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(10th edit., p. 451), where it is stated that a tenant for life " may
by assignment for value prevent himself from exercising the
powers as against the assignee." But having regard to the
dicta of Mr. Justice North and Lord Justice Chitty in Sebright's
Settled Estates and Cardigan v. Curzon-Howe, the point cannot be
considered free from doubt.

Trust for Sale or Power of Sale.

THE distinction between a trust for sale and a power of sale is often very fine, and sometimes gives rise to a difference of judicial opinion. In the comparatively recent case of Re Newbould; Carter v. Newbould (110 L. T. Rep. 6. a testator by his will appointed his wife and daughter to be his trustees and executors, and devised his real and personal estate to his trustees upon trust to sell his real estate as and when they thought proper, and to pay the net income of his real and personal estate to his wife during her life, and after her death he gave "All my real and personal estate and the proceeds of sale of such of my real estate as shall have been sold" to his daughter absolutely. The daughter survived the testator, but died in the lifetime of the widow, and at the latter's death no part of the real estate had been sold. On the death of the widow the question arose whether the real estate was converted and passed to the daughter's legal personal epresentative as personal estate. It was held by the Court of Appeal (reversing the decision of the court below) that the will did not create an imperative trust for sale, but gave to the trustees a discretionary power of sale, and, as they had not exercised such power, the real estate was not converted and passed to the heir-at-law of the daughter. It was contended on behalf of the personal representative of the daughter that the first words of the clause, " upon trust to sell," created an imperative trust unless that meaning was clearly rebutted by a subsequent clause in the will. But, as observed by Lord CozensHardy, M.R., you cannot stop at the opening words and then look to see whether you can find anything to cut down the first disposition. The proper course is to take the will as a whole. Lord Justice Swinfen Eady in the course of his judgment said: "There can be no doubt that upon the construction of some wills, what is in form a trust for sale may be construed as a discretionary power, and what is in form a power may be construed as an imperative trust. It is necessary to look at the whole will. It is not a true rule of construction to take only one clause, which may have a certain meaning, and then see if there is anything in the rest of the will to upset that meaning. You must take a the clauses together, weigh them, and ascertain the true meaning of the whole. I agree with the Master of the Rolls that where there is an absolute trust for conversion the fact that the trustees have a discretion as to time does not alter the general rule, and there will be conversion where there is a clear trust to sell. . . In my opinion the trust for conversion is discretionary, a mere power, and no imperative trust which is effective to work a conversion for a 1 purposes so as make real estate notionally personalty." The fact, however, that a trust for sale cannot be exercised without the consent of a tenant for life does not prevent its being a trust or direction for sale within the meaning of sect. 63 of the Settled Land Act 1882: (Re Wagstaff's Settled Estates, 100 L. T. Rep. 955; (1909) 2 Ch. 201).



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Company Director Office of Director to be vacated if Holder "becomes bankrupt or insolvent, or compounds with his Creditors"-Meaning of “insolvent.”

Defendants' appeal from a decision of the Divisional Court, reversing a decision of His Honour Judge Lumley Smith in the City of London Court. X, who was a director of the defendant company, assigned his salary as director to the plaintiffs. Clause 25 (a) of the articles of association of the defendant company provided that "the office of a director shall be vacated if he becomes bankrupt or insolvent, or compounds with his creditors." The County Court judge found that X. was insolvent at the date of the assignment in fact, and within the meaning of the article, and that therefore there was no salary as director that he could assign. The Divisional Court (Bray and Lush, JJ.), on the authority of Reg. v. Saddlers' Company (9 L. T. Rep. 60; 10 H. L. C. 404), reversed the decision, holding that there was no evidence of such notorious and public insolvency as must be established before the office of director was vacated under the articles. It appeared that several bankruptcy petitions had been filed at different times against X., th it all had been dismissed, that there had been no meeting of creditors at which any announcement of insolvency was made, and no step taken by X. founded upon an avowed insolvency. The defendants appealed.

Held, that there was evidence on which the County Court judge could find that X at the date of the assignment was insolvent in fact and within the meaning of the article of association. Decision of the Divisional Court reversed.

[London and Counties Assets Company v. Brighton Grand Concert Hall and Picture Palace Limited. Čt. of App. Buckley, Phillimere, and Pickford, L.JJ. Nov. 12-Counsel: for the defendants, Compston, K.C. and S. Lynch for the plaintiffs, Gordon Hewart. K.C. and Stuart Bevan. Solicitors: S. S. Seal; Zeffertt and Co.]

Lien-Bailee-Locatio operis faciendi-Goods of Third Party-
Right to general or particular Lien.

Plaintiffs' appeal from a decision of Bailhache, J. at Manchester Ass zes. The plaintiffs E. D. S. and Co. contracted with the plaintiffs C. and Co. for the printing by the latter of certain calico shirtings. C and Co. did not print themselves, and on their instructions the goods were fetched from C and Co. by P. T. and Co. P. T. and Co., being unable to bleach the goods, sent them without instructions from C. and Co. to the defendants, who were bleachers. There was nothing in the instructions of P. T. and Co, to the defendants to indicate to whom the goods belonged but each piece had upon it in tar letters "E. D. S. and Co." The goods were bleached by the defendants, but in the meanwhile P. T. and Co. went into liquidation, owing the defendants a considerable sum in respect of a general account between them for work done, and a smaller sum in respect of these particular shirtings. C. and Co. demanded delivery of the bleached shirtings, but the defendants claimed to retain them under a general and particular lien. One of the terms on which the defendants did business with P. T. and Co. was as follows: " All goods received by us will be subject to a lien upon them for the general balance of account.

Held, that the defendants had neither a particular nor a general lien on the goods of C. and Co. Decision of Bailhache, J. as to the particular lien reversed.

[Charles W. Cassils and Co. and others v. Holden Wood Bleaching Company Limited. Ct. of App.: Buckley, Phillimore, and Pickford, L JJ. Nov. 13, 16, and 17.-Counsel: Langdon, K.C. and Acion; C. Atkinson, K.C. and Dehn. Solicitors: Pritchard, Englefield and Co., for Boote, Edgar, Grace, and Rylands, Manchester; Woodcock, Ryland, and Parker, for Woodcock and Sons, Haslingden.]


Railway Company-Contract-Goods carried at Owner's Risk-
Non-delivery of any Package or Consignment"-Non-delivery of
Part of Consignment-Liability of Company.

Appeal by the defendants from a decision of the Divisional Court (Bray and Lush, JJ.) reported 109 L. T. Rep. 947. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants, a railway company, to recover damages for the non-delivery of three consignments or portions of three consignments of carcases forwarded by the defendants to his order. The goods were carried under an owner's risk consignment note which exempted the defendants from liability for loss, damage, misdelivery, delay, or detention of the goods except upon proof that such

loss, damage, misdelivery, delay, or detention arose from the wilful misconduct of the defendants' servants. It was further provided that nothing in the agreement should exempt the company from any liability they might otherwise incur (inter alia) in case of non-delivery of any package or consignment fully and properly addressed unless such non delivery should be due to accidents to trains or fire. From each of the three consignments forwarded to the plaintiff certain carcases were missing. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that they were not liable under the terms of the consignment note, upon the ground that the words "nondelivery of any package or consignment" in the condition set out above meant non-delivery of any package or consignment as an entity, and did not apply to non delivery of a portion of a consignment.

The Divisional Court held, affirming the County Court judge, that the words covered the case of non-delivery of a portion of a consignment, and that a consignment was not delivered where an appreciable part of it was not delivered. The defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Divisional Court, Phillimore, L.J. dissenting. Appeal dismissed

Wills v. Great Western Railway Company. Ct. of App.: Buckley, Phillimore, and Pickford, L.JJ. Oct. 22, 23, and Nov. 16.-Counsel for the appellants, Schiller, K.C. and Tatham; for the respondent, Rawlinson, K.C. and Weatherley. Solicitors: for the appellants. L. B. Page; for the respondent, Billings and Co., for Fairfax Spofforth, Bristol ]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Company-Partly paid Shares-Calls-Default of PaymentForfeiture Resolution Injunction Moratorium Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 78), s. 1, subs. 1 (b).

The plaintiff upon the formation of the defendant company in 1913 applied for and was allotted 2000 shares of £1 each. Calls were made upon the shares from time to time, and in July 1914 the directors made calls of 5s. per share payable on the 24th Aug. and of 2s. 6d. per share payable on the 26th Oct., which would make the shares fully paid. On the 20th Oct. the plaintiff informed the directors that he was unable to meet these calls owing to the war, but that he would either transfer the shares upon certain terms, or that he would give bills for the amounts due payable two months after the termination of the war with interest at 5 per cent. The directors refused these offers, and on the 28th Oct. passed a resolution forfeiting the shares for nonpayment of calls. The plaintiff then issued a writ claiming an injunction to restrain the defendant company and its directors from removing his name from the register of shareholders of the company, and from selling the shares. He now moved for an injunction in the same terms restraining the defendant company until judgment or further order.

Held, that the sum payable for calls was within the scope of the moratorium, and that consequently, when the resolution for forfeiture was passed, no debt was due to the company from the plaintiff. Held, also that this was an attempt to take possession of property in default of payment without the leave of the court and contrary to the provisions of the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914.

[Burgess v. G. H N. Gases Limited. Ch. Div.: Neville, J. Nov. 13-Counsel: C. E. Jenkins, K.C and W. H. Galbraith; H. E. Wright. Solicitors: H. F. Ireland; Field, Roscoe and Co.]

Contract-Construction- Arrangements preventing Bankruptcy— Petition presented "within the next Three Months"-Lunar or calendar Months- Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), 88. 6 (1) (c), 43, 49.

H. was on the 17th Oct. 1913 subject to a pending bankruptcy petition. H. was entitled in certain events to the repayment of deposits made with the plaintiffs in respect of uncompleted contracts for sale to him by the plaintiffs. His rights had been assigned to the defendants, his solicitors. The plaintiffs made an advance to get rid of the petition. They were also prepared on the 2'st. Oct 1913, on H.'s solicitors handing over the sale contracts and withdrawing their charge, to hand them a cheque for £950 on their undertaking to return it if H. was "made bankrupt or a bankruptcy petition is presented against him within the next three months." The defendants on the 22nd Oct. 1913 acknowledged the receipt of the £950, and agreed to repay the money in the event of H. "being adjudicated bankrupt within three months from this date." H. was adjudicated bankrupt upon his own petition on the 21st Jan. 1914. The plaintiffs claimed repayment of the £950. Simpson v. Margitson (11 Q. B. 23, and Bruner v. Moore (89 L. T. Rep. 738; (1904) 1 Ch. 305) were referred to.

Held, that, although in contracts not relating to commercial transactions in the City of London, "month means a lunar month, "month" may have a secondary meaning where controlled by the context in the contract in which it is used or the surrounding circumstances. The plaintiffs solicitors in making the offer of the 21st Oct. 1913 had regard to the time mentioned in sect. 6 (1) (c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 and referred to calendar months, and, having regard to the surrounding circumstances, "three months" in the defendants' acceptance also meant calendar months.

[Helsham-Jones v. Hennen and Co. Ch. Div.: Eve, J. Nov. 17.- Counsel: Edward Clyton, K.C. and J. E. Harman; Hon. W. H. Cozens-Hardy, K.C and R. H. Hodge. Solicitors: Hallowes and Carter; Hennen, Edgelow, and Castel'an.]

Petition to confirm Alteration of Objects of Company as stated in Memorandum of Association-Extension of principal ObjectsAddition of Objects incidental to principal Objects-Principles upon which the Court will sanction Alterations in Memorandum. J. B. and Co. Limited carried on an extensive business in shipbuilding and the manufacture of armaments, and the Tredegar Iron and Coal Company Limited carried on extensive colliery business. In both cases it was desired to make large alterations in the memorandums of association of the companies.


Held, that if a company is seriously considering an extension of their principal business by the adoption of a business which is not subsidiary to the business which it carries on at the present time, the court can consider the desirability of altering its memorandum so as to give it that opportunity. The court is perfectly willing to give the company every facility for carrying on the principal business which it now carries on or that business with the addition of another principal business which it intends now to carry on; but the court will not meet the possibility of the company some day or other desiring to carry on another principal business, because the company can always come to the court when they have a reasonable intention of doing it. regard to the principal business which the company is entitled to carry on, the court will give the company every facility to do so and will insert specifically anything which rea onably occurs to the company as something which it either now or in the immediate future sees the probability of it being called upon to undertake.


[Re John Brown and Co. Limited. Ch. Div.: Neville, J. Nov. 3, 10, and 17-Counsel: Sir Charles Macnaghten, K.C. and H. V. Rabagliati. Solicitors: Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, and Co. Re Tredegar Iron and Coal Company Limited. Counsel: Sir Charles Macnaghten, K.C. and H. V. Rubagliati. Solicitors: Minchin, Garrett, and Co.]

Will-Construction-Investments-Power to retain—EmployeeDeposit with Firm before Date of Will-Power of Trustees to retuin.

B. W. and Co, wholesale druggists, who had for some years received cash from their employees on current account, in 1902 instituted deposit accounts for sums of £100 and over governed by rules by which the deposit account carri d interest at 5 per cent. The maximum deposit for one depo-itor (except by permission) was to be £3000, and deposits could only be withdrawn on previous notice. S, who was employed as treasurer, had a current account opened in 1884 which at his death was credited with £187. In 1906 S. transferred from his current account to deposit account £2400, and at his death there was standing to the credit of his deposit account £2900. S., who died on the 17th Feb. 1914, by his will, dated the 29th June 1909, gave his residuary personal estate upon trust for conversion into money and, after payment of debts and testamentary expenses, at the discretion of his trustees to invest, with power at discretion to vary such investments, with a trust to pay the income to his wife for life and after her decease to The divide and pay the moneys among specified persons. testator declared "that any moneys liable to be invested under this my will may remain invested as at my death," or might be invested as in the will mentioned. The estate of the testator amounted to £4700, and, in addition to the deposit, comprised three investments authorised by his will. The trustees raised the question whether they were authorised in their discretion to retain the deposit with B. W. and Co. Re Rayner; Rayner v. Rayner (89 L. T. Rep.681; (1904) 1 Ch. 176) and Re Price (93 L. T. Rep. 44; (1905) 2 Ch 55) were cited.

Held, that the testator had used the word "investment" in its primary and true meaning. He did not treat the money on deposit as invested, and the trustees could not retain it.

[Re Sudlow; Smith v Sudlow. Ch. Diy.: Eve. J. Nov. 17.— Counsel: Bischoff; H. Watts Dollar; H.A. Hind. Solicitors: Rutland and Crauford.]

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Employers and Workmen-Injury in Course of Employment-
Compensation-Weekly Sum-Redemption of weekly Payments
Pagment of lump Sum-Registration of Memorandum-Work-
men's Compensation Act 1906, sched. 2, par. 9.

Rule calling upon the registrar of the T. County Court and
another to show cause why he should not register an agreement
between the B. Gas Company and one S., the applicant, in
certain proceedings in the County Court under the Workmen's
Compensation Act 1906. The rule was granted at the instance
of the gas company, and on the ground that under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, sched. 2, pars. 9 and 10, and the
Workmen's Compensation Rules 45 and 46 it was the duty of
the registrar to register or record the memorandum of agree-
ment. On the 27th July 1910 S. was injured by accident arising
out of and in the course of his employment by the gas company.
He was permanently incapacitated for work, and on the 1st Feb.
1912 he was awarded compensation at the rate of 19s. per
week, the maximum to which he was entitled, and the
same was paid to him up to the 14th March 1914. At
that date S. was fifty-six years old, and the amount
required to purchase a life annuity equal to the annual value
of 198. per week was £632 10s. 6d. The sum of £474 78. 11d.
was the maximum sum which S. was entitled to be paid if the
gas company then resolved to redeem the weekly payments
under sched. 1, par. 17, of the Act. Attempts were made by
the gas company to effect redemption of the weekly payments,
and the solicitors acting for S. agreed that the weekly pay-
ments should be redeemed by the payment of the maximum
sum of £474 78. 11d., with £2 2s. costs to the solicitors.
the 13th March 1914 these sums were duly paid; the sum of
£474 78. 11d. was paid to S. upon his receipt being given. The
receipt was given in duplicate, and was drawn in the form of a
memorandum of agreement, so that it might, as was intended,
be recorded in the County Court under par. 9 of sched. 2. This
was the memorandum which the registrar refused to register.
It was admittedly genuine, and S. did not dispute it or object
to its being recorded. The registrar refused to register it,
apparently on the ground that the money had already been
paid to S.
The judge also refused to register it.
support of the registrar's decision it was contended that, as the
money had been paid over to S. and a receipt given, there was
no power to register the memorandum.

Held, that the registrar was wrong in refusing to register the
memorandum, and that it was no objection to its being
registered that the redemption money had been paid.

[Rex v. Registrar of Thetford County Court. K. B. Div.:
Darling, A. T. Lawrence, and Sankey, JJ. Nov. 13.-Counsel:
H. D. Samuels and Branson; Holles Walker, K.C. and Ellis
Hill. Solicitors Treasury Solicitor; Watson, Sons, and

Franchise-Burgess Vote-Residence in Borough or within Seven
Miles-Sufficiency of Qualification-Municipal Corporations Act
1882, s. 9 (2) (c).

Case stated by the revising barrister for Shrewsbury. The appellant, who was member of Parliament for the borough of Shrewsbury and also an alderman of the borough, claimed that his name should be entered in the list of municipal voters or burgesses of the borough. The revising barrister disallowed the claim on the ground that the appellant had not resided in the borough or within seven miles thereof prior to the 15th July 1914, as required by sect. 9 (2) (c) of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882. This was the only question as to which there was any dispute before the revising barrister as regards the claim. By sect. 9 (2) of the Act, a person shall not be entitled to be enrolled as a burgess unless (c) he has during the whole of the twelve months resided in the borough or within seven miles thereof. The appellant for many years prior to the 25th March 1914 had occupied as tenant and resided at S. Hall, a house which was not within the borough, but was within seven miles thereof. In March 1914 the appellant let S. Hall furnished as from the 25th March 1914, and gave up possession on the 25th March 1914 and thereafter ceased to reside there, and before the 25th March 1914 he arranged with his sisters, who resided in the borough of Shrewsbury, that they should give him the sole use of a large double bedroom in their house. By this arrangement the room was reserved for the use of the appellant and his wife, or of his daughter if she wished to use it during his absence. The appellant paid his sisters £10 per annum, and also paid for his board when he actually occupied the room. On leaving S. Hall in March 1914 he removed to the room several things, and he and his wife kept articles of clothing there. He first slept in the room in pursuance of the arrangement on the 27th March 1914 and occupied it for the majority of week-ends up to the middle of July 1914. The respondent

did not appear.


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[Vol. 138-59

Held, allowing the appeal, that the appellant had resided in the borough or within seven miles thereof for the whole of the twelve months, and that the claim should have been allowed. K. B. Div.: Darling,

[Lloyd v. Town Clerk of Shrewsbury. Lush, and Sankey. JJ. Nov. 12.-Counsel: Hugh Fraser. Solictors: Gibson and Weldon, for Bowdler, Shrewsbury. Locomotives-Machines drawn by Locomotives-Threshing Machine and Straw Presser-Necessity for having Weight affixed thereonWaggon or other Vehicle"-Locomotives Act 1898, ss. 2, 17 (1). Case stated by justices for the county of Lancaster sitting at Bury. The appellants were summoned under sect. 2 of the Locomotives Act 1898 for that they, being the owners of certain waggons drawn by a locomotive, unlawfully did not conspicuously and legibly affix thereon the weight unloaded of such waggons. The justices convicted the appellants and ordered them to pay a penalty of 5s. and costs. The following facts were proved: On the 14th Feb. 1914 a locomotive owned by the appellants was proceeding along a main road, and to this locomotive were attached a threshing machine and a straw trusser or presser. Each of these machines was upon four wheels and no unladen weight was fixed upon either of them. If the wheels of either of the machines were removed the machines could be used in the one case for threshing or in the other case for trussing or pressing. By sect. 2 of the Locomotives Act 1898 the weight unloaded of every waggon drawn or propelled by a locomotive shall be conspicuously and legibly affixed thereon, and every owner not having affixed such weight, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £5; and by sect. 17 (1), unless the context otherwise requires, the expression waggon" includes any truck, cart, carriage, or other vehicle It was contended for the respondent that the machines were "waggons" or "vehicles" within the definition in sect. 17 (1), and that as neither had the weight unloaded affixed to it the appellants had committed an offence under sect. 2. It was contended for the appellants that the machines were not " waggons or "vehicles," and sections of other Acts were referred to. The justices, being of opinion that the case was governed by the recent case of Williams v. Wood (78 J. P. 221), held that the machines were on wheels attached to them by a kind of framework or under-carriage, and were vehicles within the meaning of the Locomotives Act 1898, and they convicted the appellants. The main contention for the appellants was that the machines could not be "vehicles" as they were not capable of carrying a load.


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Held, dismissing the appeal, that for a machine to be a "vehicle" it was not necessary that it should be capable of carrying a load, and that there was evidence on which the justices could find that the machines were vehicles.

[James Smith and Sons (apps.) v. Pickering (resp.). K. B. Div.: Darling, Lawrence, and Horridge, JJ. Nov. 11.Counsel: A. Powell, K.C.; J. C. Howard. Solicitors: JoynsonHicks and Co.; Snow, Fox, and Higginson, for Harcourt E. Clare, Preston.]

Solicitor-Bill of Costs-Appeal-Practice and Procedure-Jurisdiction of Divisional Court-Solicitors Act 1870 33 & 34 Vict. c. 28), ss. 4, 8, 10-Judicature Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 16), s. 1, sub-s. 4.

Appeal from an order of Atkin, J. at chambers reversing an order made by Master Archibald setting aside two agreements under sect. 8 of the Attorneys and Solicitors Act 1870. In Oct. 1912 C. was convicted at Liverpool Assizes for embezzlement of large sums of money from the prosecutors and sentenced to three years' penal servitude. In July, after the commencement of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutors also began a civil action against C. for the amount of their losses, and this action was stayed pending the criminal proceedings. On the 14th June 1912 C. gave J, a solicitor, a retainer in the criminal proceedings which contained the following clause: "And I agree that you shall receive the net proceeds of sale of the furniture. amounting to £436 178., to cover the law charges and disbursements of my defence." On the 9th July 19 2 he also gave, J. a retainer as follows: "I request and retain you to act for me as my solicitor in the above action at the inclusive fee of one hundred guineas, such fee to cover all disbursements until final judgment.' The administrator of C. under the Forfeiture Act 1870 took out a summons to have the agreements set aside. On the 4th April 1914 the master made an order to that effect, and on the 23rd April 1914 Atkin, J. rescinded this order on appeal. Against this decision the administrator appealed to the Divisional Court. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the solicitor that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction as this was a matter of practice and procedure under sect. 1, sub-sect. 4, of the Judicature Act 1894.

Held, that the court had jurisdiction, and, further, that as to the civil action there was not an agreement under sect. 4, and as to the criminal proceedings that the agreement must be referred back for inquiry whether there had been payment or


[Re J., a Solicitor. K. B. Div.: Horridge and Rowlatt, JJ. Nov. 11 and 2-Counsel: J. B. Matthews, K.C. and F. Walter Frampton; J H. Layton. Solicitors: Cartwright and Cunningham, for Donnison and Edwards, Liverpool; Bentley and Jones, for L. E. Menzies, Liverpool.]



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Parsons on the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906. edition. Butterworth and Co., Bell-yard, Temple Bar. 12s. 6d. net

Goadby's Introduction to the Study of Law. Butterworth and Co., Bell-yard, Temple Bar.


Fifth Price

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Jones' The Solicitor's Clerk."

Part 2, Sixth Edition. Effingham Wilson, 54, Threadneedle-street, E.C. Price 2s. 6d.


Jordan and Sons

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Llangollen, Monday

Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday. Thursday, and Fri-
day, at 10

Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10.30

Middlesbrough, Monday, at 9.30;
Thursday (C.S. at 9.30. By at 11)
Newcastle-on-Tyne, Thursday (R.
By), at 10

Newent, Monday
Northampton, Wednesday (Reg.),

at 10

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St. Austell, Monday, at 10
St. Helens Wednesday
Salford, Monday, Tuesday, and

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Shoreditch, Tuesday. Wednesday, and Thursday

Southampton, Wednesday (R. By).

at 12

Southport, Tuesday, at 10 Southwark, Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday, at 10.30

Stockton-on-Tees,* Tuesday (By at 11) and Friday (C.S.), at 9.30 Stow-on-the-Wold, Wednesday Stroud, Tuesday

Sunderland. Thursday (R. By)
Swansea, Monday, Tuesday, and

Totnes, Tuesday, at 10.30
Wakefield, Tuesday, at 10
Warrington, Thursday
Warwick, Monday, at 10
Watford, Monday (J.S.), at 10
Westbromwich, Wednesday (J.S.)
Westminster, Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday, Thursday, and Fri-

Whitechapel, Friday

and Thursday Worthing. Monday.

Monday (J.S.)

* Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary.


Manchester. Wednesday, Dec. 9
Rye, Wednesday, Nov. 25

West Ham, Friday, Dec. 4, at

come to what is a

New Points in Argument on Case stated by Justices. THE decision of the Divisional Court, consisting of Justices Darling, Avory, and Rowlatt, in the recent case of Kates v. Jeffery (111 L. T. Rep. 459), makes abundantly clear a question concerning which there was previously some little uncertainty. For the authorities thereon are by no means in unison. The Divisional Court, however, have now satisfactory determination. Upon a case stated by justices for the opinion of the Divisional Court, the well-settled rule that no point can be taken before the Divisional Court which was not taken before the justices, and does not appear upon the face of the case stated, is subject to this highly important qualification: It may be taken before the Divisional Court, provided that it is a point of law which no evidence can alter. As appears from our report, Mr. Justice Darling, who delivered what was practically the judgment of the Divisional Court, cited the dictum of Lord Blackburn (then Mr. Justice Blackburn) in Knight v. Halliwell 30 L. T. Rep. 359; L. Rep. 9 Q. B. 412) as an authority for the conclusion at which



Alfreton, Monday (J.S. & A.O.), at

Attleborough.* Monday, at 11
Barnet, Tuesday (J.S.), at 10
Belford, Thursday, at 10

Biggleswade, Monday, at 10.30
Birkenhead. Friday

Birmingham, Monday (L.), Tues-
(L.). Wednesday (L.),
Thursday (L.), and Friday (L.),
at 10
Bishop's Stortford, Friday, at 10
Bow, Monday, Tuesday, Wednes
day. Thursday, and Friday
Bradford (Yorks), Tuesday, at 10;
Thursday (J.S.), at 10.30; Fri-
day, at 10

Brentford. Wednesday, Thursday,
and Friday (J.S.), at 10
Bridgend, Thursday and Saturday
Brigg, Monday, at 10
Brighton, Thursday, at 10

Bristol, Monday, Tuesday. Wed-
nesday, and Thursday, at 10;
Friday (By), at 11

Burnley. Friday (R. By), at 10.30
Caistor, Thursday, at 10

Cambridge Tuesday, at 11; Wed-
nesday at 10

Chipping Norton, Thursday

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Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10.30 Colchester. Wednesday, at 10 Coventry. Tuesday, at 9.30 Darlington, Wednesday (C.S.), at 9 Derby, Tuesday (County Courts Act 1903, if necessary; R. By at 11), at 10.30 Dereham, Tuesday, at 10.30 Dewsbury, Tuesday, Wednesday,

and Thursday (J.S. at 10.30) Diss, Monday, at 11

Durham, Tuesday (R. By)

Edmonton, Tuesday, at 10

Grantham, Friday, at 10.30

Great Grimsby, Tuesday, at 10; Wednesday, at 10.30

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COMPOUND rate of Bonus for last 20 years,
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ESTATE DUTIES. Special low rates for Non-Profit Assurance,
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their Lordships had arrived. And the learned judge considered
that that view was further supported by what was laid down by
Lord Alverstone, C.J. in Giebler v. Manning (94 L. T. Rep. 580;
(1906) 1 K. B. 709) to this effect: It is only a question of law
which no evidence can alter that can be taken before the
Divisional Court arising on the facts stated by justices when it
was not taken before their worships themselves. At the end of the
learned Chief Justice's judgment, however, there is a passage
which possibly creates difficulty. Several cases, it will be seen from
our report, were referred to on behalf of the appellant. And the
contention urged was that it was open to the Divisional Court,
when a particular point arose on facts as found, to give judgment
upon it, even although it was not raised in the court below. But
unless such a point was one which no evidence could possibly alter
--and, therefore, the circumstance that the justices had no
opportunity of dealing with it becomes immaterial-it would be
manifestly improper, because contrary to the interests of the
opposing party, to permit it to be taken before the Divisional
Court. In the present case, Mr. Justice Darling has deduced
from the two authorities upon which he relied what seems to us to
be an unquestionably sound principle. It is eminently more
reasonable than such a sweeping decision as was pronounced in
Marshall v. Smith (28 L. T. Rep. 538; L Rep. 8 C. P. 416). For
there it was held that upon the argument of an appeal from
justices, no point can be urged which was not taken before them
If, however, it is a point of law, incapable of being affected by
evidence, its being so urged can have no unfairly detrimental
result to anyone concerned.


THE new responsibilities which are now thrown upon licensing justices throughout the country under the recent Act relating to suspensions of sales of drink are hardly yet appreciated to the full, and it may be that the novel conditions which are now obtaining, alike in crowded urban and in scattered rural areas, cannot be adequately met under that Act as it stands, but that amendments may soon be required so that the urgent needs of the community may be secured without entailing undue sacrifices on the part of individuals.

In the first place, the licensing justices find themselves pressed by Home Office circulars and by the expressed views of the War Office towards adopting a drastic attitude in regard to licensed premises and registered clubs alike. At this point it may be as well to point out that it is not entirely plain on the Act whether it is possible to differentiate between these two classes, but, on the whole, it seems safer to assume that the justices must decide on a policy applicable to both alike. Another point far from clear is whether the Act gives them power to exercise special authority over one house in particular where some peculiar temptations are to be found, or whether, on the other hand, the restrictions decided upon must apply to an area as a whole. It is conceived from official information to hand that the Home Office is of opinion that the licensing justices cannot single out a special house for exceptional treatment. These two doubts are rather far-reaching, and, as uniformity of practice is desirable on every ground, we should welcome some authoritative pronouncement upon them.

Passing from these two points of difficulty, justices have to bear in mind what are the evils which they are desired to prevent. The Act speaks of these in general terms, but, from the numerous experiences of those who have been on the various war committees formed in every district, it will be found that the dangers are quite as serious in connection with civilians as they are in regard to the troops, and in a special degree some protection has to be afforded in respect of separa‘ a'ionists. Speaking broadly, the licensing justices have to act on behalf of both classes, but they must have two or three facts in view. In the first place, the position may be one where the military are going to run their own canteen and are prepared to put all the public houses out of bounds, and are, further, ready, by military pickets or by the use of the special constables, to see that this plan is enforced. In country districts where there may be only one or perhaps two

constables some such expedient may have to be adopted. In such conditions, and with an early" last post," the military should be able to maintain effective discipline over their men, and, so far as they are concerned, the licensed premises will not attract undesirable customers.

Civilians, however, will not be affected. and so the licensing justices, even under such favourable circumstances, are still compelled to consider some suspensions of drinking hours. It is believed that, as a whole, justices lean strongly toward the hours of nine to nine, except in certain crowded areas, and towards further suspensions from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. Where, however, the troops are being billeted en masse, the two to six restriction is being made of everyday applicability. For reasons connected with parade, the military strongly favour the afternoon suspension. In some cases the justices are being urged to suspend the sales of drink after 8 p.m. It has to be borne in mind that uniformity as between licensed premises themselves and as between such premises and the canteens is very desirable so as to safeguard the community from the evils incident to one source of supply within accessible reach of another being closed at 8 p.m. whilst that other remains open to a later hour. The same desirability for uniformity seems to apply as between the areas under the administration of neighbouring licensing justices, Various awkward points arise as between different sets of justices, especially where the circumstances as regards billeting are dissimilar, but it is conceived that in the interests of the country it would be more prudent to standardise upwards rather than downwards, even though, as is unfortunately inevitable, by so doing some harm would accrue to the interests of individuals. It has been asserted in some quarters, but with what truth we cannot confidently affirm, that there has been a sudden growth in the sale of bottled liquors, and that persons requiring drink come with their own bottles. This is a feature which, if it exists at all will require to be watched.

It will be observed from a perusal of the new Act that all the powers recently conferred on the licensing justices purport to be set in motion on the recommendation of the police. It is, however, likely that in some cases the recommendation of the police is not quite on the same lines as the policy followed by the magistrates, and it is gathered that it is quite possible that such policy would need some post facto recommendation. This is not perhaps an ideal state of things, but in practice military exigencies frequently entail some sudden disposition of troops, and the licensing justices in the area are hard put to it to carry out the Home and War Office requirements within the limits of time permissible.


Judgment for Tort against Married Woman Trader.

THE case of Shaw v. Allen, upon which we commented some months ago (see 137 L. T. Jour. 270), has been followed, as in the natural sequence of events it was bound to be, by that of Re Allen; Ex parte Shaw (noted ante, p. 33). The final judgment against the defendant, who was a married woman trader, in the action that was tried before Mr. Justice Lush to which we referred-which action, as we then pointed out, was instituted because an earlier judgment remained unsatisfied-was, as an act of bankruptcy, made the foundation of a bankruptcy notice under sect. 4, sub-sect. 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52). It was treated as "available for bankruptcy purposes against her by a bankruptcy notice as though she were personally liable to pay the judgment debt," within the meaning of sect. 12, sub-sect. 2, of the Bankruptcy and Deeds of Arrangement Act 1913 3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 34). The action was brought against the defendant, claiming damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846, more familiarly known as Lord Campbell's Act. The defendant was rendered liable by the negligence of her servant, who was engaged in assisting her in carrying on her business. The damages being recovered in an action for tort, what the Court of Appeal had to determine was whether they stood on the same footing as a trade debt. It will

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