دو persons without any power of informing themselves on the subject should be held liable for the consequences of any irregularity in the qualification of their solicitor.' The case, however, brings into prominence the question why there should be any distinction between a London and country certificate, or, in fact, why any annual duty should be charged at all, save a merely nominal sum to cover the expenses of the certificate. solicitor is the only professional man who has to pay an annual tax for permission to carry on his work, and no just reason whatever exists why it should be exacted. A CONTRACTS AND THE WAR.-IX. WITH this article we shall conclude this series. As we intimated in our last article, numerous correspondents continue to raise points of interest in connection with the very broad subject with which we have been dealing. We shall now deal with such of these points as are of general interest to our readers. In the first place, we have received communications which go to show that there is much misapprehension on the position of an alien who has duly observed all the requirements under the Restriction of Aliens Act. We should have thought that a careful perusal of our previous articles would have answered many of the points raised by correspondents. At a very early stage we committed ourselves to the view that an alien enemy (so called) who had observed and who continues to observe all the requirements of the Act, and the proclamations, orders, rules, and so forth, made under or in relation to the Act, must for all contractual purposes be regarded as an alien licensed by the Crown to remain and trade in this country. This view has now been judicially upheld. There certainly does seem to be scope for difficulties in this question of the contractual relationships of registered aliens. Thus, suppose an alien who has at the outset done all he ought to do as regards registration, &c., to fail to observe his restrictions, does he thereupon become an alien enemy wrongfully in this country, and therefore a person with whom no English subject ought to have any dealings? The true position appears to be this, that so long as the requirements are duly observed there is an implied licence by Parliament and the Crown. This implied licence appears to be a conditional licence -conditional on the requirements being duly observed. Once, therefore, the condition is broken, presumably the licence is withdrawn. If this be right-and it is difficult to see what other view could be taken-no person in this country ought to transact business with an alien unless he satisfies himself that that alien has complied with and continues to observe the restrictive requirements. Presumably the position of a British subject in this country, as regards his contractual relationship with an alien enemy in this country who originally observed the conditions of his licensed sojourn in this country, but who has subsequently made default in that matter, is very much the same as in the case of an alien enemy in the enemy's country. That is to say, when default is made, the alien, losing his status as a licensed person, becomes a full blooded alien enemy, and is therefore a person with whom no subject of this country can rightfully deal. For the purposes of ascertaining the effect of the war on the contracts of such an alien we ought to apply the same principles as those explained in our previous articles-with this difference only, that the period when default was made ought in this case to be substituted for the usual crucial moment in the other cases, namely, the declaration of war. But, as we have already said, there is plenty of scope for legal difficulties in this question. For instance, is an innocent breach of the terms of the implied licence to affect the rights and obligations of parties who have been dealing with the alien? These are matters, however, which do not app ar to ns to be within the scope of these articles. Turning now to a point of some interest-namely, the effect of the war on a contract entered into by a person, who is now an alien enemy. prior to the commencement of the war, for the purchase of land in England-it would appear that, time being usually of the essence of the contract, such a contract would generally speaking, be discharged. By the common law of this country the Crown could step in and claim the landed property of an alien. "If an alien Christian or infidel," wrote Lord Coke (Co. Litt. 26), "purchase houses, lands, tenements, or hereditaments to him and his heirs, albeit he can have no heirs, yet he is of capacity to take a fee simple, but not to hold; for upon an office found, the King shall have it by his prerogative, of whomsoever the land is holden. And so it is if the alien doth purchase land and die, the law doth cast the freehold and inheritance upon the King. If an alien purchase any estate of freehold in houses, lands, tenements, or hereditaments the King upon office found shall have them." There was, however, a curious distinction which no doubt came to be engrafted on the common law by reason of the exigencies of commercenamely, the distinction between the acquisition of landed property as a form of wealth, and the acquisition of houses or places of business for the purposes of habitation and trade. Thus, Lord Coke says: 'But as to a lease for years, there is a diversity between a lease for years of a house for the habitation of a merchant stranger being an alien whose King is in league with ours, and a lease for years of lands, meadows, pastures woods, and the like. For if he takes a lease for years of lands, meadows, &c., upon office found, the King shall have it. But of a house for habitation he may take a lease for years as incident to commerce; for without habitation he cannot merchandise or trade." It is curious to note that down to a comparatively recent date an old statute of Henry VIII. remained unrepealed, making void all leases of houses or shops to an alien being an artificer or handicraftsman. Apart from that statute it would seem that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, unless the alien was a merchant friend and the house was for his habitation, the lease was forfeitable to the Crown. In 1811 the late Mr. Hargrave wrote an opinion on this point, and although he seems to have thought it doubtful whether the courts would not hesitate to go to the full extent of the law as stated above, he appears to have believed that such in strictness was the law. The Naturalisation Acts have done much to alter the position of aliens with regard to this matter of acquiring and holding land in this country. The statute 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66 empowered an alien to take and hold land for the purpose of residence and business. But there was a limit on such freedom reserved even in that Act, and the term for which the alien could hold was limited to twenty-one years. By the Naturalisation Act 1870 real and personal property of every description may be taken, acquired, held, and disposed of by an alien in the same manner in all respects as by a natural-born British subject, and a title to real and personal property of every description may be derived through, from, or in succession to an alien in the same manner in all respects as through, from, or in succession to a natural-born British subject. The term "alien" is not defined in the Act. Whether it includes an alien enemy as well as an alien friend is a matter of some doubt. Primâ facie, we think, the Act makes no distinction whatsoever between the two. The preamble consists in a single recital, which runs as follows: "Whereas it is expedient to amend the law relating to the legal condition of aliens and British subjects." The position then, as regards contracts for the purchase of land in this country entered into prior to the commencement of the war, by persons who become alien enemies on the outbreak of hostilities, appears to be as follows: If the alien is licensed expressly or impliedly, the completion of the contract ought to follow in accordance with the terms of the contract. If the alien is an enemy proper, the completion of the contract may or may not follow, according to the terms of the contract. If, according to the terms of the contract, completion is only due after the termination of the war, there appears to be no reason whatever for saying that such a contract is discharged on the outbreak of the war. As Chief Baron Pollock pointed out in the case of De Wahl v. Braune (1856, 25 L. J. 343, Exat p. 345), there is no pretence for saying that an alien enemy is civiliter mortuus. He is merely in a state of suspended animation. But if according to the terms of the contract completion is fixed at some point of time during the currency of the war-and this would be the usual case-the contract would be discharged, we think, by reason of the impossibility of performance. Presumably the position would be the same as in the cases mentioned in our former articles where the subvention of unforeseen circumstances has rendered the performance of the contract impossible that is to say, the law would leave the parties as they stood when performance became impossible. Presumably the English vendor could rightfully retain his deposit money, but would have no right against the alien enemy as regards any loss suffered by the vendor on a resale of the property. Other correspondents have raised some interesting points on the effect of the war on contracts made on the Stock Exchange In relation to this subject it will be useful to state the general principles which must be considered where questions arise as to the effect of the war on contracts of this kind. As a general rule, a broker acts as agent for his client. Broadly speaking, therefore, the relative rights of the broker, the client, and the third party or parties with whom the broker effects a privity of contract with his client, are governed by the general principles of agency law. But the rules and usages of the Stock Exchange have a considerable bearing on this relationship. The authority of the broker in the great generality of cases depends on these rules and usages The rules, regulations, customs, and usages of the various Stock Exchanges in this country vary in many important respects. Some of these rules may be described as purely domestic. Others are intended to bind outsiders. When a client instructs a broker to transact some business for him, the client either expressly or impliedly employs the broker on the terms of the particular Stock Exchange. That is to say, the material usages of that Stock Exchange are impliedly incorporated into the contract of agency. There are, however◄ limits to this general rule, and it has been said that if the client is ignorant of the usages, no usage unless shown to be a reasonable one would bind him. It has been also said that the client only binds himself by usages other than what we have called the domestic rules. "In my opinion," said the late Sir Archibald L. Smith when Master of the Rolls, in the case of Levitt v. Hamblett (84 L. T. Rep. 638; (1901) 2 K. B. 53, at p. 60), client agrees with his broker that the dealings between them are to be carried on under the rules of the Stock Exchange so far as they are applicable to outsiders, and not under the rules that are applicable only to the domestic forum of the Stock Exchange." 66 Now, suppose a German client to have employed an English broker to buy stock on an English Stock Exchange prior to the commencement of the war. Suppose the war to have broken out before the broker buys. What is the position of the broker? Apparently the whole matter would be at an end. In such a case the broker would necessarily have been impliedly instructed to exercise his authority within a certain time-that is to say, he would be required to enter into an enforceable contract with a third party for the purchase and delivery of the stock before some point of time. The proclamation of the 9th Sept. expressly forbade subjects to enter into any new transaction or complete any transaction already entered into with an enemy in any stocks, shares, or securities; so from that time onwards share transactions for alien enemies have been out of the question. In point of fact it would have been clearly against the common law principles prohibiting trading with the enemy to have carried out such a transaction apart from this proclamation. But a great deal of difficulty is introduced into this question by the terms of the earlier proclamation and the matter has been somewhat further confused by the ill-fated Treasury memorandum of last August. Apparently share transactions were actually authorised by the earlier proclamation, but this point seems so doubtful that we think it best not to hazard an opinion on it. However this may be, share transactions for an alien enemy are now clearly illegal. It is also clear that the practical difficulties with regard to carrying out share transactions for alien enemies prior to the proclamation of the 9th Sept. would, in nine cases out of ten, render contracts of this description unenforceable. Possibly the true view is that from and after the a commencement of the war all dealings for alien enemies became illegal, so that every contract in respect of shares, made before the commencement of the war and uncompleted when war broke out, became impossible of performance, and that the parties were left where they stood at the time. We ought not perhaps to leave this subject without calling the reader's attention to a very wise provision contained in the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914. Sect. 3 of that Act provides that where it appears to the Board of Trade in reference to any firm or company that the control or management has been or is likely to be so affected by the state of war as to prejudice the effective continuance of the trade or business of the firm or company, and that it is in the public interest that the trade or business should be carri d on, the Board of Trade may apply to the High Court for the appointment of a controller of that firm or company. The section gives power to the court to appoint such an officer for such time and subject to such conditions and with such powers as the court think fit. The powers which the court may confer on the controller are to be either those of a receiver and manager or those powers subject to such modifications, restrictions, or extensions as the court think fit. In point of fact the Act made no provision as to how the application to the court ought to be made. It contained no power of making rules under the Act. Consequently much doubt prevailed as to the proper method of application. Occasion having arisen recently for an application under the Act in respect of a particular company, the Board of Trade applied by petition ex abundanti coutela. Mr. Justice Warrington, to whom the application was made, expressed the view that there was no doubt whatever that, when an Act of Parliament laid it down that an application might be made to the court, that application might be made by motion. His Lordship had consulted most of the other judges of the Chancery Division on the point, as well as the Master of the Rolls, and the learned judges all agreed that the application under the Act might be made in any way in which the court could be approached. Apparently, therefore, the most satisfactory mode of application under the Act is by way of an originating motion. In this case (Re Meister Lucius and Brüning Limited (ante, p. 590) the learned judge in dealing with the question of the sufficiency of evidence to support an application under the Act, indirectly threw light on the nature of the case which would have to be shown by persons interested in having the business of the firm or company preserved. Apparently the circumstances must be such as to lead the Board of Trade to think that the control and management of the concern has been, or is likely to be, affected by the state of war, in such a way as to prejudice the effective continuance of the business, and that it is in the public interest that the trade should be carried on. But the Board of Trade are not the ultimate judges of the propriety of granting the application-that is a matter for the court. Apparently, therefore, a person interested in seeing to the preservation of the business of such a firm or company must induce the Board of Trade to take action; and the latter board need only do so if they are satisfied that the case is a proper one for an application to the court. Mr. Justice Warrington in the lastmentioned case intimated that, as regards evidence, all the court ought to require is some evidence that the information of the board has some reasonable foundation. This concludes our observations on the very broad and difficult subject which forms the title of this series of articles. Not only are there difficulties with regard to the subject-matter generally, but the task undertaken by the writer has been rendered heavier by the constant alterations in the law which have from time to time been made while these articles were in course of preparation. Many subjects have been purposely omitted, such as the numerous questions arising with regard to insurance and the underwriting of ships and cargoes. So also have questions rela ing to contracts of a treasonable nature. As regards the former, the law on this subject is f too complicated a nature to be satisfactorily dealt with on broad lines. As regards the latter, the ground of public policy appears to us to furnish a good reason for omitting that subject. ( It is believed, however, that the general outline given in these articles of the principles which govern the subject-matter will be found of practical use to those who have to consider the relative rights and obligations of British subjects and aliens regarding their contractual relationships in the present unfortunate circumstances which have been brought about through the failure of a high contracting party to recognise those principles of integrity and good faith upon which the English law of contract is based. (Conclusion.) A LANDLORD'S REMEDY UNTOUCHED. A CORRESPONDENT writes : There is an important omission from the list of the landlords' special remedies, the exercise of which are by the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 78) rendered subject to the discretion of the courts. The particular remedy of the landlord referred to is that contained in sect. 6 of the Law of Distress Amendment Act 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 53). By the terms of this section it is provided that, "in cases where the rent of the immediate tenant of the superior landlord is in arrear it shall be lawful for such superior landlord to serve upon any undertenant or lodger a notice (by registered post addressed to such undertenant or lodger upon the premises) "-it was held in the case of Jarvis v. Hemmings (106 L. T. Rep. 419; (1912) 1 Ch. 462) that a landlord who served notices upon the undertenants personally requiring them to pay the rents to him had complied with the requirements of the section-" stating the amount of such arrears of rent, and requiring all future payments of rent, whether the same has already accrued due or not, by such undertenant or lodger to be made direct to the superior landlord giving such notice until such arrears shall have been duly paid, and such notice shall operate to transfer to the superior landlord the right to recover, receive, and give a discharge for such rent." There being no reference to this power of the landlord contained in the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914, it is conceived that landlords are enabled to continue the exercise of such power without any previous application for leave to the courts. Moreover, on consideration it will be seen that the particular mischief against which the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act is directed—namely, the harsh action of c editors enforcing payment of debts which, owing to circumstances attributable to the present war, debtors are unable immediately to meet-does not arise in connection with this particular power of the landlord. In the nature of the case the tenant of the superior landlord is not damnified. Where the tenant has collected rent due by his undertenant and neglected to pay the superior landlord what is owing to him, it is no hardship that the superior landlord should have first call, so to speak, on future sums falling due by undertenants. He is given a charge upon the profits arising from the property to the exclusion of his immediate tenant, and there can be no injustice, in such circumstances, in his being preferred. At all events, a tenant who has taken rent from undertenants and spent all the money could not be heard to say that he was unable to pay his superior landlord owing to circumstances attributable to the present war. There would, therefore, be no good reason for requiring a superior landlord to make an application to the courts before availing himself of the particular remedy provided by sect. 6 of the Law of Distress Amendment Act 1998. NOTEWORTHY DECISIONS OF THE JUDICIAL YEAR. (Continued from p. 31.) Turner or Fraser v. Riddell and Co. (1914, S. C. 125) is another Scotch case of general utility. There the accident was the fall of an engine driver, while drunk, from his engine. It was held that, despite this strong circumstance, the accident had arisen out of and in the course of the employment, although the driver was quite unfit for the discharge of his duties. Martin v. J. Lovibond and Sons Limited (110 L. T. Rep. 455; (1914) 2 K. B. 227) was another accident arising out of a desire for drink. The victim was a drayman who, while in charge of a van, was engaged in obtaining or delivering orders for beer. In the course of an afternoon he drew up at the roadside and crossed over to obtain a drink in a public-house. In returning he was killed by a passing vehicle. The Court of Appeal held here that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, having regard to his work, which involved his being practically all his time in the London streets. Sanderson v. H. Wright Limited (110 L. T. Rep. 517) was a Court of Appeal decision where it was held that an accident had arisen in the course of the employment when a workman, returning to a warehouse in accordance with his duty, attempted to do so viâ some lines of railway, where he was killed by the rebound of some carriages from a buffer stop during shunting operations. It was contrary to the rules to cross while shunting was in progress, but the workmann thought that they had ceased. It was held that his dependants could claim compensation from his employers. This case may be contrasted with Pritchard v. Torkington noted 137 L. T. Jour. 316), where a workman was killed crossing the line, and the Court of Appeal held that there was no evidence to justify the County Court in holding that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. Weeks v. William Stead Limited (noted 137 L. T. Jour. 181) is another addition to cases where the accident in respect of which compensation was given resulted from molestation by men of a criminal class. The House of Lords has recently reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal in Webber v. Wansborough Paper Company Limited (noted 137 L. T. Jour. 237) and have held that an accident arose out of and in the course of the employment where a man slipped on a ladder going ashore from a ship. Lewis v. Port of London Authority (noted 137 L. T. Jour. 238) was a Court of Appeal decision where an award was made in respect of an embolism of a man with four kidneys injured by a fall of timber, the effect of which was to waken up a cancer which had probably been dormant from birth. Kerr v. Ayr Steam Shipping Company (noted 137 L. T. Jour. 340 is a case of a mysterious disappearance of a ship's steward where the House of Lords held that he was entitled to compensation. In regard to cases of industrial diseases, reference may usefully be made to Dean v Rubian Art Pottery Company (No. 1) (110 L. T Rep. 594; (1914) 2 K. B. 213), where the Court of Appeal had to deal with the obscure and difficult sect. 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906. The Court of Appeal held that there was nothing in the section which avoided the necessity for a workman to prove, as in other cases, that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. The workman here had contracted lead poisoning while working for W. prior to May 1911. In March 19 3 he worked in a lead process for four days for R., and for four and a half days in April up to the 18th April. Pneumonia followed a cold in May and he died, the end being accelerated by the lead poisoning. The widow applied for compensation against R., who brought in W. as a third party. The Court of Appeal agreed with the County Court judge that judgment must go for the employers, holding that the workman's widow had not shown that the disease was caused by the last employment, and that it was not enough to show that he had been engaged in a lead industry twelve months previous to the death The employment was not shown to have been "at or immediately before" the death. Amongst the cases relating to notice, Thompson, v. NorthEastern Marine Engineering Company (110 L. T. Rep 441; (1914, W. N. 22) is likely to be frequently cited where excuse is being made for a failure to give notice of an accident. There a workman slipped and injured his elbow, but was unaware for nearly three months that he had fractured it. In a few days, after discovering the facts as a result of X ray treatment, he notified the employers, and later on commenced proceedings. The Court of Appeal, agreeing with the County Court, held that the failure to give notice was accounted for by the latent character of the injury, and by the man's ignorance of the cause of the illness being attributable to an accident so long before. Under these circumstances the court held that there was a reasonable cause for not giving notice. This may be compared with Hodgson v. Robins, Hay, Waters, and Hay (1914) W. N. 47), where the Court of Appeal thought that the employers had been prejudiced by a failure to give notice. In July a charwoman slipped on stairs and wrenched a knee. Two days afterwards she fell again in her own home and broke her kneecap. Between the two accidents she had done her work. No notice of the accident was given until the following January. The Court of Appeal did not disturb the finding of the County Court judge that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, and that there was a connection between the two accidents, but they felt strongly that the employers had been prejudiced, and th y drew attention to the principle that it was highly necessary in these cases for a workman to prove affirmatively that the employer had not been prejudiced. Clapp v. Carter 110 L. T. Rep. 491) is another highly important pronouncement in regard to notice. The d that an ent when a h his duty was killed op during Cross while thought ependant This case 137 L. T e, and the stify the of and in Limited where the ted from ords has n Webber T. Jour be course ashore 37L. T as made red by a er which Steam se of a ouse of sefully 111 Appeal Work d that ity for aruse 1 bere › May days Apri being com The that had the or workman had a fall and damaged his head. He returned to Nine months after the accident his wife made a verbal claim, We have now commented on those decisions which seem to COMMENTS ON CASES. Locality of Personalty. As a general principle it will be agreed that personal [Vol. 188.-55 Limited v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (84 L. T. Rep. 101; (1901) 1 K. B. 245) to hold that the commissioners were right. The last-mentioned case was a very strong one, as it related to the sale of the benefit of a contract respecting land in Roumania. Land in Roumania is locally situate out of the United Kingdom, so it might well be said that a contract relating to it should be regarded as so situate The Court of Appeal, however, decided that it was not so. Lord Justice Stirling, having held that the benefit of the contract was property, said: "In the present case the subject-matter of the agreement is a personal right against a person resident abroad," and was of opinion that such a right was not locally situate abroad. For some purposes choses in action are deemed to have a locality. For instance, in Re Clark (89 L. T. Rep. 736; (1904) 1 Ch. 294) a testator domiciled in England bequeathed all his personal estate in the United Kingdom to certain persons and all his personal estate in South Africa to other persons. At the time of his death he carried on business in London, and there were simple contract debts owing to him from people in South Africa to whom in the course of that business he had exported goods, and he also owned bonds to bearer in the Port Elizabeth Waterworks Company. Mr. Justice Farwell said: "With regard to the bonds, it is conceded that if they are on the same footing as simple contract debts the rule is, in construing a will, that the debts are, so far as they can have a locality at all, to be considered to be located where the debtor is resident; and for this purpose I do not see any ground for drawing a distinction between a bond and a simple contract debt. For fiscal purposes, no doubt, a distinction may be drawn between the two." The testator had also shares in a number of South African companies, which had offices both in London and South Africa, with boards of directors or officers in both for the purpose of carrying on the business, transferring shares, and issuing share certificates. In order to decide whether these shares passed as being in the United Kingdom or in South Africa, the learned judge had recourse to the actual locality of the certificates, and held "that where the certificates of the shares in these companies were in England, they pass under the gift of property situated in England, and not under the gift of property in South Africa." IMPOSSIBLE to challenge is Mr. Justice Rowlatt's statement in the course of his judgment in the recent case of Worcestershire County Council v. Notley Brothers (111 L. T. Rep. 382) as to the object of sect 1, sub-sect. 2, of the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 27). As his Lordship there said, it is to secure to a purchaser of food for cattle or poultry some idea of the ingredients of the article, 'the composition of which is presumably not apparent." But whe her by the use in that sub-section of the words "artificially prepared" the Legislature have fulfilled that laudable object is quite another consideration. His Lordship's employment of the particular word "com. position," was, however, a trifle unfortunate, maybe. For in its very essence there is involved a putting together of various things or parts. It is a far stronger word than "prepare," which denotes no more than "make ready." Nevertheless, the construction which the learned judge thought proper to place upon the words "artificially prepared" seems, without any undue straining of their fair meaning, to give a much better effect to the intentions of Parlia ment than the construction that appeared to Justices Avory and Shearman-the other learned judges who constituted the Divisional Court-to be the right one. Moreover, the separation of "sharps," an offal of wheat, from the flour and bran which form the two remaining component parts of the whole grain after the sharps have been removed, would not unreasonably be regarded as a "making ready," a "preparing," thereof for the purpose for `which it is designed-namely, food for cattle or poul ry. It may be taken for granted that, as Mr. Justice Avory remarked, the "Act was passed because of the practice of selling for food substances the composition of which was hidden from the purchaser." But if that was so, some words havi g that import could readily have been introduced in lieu of "artificially pre pared." Those appear to be hardly forceable and definite enough to exclude a mechanical separation of the constituents of a substance. That Lathom v. Spillers and Bakers Limited (108 L. T. Rep. 936; (1913) 2 K. B. 355) was a decision not governing the present case there is no room for doubt, when the difference in the subject matter dealt with is dissected. Guilty Wife alleged to be Maintained by Co-respondent. PARTIES to a divorce suit are made competent witnesses by sect. 3 of the Evidence Further Amendment Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 68), though they are not bound to answer any question tending to show that they have been guilty of adultery. The provisions of that section came prominently into discussion in the recent case of Bass v. Bass and Bianchi (noted ante, p 10). Crossexamination as to means is authorised by rule 191 of the Divorce Rules. But never before the present case seemingly has crossexamination of a guilty wife been allowed on the issue whether she is being maintained by the co-respondent. It appears, however, from the decision in Maden v. Maden and De Thoren (18 L. T. Rep. 337; 37 L. J. 10, P. & M.) that if a husband can prove that his wife has sufficient means of support independently of him, even though they be derived from the co-respondent, she will not be entitled to an allotment of alimony. As to such an allotment pendente lite, it is for the purpose of supplying the wife with means until decree absolute is granted: (Wells v. Wells, 3 Sw. & Tr. 542; Ellis v. Ellis, 49 L. T. Rep 223 8 P. Div. 188; see, further, Dunn v. Dunn, 59 L. T. Rep. 385; 13 P. Div. 91). But if she already has means of support, no alimony pendente lite is required. And in Holt v. Holt and Davis (16 L. T. Rep. 662; L. Rep. 1 P. & M. 610) it was refused on the ground that the respondent was being supported by the co-respondent. It is noticeable, however, that in that case the respondent did not deny the charge of adultery. In the present case, the object of the husband in making the application which is briefly recited in our note was to ascertain whether the wife was disentitled to alimony pendente lite because she had other means of support: (Eaton v. Eaton and Campbell, 21 L. T. Rep. 733; L. Rep. 2 P. & M. 51). There cannot be the remotest doubt, therefore, that the Court of Appeal, consisting of Lords Justices Kennedy and Swinfen Eady, were perfectly right in affording the husband the opportunity that he sought. But in limiting the order in the manner which is specified in our note, any injustice to the wife and alleged co-respondent was effectually precluded. THE CONVEYANCER. Settled Land Act 1882-Mortgage of Life EstateConsent to Sale. IT is well settled that when trustees of a settled estate have a power of sale over it, to be exercised at the request or with the consent of the tenant for life, who has alienated his life estate, either by way of sale or mortgage, neither the power of sale nor the power of consenting to a sale is extinguished, but that a sale can be effected with the concurrence of the alienee of the life estate: (see Alexander v. Mills, 24 L. T. Rep 206; L. Rep. 6 Ch. 124 Re Cooper; Cooper v. Slight, 51 L. T. Rep. 113; 27 Ch. Div. 565; and Re Bedingfield and Herring's Contract, 68 L. T. Rep. 634; (1893) 2 Ch. 332). A somewhat similar question arises under sect. 50 of the Settled Land Act 1882. That section provides, in effect, that the powers under the Act of a tenant for life are not capable of assignment or release, and remain exercisable by the tenant for life after and notwithstanding any assignment, by operation of law or otherwise, of his interest under the settlement. But this section is to operate "without prejudice to the rights of any person being an assignee for value of the estate or interest of the tenant for life," and in that case the assignee's rights are not to be affected without his consent, except that, unless he is actually in possession of the settled land, his consent is not to be requisite to leases by the tenant for life in conformity with the Act. It will be observed that the section does not say that la tenant for life who has sold or mortgaged his estate shall not sell under the Settled Land Act, but merely that the rights of the assignee shall not be affected without his consent. In Re Sebright's Settled Estates (55 L. T. Rep. 570; 33 Ch. Div. 429), which was an application by a tenant for life, who had mortgaged his life estate up to the hilt, for liberty to sell the mansion-house, Mr. Justice North and the Court of Appeal refused to make the order without the consent of the mortgagees of the life estate. Mr. Justice North in the course of his judgment, after referring to sect. 50 and also to sect. 20 of the Act (which provides for the way in which a sale by a tenant for life is to be carried out by conveyance), said: "When, therefore, his life estate is incumbered up to the hilt he can only sell that which is practically a reversion, not an estate in possession." And further on he said: "It seems to me that the Act does not necessarily forbid a sale by the tenant for life although he may have mortgaged or parted with his whole interest. I do not decide this point now; the sole question before me is with regard to the sale of the mansion-house and park." In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Cotton in the course of his judgment said: "If the mortgagees of the life estate will not consent to the sale of the mansionhouse with the estate, so as to make it a residential property, then at any stage or at any moment they may come and say they want to take possession." The point arose incidentally in the case of Ca digan v. Curzon-Howe (53 L. T. Rep. 704; 42 Ch. Div. 338). The actual decision was that the costs of obtaining the consent and concurrence of mortgagees of the life estate on a sale by the tenant for life are not costs "of or incidental to the exercise" of the statutory powers properly payable out of the capital money produced by the sale (not following Re Beck, 49 L. T. Rep. 95; 24 Ch. Div. 608). But Lord Justice Chitty (then Mr. Justice Chitty in the course of his judgment said: "The argument on the 20th section and on other parts of the Act was, that a tenant for life selling sells the whole estate and interest within the settlement itself, and that therefore if he sells or attempts to sell without obtaining the consent of the mortgagee of his own life interest, he is not making a sale within the Act. I cannot, as at present advised, assent to that proposition, because the section itself and the other parts of the Act confer upon him this power of sale, which, however, is not to prejudice his own mortgagee; it seems to me to follow almost in the words of the section that he may sell without prejudice to the rights of his own mortgagee. That is a sale, and it appears to me that that is a sale justified by the Act prima facie. I am not bound to go into any m nute discussion of what the effect of th 53rd section may be with reference to this point, or to express a final opinion whether the tenant for life in exercising this power of sale, if he sold without prejudice to the rights of his own mortgagees, would be selling having that regard which he ought to have under the 531d section to the interest of other parties in the settlement, because unquestionably if, as in the case before me, the tenant for life has mortgaged, to use a common expression, up to the hilt, it comes very much in the result to what Mr. Justice North said in Re Sebright's Settled Estates: When, therefore, his life estate is incumbered up to the hilt, he can only sell that which is practically a reversion, not an estate in possession.' But I pass that by with this observation only, that I do not think it necessary that I should decide this point in order to arrive at a conclusion upon the actual question that is before me." If the assignee's rights are not to be affected without his consent, it is difficult to see how a sale can be effected without such consent, because one of his rights would be to have the land as a security during the life of the tenant for life; and another right would be to take possession during the same period. Apart from statutory enactment, a mortgagor has no right to do an act which will cause a change of the investments comprised in the mortgage, without the consent of his mortgagee, as would be a violation of the principle that a grantor shall not derogate from his own grant. Further, it seems reasonable that the mortgagee should have a voice in fixing the purchase money. It is submitted, therefore, that if a tenant for life mortgages or sells his life estate, he cannot exercise the power of given by the Settled Land Acts without the consent of his alienee; and that would seem to be the view taken by the learned authors of Wolstenholme's Conveyancing and Settled Land Acts that |