dividends on the amount of simple contract debts of £8000. Then out of this £3000, or thereabouts, the executor would be entitled to retain his £2000 and the other simple contract creditors would receive the rest.

Now, turning again to the example we have given above, it will be seen that, according to the two last-mentioned decisions, the £6000, which is the amount of the testator's assets, is to be made assets, under the Act, for the payment of the specialty and the simple contract debts-viz., for the payment of £13,000. The dividend on this would amount to about 9s. 2d. in the pound. Now, as regards 'the specialty creditors, whose debts amount to £5000, they are to receive this dividend, which will

exhaust about £2291 13s. 4d., leaving about £3708 6s. 8d. to meet the simple contract creditors. Out of this the executor takes his £2000 under his right of retainer, and the remaining £1708 68. 8d., or thereabouts, is divisible amongst the simple contract creditors, whose debts amount (exclusive of the debt of the executor) to £6000. Thus, as we have already pointed out in the example given above, the executor gets his £2000. But that is not because the Act allows him to retain as against the specialty creditors, but because the effect of the Act has been to increase or augment the fund out of which the simple contract creditors are to be paid.

There are, however, certain dicta which were dropped by the Lords Justices in the case of Re Samson; Robbins v. Alexander (95 L. T. Rep. 633; (1906) 2 Ch. 584) which, it is conceived, tend to throw some doubt upon some of the former authorities. In that case the question was whether there is anything in the Act which deprives an executor of his administrative right of preferring one creditor to another by paying the simple contract creditors of his testator in full without making provision for the specialty creditors. The Court of Appeal held that there was not. It was argued that retainer by an executor is only an exercise of the right of preference by the executor in favour of himself, and that there is no difference between the right to retain, which is merely the right to prefer oneself, and the right to prefer one creditor to another; and that the court could not decide in favour of a right of preference in the executor without also deciding in favour of the executor's right of retainer, which would involve an extension of this right of retainer as against specialty creditors, and would involve also the overruling of the decisions in Wilson v. Coxwell (sup.) and Re Jones; Calver v. Laxton (sup.). Lord Justice Buckley (1906) 2 Ch., at p. 587) pointed out that Re Williams ; Williams v. Williams (sup.) was inconsistent with Re Jones ; Calver v. Laxton (sup.), but his Lordship did not intimate which of the two was the better law. As a matter of fact, the learned Lords Justices refused to be drawn into the question as to the effect of the Act on the executor's right of retainer. But Lord Justice Vaughan Williams in delivering his judgment remarked that he recognised quite well that the trend of recent cases had been rather in favour of holding that the old rights of the executor in administration did [continue, but that, continuing, they were to be dealt with as if the classes of specialty creditors and simple contract creditors and the priority of one over the other also still continued. But Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton expressed the opinion that so far as the cases quoted to the court suggested that under the present law two funds ought to be formed, one in respect of the specialty debts and the other in respect of the simple contract debts, those decisions were erroneous, and were in direct conflict with the provisions of the Act.

The next point which ought to receive attention is the effect of the appointment of a receiver in an administration action. When an executor pays money into court he does not, as has already been pointed out, thereby lose his right of retainer as regards the sums so paid in.

The mere appointment of a receiver does not of itself destroy the right of retainer. "Even in the case where a receiver is appointed against an executor hostilely on account of misconduct," said Mr. Justice Kay in Re Jones; Calver v. Laxton (sup. at p. 443), "it never is intended to punish the executor by destroying his legal right of retainer. It would be very reasonable to hold that, as the receiver is only an officer of the court appointed to protect the fund, his appointment ought not to interfere with any legal rights over the actual possession of the property, and that the effect should be only the same as where the assets are paid into court, in which case the right of retainer is unaffected." But after a receiver has been appointed, then, if the assets are collected by the receiver and paid into court, the executor cannot claim his right of retainer in respect of those assets so paid in by the receiver. "When the assets are paid into court, there being no receiver," said Mr. Justice Kay in the last-mentioned case (31 Ch. Div., at p. 444), "that is done with the assent of the executor, and it is the same for this purpose as if they had

passed through his hands; but when a receiver is appointed, a debtor to the estate may pay his money direct to the receiver and obtain a good discharge, so that the appointment of a receiver prevents the money actually or theoretically coming to the executor's hands": (see also per Mr. Justice Pearson in Re Harrison; Latimer v. Harrison, 32 Ch. Div. 395, at p. 397).

But the mere fact that the receiver receives the assets from the executor does not exclude the executor from exercising his right of retainer over the assets so handed over: (see Re Harrison; Latimer v. Harrison, sup ).

Where the creditorship of the executor arises by reason of, his having been a surety for his testator, and the executor has not in fact paid the surety debt, it would, on general principles, appear to be tolerably clear that the executor is not such a creditor of the testator as to enable him (the executor) to exercise his right of retainer. But in Re Giles; Jones v. Pennefather (74 L. T. Rep. 21; (1896) 1 Ch. 956) Mr. Justice Kekewich held that under such circumstances, the executor being under a liability to pay the creditor, this created an equitable debt as between the testator's estate and the executor, and that the executor could exercise his right of retainer in respect of such a debt.

In the case mentioned in the opening lines of this article, Mr. Justice Neville refused to follow the decision in Re Giles; Jones v. Pennefather (sup.). His Lordship pointed out that there was no legal debt until the executor paid the debt for which he was surety, and that, unless there was a legal debt, there could be no right of retainer in favour of the executor.

COMMENTS ON CASES.

Conditions in Licences for Cinematograph Exhibitions It is common knowledge, so recent is the enactment, that the passing of the Cinematograph Act 1909 (9 Edw. 7, c. 30) was the outcome of an only too well-founded scare caused by the outbreak of frequent fires during cinematograph exhibitions. Any room or hall, no matter how utterly unsuited it might be for the purpose from the point of view of danger from fire, was deemed available to be converted into a "picture palace" when the craze for such attractions was fast spreading, Reckless disregard of the inflammable nature of the materials employed in producing the exhibitions forced the Legislature at length to intervene in order to protect the safety of the numberless persons visiting the same. But does that intimate acquaintance with the original object in placing the Act above referred to upon the statute-book warrant a corresponding narrowing of the construction that ought to be placed upon the extremely wide terms of its second section? We should hardly have thought that there was an opening for much doubt as to the answer to that inquiry. Yet according to the decision of the majority of the learned judgesJustices Lush and Rowlatt-who constituted the Divisional Court before which was argued the recent case of Theatre de Luxe (Halifax) Limited v. Gledhill (noted ante, p. 191), the main object of the Act is what has to be borne in mind. As we remarked when commenting upon two earlier cases arising under the same Act (eee ante, p. 187), the expounding of its provisions is a necessity of extreme importance at the present day, having regard to the multiplicity of the entertainments controlled thereby that are constantly being presented. We question, however, whether such comprehensive language as that of which the section consists can be subjected to the hazardous process of having applied thereto knowledge of the reason why it ever came into existence. The dissentient opinion of Mr. Justice Atkin seems to us far more in keeping with the true interpretation of the wide statutory words: "On such terms and conditions and under such restrictions as, subject to regulations of the Secretary of State, the council may by the respective licences determine." The age of children visiting cinematograph exhibitions may have no immediate connection with the primary object in declaring that licences to hold them may be granted on "terms and conditions." But where the power is derived from to say that such "terms and conditions" shall be solely in the interests of

the safety of the spectators is by no means apparent. Nor is it easy to discover in what respect a condition relating to children is ultra vires or unreasonable. The conviction by the justices, on the contrary, gave full effect to the wide discretion conferred by the Act as to the conditions to be attached to the granting of a licence thereunder.

Meaning of "Issue" and "Event."

STRANGE as it may appear, the true meaning of the word "issue in rules 1 and 2 of Order LXV. of the Rules of the Supreme Court was still open to doubt when the recent case of Howell v. Dering (111 L. T. Rep. 458, 790) came before Mr. Justice Bailhache, sitting with a special jury, and subsequently the Court of Appeal for determination. And that was so despite the number of years that those rules have been in operation. The first of them concludes with these words: "Provided also that, where any action, cause, matter, or issue is tried with a jury, the costs shall follow the event, unless the judge by whom such action, cause, matter, or issue is tried, or the court, shall, for good cause, otherwise order." Mr. Justice Bailhache, on consideration of the authorities to which his Lordship had been referred, came to the conclusion that "issue" merely meant a definite matter in controversy between the parties and not a matter in controversy involving a whole cause of action. The plaintiff in that case was accordingly held to be entitled to the costs of two questions which were raised in the action and on which he had succeeded. The learned judges of the Court of Appeal, on the contrary, were unanimously of opinion that the two questions were not separate issues; and that the answers thereto did not constitute "events" within the meaning of the rules. Lord Justice Buckley's definition of "issue" for the purposes of the rules places the matter on a thoroughly unequivocal basis: "An issue is that which, if decided in favour of the plaintiff, gives in itself a right to relief, or, but for some other consideration, would in itself give a right to relief; or, if decided in favour of the defendant, would be in itself a defence." An "event" within the meaning of the rules was, in his Lordship's opinion, an outcome, a result of the presentation to the tribunal of some claim made by the plaintiff against the defendant which results in a finding that the plaintiff is or is not entitled to some relief against the defendant." The authorities decided on the rules seemed to the learned Lord Justice to bear out what he said. They were Wagstaffe v. Bentley (85 L. T. Rep. 744; (1902) 1 K. B. 124), Hubback v. British North Borneo Company (91 L. T. Rep. 672; (1904) 2 K. B. 473), Hoyes v. Tate (96 L. T. Rep. 419; (1907) 1 K. B. 656), and Stafford v. Erlebach (106 L. T. Rep. 61; (1912) 3 K. B. 155). After so conlusive an interpretation of the rules, there should be an end to all uncertainty and difficulty whenever the same come up for consideration in the future.

66

THE CONVEYANCER..

Settled Land Acts-Effect of- Disentailing Deed— Compound Settlement.

THE case of Re Trafford's Settled Estates (137 L. T. Jour, 564; (1915) 1 Ch. 9) decides a new point under the Settled Land Acts-namely, that a disentailing deed executed by a tenant in tail in possession of settled land is not an "assignment by operation of law or otherwise of his estate or interest under the settlement" within the meaning of sect. 50, sub-sect. 1, of the Act of 1882. It was contended on behalf of the quondam tenant in tail that, having once had the powers of a tenant for life in respect of the settled land, those powers still continued notwithstanding the execution by him of the disentailing deed. As is well known, the powers under the Act of a tenant for life are incapable of assignment or release. The question turned upon whether the execution of a disentailing deed was an assignment of the interest of the tenant in tail within the meaning of sect. 50 sub-sect. 1, of the Settled Land Act 1882. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Warrington in the course of his judgment, that depends upon the meaning and effect of sect. 15 of the Fines and

Recoveries Act 1833, which enables a tenant in tail to dispose of the lands entailed for an estate in fee simple. For the purposes of effective disposition, it turns the estate of the tenant in tail into an estate in fee simple, provided the formalities required by the Act are observed. By a disentailing deed in the ordinary form he does not assign or dispose of his estate or interest at all. The case of Re Trafford's Settled Estates is also useful as confirming the law as laid down in Re Marquis of Ailesbury and Lord Iveagh (69 L. T. Rep. 101; (1893) 2 Ch. 345) and Re Phillimore's Estate (91 L. T. Rep. 256; (1904) 2 Ch. 460)-namely, that the subsistence of annuities charged on the settled land may be sufficient to create a compound settlement, although there is no term limited to secure them, nor any trust for their payment. In Re Phillimore's Estate the facts were very shortly as follows: By an indenture dated the 3rd Aug. 1886 certain real and leasehold property was assured to trustees upon trust for such persons as P. should by deed appoint. By deed poll dated the 4th Aug. 1886 P. appointed that this property should be held upon trust for himself for life, and, subject thereto, to pay certain annuities to five persons for their respective lives, and, subject thereto, in trust for P. absolutely. P. died in Feb. 1887, having by his will given his residuary estate, which included the interest he had retained in the property subject to the annuities, upon certain trusts under which the plaintiff was tenant for life with remainder to his infant son in tail; and it was held by Lord Justice Farwell (then Mr. Justice Farwell) that the deeds of the 3rd and 4th Aug. 1886 and the will formed a compound settlement, and that the plaintiff, as tenant for life thereunder, could sell the property discharged from the annuities. In Re Trafford's Settled Estates the facts were shortly as follows: E. T., by his will dated in 1889, devised certain freehold estates to the use of his son S. T. for life, with remainder to the use of his first and other sons successively according to their seniorities in tail male, with remainders over; and he charged his settled estates with the payment of certain annuities, some of which were still subsisting. E. T. died in 1892. S. T., the tenant for life, died in 1912, and thereupon his eldest son, J. T., became tenant in tail in possession of the settled estates. On the 8th April 1914 he executed a disentailing deed, which was duly enrolled, limiting the settled estates to himself in fee simple. On the 17th April 1914 he executed a resettlement on his marriage of part of the estates to the use of himself for life with remainders over, and two persons were thereby appointed trustees thereof for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts 1882 to 1890. Held, by Mr. Justice Warrington, that by reason of the subsistence of the annuities created by the will, there was a compound settlement consisting of the will, the disentailing deed, and the resettlement, and that trustees of such compound settlement ought to be appointed. His Lordship thought that the case came within Re Marquis of Ailesbury and Lord Iveagh and Re Phillimore's Estate, before referred to.

Notice of Trusts.

REFERRING to an article which appeared in these columns on the 19th Dec. last, p. 160, under the heading of "Marriage Settlements-Duty of Trustees-Notice," where it is stated that when a settlement is effected by two deeds (one being a conveyance to trustees upon trust for sale and the other being a deed declaring the trusts of the proceeds of sale) there appears to be no case actually deciding whether or not an intending purchaser or mortgagee can require production of the deed declaring the trusts, a correspondent writes to ask whether the case of Re Blaiberg and Abraham's Contract (81 L. T. Rep. 75; (1899) 5 Ch. 340) does not decide that in any case where the trusts have been disclosed a purchaser cannot call for both an abstract and the production of such deed and any subsequent trust deed in order to trace the title of the trustees from the date of the settlement, so that the purchaser can get a good discharge for the payment of the purchase money. We quite agree that in a case similar to Re Blaiberg and Abraham's Contract the purchaser would be entitled to call for an abstract and the production of the deeds referred to; but that was quite a different case from the ordinary one of a settlement effected by two deeds referred to in the aforesaid article. In Re Blaiberg and Abraham's Contract a contract had been entered into for the sale

of property which was subject to a mortgage to two persons. The mortgage deed contained the usual statement that the money belonged to the mortgagees on a joint account. By inadvertence it was disclosed to the purchasers that the mortgage money was held on the trusts of a settlement of which the mortgagees were not the original trustees, and it was held, and rightly, that the purchasers were entitled to require that it should be shown that the mortgagees were the duly appointed trustees of the settlement. In that case the purchaser could not have got a good discharge for his purchase money without evidence that the mortgagees were duly appointed trustees. But in the case of a conveyance in trust for sale it seems clear that the trustees of such deed can give a good discharge to a purchaser without referrence to the contemporaneous deed. As pointed out in Mr. T. Cyprian Williams' well-known work on the Law of Vendor and Purchaser, vol. 1, p. 240, 2nd edit., if land has been conveyed by several persons jointly in fee, and it is disclosed that they are trustees of some settlement, a purchaser from them must find out whether they are duly appointed trustees, and were empowered to invest their trust funds in the purchase of lands, and are empowered to sell the land, and can give good receipts for the purchase money; and, if it appear that such powers have not been conferred upon them, he must require the coucurrence of all persons beneficially entitled, and should not accept the title if this cannot be obtained, or some beneficiary be under an insurmountable disability. That, again, is quite different from the case of trustees with full power of sale and of giving receipts of the purchase money. Therefore we adhere to the submission contained in the article referred to by our correspondent—namely, that where a settlement is effected by two deeds (one being a conveyance in trust for sale and the other being a deed declaring the trusts of the proceeds), a purchaser could not, under ordinary circumstances, require production of the separate instrument declaring the trusts of the proceeds of sale.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS.

COURT OF APPEAL.

Employer and Workman-Hiring of Threshing Machine-Injury by Accident - Compensation ،، Employment "Accident arising out of and in the Course of the Employment "-Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58), s. 1.

N. was a casual labourer. B. was a farmer. F. was the owner of steam threshing machines which were taken round along the high road by an engine driver, a feeder, and a road man from farm to farm to do threshing. The driver and feeder had the assistance of other hands to move the machinery into position and to fetch it back again to the high road. F. was served by B. with a notice claiming indemnity. The arbitration was concerned with the somewhat complicated relationship between the three parties, a relationship common in Norfolk and elsewhere. N. was helping the engine driver and feeder to get a threshing machine out of B.'s farm when the machine suddenly moved and jammed him against a gate post. He was ruptured and otherwise injured. It was well understood and was in the contemplation alike of employer and workman that N. was to do the ordinary and accustomed work of the casual labourer where a steam threshing machine and elevator were used for threshing. The learned County Court judge found as a fact that part of that ordinary and accustomed work was, according to the custom or local common law, to help to move the machinery on and off the farm as well as to help to move the sheaves. His Honour inferred and found as a fact that in assisting to get the machinery to the road N. was doing part of the work that he was engaged by B. to performthat it was in his day's work. He was assisting to move the machinery on B.'s land during the time for which B. engaged to pay him. And His Honour found that the work N. was doing at the time of the accident was not merely ancillary but was a factor of his employment; and that therefore the injury by accident to N. arose "out of and in the course of " his employment. B. appealed.

Held, that there was ample evidence from which the learned County Court judge could draw the inference of fact that he did, and justified him in arriving at the conclusion that the

accident to N. arose "out of and in the course of " his employment. Appeal dismissed.

[Newson v. Burstall and Farrow. Ct. of App.: Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R, Swinfen Eady and Phillimore, L JJ. Jan. 12.-Counsel: Ellis Hill; Holman Gregory, K.C. and Gerald Dodson. Solicitors: Watson, Sons, and Room; A. E. Pratt, agent for Mills and Reeve, Norwich.]

Rating-Charitable Institution—Public Charity-Private Charity -Exemption from Rating-Towns Improvement Clauses Act 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 34), s. 168.

Appeal by the defendants from a decision of the Divisional Court (Lush, Atkin, and Rowlatt, JJ.) noted 138 L. T. Jour. 192. By the deed of foundation of a certain charity the primary objects of the charity were declared to be as follows: (1) To provide a home for ladies by birth and education who have become reduced in circumstances, and for such ladies who, by their pecuniary needs, may be deserving a better and more comfortable position in life. (2) To pay annuities to such ladies as aforesaid who may become occupants of the home and who are called "lady occupants." (3) To pay annuities to other ladies who are not occupants of the home and who are known as "lady_recipients." There were certain restrictions in the deed which confined the benefits of the charity to ladies of not less than a certain age, of good character, of certain means, and a preference was to be given to those who were born or had been resident for a specified period in H. By sect. 168 of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 34) it is provided that: "No person shall be rated to any rate made in pursuance of this or the special Act in respect of tithes, or of any church, chapel, meeting-house, or other building exclusively used for public worship, or any building exclusively used for the purposes of gratuitous education of the poor or of public charity, or any building or land belonging to the commissioners." On a special case stated as to whether the homes provided under the charity were liable to be rated or were exempt from rating under the Towns Improvement Clauses Act 1847, it was held that there is no special definition as to what constitutes a "public charity," but that all the circumstances of the case must be taken into consideration. Unless the restrictions imposed are confined within the narrowest limits, it is a presumption that the charity is a public one, and consequently that homes established in connection with such a charity are exempt from rating under the Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Divisional Court and dismissed the appeal.

[Shaw and others v. Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the Borough of Halifax. Ct. of App.: Buckiey, Kennedy, and Pickford, L JJ. Jan. 12.-Counsel: for the appellants, Tindal Atkinson, K.C. and Courthope-Munroe, K.C.; for the respondents, Colam, K.C. and Konstam. Solicitors: for the appellants, Sharpe, Pritchard, and Co. agents for P. Saunders, Halifax; for the respondents, Sewell, Edwards, and Nevill, agents for Hill and Norris, Halifax].

KING'S BENCH DIVISION, IN BANKRUPTCY. Bankruptcy-Petition against a married Woman-Carrying on Business before Marriage-Marriage after active Trading had ceased-Stock and Book Debts still in Hand-Married Women's Property Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), s. 1, sub-s. 5.

R. was a married woman. In Aug. 1912 the father of the debtor died, having by his will appointed his wife his executrix and sole legatee. The wife died intestate in Nov. 1912 without having proved her husband's will. In April 1913 letters of administration with the testator's will annexed were granted to his daughter, who was the debtor. The debtor continued to carry on her late father's business, that of a corn merchant, and incurred certain debts with regard to it. On learning she was personally liable for debts, she collected the book debts and tried to sell the business. On the 10th June she ceased actively to carry on the business, and she ordered a sale of the business on the 30th June and the 1st July. On the 24th July she committed an act of bankruptcy by sending out a circular to the creditors. On the 25th July she married. On the 27th Oct. a bankruptcy petition was presented based on the act of bankruptcy committed on the 24th July. On the 4th Nov. the petition came before the registrar, and on this date the debtor still had a small amount of hay, and a few book debts were uncollected. The creditor now appealed against the finding of the registrar of the Birmingham county court-viz., that the debtor had on the 10th June ceased to carry on business, and was not at the hearing of the petition a married woman carrying on business.

Held, by Horridge, J., that the statute applicable was sect. 1, sub-sect. 5, of the Married Women's Property Act 1882. Distinguishing the case from Re Dagnal (75 L. T. Rep. 142), he held that the debtor could not be said to be carrying on business at the date of the petition. Held, by Rowlatt, J.,

dissenting, that the principle of Re Dagnal applied, and that the debtor was still carrying on business at the date of the petition. Appeal dismissed."

[Re a Debtor. K. B. Div. in Bank.: Horridge and Rowlatt, JJ. Jan. 11.-Counsel: Arthur Ward; J. F. Eales. Solicitors : Surr, Gribble, and Co, for Docker, Hosgood, and Co., Birmingham; C. Pearsall Locker, Birmingham.]

LAW LIBRARY.

Mens Rea. By DOUGLAS AIKENHEAD STROUD, LL.D. Sweet and Maxwell Limited.

DR. STROUD'S work on Imputability under the Law of England is his thesis presented to the University of London for his doctor's degree. The book has been very carefully put together. His tabulated excuses from conviction of crime put the scheme which he has here elaborated before one at a glance in an able manner.

The Law of Hearsay Evidence. By J. B. C. TREGARTHEN. Stevens and Sons Limited.

MR. TREGARTHEN has made a useful digest of the law of hearsay, and goes on to analyse the res geste rule and to divide into different groups, according to the principle governing the admissibility in each case, the mass of material that has gathered under this head. He discriminates clearly between original evidence and hearsay, and elaborates his subject through twenty interesting chapters.

In Debtors and the War (Stevens and Haynes, and Sherratt and Hughes, Manchester) Mr. T. E. Bradley deals with the rights and privileges of debtors under the moratorium and the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914, and concisely discusses and explains that Act and the provisions of the Postponement of Payments Act, with the orders and rules made under them.

The Life of Robert Spence Watson. By PERCY CORDER. Headley Brothers.

MR. CORDER has prepared a highly interesting memorial of his uncle, the Quaker solicitor. In the absence of diaries or journals, he has not adopted the usual chronological sequence of biographies, but has treated the record of Dr. Spence Watson's life under Topics. He has succeeded in drawing a vivid picture of a varied personality and in producing a most readable book, the subject of which practised in Newcastle for fifty years. Not the least interesting part of the book is the series of charming family portraits.

We have received from T. Maskew Miller, Cape Town, a translation of Van der Linden's Institutes of the Laws of Holland, prepared by George T. Morice, K.Č. This legal, practical, and mercantile manual has been for many years the text-book of Roman-Dutch law most largely in use in South Africa, and an edition showing how far his statement of the law is applicable to modern conditions has long been wanted. As it is the prescribed text-book for the law examination for solicitors and civil servants, students will welcome this attempt to present it in an up-to-date form.

The Law Relating to the Child. By ROBERT W. HOLLAND. Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Limited.

DR. HOLLAND has done much in this book to bring together the loose ends which have been created by the various Acts of Parliament affecting children's education, birth notification, school feeding, and so on. In his introduction he contrasts the ideas obtaining in different countries as to the foundations upon which the conservation of child life should be based. He finds this country backward in its legislation as regards the protection, education, and employment of children, and gives his readers a glimpse at what has been done in Spain, Germany, France, and Italy in these respects.

The Law of Contract During War. By WILLIAM FINLAYSON TROTTER. William Hodge and Co. PROFESSOR TROTTER opens his work with a lucid statement of the law, and then proceeds to deal with leading British and American cases under seven headings. Then follow the text of recent statutes, rules of court, and Act of Sederunt, with notes; and in Part 4 Orders in Council and proclamations, with notes. The author deals with his subject with special reference to the present circumstances in a most concise and practical manner. In the addendum he gives notes of the most recent cases.

In Practical Accounts for Executors and Trustees (Stevens and Sons Limited) Mr. Sydney Hodsoll has elaborately set forth examples of the manner in which these accounts should be kept. These will be invaluable to law and accountancy students, solicitors, and others, who have such duties to perform. Trust accounts, being of a somewhat technical nature, involve different methods from those generally in use in the commercial and business world. The author treats of his subject in three sections: Executors' and Administrators' Accounts per se; Accounts of Continuing Trusts under Wills; and Trust Accounts under marriage and other voluntary settlements.

The Guilt of Lord Cochrane in 1814. Lord Ellenborough. (Smith, Elder, and Co.)

66

LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S criticism" is a defence of his grandfather against attacks made by Lord Cochrane in a book called The Autobiography of a Seaman, published in 1860 and reprinted in 1890. In this book Lord Cochrane's conviction for fraud is attributed to the partiality of his judge, Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough. As all biographies of the great Chief Justice have been written by his political opponents, and the judgment on Lord Cochrane was attributed to political bias, it is as well that the facts for the other side are now set forth by his grandson, and we congratulate Lord Ellenborough upon having completed this interesting volume.

NEW EDITIONS.

Mr. Charles Thwaites has prepared a ninth edition of hist Guide to Criminal Law and Procedure (George Barber). The book is intended to assist articled clerks and Bar students in preparing for their examinations, and will be found all that can be desired for that purpose where time is lacking for the perusual of larger works. The text has been carefully revised and exterded by some sixteen pages.

A second edition of Mr. Robert Dymond's excellent book on Death Duties (Jordan and Sons Limited) has been called for on account of the passing of the Finance Act 1914 and the Death Duties (Killed in War) Act 1914. All the Acts relating to death duties, including Table 1 of the Succession Duty Act 1853, have been included. This has increased the size of the book, but the convenience of having the text of the Acts for reference sufficiently compensates for this.

:

Mr. Herbert W. Jordan in his Private Companies their Utility and the Exemptions they enjoy (Jordan and Sons Limited) sets forth the advantages of a private company, and the advantage of this method for commercial men wishing to safeguard their business by limiting their liability.

The Cambridge University Press publishes Dr. J. Holland Rose's lectures, delivered in the Michaelmas Term, on The Origins of the War. The eight lectures deal with Anglo-German Rivalry, the Kaiser, Germany's World Policy, Morocco and the Baghdad Railway, Alsace-Lorraine, the Eastern Question (1908-1913, the Crisis of 1914, and the Rupture, tracing the course of the political developments leading to war.

Judicial Interpretation of Political Theory (G. P. Putnam's Sons) is a study in the relations of the courts to the American party system, by Dr. William Bennett Bizzell. It is a reprint, with additional chapters on the theory of direct legislation and the theory of the recall of judicial decisions, of a series of lectures delivered at Illinois. At the moment, when attention is directed to the unusual power of the courts in regard to questions invoiving partisan and political views, Dr. Bizzell's book is of particular

interest.