the most widely used text-books for Bar students entering on the subject with which it deals. How many, one wonders, of those who use the work are aware that its author, Edmund H. T. Snell, published it in 1868, when he was only twenty seven, and that he died in Madras in the following year? Called to the Bar at the Middle Temple in 1867, after a successful career as a student, he was one of those who do not sit down and wait till briefs may be pleased to come; like a few others who have left their mark in legal authorship, he devoted his leisure to the compilation of a legal treatise, and the book which he wrote has kept his name in remembrance. Apparently the work was at once recognised by American students as a valuable addition to legal literature, as it was published in Philadelphia in the same year that it was issued in this country. After Snell's death two or three editions were published under the editorship of Mr. J. R. Griffith, then from the fourth to the sixteenth the book was edited by Mr. Archibald Brown, but with the new edition just issued new names appear on the title-page as editors-Mr. Gibson Rivington and Mr. A. Clifford Fountaine.

Dr. F. J. Waldo, of the Middle Temple, barrister-at law and H M. Coroner for the City of London, was elected president at the annual meeting of the Coroners Society of England and Wales held on Tuesday, the 23rd inst. Dr. Waldo reminded the meeting that the founder and first president of their society was the late Mr. Serjeant William Payne, and the first secretary was Mr. Samuel Langham. Both these gentlemen filled the office of coroners for London—a post he (Dr. Waldo) now had the honour of holding. Serjeant Payne called together the first meeting of the society in his chambers in the Temple-1, Churchyardcourt-not an inapt assembly place for a body of coroners-in 1846! The object of the society was the co-operation between coroners for the more effective discharge of their duties to the public, as well as for the maintenance of the rights and privileges of coroners. Serjeant Payne was a strong and far-seeing coroner, and, among other useful reforms, was chiefly instrumental in introducing the Coroners Act of 1860, which provided for the payment of coroners by salary in place of by fee, and which did away with the old quarrel between the justices at quarter sessions and the coroners. The justices were, under the old régime, in the habit of taking on themselves the discretionary power of the coroner, and often refused to pay the coroner his rightful fee for holding what they (the justices) asserted were unnecessary i quests.

On the 16th inst., in consideration of the Lords' amendments to the Legal Proceedings against Enemies Bill, in the House of Commons the Attorney-General moved that the House of Commons do agree with the Lords in an amendment to the clause following: "The Lord Chief Justice shall give directions for expediting proceedings or regulating procedure generally in a case where an enemy service order has been made and the enemy defendant does not appear," the amendment being the leaving out of the words "the Chief Justice shall give directions" and the insertion instead thereof of the words "the Lord Chancellor shall make such rules as he thinks fit." The criticisms in debate on the substitution of the Lord Chancellor for the Lord Chief Justice were thus dealt with by the Attorney-General: "It is desirable, or seemed to us desirable, that the making of rules for expediting proceedings should be done by somebody who had a direct responsibility to Parliament. In this House I have as best I can to answer for such matters, even though the Lord Chancellor is the supreme judicial and legal authority and sits in another place. It was thought desirable, and is consistent with our constitutional position, that the matter should be made one for which responsibility should be accepted in Parliament by the Government in case of dispute or criticism." It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to criticise in Committee of Supply the action of the Lord Chancellor. His salary of £4000 per annum as Speaker of the House of Lords is, no doubt, voted in Committee of Supply, but criticism on his conduct and action in discussion on that vote would be strictly confined to his conduct and action in the office to which the salary to be voted him attached, whereas his judicial salary is paid out of the Consolidated Fund, and is accordingly not within the purview of criticism in Committee of Supply. The only method

by which the conduct of a Lord Chancellor can be impugned, if we omit the obsolete process of impeachment to which in days gone by several Lord Chancellors, notably Bacon, Clarendon, and Macclesfield, have been subject, would be by way of a specific motion censuring that conduct, as in the case of Lord Westbury in 1865, or by a motion of want of confidence in the Government generally, in which the conduct of the Lord Chancellor as a member of the Administration could be criticised.

The Order of His Majesty, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, on the 15th inst., continuing the measures taken in reply to Germany's declaration of a military area around these islands, which appears in the London Gazette of the 15th inst., has been very generally referred to in the lay Press as the King's Proclamation, whereas the Order in Council is practically a resolution passed by the King in Council, communicated by publication or otherwise to those whom it may concern. Such resolution may doubtless be embodied in a Royal Proclamation, which is a formal announcement of an executive act. The act is a resolution of the King in Council, but the document by which it is promulgated-the Royal Proclamation-passes under the Great Seal.

IRISH NOTES.

GREAT sympathy is felt amongst Irish lawyers for Mr. Justice Wylie, whose son, Lieutenant Wylie, was killed last week at Neuve Chapelle The learned judge's family consists of three boys: one has been lost as stated, another is at the front, and the third is on active service on his ship in the North Sea. In the same engagement Mr. Brendon Fottrell, solicitor, son of Mr. John Fottrell, Crown Solicitor for Meath, also lost his life.

THE action of the Corporation of Drogheda last week in conferring the freedom of the borough on Drummer Kenny, who won the Victoria Cross for bravery at the front, is entirely unique. At the present moment it was a thoughtful and striking compliment to pay to a gallant soldier, and has produced a dramatic effect. The enthusiasm which marked the proceedings during the day showed clearly that there was public approval, and appreciation of, the action of the local authority. The first freeman of Drogheda Borough was Mr. Isaac Butt, Q.C., who carried through the House of Commons the Municipal Privilege Act 1876, which enables certain Irish boroughs to grant these privileges.

THE Incorporated Law Society of Ireland is still engaged agitating the question of costs. The practice of the judges in measuring the costs of motions in the High Court is a source of great complaint, and it appears ithat the grievance on the question extends to the County Court. They have passed a resolution declaring the custom, wherever it takes place, to be oppressive and unfair to litigants and solicitors, and requesting that the courts shall, when costs are ordered to be paid, direct that the same shall be taxed under the scales applicable in the several courts. A copy of this resolution has been sent to every recorder and County Court judge in Ireland.

THE Fermanagh Herald has a scathing attack upon what it calls the farce of the appeal to the assize courts from the County Court. It sets out the result of two claims for malicious injury, one of which came before the Lord Chief Justice on appeal, and the other before Mr. Justice Gibson. Both were in respect of the burning of hay, and the probability of the act being malicious was a hundred times stronger in the one case than the other. So much was this so on the evidence, that County Court Judge Johnston granted compensation in one case and refused it in the other. But the former case came before Mr. Justice Gibson, who reversed the decision and refused compensation, and the latter was heard before the Lord Chief Justice, who also reversed the County Court judge and granted compensation. Beyond question the result is most Gilbertian, and leaves the public in a condition of utter bewilderment as to what the law really is upon the question. The newspaper comment adds: The two cases illustrate what a farce the appeal in civil bill cases has really become, and how much has been done to confuse the law by the the decisions of the Superior Court judges. In fact, the County Court judges did something to secure a uniform code, but their good work has been rendered hopelessly useless by the confusing

PRIZE COURT.

March 15 and 22.

(Before Sir S. T. EVANS, President.)

THE PANARIELLOS. (a)

Trading with Enemy-Goods of Ally-Consignment to Enemy— Contract of Sale at Date prior to Outbreak of_War-Neutral Vessel-Dispatch from neutral Port-Date of Departure after the Outbreak of War-Liability to Seizure and CondemnationGeneral Principles to be applied-Obligations as to Trading binding Confederate States.

THIS was a case in which the Crown claimed the condemnation of the proceeds of sale of 1020 tons of silver lead shipped by the Compagnie Française des Mines de Laurium, a French company, in the steamship Panariellos, a Greek vessel, and consigned to Beer, Sondheimer, and Co., a German firm, carrying on business at Frankfort.

The silver ore was sold by the Laurium Company in July 1914, in pursuance of a contract dated the 9th May 1914, to the German firm of Beer, Sondheimer, and Co., f.o.b. Ergasteria, in Greece. At the request of the purchasers the vendors chartered the Panariellos, under a charter-party dated the 10th July 1914, for a voyage from Ergasteria to Antwerp and Newcastle. The loading of the silver ore began on the 29th July, and the ship sailed for Greece on the 11th Aug., the war between Great Britain and the German Empire having in the meantime broken out-namely, on the 4th Aug. The Panariellos put in at Swansea, where the cargo was seized and afterwards sold. The sale realised £15,507, and the money was paid into court. A claim ori inally put forward by the German firm was withdrawn, and it was agreed that the property in the goods at the time of seizure was in the Laurium Company. Evidence was given by the managing director of the Laurium Company that an effort was made to stop the sailing of the ship from Greece, and that, when that was impossible, her voyage was diverted from Antwerp to Swansea. After an interview with the London representative of the German firm, which came to nothing, as he had the bills of lading still in his possession, he sold the silver ore to a firm in London, who in turn resold the same to a firm in Newcastle. Meanwhile, however, the Procurator-General had sold the cargo after its seizure to the same firm at Newcastle.

The Solicitor-General (Sir S. O. Buckmaster, K.C.) and G. W. Ricketts for the Crown-The facts of the case made it quite clear that there had been trading with the enemy by the Laurium Company. The company should never have allowed the ship to sail from Greece. A contract had been entered into with the enemy, and it was quite enough for the purposes of condemnation of the goods that there was trading with the enemy at the inception of the voyage. The present case went beyond that. There was a clear case of trading until the time of the seizure at Swansea, for negotiations had been going on with the London representative of the German firm. As this was certainly trading with the enemy, the goods or the proceeds of their sale, were liable to condemnation.

Butler Aspinall, K.C. and R. A. Wright for the claimants, the Laurium Company-There should be no condemnation. The goods were in a neutral ship, and were consigned from a neutral port by an ally for sale in Newcastle. The company had acted with perfect propriety throughout. Whatever might be said as to trading with the enemy at the time of the commencement of the voyage, it was impossible under the circumstances to say that the rading had continued, or that there was such trading at the time of the seizure. They cited

The Juffrow Maria Schroeder, Roscoe's English Prize Cases, vol. 1, 279; 3 Ch. Rob. 147;

The Abby, Roscoe's English Prize Cases, vol. 1, 464; 5 Ch. Rob. 251. W. N. Raeburn held a watching brief on behalf of the London house of Beer, Sondheimer, and Co.

All the facts of the case are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

Cur. adv. vult.

March 22-THE PRESIDENT.-In these proceedings the Procurator-General, on behalf of the Crown, asks for the condemnation as prize of a crgo of 1020 tons of silver lead, which was shipped by allied citizens in a neutral vessel. The vessel was a Greek vessel, the steamship Panariellos. The shippers, and the owners of the cargo at all material times, were a French company-La Compagnie Française des Mines du Laurium. The cargo was laden upon the vessel at Ergasteria, in Greece It was originally shipped and intended to be delivered, pursuant to a contract of sale, to a German company, Beer, Sondheimer, and Co., of Frankfort.

The case raises for the first time during the present war the important question of the liability to capture and confiscation of property of citizens of an ally, who are alleged to have had commercial intercourse with, or to have been trading with, the

(a Reported by J. A. SLATER, Esq., Barrister at-Law.

enemy. Therefore, before I deal with the facts, as the question affects this country and its allies and their respective subjects or citizens in the present complicated hostilities, it seems desirable in the public interest to state the general principles which are applicable to such cases according to the law of nations. The following general propositions can, I think, be established: First, when war breaks out between States, all commercial intercourse between citizens of the belligerents ipso facto becomes illegal, except in so far as it may be expressly allowed or licensed by the head of the State. Where the intercourse is of a commercial nature, it is usually denominated 'trading with the enemy." This proposition is true also, I think, in all essentials with regard to intercourse, which cannot fitly be described as commercial. Secondly, on the outbreak of war in which a belligerent has allies, the citizens of all the allied States are under the same obligations to each of the allied States as its own subjects would be to a single belligerent State, with relation to intercourse with the enemy. Thirdly, where such illegal intercourse is proved between allied citizens and the enemy, their property engaged in such intercourse, whether ship or cargo, is subject to capture by any allied belligerent, and is subject to condemnation in that belligerent's own Prize Courts. Fourthly, when such intercourse in fact takes place, the property of the persons engaged in it is confi-cable whether they were acting honestly and with bona fides or not.

The rule embodied in the proposition first mentioned was authoritativ ly stated by Lord Stowell in The Hoop (Roscoe, vol. 1, 105; 1 Ch. Rob. 196) as follows: "In my opinion, there exists such a general rule in the maritime jurisprudence of this country, by which all subjects trading with the public enemy, unless with the permission of the Sovereign, is interdicted. It is not a principle peculiar to the maritime law of this country; it is laid down by Bynershoek as a universal principle of law-Ex naturâ belli commercia inter hostes cessare non est dubitandum. Quamvis nulla specialis sit commerciorum prohibitio, ipso tamen jure belli commercia esse vetita, ipse indictiones bellorum satis declarant, &c. In my opinion, no principle ought to be held more sacred than that this intercourse cannot subsist on any other footing than that of the direct permission of the State. Who can be insensible to the consequences that might follow, if every person in time of war had a right to carry on a commercial intercourse with the enemy, and, under colour of that, had the means of carrying on any other species of intercourse he might think fit?' And, after an exhaustive review of numerous authorities, he added: "The cases which I have produced prove that the rule has been rigidly enforced; that it has been enforced where strong claim, not merely of convenience, but almost of necessity, excused it on behalf of the individual; that it has been enforced where cargoes have been laden before the war, but where the parties have not used all possible diligence to countermand the voyage after the first notice of hostilities; and that it has been enforced not only against the subjects of the Crown, but likewise against those of its allies in the war, upon the supposition that the rule was founded on a strong and universal principle, which allied States in war had a right to notice and apply mutually, to each other's subjects": (Ibid., p. 216.

And Mr. Justice Story, in his well-known Notes on Prize Courts, writes: "It is a fundamental principle of prize law, that all trade with the enemy is prohibited to all persons, whether natives, naturalised citizens, or foreigners domiciled in the country during the time of their residence, under the penalty of confiscation. The same penalty is applied to subjects of allies in the war, trading with the common enemy": (Pratt's Story, 69.)

These statements of the law affecting commercial intercourse and trading with the enemy are a century old. In the meantime commerce, especially international commerce, has advanced and expanded, and occasionally in times of war there have since been special permission and licences given in relaxation of the rule. But the general rule, in the absence of any such licence, has been adhered to as the years have rolled on and commercial enterprises have developed. It may be well to fortify this by one or two more recent authorities, and reference may be made for this purpose to Dana's Wheaton, 1866 edit., pars. sects. 309 315; and to the 4th edition of M. Calvo's most valuable and careful work, vol. 4, sects. 1953-1955. There is no doubt that the rule exists in all its force and rigour at the present day. In the view I take of the facts of the present case, as will be hereafter stated, there was a commercial intercourse between the claimants and the enemy, which amounted to a "trading with the enemy.' But lest the higher and final tribunal might think otherwise, and adopt the argument for the claimants that there was no actual “trading with " the enemy, I will deal further with the more general and fundamental conception of the illegality of intercourse with the enemy apart from the element of commerce, and falling short of the act of trading.

In The Cosmopolite (Roscoe, vol. 1, 326; 4 Ch. Rob. 8) Lord Stowell states the rule in quite general terms thus: "It is

perfectly well known that by war all communication between the subjects of the belligerent countries must be suspended, and that no intercourse can legally be carried on between the subjects of the hostile States but by the special licence of their respective Governments' And in Christopher Robinson's note to the case is cited a passage from the Black Book of the Admiralty (the original of which is the most precious possession entrusted to the President for the time being of this division) as follows: "In the ancient practice of the Court of Admiralty (says the editor) we find it laid down: 'Item, soit enquis de tous ceux qui entrecommunent, vendent, ou achatent, avec aucuns des ennemis de Messieur le Roi sans licence especiale du Roi, ou de son Amiral. -Black Book, p. 76." No doubt it was with cases of commercial intercourse that Lord Stowell was dealing in The Hoop (ubi sup.) and The Cosmopolite (ubi sup.), but it will be remembered that in the former he enforced the reason for the rule by reference to the possible consequences of allowing persons to carry on a commercial intercourse, and under colour of that to give them the means of carrying on any other intercourse they might think fit: (see 1 Ch. Rob., at p. 200). In the United States of America the Supreme Court has given a very wide range to the "intercourse which is prohibited by the rule we are dealing with In The Rapid (8 Cranch, 156), J. Johnson, in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court (of which be it noted, Chief Justice Marshall and Mr. Jus ice Story were two of the members), pronounced upon this subject as follows: "The universal sense of nations has acknowledged the demoralising effects that would result from the admission of individual intercourse. The whole nation are embarked in one common bottom, and must be reconciled to submit to one common fate. Every individual of the one nation must acknowledge every individual of the other nation as his own enemy-because the enemy of his country. It is not necessary quote the authorities on this subject; they are numerous, exp it, and respectable." And after dealing thus generally with the subject, he proceeded to consider the point urged for the claimant in that case that there was no trading in the eye of the prize law such as would subject the property to capture, because the claimant had only sent a vessel to fetch away his own property acquired before the war from a small island belonging to the enemy, where they had been deposited before the war. He answered this point thus: "The force of the argument on this point depends upon the terms made use of. If by trading, in prize law, was meant that signification of the term which consists in negotiation or contract, this case would certainly not come under the penalties of the rule. But the object, policy, and spirit of the rule is to cut off all communication or actual locomotive intercourse between individuals of the belligerent States. Negotiation of contract has therefore no necessary connection with the offence. Intercourse inconsistent with actual hostility is the offence against which the operation of the rule is directed; and by substituting this definition for that of trading with an enemy, an answer is given to this argument.' On the same day as this judgment was pronounced (the 7th March 1814, Mr. Justice Story delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court in another case, The Julia (8 Cranch, 181); and he expressly adopted the decision and the reasons and principles of the judge of the Circuit Court.

In various cases intercourse which could not be properly described as commercial or which could not answer the description of "trading" has been declared illegal, and it would not be difficult to enumerate instances of such intercourse in cases of absolute gifts of property to enemy subjects of a comforting, useful, or beneficial character. It remains to note a rule of a correlative nature that whatever intrcourse, commercial, trading, or otherwise, is prohibited, the same obligations are laid upon the citizens of an ally as upon the subjects of a single belligerent State, and the same penalties of confiscation fall upon allied citizens as upon such subjects on non-observance of the obligations. Statements to this effect are found in the dictum from the judgment in The Hoop (ubi sup.) and in the passage from Pratt's Story, which have already been cited. But in The Neptunus (Roscoe, vol 1, 595; 6 Ch. Rob. 403) the doctrines as to the position of allies were material to the decision. Lord Stowell declares them in the following part of his judgment: "If one State only is at war, no injury is committed to any other State (ie., by allowing particular relaxations. It is of no importance to other nations how much a single belligerent chooses to weaken and dilute his own rights. But it is otherwise when allied nations are pursuing a common cause against Between them it must be taken as an implied, if not an express, contract that one State shall not do anything to defeat the general object. If one State admits its subjects to carry on an interrupted trade with the enemy the consequence may be that it will supply that aid and comfort to the enemy. It should seem that it is not enough, therefore, to say that the one State has allowed this practice to its own subjects; it should appear to be at least desirable that it could be shown that either the practice is of such a nature as can

a common enemy.

in no manner interfere with the common operations, or that it has the allowance of the confederate State.' Again, this rule is stated in its full force sixty years later in Wheaton (see Dana's Wheaton, 8th edit., 1866, par. 316): "Not only is such intercourse with the enemy, on the part of the subjects of the belligerent State, prohibited and punished with confiscation in the Prize Courts of their own country, but, during a conjoint war, no subject of an ally can trade with the common enemy without being liable to the forfeiture, in the Prize Courts of the ally, of his property engaged in such trade. This rule is a corollary of the other, and is founded upon the principle that such trade is forbidden to the subjects of the co-belligerent by the municipal law of his own country, by the universal law of nations, and by the express or implied terms of the treaty of alliance subsisting between the allied Powers. And, as the former rule can be relaxed only by the permission of the sovereign power of the State, so this can be relaxed only by the permission of the allied nations, according to their mutual agreement. A declaration of hostilities naturally carries with it an interdiction of all commercial intercourse. Where one State only is at war, this interdiction may be relaxed, as to its own subjects, without injuring any other State; but when allied nations are pursuing a common cause against a common enemy there is an implied, if not an express, contract that neither of the co-belligent States shall do anything to defeat the common object. If one State allows its subjects to carry on an uninterrupted trade with the enemy, the consequence will be that it will supply aid and comfert to the enemy, which may be injurious to the common cause. It should seem that it is not enough, therefore, to satisfy the Prize Court of one of the allied States to say that the other has allowed this practice to its own subjects; it should also be shown, either that the practice is of such a nature as cannot interfere with the common operations, or that it has the allowance of the other confederate State."

And still more recently, M. Calvo, in the edition already referred to (vol. 4, par. 1956), states the rule and the reasons for it : Sect. 1956. La même règle s'étend aux sujets alliés. Heffter, il est vrai, n'est pas de cet avis: il trouve la question plus délicate pour les alliés que pour les nationaux, parce qu'à l'égard des premiers, le belligérant semble en quelque sorte assumer une autorité juridictionnelle qui ne lui appartient que quand elle découle pour lui de stipulations conventionnelles expresses. Mais c'est là, suivant nous, une thèse irrationnelle, puisque l'alliance devant avoir pour conséquence logique de placer les co belligérants exactement sur la même ligne à l'égard de l'ennemi, il n'est pas admissible que la prohibition imposée à l'un ne s'étend pas de plein droit à l'autre. C'est au surplus ce que Wheaton démontre d'une manière irréfutable, quand il dit que pour être justes et sensées, la règle et les exceptions qui y sont apportées doivent s'appliquer également à tous les deux; qu'en défendant la continuation du commerce avec l'ennemi, le belligérant obéit à la fois aux préceptes du droit civil interne, aux principes généraux du droit des gens et à l'esprit ou à la lettre de l'alliance qu'il a contractée. Il faut enfin remarquer que la situation de l'allié par rapport à l'ennemi commun étant la même que celle de son co-belligérant, on ne saurait en ce qui concerne le commerce, établir de distinction entre ceux qui enterprennent une lutte de concert et se sont par là taci ement obligés à ne rien faire de contraire au but général de l'alliances qui les unit. Dans une de ses sentences, Sir W. Scott déduit de ce principe qu'il ne suffisait pas pour sa justification que l'état allié put alléguer qu'il avait autorisé la continuation du trafic avec son adversaire, mais qu'il fallait encore que son co-belligérant eût donné son assentiment à la mesure.

So intimate and imperative are the neutral duties of allies bound to each other by sacred and solemn bonds to fight a common foe that I believe the true rule to be that, whatever intercourse with an enemy is prohibited by international law, no relaxation whatever can be allowed by one State in favour of its citizens, which can affect the confederate States, unless expressly sanctioned by the latter.

Finally, it is clear that the rule must be enforced and confiscation decreed whether a person engaging in the prohibited intercourse acts innocently, in good faith, and in pursuance of advice honestly believed to be sound, or of licences or permissions honestly believed to be valid. The authorities for this are numerous. The Hoop (ubi sup.) in itself would be sufficient. The fact of actual intercourse is the determining factor. Innocence of intention is no answer. If there has been an infraction of the rule, however innocent, the court must apply the consequences by decreeing confiscation. To borrow the quaint language of a judge of the United States Supreme Court: "It is the unenvied province of this court to be directed by the head, and not by the heart In deciding on principles that must define the rights and duties of the citizen (and it may be added of allied citizens), and direct the future decisions of justice, no latitude is left for the exercise of feeling."

Having stated the principles, it now remains to set out the material facts in the present case to which the principles have to be applied. The claimants-the French company-had had constant dealings with Beer, Sondheimer, and Co., the German company. The German company sold to the French company silver and lead ores; and the French company then carried out in Greece a process of reduction which resulted in a product called silver lead, which they contracted to sell to the German company. The contract was before the war. For the purpose of fulfilling the contract, after the silver lead was manufactured, the French company chartered the Greek steamship Panariellos to carry the lead to the purchasers. The loading of the silver lead upon the steamship began before the war. It was continued for about seven days after the war.

The vessel began her voyage on the 11th Aug., with the cargo on board, which was intended to be delivered pursuant to the contract with the German company. While the loading was proceeding, the following letter was sent, on the 4th Aug. 1914, by the agents of the French company at Ergasteria to the French company's head office in Paris:

66

Having received from Frankfort the following telegram: 'Send Bill of Lading Ship Panariellos 1000 tons Silver lead direct Beer Sondheimer et Co. London 120 Fenchurch Street and transmit by your Paris Office by Telegram these instructions. Telegraphic communications with Paris stopped. Acknowledge receipt. BEERSONDHEIMER,' we wired you this morning :'Telegraphic communication between Frankfort and Paris stopped; Beersondheimer beg us to ask you send Bills of Lading for 1000 lead Panariellos direct 120 Fenchurch London.'

:

Beer, Sondheimer, and Co., of 120, Fenchurch-street, London, was a mere agency for Beer, Sondheimer, and Co., of Frankfort. The work at the agency was carried on by a German subject, who was in Germany at the outbreak of the war, with the aid of a clerk who was an Austrian subject. On the 12th Aug. 1914, after the voyage commenced, the French company sent the following telegram to the London agency of the buyers: Panariellos started eleventh with 1020 tons lead. Suppose you have defrayed insurance.-LAURIUM."

66

66

And on the same day the two following letters were written, one from the claimants' Paris office to the London agency of the German buyers and the other from the latter to the former: 'Paris, the 21st Aug. 1914.-Gentlemen, Panariellos.-We beg to acknowledge receipt of your to day's telegram as follows: Received telegram regarding steamer Panariellos. Where are bills of lading? Telegraph Beer, Sondheimer Company; and to confirm that which we sent you in answer as follows: "Not yet received bill of lading Panariellos.' The steamer Panariellos left, indeed, the port of Ergasteria on the 11th of this month, bound to Antwerp and Newcastle, and we have not yet the documents in our possession. But we will send you these as soon as we get them, according to the instructions received from your firm of Frankfort. We remain, Gentlemen, yours faithfully, S. Ingenieur Secretaire General. (Signed) P. ALBRAND. P.S.-Don't forget that in the present circumstances letters and packets from Greece are much delayed in reaching us."

"Beer, Sondheimer, and Co., London Agency, 120, Fenchurchstreet, London, the 21st Aug. 1914.-To Monsieur le Baron J. de Catalin, E. V.- Dear Sir,-I hear by MM. Leopold Walford et Co. that you will be in London to-morrow. I should be very glad to see you about the silver lead loaded on the steamer Panariellos. I will take the liberty of calling you on the telephone to-morrow at about 10.30 in the morning in order to make an appointment with you.-I remain, dear Sir, yours faithfully, for Beer, Sondheimer, and Co, London Agency. Signed (unreadable)."

On the next day Baron de Catelin, the managing director of the French company, had an interview in London with Mr. Weissberger, the Austrian subject, who was then in charge of the London agency of the German company. In a statement subsequently sent to the Procurator-General by the Baron, he said that at this interview it had been verbally agreed that if the lot of lead was delivered to the said firm, a complete settlement of accounts would follow." The Baron seems to have thought that up to that time the London agency of Beer, Sondheimer, and Co. had a right to continue to carry on their business on behalf of the German company. On the following day, the 23rd Aug, the offices of Beer, Sondheimer, and Co. in London were seized and closed. On the 25th Aug. 1914 a letter was sent from the Paris

office of the claimants, apparently without any knowledge of the interview of the 22nd Aug., that already reported, or of the closing of the agency office. The Baron said that it was written without any authority from him or the company, but in these proceedings I have no means of testing that statement, and must assume that it was written in the ordinary course of business, especially as no steps were taken to put an end to any further communications. The following is a translation of the letter:"Gentlemen,-Panariellos.-Confirming our letter St. No. 5863 of the 21st of this month, we beg to send you annexed: 1. A bill of lading indorsed in blank 10,476 pigs or 510 tons of silver lead loaded in holds 1 and 3. 2. A bill of lading indorsed in blank 10,493 pigs or 510 tons silver lead, loaded in holds 2 and 4. We beg you please to acknowledge the receipt of these documents, and we remain, Gentlemen, yours faithfully, l'Ingenieur Secretaire General (Signed) P. ALBRAND."

The vessel arrived in the Downs about the 28th Aug., and the master refused to proceed to Antwerp, where part of the cargo (viz, some zinc ore) was to have been delivered, and part of it was destined for Germany or for German firms.

The vessel was afterwards sent to Swansea, where there was a market for the zinc ore. The zinc ore, which was stored above the silver lead, was sold. The vessel arrived at Swansea on the 7th Sept. 1914, and on that day the silver lead was formally seized pending further inquiries, and was finally seized as prize subject to confiscation on the 25th Sept. 1914. Meantime, on the 31st Aug., a letter was written by the claimants to their London brokers, of which the following is a translation:

My dear Walford, Enclosed I send one bill of lading of the Panariellos indorsed in blank so you have every right to take delivery of the cargo. I remind you that the 800 tons of calamine No. 1 and the 300 tons of calamine No. 3 are sold through Dixon at Swansea. So far as concerns the lead you decide with Dixon and Heberlein the best course to adopt with regard to this lot. If Beer, Sondheimer, and Co. or the English Government wish to use the parcel bill of lading which they have in their hands you should explain that this bill of lading was sent them in current account, but that in reality almost the whole, say, fourfifths, belong to us. In fact, I have no time to give you details of this current account, but the balance in favour of Beer Sondheimer, and Co. without reckoning the Panariellos comes to 103,648f. 35c As the value of the 1000 tons of lead in the Panariellos is about 500,000f. the difference should come to us, say, in round figures, 400,000f., and the Government should only be able to seize the balance. As we have another specimen of the general bill of lading and as this letter might possibly not reach you, I am sending one of our employees to bring it to you and also a copy of this letter. The money coming over from the calamine or from the lead should be paid to the account of our company at the London County and Westminster Bank Limited. Relying on your efforts and thanking you in advance for all that you will do for us,-I remain, dear Sir, yours, &c., (Sd.) J. DE CATELIN."

The Baron de Catelin disavowed with emphasis any intention in these transactions to do anything which would be helpful to the enemy, or prejudicial to this country. I accepted willingly his disavowal. He probably thought that he could properly deliver the cargo of silver lead to his customers, Beer, Sondheimer, and Co., if they accepted delivery at Newcastle or elsewhere in England. After these proceedings were instituted Beer, Sondheimer, and Co., London Agency, caused an appearance to be entered, and put in a claim as the owners of the goods. This claim was subsequently abandoned by an express notice of withdrawal. The above facts are amply sufficient to show that in respect of the cargo of 1020 tons of silver lead, there was commercial intercourse and a trading after the war between the present claimants and citizens of the enemy. The cargo was sold by arrangement between the marshal and the claimants, and the proceeds, amounting to about £16,000, are now in court. Applying the principles deduced to the facts proved, I have no alternative but to declare that the cargo was confiscable, and to decree the condemnation of the proceeds as lawful prize.