Jan. 29. BAKER, BERTRAM HERBERT, Bargoed, plumber. Jan. 28. Ct. To surrender at their respective District Courts. DAVIS, SARAH JANE, Worcester, grocer, widow. Ct. Worcester. Jan. 30. HAMMOND, WILLIAM, Kingston-upon-Hull, stationer. Ct. Kingston-upon- HAYES, ALBERT THOMAS, Ebbw Vale, boot dealer. Ct. Tredegar. Jan. 28. KAISER, SIGMUND, Normanton, jeweller. Ct. Wakefield. Jan. 29. NICKLIN, SELINA_(trading as S. Nicklin and Co.), Leicester, draper. Ct. Leicester. Jan. 28. PRENTIS, FRANK HERBERT, late Ilford, engineer. Ct. Chelmsford, Jan. 28. ROBERTS, JOHN THOMAS, Manchester, retail fruiterer. Ct. Manchester. Jan. 28. STANLEY, JOHN WILLIAM, Quadring, innkeeper. Ct. Peterborough. Jan. 28. WHITE, GEORGE HENRY, Bristol, cabinet maker. Ct. Bristol. Jan. 29. Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, Jan. 12. TRANTER, ARTHUR (trading as Jones Brothers and Tranter). Droitwich, builder. Ct. Worcester. Jan. 6. ADJUDICATIONS. GAZETTE, JAN. 29. BORRODELL, CHARLES CARTER, Southend-on-Sea, corn merchant. Ct. BLUM, BESSIE (trading as M. O. Blum and Co.). Manchester, leather DURSTON, FRANK, Aberdare, collier. Ct. Aberdare and Mountain Ash. DAVIES, ARTHUR LLEWELLYN, Swansea, master mariner. Ct. Swansea. Jan. 26. GREEN, CHARLES EDWARD, Crawley. hotel proprietor. Ct. Brighton. GILL, J. WITHERS, Brockenhurst. Ct. Southampton. Jan. 23. HOLLIDAY, GEORGE WILLIAM, Chellaston, farmer. Ct. Derby and Long LE VAY, WILLIAM, and LE VAY, MOSES MONTEFIORE (described in the receiving order and trading as Le Vay Brothers), Church-la, Whitechapel, boot factors. Ct. High Court. Jan. 26. MICHAEL, FREDERICK WILLIAM, Camberwell-rd, bachelor of medicine. Ct. High Court. Jan. 26. MOLDEN, EDWIN WILLIAM, Wood Green, nurseryman, Jan. 25. PINNOCK, EDMUND, Jan. 26. Ct. Edmonton. Ullesthorpe, licensed victualler. Ct. Leicester PARKINSON, EDWIN, Manchester, plumber. Ct. Manchester. Jan. 25. PETTIT, PERCY WILLIAM ARTHUR, Windsor, tailor. Ct. Windsor. Jan. 25. STARLING, EDWIN WESLEY, Holt, licensed hawker. Ct. Norwich. Jan, 26. STAINSBY, ARTHUR, Swinton grocer. Ct. Salford. Jan. 27. TENCER, ABRAHAM (trading as Tencer and Forrest). Great Prescott-st, Minories, tailor. Ct. High Court. Jan. 25. THOMPSON, ANNE, Chester, tobacconist, widow. Ct. Chester. Jan. 26. TRIM, WILLIAM JAMES, late Cerne Abbas, blacksmith. Ct. Dorchester. Jan. 26. TAYLOR, WILLIAM, Rainford, farmer. Ct. Liverpool. Jan. 25. TAYLOR, OWSTON, Scarborough, cab proprietor. Ct. Scarborough. Jan. 27. WHITEHOUSE, WALTER, Lamb-st, Spitalfields Market, fruit salesman. Ct. High Court. Jan. 27. WHALLEY, ALBERT, Darwen, iron erector. Ct. Blackburn and Darwen. Jan. 26. WATERFALL, JOHN HAROLD, Walsall, advertisement manager. Ct. Walsall. Jan. 27. Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, Jan. 5, 1912. ROWE, HERBERT EDWARD, and WRIGHT, ERNEST ALFRED GEORGE, Portsmouth, builders. Ct. Portsmouth. Dec. 29, 1911. BRECKMAN, ISAAC (known and described in the receiving order as Isadore Breckman), Curtain-rd, furniture manufacturer. Ct. High Court. Jan. 28. BRUCE, ROBERT, Sale, commercial traveller. Ct. Manchester. Jan. 29. DE WOLF, WALTER, late Southport, secretary. Ct. High Court. Jan. 28. HAMMOND, WILLIAM, Kingston-upon-Hull, stationer. Ct. Kingston-upon- HAYES, ALBERT THOMAS, Ebbw Vale, boot dealer. Ct. Tredegar. Jan. 28. STEED, ALFRED JOSEPH, Tatam-rd, Stonebridge Park, clerk, Ct. High X CONTENTS. READY SHORTLY. The 1915 Edition is the most important issue of "STONE" that has appeared for many years. This would be true if only on account of the Criminal Justice Admi istration Act 1914 being included in the Work for the first time. This Act is the most important re'ating to Summary Jurisdiction that has been passed since the Act of 1879. The fact that it is included in the 1915 issue of "STONE" renders it indispensable to all concerned with the administration of Magisterial Law. 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Vol. 138.-No. 3750. REPORTS. 993 HOUSE OF LORDS. LUMSDEN v. COMMISSIONERS OF INLAND REVENUE. Revenue Sale of land - Increment value duty-Method of calculation ...... SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE. COURT OF APPEAL PETTEY V. PARSONS.-EasementRight of way - Private roadInterference-Erection of gateSubstantial obstruction....... 1011 WYNN v. CONWAY CORPORATION.Landlord and tenant-LeaseCovenant for renewal-Construction-Local government BRITISH OIL AND CAKE MILLS LIMITED บ. PORT OF LONDON AUTHORITY. - London (Port of London)-Part rates........................... STOTT (BALTIC) STEAMERS LIMITED v. 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The Court of Appeal. 351 352 Ir is to be hoped that, after the hearing of Admiralty appeals is concluded, the time of the third Court of Appeal will be devoted to the reduction of the King's Bench Final and New Trial List. At the present time appeals set down in May last have only just been reached, and considerable effort will be required to bring the list to reasonable dimensions before Easter next. This is the only section of the Supreme Court that is now in arrear with its work, and, although progress was made last sittings with the Common Law appeals, much still remains to be done. Trading with the Enemy. THE judgment recently delivered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Kupfer makes it quite clear that the law as it now stands is quite strong enough to prevent devices by which payments may be made indirectly to alien enemies where direct payment is impossible. The question for the jury to consider is whether the payment is made knowing that it would benefit the alien enemy, and, on the evidence in the particular case, it is clear that a verdict of guilty was amply justified. Offences of trading with the enemy are serious, and, when discovered, merit severe punisli ment. The German "Blockade." We do not suppose that this country will be greatly disturbed by the latest German effusion. That neutrals should resent a declaration that their ships and crews will be sunk without warning or examination is not surprising, and, should such incidents happen, no doubt the nations concerned will take immediate steps to express, by adequate methods, their views of the latest form of German Kultur. So far as England and her allies are concerned, we have long since given up all expectation that a country that attacks refugee and hospital ships and unfortified places will respect any rules of international law, and the British navy can be relied on to deal adequately with those that carry out the new form of "frightfulness." WHAT IS A PORT? THE word "port," as used in commercial and legal documents, has such a variety of meanings that it is scarcely possible to frame a concise definition. The questions which most often have to be considered are what constitutes a port, and what are the geographical limits of a port. Sir Matthew Hale, in his treatise De Portibus Maris. (Hargrave's Law Tracts) described a port as follows: "A port is a haven, and somewhat more. First, it is a place for arriving and unlading of ships or vessels. Secondly, it hath a superinduction of a civil signature upon it, somewhat of franchise and privilege, as shall be shown. Thirdly, it hath a ville or city or borough, that is the caput portus, for the receipt of mariners and merchants, and the securing and vending of their goods and victualling their ships. So that a port is quid aggregatum, consisting of somewhat that is natural, viz., an access of the sea whereby ships may conveniently come, safe situation against winds where they may safely lye, and a good shore where they may well unlade; something that is artificial, as keys and wharfs and cranes and warehouses and houses of common receipt; and something that is civil, viz., privileges and franchises, viz., jus applicandi, jus mercati, and divers other additaments given to it by civil authority." Subsidiary places associated with a more important place of trade were commonly called creeks or members of the principal port. Sir Matthew Hale's definition, written in the seventeenth century, is still useful, but for practical purposes a more detailed examination of the subject is necessary. The meaning of the word "port," as used in commercial documents such as charterparties and policies of marine insuran e, may have to be ascertained with reference to places in any part of the world, and the rules which may be gathered from decided cases as to is commercial meaning are such that they can be applied to any country. They will be referred to later. It is convenient to consider first the meanings of the word in other senses which may be classed as legal. IN THE LEGAL SENSE. The word "port," when used legally and applied to places on the coasts of the United Kingdom, has several meanings. No place can be legally established as a port-a place were trade is carried on and where port dues may be charged-except by authority of the Crown: (Foreman v. Free Fishers of Whitstable, 21 L. T. Rep. 804; L. Rep. 4 H. L. 266; Hunter v. Northern Marine Insurance Company, 13 App. Cas. 717). By virtue of charters and Acts of Parliament a large number of places are ports. In a port one or more local authorities usually exercise jurisdiction for various purposes. The geographical limits for harbour or dock purposes, conservancy, sanitary matters, and pilotage are not always the same, but they are always confined more or less to the neighbourhood of the particular place, so that certain parts of the coast are not within any port, using the word in the ordinary legal sense. For fiscal purposes, however, there is no part of the coast which is not within some port. The whole of the coasts of the kingdom have from the earliest times been entirely divided up into various ports for Customs purposes, and the limits of those ports have always comprehended between them the whole of the coast. Though those ports have been from time to time subdivided or aggregated, there never was a time when any portion of the shore of the kingdom was outside the limits of a Customs port: (Moore's History of the Foreshore, p. 551). It follows that, wherever goods are landed, they are within a Customs or fiscal port, though for convenience in the collection of revenue the import and export of customable goods is restricted by law to particular places. Moreover, the quays of a harbour are not legal quays for the shipping and unshipping of goods until they have been approved by the Treasury and Customs: (Harbours Clauses Act 1847, s. 24). The present statute under which Customs ports are established (which continues the provisions of earlier legislation) is the Customs Consolidation Act 1876. By sect. 11 the Treasury may appoint ports and declare the limits thereof, and appoint proper places within the sameto be legal quays for the lading and unlading of goods, and alter or vary the limits. Although particular places which are ports in the ordinary legal sense are thus distinct from Customs ports, the two senses of the word cannot be entirely dissociated. It is provided by the section referred to that any port appointed by the Treasury for Customs purposes shall, to the whole extent of the limits thereof, be deemed to be a port within the meaning of the Harbours Act 1814, and of any other public Act for the protection of the ports, harbours, shores, and navigable rivers of the United Kingdom. Under sect. 14 of the Harbours Act 1814 the Board of Trade (formerly the Admiralty) may make orders prohibiting the removal of shingle or ballast from the shores or banks of any port, harbour, or haven. The Board of Trade made an order in respect of a place which was beyond the limits of the port of Hull in the ordinary sense, but within the Customs port of Hull, and it was held that the order was valid: (Nicholson v. Williams, 24 L. T. Rep. 875; L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 632). But the authority of the decision is questioned in Moore's History of the Foreshore, p. 551. In contrast to this it was held in Hull Dock Company v. Browne (1831, 2 B. & Ad. 43) that a local Act which gave the Hull Dock Company a tonnage on ships coming into or going out of the harbour of Kingston-upon-Hull, and the company's basin or docks within the port of Kingston-upon-Hull, or unlading or lading any of their cargo within the said port, must be construed as referring to the port in the ordinary sense, and did not refer to the larger area of the Customs port. In Assheton-Smith v. Owen (96 L. T. Rep. 478; (1907) A C. 124) the House of Lords held that the port of Carnarvon in the Carnarvon Harbour Acts 1793 and 1809 must be construed to mean the fiscal or Customs port, and not the port in its ordinary The local Acts in question were confused and ill-drawn, and, although a great number of authorities were examined, the case cannot be regarded as more than a decision upon the parti. cular local circumstances. No broad rule can be deduced. sense. Naturally the word "port" is of frequent occurrence in the Merchant Shipping Acts, but the definition section in the Act of 1894 merely declares that "port includes place." The word also occurs in the Pilotage Aet 1913, but again there is no definition. Clearly, however, "port" must be distinguished from "pilotage district." The geographical area may be the same in some instances, but frequently it is different. The limits of the London pilotage district as established by the Pilotage Order (London) Confirmation Act 1913 are: "The Thames and Medway as high as London Bridge and Rochester Bridge respectively and the sea and channels leading thereto and therefrom as far as Selsey Bill to the south and west and Orfordness to the north and east and falling within an imaginary line" drawn through certain named points, but excluding docks and any Trinity House outport district or district of any other pilotage authority. This is a much larger area than the "port of London" over which the Port of London Authority exercises jurisdiction. The last-named area, as defined by the Port of London Act 1908, extends from Teddington Lock to a line drawn from Havengore Ceek in Essex to Warden Point in the Isle of Sheppey, Kent, and includes the various docks on the Thames. The same area is the Customs port of London, and, by virtue of sects. 110-112 of the Public Health (London) Act 1891, is also the district within which the Corporation of London exercises jurisdiction as the sanitary authority of the port. The limits of dockyard ports are defined by Orders in Council made under the Dockyard Ports Regulation Act 1865. So much for the various meanings of the word "port" as used in the legal sense. IN THE COMMERCIAL SENSE. The difference between the geographical limits of a port laid down for legal or fiscal purposes and the area denoted by the word "port," when used commercially, was emphasised in Sailing Ship Garston Company v. Hickie (53 L. T. Rep. 795; 15 Q. B. Div. 580). In that case Brett, M.R. indicated some principles to be followed in ascertaining the commercial meaning of "port." In commercial documents the word means the port as commonly understood by shipping and mercantile people. The question is one of fact in each case. The port will ordinarily include the extent of water which is naturally, or which has artificially, been made a place of safety for loading or unloading. Another test is the extent of the space of water within which the port authorities exercise port discipline over ships. In the case referred to, a ship was held not to have "finally sailed" from the port of Cardiff under a charter-party. In one earlier case (Roelandts v. Harrison, 1854, 23 L. J. 169, Ex.) the decision was similar, but in another previous case (Price v. Livingstone, 47 L. T. Rep. 629; 9 Q. B. Div. 679) the ship, having proceeded about three miles out into the Bristol Channel, was held to have finally sailed from the port of Cardiff, as used in the ordinary commercial sense, although still within the larger Customs port. The question of the limits of a port in the commercial sense was further examined in Hunter v. Northern Marine Insurance Company (sup.). Lord Halsbury quoted with approval Sir Matthew Hale's definition (set out above), and also agreed with what was said in Sailing Ship Garston Company v. Hickie as to the proper tests to apply. "The reception of port dues, the loading or unloading of vessels bound to the port are [he observed] the natural and appropriate sources of proof." But where a port is one of several situated on a land-locked waterway, such as the Clyde, the question becomes more difficult. Having regard to the particular circumstances in that case, it was held that the ship had left the port of Greenock, within the meaning of a policy, although not more than 500ft. distant from the harbour works. All the circumstances must be taken into account. In some places (e.g., at Saloe, a Spanish port), a ship lying in an open and exposed roadstead may be within the port: (Sea Insurance Company v. Gavin, 1829, 4 Bligh N. S. 578; 2 Dow & C. 125). The size of the port also is material. "In the case of a small port," said Lord Justice Kennedy in Leonis Steamship Company v. Rank (1908) 1 K. B. 499), “'port' may or may not mean the whole of the geographical port. In the case of a widely extended area, such as London, Liverpool, or Hull, it certainly signifies some area which is less than the geographical port, and which may, I think, not unfitly be called the commercial area." The two Irish cases of Caffarini v. Walker (Ir. Rep. 10 C. L 250) and M'Intosh v. Sinclair (Ir. Rep. 11 C. L. 456) involved the question of the limits of the port of Newry, a place of relatively. small commercial importance. The expression "port of Newry as used in commercial documents was interpreted as meaning the area of the Customs port. These two decisions were considered in Nielsen v. Wait (14 Q. B. Div. 516), in which the limits of the port of Gloucester were discussed, though the actual decision rested on other grounds. For a decision as to the limits of the port of Manchester in the commercial sense, see Re Goodbody and Balfour, Williamson, and Co. (5 Com. Cas. 59); and as to Harwich, see The Mary Thomas (12 Times L. Rep. 511). In Constable v. Noble (1810, 2 Taunt. 403; 11 R. R. 617) Bridport was held not to be within the port of Lyme Regis, and in Payne v. Hutchinson (1808, 2 Taunt. 405; 11 R. R. 620) Llanelly was held not to be within the port of Carmarthen, within the meaning of policies, though those places were legally within the ports named. It should be noted, however, in regard to insurance, that the rule is modified if there is a mercantile usage to ship at a place adjoining the place named in the policy (Moxon v. Atkins, 1812, 3 Camp. 199). Third Sheet A number of decisions on warranty against capture in port were given during the Napoleonic war, but they were based not so much on the meaning to be attached to the word "port" as on other considerations: (see Arnould on Marine Insurance). In the recent case of The Mowe (ante, p. 43), in the Prize Court, Sir Samuel Evans had to consider the meaning of the expression "in port" as used in the Hague Convention No. VI., and he held that the word "port" must be construed in its usual and limited popular or commercial sense as a place where ships are in the habit of coming for the purpose of loading or unloading, embarking or disembarking, and that it does not mean the fiscal port. In the recent case of the Cargo ex Roumanian (ante, p. 147), in which oil had been pumped into tanks on land where it was seized, the Prize Court held that the oil tanks were within the port, considering them in the same category as warehouses, mentioned in Sir Matthew Hale's definition' MINING LEASES AND INCREMENT VALUE DUTY. IN a leading article two years ago (see LAW TIMES, May 17, 1913) we discussed the provisions of the Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 in regard to their relation to mining leases. The point then more particularly considered was whether a lease of mines for a term not exceeding fourteen years was liable to or exempt from payment of increment value duty. In the article referred to, we drew attention to the relevant sections of the Act bearing on the point under consideration, and we expressed the opinion that on the grant of any lease of minerals, whether for a term exceeding or for a term not exceeding fourteen years, the minerals are chargeable with increment value duty annually in accordance with sect. 22 of the Act. This opinion gave rise to considerable discussion, in subsequent issues of the LAW TIMES, on the part of others holding different views, and in this connection the recent decision of Mr. Justice Rowlatt in the case of Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Sheffield and South Yorkshire Navigation Company (noted ante, p. 316) is of considerable interest and importance. In that case the commissioners claimed increment value duty in respect of a lease for a term of ten years, and the battle seems to have raged round sects. 1 and 22 of the Act. Sect. 1 provides (shortly) tha, subject to the provisions of Part 1 of the Act, increment value duty shall be charged on the occasion of (inter alia) the grant of any lease of land not being a lease for a term not exceeding fourteen years. As the expression "land" clearly embraces minerals, there would, if the matter rested here, be little doubt that the grant of a lease of mines for less than fourteen years would not give rise to a claim for increment value duty. Indeed, such was actually the decision of the referee before whom the case referred to first came, as it was also the main argument on behalf of the respondents when the case came before the High Court on appeal from the referee. But the Act contains other sections-namely, sects. 20 to 23 -which enact special provisions in regard to minerals. These sections were more fully dealt with in the article before referred to, and it is not thought necessary to set them out again in this article. It will be sufficient for our pr.sent purpose to refer to sect. 22. Sub-sect. 1 of that section provides that no increment value duty shall be charged on the occasion of a grant of a mining lease or in respect of minerals which are comprised in a mining lease or are being worked, except as a duty payable annually in manner provided by the Act. Sub-sect. 2 of the same section exempts minerals which are in lease or being worked on the 30th April 1909, and sub-sect. 3 of the same section provides that increment value duty in respect of the increment value of minerals which are comprised in a mining lease or are being worked shall, where that duty is chargeable, be charged annually. Mr. Justice Rowlatt decided that the exemption from liability to increment value duty in sect. 1 of the Act in favour of leases for not exceeding fourteen years does not apply to leases of minerals, and that as respects minerals the matter is governed by sect. 22, the effect of which is to make the duty payable in respect of a mining lease for any term of years. It will be seen from the above decision that the provisions of sect. 1 and sects. 20 to 23 must, when considering their application to minerals, be read together, and that, as the latter sections deal specially with the subject of minerals, the dominant effect must be given to those sections. This was the opinion we ventured to express in the article we wrote two years ago, and the decision seems to us to accord with common sense. To have allowed minerals, which from their very nature can only be realised once, to escape payment of the duty by the mere device of including them in short term leases would certainly have disclosed such a manifest flaw in the framework of the Act as would call for prompt amendment. COMMENTS ON CASES. A Del Credere Agent's Obligation. "A NOVEL effort ... to put the position of a del credere agent where it has never been before" was how the appeal in the recent case of Gabriel and Sons v. Churchill and Sim (111 L. T. Rep. 933) was characterised by Lord Justice Kennedy. And seeing that the ordinary notion of the obligation of such a factor or agent in mercantile transactions is, in consideration of some additional compensation, over and above the usual commission, to guarantee to the seller, his principal, the payment of debts to become due from buyers, it was certainly a justifiable criticism on the part of his Lordship. To say that a del credere agent is personally responsible for a contract of sale-entered into through his mediation and resulting in an ascertained debt due from the buyer to the seller-so as to entitle the seller to call on him to litigate disputes arising out of the contract and determine what is due as between buyer and seller was stretching his obligation far indeed. The term del credere is the Italian equivalent of guaranty or warranty, according to Story on Agency (see sect. 33). But that such guaranty or warranty should extend to anything beyond answering to the seller for the default of a buyer, from whom it is impossible to recover the amount of an ascertained debt due from the latter to the former, is a proposition which seems to be without authority to support it. Founded, however, on the judgment of Lord Mansfield in Grove v. Dubois (1 T. R. 112), the contention urged in the present case went much further, as appears from our report. But the Court of Appeal, in dealing with that authority, pointed out that Lord Mansfield's language had been criticised in Morris v. Cleasby (4 M. & S. 574), Hornby v. Lacy (6 M. & S. 166), and Couturier v. Hastie (8 Ex. 56). Moreover, in a note to the section in Story on Agency, to which we have already referred, the decision in Grove v. Dubois (ubi sup.) is not cited with any kind of approval, for the reasons that the learned author presents. What Lord Mansfield said, in defining the nature of a del credere contract, was this: "It is an absolute engagement to the principal from the broker and makes him liable in the first instance. There is no occasion for the principal to communicate with the underwriter, though the law allows the principal for his benefit to resort to him as a collateral security. But the broker is liable at all events." Whatever was meant to be laid down by Lord Mansfield in Grove v. Dubois (ubi sup.), the Court of Appeal did not see their way to disturb the decision of Mr. Justice Pickford (as he then was) in the present case. Debenture-holders' Floating Security in Jeopardy. CASES in which the floating security of debenture-holders which create a floating charge on the property of a limited company has been in jeopardy, although there has been no such default as would render their principal moneys payable, have been somewhat frequent of late. A further interesting illustration of the position of that class of investors in circumstances of that nature is afforded by the recent case of Grigson v. George Taplin and Co. Limited (noted ante, p. 293). What has to be borne in mind is that, even though the time for the payment of the principal secured by a debenture may not have arrived, and there has been no actual default in payment of the interest due thereunder-the floating security not having crystallised, but is remaining dormant-yet a present charge always exists: (see Re Panama, New Zealand, and Australian Royal Mail Company, 22 L. T. Rep. 424; L. Rep. 5 Ch. App. 318). At the instance of the debenture-holder the court will interpose and appoint a receiver and a manager likewise, when so required-if properly satisfied that his floating security is in danger of being sacrificed. For nothing can be better established than that a mortgagee is entitled to the protection of his security. And it was on that principle that Mr. Justice Kekewich considered it right to act in the first reported case in which this important problem was fairly tackled-namely, that of McMahon v. North Kent Ironworks Limited (64 L. T. Rep. 317), pronounced in the year 1891. Since that date, in numberless cases has the decision of the learned judge been approved and acted upon. And his Lordship saw no reason whatever for qualifying his original views on the same question again coming before him in the subsequent case of Re Victoria Steamboats Limited; Smith v. Wilkinson (75 L. T. Rep. 374; (1897) 1 Ch. 158). Among more recent cases may be cited Re Tilt Cove Copper Company Limited (109 L. T. Rep. 138; (1913) 2 Ch. 588), Re Crompton and Co. Limited; Player v. The Company (110 L. T. Rep. 759), and Re Braunstein and Marjolaine Limited; Philipson v. The Company (137 L. T. Jour. 342, where the view what constitutes "jeopardy" to a debenture-holder's floating security was strikingly exemplified. It was the case of Re New York Taxicab Company Limited; Sequin v. The Company (107 L. T. Rep. 813), however, that was regarded as being the authority directly in point in Grigson's case (ubi sup.). For there the fact that judgments had been recovered against the company, and that execution was likely to issue, demonstrated to the fullest extent that the floating security of the debenture-holders was in jeopardy, as in Re New York Taxicab Company Limited (ubi sup.), where the assets of the company were in danger of being seized by other creditors. But it will be observed that the appointment of the receiver and manager was quite rightly restricted to the assets specifically charged. Accident to Workman while Intoxicated. THE accident to the workman in the recent case of Williams v. Llandudno Coaching and Carriage Company Limited (noted ante, p. 312) occurred through his being, as appears from our note, in a state of intoxication at the time. In following the decision of the Court of Session in Scotland in Fraser v. John Riddell and Co. (1914, S. C. 125), and in giving the go-by to the decisions of the Court of Appeal in this country in Frith v. Steamship Louisianian (106 L. T. Rep. 667; (1912) 2 K. B. 155) and Nash v. Steamship Rangatira (111 L. T. Rep. 704), a considerable modification of opinion would, at first sight, seem to have been evinced by the Court of Appeal concerning acci dents caused by intoxication. This being so, it is of much importance to contrast the views that were expressed in those cases in order to ascertain whether or not such an apparent change has in reality taken place. In Frith's case (ubi sup.), a seaman was brought on board his ship so much under the influence of drink that he fell overboard and was drowned. A fatal consequence, in circumstances not altogether dissimilar, happened to a seaman in Nash's case (ubi sup.). Those decisions, said the Master of the Rolls (Lord Cozens-Hardy) in Williams case (ubi sup.), are binding upon the Court of Appeal even if the Court in Scotland had taken a different view of the law. And, inasmuch as those decisions left a somewhat general impression that intoxication would prove an effectual bar to any clain for compensation in respect of an accident that had befallen a workman by reason of it, the contrary decision of the Court of Session in Fraser's case (ubi sup.) created some disturbance of preconceived notions on the point. In that case, an engine driver, who was intoxicated, fell off the footplate and was fatally injured. The standpoint from which the Court of Session, departing from the decision pronounced by the arbiter, regarded the position of the workman was that he was performing the duty which he was employed to perform-namely, driving the engine-although he was guilty of "serious and wilful misconduct" within the meaning of sect. 1, sub-sect. 2 (c). of the |