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effect of paying the money into court was merely to free the land in the hands of the purchaser from the charge, or to transfer the charge to the purchase money, so as to make the proceeds of sale in the hands of the trustees available to make good the depreciation. And it was held by the learned judge that the portion charge was transferred to the purchase money. As pointed out in the course of a closely reasoned judgment, the main object of sect. 5 was to allow the land to be conveyed to a purchaser free from the incumbrance, and not to disturb vested or other rights more than is necessary. The Act did not say that when the money was paid in and the land freed that the money should be substituted as the security; and as in this case the money could be traced, it was a more equitable construction of the section to throw the loss on the money in the hands of the trustees than upon a chargee who had nothing to do with the sale. The cases in which a fund is set aside by the court to meet annuities and legacies charged on property before distributing the rest of it bear some analogy to the foregoing. Thus in Re Evans and Bettell's Contract (103 L. T. Rep. 181; (1910) 2 Ch. 433) it was decided by Lord Parker of Waddington (then Mr. Justice Parker) that, where annuities and legacies are charged on property, the court's jurisdiction to set apart a fund to answer the same and distribute the rest of the property is based on administration only, and that the exercise of jurisdiction does not release the rest of the property, which, if the fund fails to answer the annuities and legacies, may be followed into the hands of those who take it; and that, notwithstanding the setting apart of the fund, a purchaser of part of the distributed property may validly object to the title in the absence of any release from the annunities and legacies and of an order under sect. 5 of the Conveyancing Act 1881. The decision, however, in Re Wilberforce of course turned upon the construction of the Act of Parliament.

Yorkshire Registries Act 1884.


DECISIONS upon the Registry Acts of Middlesex and Yorkshire are not frequent, and when they occur it is well to note them. In Arden v. Arden (52 L. T. Rep. 610; 29 Ch. Div. 702) it was decided that the local Registry Acts were intended to apply And only to dealings, at law or in equity, with the land itself. that accordingly an incumbrancer upon a share in the proceeds of real estate in Middlesex devised in trust for sale obtains no priority over other incumbrancers on such share by registering his mortgage deed; and that the priorities of such incumbrancers rank according to the dates of their respective notices to the trustees. The language of the Middlesex Registry Act (7 Anne, c. 20) is not quite the same as that of the Yorkshire Registries Act 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 54), as the former refers to deeds and conveyances whereby any hereditaments in Middlesex "may be in any way affected in law or equity," but the latter Act omits the words in law or equity." In the recent case of Gresham Life Assurance Society v. Crowther (111 L. T. Rep. 887; (1914) 2 Ch. 219) the facts were shortly as follows: Under a settlement of land by way of conveyance in trust for sale C. was entitled to a reversionary interest in the proceeds of sale which she mortgaged to the plaintiffs, and a few days afterwards she gave notice of the mortgage to the trustees of the settlement, but did not register the same under the Act of 1884. Subsequently C. mortgaged her reversion to another person, and that mortgage was transferred to X., who subsequently sold to Y. The mortgage, transfer, and conveyance to Y. were all duly registered under the Act of 1884, and without notice of the plaintiff's mortgage. Notice of each of these three deeds was also given to the trustees of the settlement. It was decided by Mr. Justice Astbury and affirmed by the Court of Appeal (following Arden v. Arden) that the plaintiff's mortgage was not registrable under the Act of 1884, and that it was entitled to priority by virtue of the prior notice to the trustees. Conveyances by a Majority of Charity Trustees.

SECT. 12 of the 'Charitable Trusts Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 110) enacts, in effect, that where the trustees of a charity have power to determine on any sale, mortgage, or other disposition of the charity property, a majority of them who are present at a duly


constituted meeting and vote on the question shall have, and be
deemed to have always had, full power to execute all assurances
requisite for carrying any such sale, &c., into effect; and such
assurances shall have the same effect as if they were respectively
executed by all the trustees and the Official Trustee of Charity
Lands. It seems to be generally considered that that section
applies to all charities, and not merely to those which are within
the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioners under the Charit-
able Trusts Act 1857 (see Lewin on Trus's, p. 291, 12th edit.,
and the Earl of Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 4, p. 276).
Having regard, however, to the frame of the various Charitable
Trusts Acts, the point is not as clear as it might be.
The Charitable Trusts Act 1853 expressly exempts from its
operation various charities, such as buildings registered for
religious worship and bonâ fide used for that purpose, and
charities wholly maintained by voluntary contributions. The
Act of 1855, which places a restriction upon sales, mortgages,
&c., of charity land, does not throw much light on the point;
but it has been decided that that restriction does not apply
to charities exempted from the Charitable Trusts Acts by the
Act of 1853. The Charitable Trusts Acts of 1853, 1855, and 1860
66 shall be
contain the somewhat usual provision that they
construed together as one Act." The Act, however, of 1869
slightly varies the form by providing that "so far as is con-
sistent with the tenor thereof" it shall be construed as one
with the previous Acts. Whether or not it is consistent with
the tenor of the Act of 1869 to construe sect. 12 as applying
to all charities is not free from difficulty; but it is submitted
that, having regard to the provision that the majority of the
trustees are to be deemed to have "always had full power to
execute" assurances, the section applies to all charities, whether
exempted from the operation of the Act of 1853 or not, because
prior to 1853 there was no difference between exempted and
non-exempted charities. It is scarcely necessary to add that
in the absence of express statutory authority a majority of charity
trustees could not pass the legal estate which is vested in all: (see
Re Ebsworth and Tidy's Contract, 60 L. T. Rep. 841; 42 Ch.
Div. 23).




Employer and Workman-Injury by Accident-Compensation-Farm Hand-Journey in Farmer's Cart to fetch Workman's Box from Railway Station-" Accident arising out of and in the Course of the Employment" Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58), s. 1.

The applicant was a farm hand living at B., and on the 8th Nov. 1913 was hired at A. by the respondent, who was a farmer at M., near A., at wages of £17 15s. for half a year, to enter the respondent's employment on the 13th Nov. It was a term of the employment that the applicant could have a horse and cart to convey his box from the railway station to the respondent's farm. On the 13th Nov., about 12.30 p m., the applicant arrived at the farm, having cycled over from his home, and his box was then at the railway station. He saw the respondent's wife. She said she would make him his dinner, and then he would have to go for his box. He had his dinner, and then the respondent's wife told her boy to show the applicant which horse he had to take. The boy pointed out a horse. The applicant harnessed the horse to the cart and proceeded towards the railway station to procure his box. On the way the horse was frightened by a motor, and an accident happened whereby the applicant was seriously injured. The County Court judge, in finding that the accident did not arise "out of" the employment, said that when the applicant went for his box and met with the accident he was not in any way fulfilling any obligation imposed upon him by his contract of service, but met with the accident while he was going to the railway station for his own purposes-i.e., to convey his box therefrom. His Honour further found that the evidence did not support the contention that there was a contractual obligation by the respondent to convey the applicant's box; that the respondent had only promised to let the applicant have a horse and cart; and that this was the usual practice in the neighbourhood. His Honour further decided that the accident did not arise "in the course of" the applicant's employment. The applicant appealed.

Held, that it could not be said that the applicant in going with the horse and cart for his box was fulfilling any contract by the respondent to carry that box from the railway station to the farm; that the applicant was merely using the respondent's horse and cart with leave and licence as it was agreed that he should be at liberty to do; that he was going on his own business, and not on the respondent's business; and that therefore the County Court judge was amply justified in coming to the conclusion that the accident did not arise "out of" the applicant's employment having regard to the evidence. Held, therefore, that it was unnecessary to consider whether the accident arose also "in the course of" his employment. Appeal dismissed.

[Whitfield v. Lambert. Ct. of App.: Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Swinfen Eady and Phillimore, L JJ. Jan. 13 and 21.— Counsel: Henriques; William Shakespeare. Solicitors: Doyle, Devonshire, and Co, agents for J. Ingram Dawson, Barnard Castle; Speechly, Mumford, and Co., agents for Saul and Lightfoot, Carlisle.]

Employer and Workman-Injury by Accident - CompensationShunter riding on Buffer of Railway Waggon in Breach of Regu lations-Added Peril-"Accident arising out of and in the Course of the Employment"-Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58), s. 1.


The applicant was a shunter, and he was employed to shunt waggons on the private line of railway on the premises of the respondents On the day in question he was engaged until about half-past 12 p.m. At that time the work was practically finished, the engine was to go back to the engine shed, and the men were to go to their dinner. There were four waggons. The four waggons had been picked up by the engine on the way and coupled to the engine. There was a run of about threequarters of a mile to the engine shed. It was the duty of the applicant to accompany the trucks as far as the engine shed. had to walk in fr nt of the waggons to keep a proper look out. It was against the rules to ride on the waggons, and it was a dangerous thing to ride on the buffer. Nevertheless the applicant got upon the right-hand buffer of the waggon farthest from the engine. The engine was running tender first and pushing the waggons in front of it and not pulling them. The applicant was sitting sideways with his legs hanging to the right-hand side of the line. "He had hold of his shunting pole with both hands. One end of the pole was under the drawbar of the waggon. The other end of the pole was resting on the top of the right-hand buffer. He fell off the buffer because the shunting pole slipped." He fell on to the line. Some of the waggons passed over his legs, and he was severely injured. It was decided by the County Court judge that the accident arose "out of "as well as in the course of" the employment of the applicant. The respondents appealed. Held (Phillimore, L.J. dissentiente), that the applicant, by riding on the buffer in the way in which he did, instead of walking in front of the waggons, was doing that which he was forbidden to do, thereby incurring a risk which, as between himself and his employers he ought not to have exposed himself to. Held, therefore, that the accident did not arise "out of " the employment in which the applicant was engaged. Appeal allowed.


[Herbert v. Samuel Fox and Co. Limited. Ct. of App.: Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R, Swinfen Eady and Phillimore, L.JJ. Jan. 20 and 21.-Counsel: T. E. Ellison; H. T. Waddy. Solicitors: J. B. Somerville, agent for F. G and H E. Smith, Bradford: Pitman and Sons, agents for Chambers and Son, Sheffield.]

Insurance (National)—Unemployment Insurance-Insured Trade— Saw milling-Special Order of Board of Trade-Extension of Part 2 of National Insurance Act 1911 to Workmen in Trade other than insured Trade-Jurisdiction of "competent and impartial Person appointed to inquire· Ultra viresNational Insurance Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 55), ss. 103, 113, scheds. 6 and 9.

Appeal from a judgment of the Divisional Court (Lord Reading, C.J., Coleridge and Rowlatt, JJ.) reported (1915) 1 K. B. 133. By sect. 103 of the National Insurance Act 1911 the Board of Trade has power to make a special order extending Part 2 of the Act to trades other than insured trades mentioned in the sixth schedule to the Act, by clause 7 of which saw milling "carried on in connection with any other insured trade" is an insured trade. By sect. 113 and the ninth schedule to the Act the Board of Trade has power to appoint a competent and impartial person to inquire and report with regard to any draft order. The board made a draft order extending Part 2 to saw milling, "whether carried on in connection with any other insured trade or not," and appointed a barrister under sect. 113 to inquire and report. The barrister was of opinion that the order was ultra vires the board because saw milling already appeared in the schedule among insured trades, and therefore the order could not extend Part 2 to it.

The Divisional Court held (inter alia) that the order was intra vires, as the trade of saw-milling dealt with by the order was, within the meaning of sect. 103, a different trade from the sawmilling mentioned as an insured trade in the sixth schedule. Held, that the draft special order was intra vires, and the appeal must be dismissed.

[Rex v. Hudson. Ct. of App.: Buckley, Pickford, and Bankes, L.JJ. Jan. 26.-Counsel: Sanderson, K. C. and Eastham; Sir John Simon (A.-G.), Ash on, K.C. and Branson. Solicitors: Busk, Mellor, and Norris, for Vaudrey, Oppenheim, and Mellor, Manchester; Solicitor to the Board of Trade]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Company-Judgment Creditor's Petition to wind-up-" Proceed to enforce Judgment "-Leave of Court necessary Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914, s. 1, sub-s. 1 (a).

This was a motion by a company for an injunction to restrain the respondent, who was a judgment creditor of the company, from advertising or proceeding with a petition to wind-up the company unless and until application had been made to the court under sec. 1, sub-sect. 1 (a), of the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 and leave given to proceed. Sect. 1, sub-sect. 1 (a), of that Act provides that no person should proceed to execution on or otherwise to the enforcement of any judgment or order of any court (whether entered or made before or after the passing of that Act) for the payment or recovery of a sum of money to which that sub-section applied, except after such application to such court and such notice as might be prov ded for by rules and directions under that Act. This sub-section was applicable to the sum due to the respondent on the judgment obtained. The question was whether this petition to wind-up the company was proceeding to enforce a judgment within the meaning of that sub-section.

Held, that this petition was a proceeding to execution on or otherwise to the enforcement of the judgment of the respondent within the meaning of sect. 1, sub-sect. 1 (a), of the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914, and that therefore the leave of the court to proceed was required under that Act; that it was made clear in the cases of Re Chapel House Colliery Company (47 L. T. Rep. 575; 24 Ch. Div. 259) and Re Crigglestone Stone Company (95 L. T. Rep. 510; (1906) 2 Ch. 327) that a winding-up order entitled the creditor to seize the assets of his debtor and might be called an equitable execution, and therefore a petition to wind-up must be held to be within the meaning of this Act; and that the Act, being passed to prevent unnecessary destruction of property or credit of debtors who had been affected by the war, should be applied in such a as this.


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Company-Motion-Receiver-Jeopardy-One Debenture holder— Charge on specific Articles-Usual "floating Charge' Condition-Fixed Charge not altered thereby-No Right to have Receiver and Manager.


Motion for the appointment of receiver and manager Plaintiff owned the only two £100 debentures issued of a series of five, and was the only debenture holder or mortgagee of the company. He proved that judgments had been re overed against the company and that execution was likely to issue, and contended that he had proved jeopardy within Re New York Taxicab Company; Sequin v. The Comp ny (107 L. T Rep. 813). Clause 3 of the debentures says: The company hereby charges with such payments all its plant, machinery, shop fittings, and office furniture" i.e., spec fic and named articles of the nature of fixed capital. Condition I was as follows: This debenture is one of a series of like debentures of the company for securing principal sums not exceeding in the aggregate at any one time £500. The debentures of the said series, whether original or not, are all to rank pari passu as a first charge on the property hereby charged without any preference or priority one over another, but so that the company is not to be at liberty to create any mortgage or charge in priority to or pari passu with the said del ensures. Condition 10 set out the events in which the principal moneys became payable. There had not in fact been any such default as would render the principal moneys payable. condition 11, if the moneys became due under condition 10, and if a receiver were appointed, that receiver should have power to enter on the premises and carry on the business, and to apply moneys in aid of the property specifically charged in the paying off of these debentures.


Held, (1) that there was jeopardy within Re New York Taxicab Company; Sequin v. The Company (107 L. T. Rep. 813); (2) that the words in condition 1, “but so that the company is

not to be at liberty to create any mortgage or charge in priority to or pari passu with the said debentures," could not be construed as implying the creation of a floating charge contrary to the specific charge already given by the debenture; and (3) that the plaintiff was not entitled to the appointment of a receiver and manager of the whole assets and business of the company, but only to have a receiver appointed of the assets specifically charged.

[Grigson v. George Taplin and Co. Limited. Ch. Div.: Sargant, J. Jan. 22.-Counsel: Romer, K.C. and Rowlands; Elsley Zeitlyn. Solicitors: Wrentmore and Son; Kenneth Brown, Baker, Baker, and Co.]

Covenant-Construction-Building Scheme Shop and House Plots-"No House shall be used as a Shop"-Club-Lock-up Shops on Ground Floor-User as retail Shops.

The plaintiff, the owner of land comprising two farms, proposed to develop it subject to a building scheme which provided for the erection of shops on lots so marked on a plan and houses only on the remaining lots. He had conveyed in fee simple on the 27th July 1893 and the 28th Feb. 1894 to the predecessor in title of the defendants three of these plots for houses subject to covenants that (inter alia) "no house shall be used as a shop." and no house or shop should be built of less value than £300 each. The defendants, who in 1912 bought subject to and with notice of these restrictions, erected on these plots intended only for the erection of houses a residential building the larger portion of which was occupied as a social and political club with quarters for a resident caretaker, and on the ground floor, fronting the road, four lock-up shops within the walls and under the roof of the main building, one of which was in use for the sale of provisions and the others intended to be used for retail shops. In an action raising the question whether there had been a breach of the stipulation, the defendants alleged that no stipulation prohibited the erection of a shop, "house" was spoken of in contradistinction to "shop," either a house or shop could be erected, and that the stipulation did not apply to a building ori inally erected for a shop, but would prevent the conversion of a house into a shop.

Held, that, assuming the covenant was capable of being construed as contended for by defendants, their contention could not be adopted, having regard to the circumstances existing when the covenant was entered into. The stipulation meant that no building erected on a plot confined to the erection of houses should be used as a shop. Injunction granted.

[Ramuz v. Leigh-on-Sea Conservative and Unionist Club Limited. Ch. Div.: Eve, J. Jan. 22.-Counsel: Maugham, K.C. and Warwick H. Draper; Edward Clayton, K.C. and C. H. Thorpe (or J. Ewart Walker). Solicitors: Horsley and Weightman; James Mellor and Coleman, agents for E. Houghton, Fry, and Young, Southend-on-Sea.]

Settled Land-Trust to retain or sell-Discretionary Power to postpone Sale and Conversion-Tenant for Life-Trust or Direction for Sale within the Meaning of sect. 63 of the Settled Land Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 38).

Originating summons to determine whether residuary real estate devised by will was subject to a trust or direction for sale thereof within the meaning of sect. 63 of the Settled Land Act 1882 so as to give the person entitled to the income until sale the powers of a tenant for life under the Settled Land Acts. A testator by his will made in 1906 devised and bequeathed the residue of his real and personal property (except any copyhold property of which he might be possessed) upon trust to retain in the same state as at the time of his death or at such time and in such manner as his trustees should think fit to sell the same, and by clause 12 of his will he declared his trustees might at their discretion postpone such sale, and that the income of his property until sale and conversion should be held upon the same trusts as were declared concerning the income of his trust estate. In the events which happened C. became tenant for life of the income of the residuary real estate and de-ired to manage the estate, which had become vested in the Public Trustee, but the question arose whether under the trusts of the will there was a trust or direction for sale of the residuary realty within the meaning of sect. 63 o as to give C. the powers of a tenant for life under the Settled Land Acts. The will directed that his copyhold estates should be sold and the money arising therefrom applied as directed with respect to the other residuary real estate and the income thereof. There were no subsequent gifts following the direction to retain or sell to show an intention of the testator that his real estate should remain and be dealt wi h as such, but the subsequent trusts were all trusts ordinarily applicable to proceeds of sale.

Held, that there was a trust or direction for sale within the meaning of sect. 63 of the Settled Land Act 1882; that, having regard to the terms of the whole will, and particularly to the power to postpone the sale and conversion, the trust to retain

or sell amounted to a trust or direction for sale subject to a power to retain, meaning a power to postpone, as was made clear by clause 12; and that this case was different from Re Goodall's Settlement; Fane v. Goodall (100 L. T. Rep. 223; (1909) 1 Ch. 440), but the decision in Re Crips; Crips v. Todd (95 L. T. Rep. 865) was applicable.

[Re J. H. Johnson (deceased); Cowley v. Public Trustee and others. Ch. Div. Astbury, J. Jan. 20 and 21-Counsel: Frank Russell, K.C. and Alfred Adams; E. F. Ball; E. P. Hewitt, K.C. and W. R. Sheldon; N. Micklem, K C. and W. Seymour Eastwood. Solicitors: Clowes, Hickley, and Steward; Tilleards; Thompsons, Quarrell, and Jones; Charles Rogers, Son, and Abbott ]

Trade Mark-Registration - Distinctive Word-Application to register the Word "Berna"-Geographical Name in foreign Language-Trade Marks Act 1905 (5 Edw. 7, c. 15), s. 9,

sub-s. 5.

This was an application under sect. 9, sub-sect. 5, of the Trade Marks Act 1905 by the Berna Commercial Motors Limited for an order directing the registrar to register the word "Berna as a trade mark in respect of certain motorcars. It was objected to upon the following grounds (inter alia): (1) That the word "Berna" in Italian and Spanish was the name for Berne, the capital of Switzerland, and, being a geographical name, should not be registered; and (2) that the word "Berna" was likely to induce the belief that the goods were made in Switzerland, when in fact they were made in England. It appeared from the evidence that the original company was started in 1902 and was Swiss, but its rights were transferred to the applicants in 1908, who continued to carry it on until 1912, when they disposed of their rights outside the United Kingdom and British dependencies to a new Swiss company. In 1913 the applicants decided to sell their business in the United Kingdom, including the right to use the word "Berna," to an English company known as the British Berna Motor Lorries Limited, the applicants retaining their rights in British dependencies. The assignment to this company had not been completed at the date of this application and, upon objection by the registrar, leave was given to substitute this company in place of the applicants.

Held, as regards (1) the principal objection, that the word "Berna" was not to English people particularly suggestive of the capital of Switzerland, and since it was not disqualified from being appropriated as a trade mark, and having regard to its extensive user as denoting the applicants' goods, the objection failed, as did also the second objection. The registrar was therefore ordered to proceed with the registration.

[Re Berna Commercial Motors Limited. Ch. Div.: Sargant, J. Jan. 14.-Counsel: L. B. Sebastian; J. Austen-Cartmell. Solicitors: Theodore Roberts; Solicitor to the Board of Trade.] Will-Construction-Bequest of net Profits ·Shares and Deb ntures of a limited Company-Share in a private Partnership-Gift of Income indefinite in Point of Time-Gift carrying Fund itself producing Income

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A testator left to M. "one fifth share of the net profits of my commercial undertakings-namely," naming two limited companies and a partnership. At his death the testator held shares in each of the limited companies, and also debentures of each of the companies issued to him as security for debts due to him from the companies respectively. He was also interested as a partner in the assets and profits of the partnership. At the testator's death one of the companies was making no profits. The question arose whether the bequest of net profits, being unlimited in point of time, carried one fifth of the shares of the testator in the companies and of the debentures or the debts secured by them, and one-fifth of the testator's share in the capital of the partnership.

Held, that there was no reason why the rule of law that a gift unlimited in point of time carries the fund producing it should not apply to the shares of a limited company; that a gift of the net profits of a company was equivalent to a gift of the dividends arising from its shares, and consequently carried the shares themselves; that neither the debentures nor the debts secured by them passed under the bequest; and that the rule of law above referred to did not apply to the bequest of the profits of a partnership so as to carry the capital of the partnership, as these profits did not arise merely from the capital of the partners, but from their exertions, and were not necessarily proportioned between the partners in relation to their shares of capital; and consequently as regards the partnership the bequest only carried the net profits which the executors of the testator were entitled

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KING'S BENCH DIVISION. Revenue-Increment Duty-Ascertainment of Site Value-Deductions-Stone Walls without Mortar-Walls used on Farm for protecting Sheep from Storms-" Buildings ""Any other Structures "-Meaning of Terms-Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 (10 Edw. 7, c. 8), s. 25, sub-8. 2.

By sect. 25, sub-sect. 2, of the Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 (10 Edw. 7, c 8) it is provided: "The full site value of land means the amount which remains after deducting from the gross value of the land the difference (if any) between that value and the value which the fee simple of the land, if sold at the time in the open market by a willing seller, might be expected to realise if the land were divested of any buildings and of any other structures (including fixed or attached machinery) on, in, or under the surface, which are appurtenant to or used in connection with any such buildings, and of all growing timber, fruit trees, fruit bushes, and other things growing thereon.' In ascertaining increment duty on the site value of a farm, the question arose as to whether the value of walls built without mortar, several feet high, and utilised for the purpose of protecting sheep from storms as well as for serving as boundary walls between adjacent properties, could be divested as coming within the definition of " buildings” or “any other structures within the above sub-section.

Held, that in interpreting the meaning of the statute it was necessary to consider the nature of the property which was being dealt with, the character of the structures themselves, and the functions which they fulfilled; that in the case of land used as a farm the word "buildings" or "any other structures could only include what were ordinarily described under the heading of farm buildings; and that the value of the walls could not therefore be taken into consideration. Leave to appeal.

[Walter Morrison v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue. K. B Div. Rowlatt, J. Jan. 25.-Counsel: Dickens, K.C. and W. Allen; Solicitor-General (Sir S. O. Buckmaster, K.C.) and W. R. Sheldon. Solicitors: Royds, Rawstorne, and Co, for Charlesworth and Co., Settle; Solicitor for Inland Revenue.] Revenue - Undeveloped Land Duty-Land "used bona fide for any Business, Trade, or Industry other than Agriculture—Busi ness of Land Developer - Exemption from Duty - Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 (10 Edw. 7, c. 8), s. 16, sub-s. 2.

By sect. 16, sub-sect. 2, of the Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 (10 Edw. 7, c. 8) it is provided, as to the charging of undeveloped land duty, that "for the purposes of this part of this Act, land shall be deemed to be undeveloped land if it has not been developed by the erection of dwelling-houses or of buildings for the purposes of any business, trade, or industry other than agriculture (but including glasshouses and greenhouses), or is not otherwise used bonâ fide for any business, trade, or industry other than agriculture." B., the owner of certain land, carried on the bona file business of a land developer, and the question was whether the land, which had no dwelling-houses or buildings erected upon it, was exempt from undeveloped land duty as being "used bonâ fide for any business, trade, or industry other than agriculture." The referee decided against B., although it was admitted by the Crown that land developing was a business and was being carried on bona fide by B. On appeal it was contended that one of the objects of the appellant's business was the distribution of land, and that as the employment of it was such as to discourage the holding of land, at which the statute aimed, it was therefore "used within the meaning of the word in the sub-section, and was furthermore used in the business of the appellant.

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the use of the land in accordance with the provisions of the statute, meant the employment of the land as land, and not its use as a saleable commodity held in a condition in which, regarded as land, it was unused or used only for agriculture

K. B. Div.:

(Brake v. Commissioners of Inland Rerenue. Rowlatt, J. Jan. 26-Counsel: Cox-Sinclair and Hynes ; Solicitor-General Sir S O. Buckmaster, K.C.) and T. H. Parr. Solicitors Church, Adams, and Prior, for Hollest, Mason, and Nash, Farnham; Solicitor for Inland Revenue]



Petition for Nullity-Alleged "wilful and persitent Refusal" by Wife to consummate-No reasonable Attempt by HusbandDickinson v. Dickinson, otherwise Phillips, distinguished. Petition for nullity of marriage by C. C. J. N. on the ground of the wilful and persistent refusal of his wife, E. M. de G. N., to permit him to have marital intercourse with her or to

consummate the said marriage, which he was willing and ready to do. From the evidence of the petitioner, taken on commission, it appeared that he and E. M. de G. N. went through a ceremony of marriage at Wareham, Dorset, on the 19th March 1907. The marriage had never been consummated. He had always been willing if he got the opportunity. He was now a trooper in the British South African Company's police. In 1906 and 1907 he was living in Swanage at a private tutor's. He was then sixteen years old. He was about 6ft. 2in. high and looked much older than his age. He fell in love with the respondent, who lived at Swanage and was twenty-four. After the ceremony they parted at the door of her father's house. Subsequently he stayed one night at the home of her parents in Ilfracombe. He suggested consummation, but she refused. The couple corresponded intermittently for awhile. The petitioner went to Scotland and Norfolk to learn farming, and about five years ago went to South Africa. In April 1914 he returned to England and tried to get his wife to live with him, but she refused. Cross-examined, he had not known his wife's address for five years. Medical evidence was given on behalf of the petitioner. The suit was undefended by the respondent, who did not appear at the medical examination. Counsel for the petitioner relied upon Dickinson v. Dickinson, otherwise Phillips (109 L. T. Rep. 408) and W. v. W., otherwise L. (1912) P. 78).

Held, that the facts were not similar to those in Dickinson v. Dickinson. Further, that there had not been any reasonable attempt by the husband, nor any "wilful and persistent refusal" by the wife in the sense referred to in the above case, and accordingly the petition must be dismissed. [Napier v. Napier, otherwise Goodban. P. Div.: Sir S. T. Evans, P. Jan. 23 and 26.-Counsel: Le Bas. Solicitors: Markby, Stewart, and Co.]

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL. Criminal Law-Charge of unlawfully entering Dwelling-house with Intent to steal-Plea of guilty-Mistaken Plea-Conviction and Sentence set aside.

The appellant was charged at the Brecon Quarter Sessions with entering a dwelling-house with intent to steal. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to seven years' penal servitude. It transpired that the accused really intended only to admit an unlawful entry without an intent to steal.

Held, that the question whether the appellant had pleaded guilty by mistake was one which the court could decide on consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case; that in the present case the plea of guilty was not in reality a plea of guilty to the offence charged; and that the conviction and sentence must be set aside.

[Rex v. Golathan. Ct. Crim. App.: Lord Reading, C.J., Ridley and Shearman, JJ. Jan. 25.-Counsel for the Crown, Roland Oliver, instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions.]



We have received from Messrs. Butterworth and Co. and Shaw and Sons The Yearly County Court Practice 1915, the editors being, as formerly, His Honour Judge Woodfall and Mr. E. H. Tindal Atkinson, Mr. Harry Cousins being responsible for the chapter on costs and the precedents of costs. The full and valuable notes in this excellent practice have been brought well up to date, and a special section is devoted to the Postponement of Payments Act, the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, and the Bills of Exchange Act passed last year. Mr. Aylmer Digby has revised the Admiralty chapter, and Mr. J. Errington the time and practice table and table of fees.

The new, and twenty-fifth, edition of Paterson's Licensing Acts (Butterworth and Co.; Shaw and Sons) has been subjected to certain alterations in arrangement, while the chapter on clubs has been amplified and to a large extent rewritten. The present editor of this well-known work is Mr. Gerard R. Hill, assisted by Mr. S. E. Major, jun., and all recent decisions and legislation have been incorporated, emergency legislation being placed at the commencement of the book. Both forms and index have been revised and added to, and the present volume can be well described as a full and accurate guide to our licensing law.

The Law Quarterly Review for January (Stevens and Sons Limited) contains (inter alia): The Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments, by W. S. Holdsworth; Intercourse with Alien Enemies, by T. Baty; The Origins of the Law of Sale, by Gilbert Stone; The Origins of the English Bar, II., by Herman Cohen; The True Nature of a Pawnee's Interest in Goods Pawned, by T. Cyprian Williams; Symbolical Deliveries by Documents, by Frank Tudsbery; Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, by the Editor; The Right Hon Arthur Cohen, K.C. (1830-1914), by A. V. Dicey, K.C.


Disney on Carriage by Railway. Fourth Edition. Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancery-lane. Price 7s. 6d.

Melville on Roman Law. W. Green and Son, Edinburgh. Price 20s. net.

Soward on Estate Duty. Fifth Edition. Waterlow and Sons Limited, London Wall, E.C. Price 10s. 6d. net.

Voy ey on Inland Revenue Affidavits. Stevens and Haynes, 13, Bell-yard, Temple Bar. Price 2s. 6d. net.

Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation. Vol. 15, Part 1. John Murray, Albemarle-street, W. Price 58. net. Colombia and the United States. N. Thomson and Co., 27, Cannon-street, E.C. Price 1s. net.

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His HONOUR.-I find upon the evidence that the plaintiff is a cattle dealer in a large way of business, and had previously sold a cow to the defendant, who, to the knowledge of the plaintiff, was a dairyman; that early in Nov. 1911 the plaintiff called upon the defendant and told him he had a cow which would suit him; that the defendant went to the Tavistock Market, and that the plaintiff thereupon said he had a cow other than the one he had first referred to that would suit him and showed him a cow in the market. This cow was very thin, and the defendant said it would not suit him as he felt sure it was not sound. The plaintiff thereupon expressed his firm opinion that the cow was sound and that its thin condition was due to the poor land from which it had been recently removed, and that it would improve. The defendant thereupon, relying on what the plaintiff had said, purchased the cow. There was a conflict of evidence as to whether there was or was not an express verbal warranty of soundness. I have often had occasion to point out the risk that purchasers take in not having warranties put into writing. The burden of proof is on the party setting up the warranty, and unless the tribunal, whether judge or jury, is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a verbal warranty was given, it is impossible, having regard to the principies of English law, to hold that the purchaser is entitled to remedy or relief. It is sufficient in this case to say that in my opinion it is unnecessary to give any finding on this contested question of fact. I find that the defendant by implication made known to the plaintiff that the particular purpose for which the cow was required was

purpose." The question, which was well argued before me by Mr. Wivell for the defendant, and by Mr. Peter for the plaintiff, was whether or not the defendant purchased the cow subject to the implied condition that it was reasonably fit for dairy purposes; or, in other words, whe her the above mentioned section applied to the contract of purchase. It might be suggested that this section was intended to impose such condition on the seller only in regard to goods where the defects are such as a skilled or experienced seller could discover, but it has been settled that the section operates in regard to the sale of goods where the defects are latent, concealed, or impossible to discover: (see Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533; Randall v. Newson, 36 L. T. Rep. 164; 2 Q. B. Div. 102; and Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Company (92 L. T. Rep. 527; (1905) 1 K. B. 608, at p. 613 C. A.). I am of opinion that sect. 14 applied to the contract of sale and that the plaintiff can only recover the amount realised upon the sale of the cow by the defendant. I wish to add that it is possible to over-estimate the effect of this judgment upon the ordinary agricultural market transactions of everyday life. If the sale in this case had been between two ordinary private individuals, the seller not being a seller within the meaning of the scction, there would seem to be authority that the maxim Caveat emptor would apply, although the subject-matter of the sale, or the purpose, was for the supply of human food: (see Burnby v. Bollitt, 16 M. & W. 644).



Abingdon, Wednesday, at 10
Aldershot, Wednesday, at 9.30
Altrincham, Friday

Andover, Friday, at 10.45

Arundel, Wednesday

Ashborne, Monday, at 11

Ashton-under-Lyne, Thursday, at


Atherstone, Thursday (J.S.) Aylesbury, Wednesday, at 10 Bangor, Monday


Barry, Tuesday, at 10
Basingstoke, Monday, at 10
Belford, Thursday, at 10
Belper, Wednesday, at 10
Berwick, Tuesday, at 10.30
Bicester. Thursday, at 10.30
Birkenhead, Tuesday and
Birmingham, Monday (L.), Tues-
day (L.). Wednesday (L.).
Thursday (L.), and Friday (L.),
at 10
Bloomsbury, Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday, Thursday, and Fri-
Bodmin, Friday, at 10

Boston. Tuesday (R. By), at 1.30 Bow, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday Bradford (Yorks). Tuesday, at 10; Thursday (J.S.), at 10.30; Friday, at 10

Brentford, Friday, at 10
Brighton, Thursday, at 10
Bromley, Saturday, at 9.30
Bromsgrove, Saturday, at 10
Burslem, Thursday, at 9.30
Burton, Monday (R. By), at 11.30
Camelford, Thursday, at 11.30
Cardiff, Monday, at 11; Wednes-
day. Thursday, Friday, and
Saturday, at 10
Carmarthen, Friday

Carnarvon, Wednesday
Cheltenham, Friday
Chertsey, Friday

Chesham, Tuesday, at 10

Tuesday Thursday,

Chesterfield, Friday, at 9.30
Cirencester, Thursday
Clerkenwell. Monday,
(J.S.), Wednesday,
and Friday, at 10.30
Colwyn Bay, Thursday
Consett, Wednesday, at 10.30
Dartford. Thursday, at 9.30
Derby, Tuesday, at 10
Dewsbury, Tuesday,


and Thursday (J.S.), at 10 Doncaster, Wednesday, at 10 Dudley, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10

Durham, Tuesday (R. By)
East Retford. Tuesday, at 11
Godalming. Thursday
Gravesend, Friday, at 10
Great Grimsby, Wednesday (R.
By), at 10.30

Great Malvern, Friday, at 10
Greenwich, Friday, at 10.30
Hayward's Heath, Tuesday
Hereford,* Tuesday, at 10
Hitchin, Monday, at 10
Holsworthy, Tuesday, at 10.30
Hull, Monday, Tuesday, Wednes-
day. Thursday, and Friday
Huntingdon, Wednesday, at 10
Ilford, Monday, Tuesday.
Wednesday, at 10.30

Jarrow, Tuesday, at 10


Lambeth, Monday, and Tuesday (Reg. at 9.30), at 10.30

Launceston,* Wednesday, at 10
Ledbury, Thursday, at 10

Leeds. Monday (J.S. & A.O.), at
10; Tuesday (R. By), at 11;
Wednesday, Thursday
A.O.), and Friday, at 10

The Perfected System of Life Assurance.

(J.S. &

for the dairy, and that the defendant purchased such cow relying LEGAL & GENERAL

on the skill or judgment of the plaintiff, and that the cow was of the description of animals which it was in the course of plaintiff's business to supply. I further find that the cow at the time of the sale was unsound and diseased, and was suffering from tuberculosis. It was proved that it was ultimately sold for a small sum of money and killed. Sect. 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 is as follows: "Subject to the provisions of this Act and of every statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale, except as follows: (1) When the buyer expressly or by implication makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the course of the seller's business to supply (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purposes, provided that in the case of a contract for the sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name there is no implied condition as to its fitness for any particular

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