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The same principle is formulated in a convention relative to
bombardment by naval forces. An explanation is necessary
relative to the words par quelque moyen que ce soit. They were
introduced in 1907 on the demand of the French delegates in
reference to bombardment by balloon. In 1899 the conference
had adopted a declaration interdicting for five years the casting
of projectiles or explosives in the air from balloons, or by other
new analogous modes. This declaration had expired when the
conference met in 1907; its renewal was proposed. France was
opposed to it, but her delegates explained that she meant that
it was not permissible to do by means of balloons that which it
would not be lawful to do otherwise. We can attack a fortified
place by cannon; we can attack it by balloons; we must not
attack a place of buildings not fortified; we are no more entitled
to do it by balloons than by cannon. This was set forth in the
modification proposed to art. 25.

The commandant of the assailing troops, before under-
taking a bombardment, and save in the case of attack
de vive force, should do all in his power to notify the
authorities: (art. 26).

The next disposition applies evidently to all bombardment in
whatever form it may take:

In sieges and bombardments all necessary measures should be
taken to spare, as much as possible, buildings consecrated
to worship, to art and science, and to benevolence, historic
monuments, hospitals, and places of rassemblement of the
sick and wounded, on the condition that they are not at
the same time used for any military purpose.

The duty of the besieged is to indicate the buildings or
places of rassemblement by special visible signs which shall
be notified in advance to the besieger: (art. 27).
A general disposition (art. 23 (g) forbids

The destruction or the seizure of enemy property, save where
the destruction or seizure is imperiously demanded by the
necessities of war.

As to perfidious means, it is interdicted

To kill or wound by treachery any individuals belonging to
the enemy, nation, or army: (art. 23 (b).

To use unlawfully the Parliamentary flag, or the national
flag, the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as
well as the distnctive badges of the Convention of Geneva:
(art. 23 (ƒ).

Everything which implies a violation of the parole donnee constitutes a perfidy interdicted, with the exception of ruses of war, which are regarded as lawful.

The relations perhaps the most delicate to regulate are those of the belligerents with the civil inhabitants. During a long time they had been abandoned entirely to arbitrariness, and the worst excesses were committed as far as persons and property were concerned. J. J. Rousseau had well said that war is a relation of State to State and that private persons, in the greatest measure possible, should be held as being beyond the hostilities. A long time had necessarily to elapse before this philosophic view should have any practical result. The réglement of The Hague takes into consideration this idea in the dispositions which I shall cite, and which if they were loyally observed would much attenuate the evils of war:

It is forbidden to force the population of an occupied territory to take the oath to the enemy Power: (art. 45). The fact of occupation is not able in itself to suppress the Sovereignty of the State invaded, and, as a consequence, it cannot release the inhabitants from their duty of fidelity to their lawful Sovereign.

The honour and the rights of the family, the life of individuals
and private property, as well as the religious convictions
and the exercise of worship, must be respected.

Private property cannot be confiscated.

The Powers represented at the Peace Conference have proclaimed that private property must be respected, and the following dispositions have the authority of the enemy of to-day:

Pillage is formally interdicted: (art. 47).


It is interdicted to celiver over a town or locality to pillage,
even after being taken by assault: (art. 28).
It is interdicted to declare extinct, suspended, or
receivable in justice the rights and actions of nationals of
the adverse party: (art. 23 (h).

The property of the enemy State would not naturally enjoy the same immunity, but it does not follow that all the biens mobiliers are proper captures. Art. 53 of the réglement specifies the right of the belligerent in this respect :

The army which occupies a territory is only able to seize the currency, the funds, realisable securities belonging of right to the State, the depots of arms, means of transports, the victualling departments, generally all movable property of

the State of a nature serviceable in warfare: (art. 53, par. 1).

In this order of ideas it is necessary to refer to art. 56 singularly interesting at the moment:

The property of communes, that of establishments consecrated to worship, to charity, and to instruction, to art and science, although belonging to the State, shall be treated as private property.

Every seizure, destruction, or intentional degradation of such establishments, of historic monuments, of works of art, and of science is interdicted.

By a great majority the conference of 1907 passed art. 44, which interdicts a belligerent from compelling the population of an occupied territory to give information upon the army of the other belligerent, or upon his means of defence. Germany and Austra-Hungary refused their assent to this article.

The military authority is not always able to obtain amicably all that is required for the army; it has recourse to a means of constraint which they call requisitions. The réglement of The Hague thus attempts to restrain the demands of the occupant : Requisitions in kind and of services shall only be reclaimed. from communes or inhabitants for the army of occupation. They must be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a rature as not to imply an obligation on the part of the inhabitants to take part in the operations against their country.

These requisitions and these services shall only be demanded with the authorisation of the commandant in the locality occupied.

The requisitions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for on the spot; if not, they shall be acknowledged by receipts, and the payment of the sums due shall be made as soon as possible: (art. 52).

For the contributions in money, which have given place to so many abuses, which were considered formerly as a ransom of pillage, an effort has been made to restrict them.

If besides the imposts, referred to in the preceding article, the occupant levies other contributions in the occupied territory, they shall only be for the wants of the army or the administration of the territory: (art. 49).

The foregoing disposition aims at putting an end to contributions which had for their object the enrichment of the occupant, or the exercise of pressure upon the inhabitants.

Art. 50 is aimed at another abuse. Often a belligerent has rendered communes responsible for the acts of individuals, real or pretended. Sometimes the commune has been made to suffer for acts of the invaders themselves, the principle of the invader amounting to this: the communes ought to protect the enemy of their country against their own nationals. Consequently The Hague has declared

No collective punishment, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon populations on account of acts committed by individuals, for which the populations collectively could not be considered responsible.

Concluding, M. Louis Renault said: It is not without profound grief that I have brought together so many texts in the elaboration of which I have had the honour of taking part, and which recall so many eminent men, convinced as I was that we had made some serious progress in civilisation. The deception is cruel indeed.


PALEY ON SUMMARY CONVICTIONS. A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. EPOCH-MAKING law books are not published every day, and Paley on Summary Convictions may not come within the charmed circle, but nevertheless, as one of the comparatively few treatises that have completed their century, the work is deserving of notice in any legal bibliographical record. Its writer, William Paley, was the eldest son of Archdeacon Paley, the author of the Evidences of Christianity. The son's fame has been completely overshadowed by that of the father, and details about his life are extremely scanty, We gather that he was born about the year 1780, and that he had a distinguished career at Cambridge, where he gained numerous prizes and became a Fellow of his college. Regarding him, his father entertained the highest hopes, saying, "I know not what he will do; he can do anything." Called to the Bar at Lincoln's-inn in 1802, he joined the Northern Circuit. Inheriting some of his father's literary aptitudes. he set himself to compile the two legal works which bear his name, the first a treatise on the Law of Principal and Agent, the second, the book with

which we are more immediately concerned. The Law of Principal and Agent, dedicated to his and his father's friend, Lord Ellenborough, was published in 1812, and was well received, being mentioned with approbation by Story, the American jurist. It went into two more editions, issued respectively in 1819 and 1833, the first under the editorship of Niel Gow, and the second under that of J. H. Lloyd. The editor of a legal treatise scarcely ever approves of the handiwork of his predecessors, but rarely do we find such open disapprobation expressed as was done by J. H. Lloyd regarding the editorial competency of Niel Gow. One of Lloyd's chief duties consisted, so he tells us, in removing the mass of "extraneous and irrelevant matter which Gow had introduced into Paley's text!

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In 1814 the Law and Practice of Summary Convictions was first published, being printed for R. Pheney, Inner Temple lane, and S. Sweet, 3, Chancery-lane. It was dedicated to William Tidd, the author of the once famous, and still occasionally referred to, Practice of the Court of King's Bench. Tidd, it will be recalled, was the favourite author of Uriah Heep-a circumstance which will keep his name in remembrance with many who have never seen his Practice. But though he may be said to owe the continuance of his fame to the fact that his name is enshrined in the pages of David Copperfield, it is worth bearing in mind that he played a notable part in the education of many of our most distinguished lawyers. We are told that he usually had from ten to fifteen pupils in his chambers at a time, and among these were three future Chancellors-Lyndhurst, Cottenham, and Campbell-and one Chief Justice-Denman. We may infer from the dedication penned by Paley that he, too, had been among the famous pleader's pupils. The work, thus inscribed to Tidd, opened with a long and interesting dissertation on the history of the office of justice of the peace-an introduction which, with some alterations, had been retained in each successive edition. The body of the book then gave a clear and succinct view of the subject, and a collection of forms was added, some of them being extremely quaint, as, for example, that of a conviction for profane swearing, which runs thus: A. B., yeoman, not being a day labourer, common soldier, common sailor, or common seaman, and being under the degree of a gentleman, was convicted of swearing five profane to wit, in the words ' God damn you,' five several times repeated, and ten profane oaths, to wit, the words 'By God,' ten several times repeated, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, for which offence A. B. was adjudged to have forfeited for the use of the parish 30s., that


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to say, 2s. for each of the said curses and 2s. for each of the said oaths." Our army, according to Uncle Toby, swore terribly in Flanders, but it is to be hoped not more than "A. B., yeoman."

Paley survived the publication of the work for three years, dying on the 12th March 187 at the early age of thirty-seven. But his book had been seen to fill a gap in legal literature, and, accordingly, it was not allowed, like so many other treatises, to fall into oblivion. It is true that a considerable time elapsed before a second edition was published, but in those days the Profession was not accustomed to the phenomenal rapidity with which in our time edition follows edition. It was 1827 before the second edition made its appearance under the editorship of James Dowling, of the Middle Temple. Dowling's name is kept alive, not so much by his association with Paley's book as by the fact that he was the senior member of the reporting partnership responsible for the nine volumes of Dowling and Ryland's Reports. In the same year that he brought out his edition of Paley (which he dedicated to Mr Justice Bayley) he became a puisne judge in New South Wales, and later he rose to be Chief Justice of the colony. Besides bringing Paley's work up to date and furnishing new forms, Dowling added a supplement relating to convictions under the Excise and Customs Acts.

Eleven years elapsed and then the third edition was issued, the editor on this occasion being Edward E. Deacon, of the Inner Templ, who was associated with Basil Montagu and others in several series of bankruptcy reports. Deacon dedicated his edition to Sir William Follett, "whose merits as a lawyer and a senator are the theme of too much praise to admit of further eulogy." The preface is dated from Chancery-lane, in which, apparently, not a few barristers had chambers at that time, although now, we imagine, that historic thoroughfare has been quite abandoned in favour of the various Inns of Court by members of the Bar. Deacon furnished many new precedents. Like many another editor of a legal treatise, he found that the task he had undert ken in bringing the work up to date was much greater than he anticipated, but in his preface he proceeded to say that "if his present labours should, like his former ones, have the good fortune to be favourably noticed by his learned brethren in these golden days of encouragement to literary expounde s of the law, he is bound, of course, to add, in the disinterested style of legal authorship, that he will be amply repaid

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From which we

by the approbation of a liberal profession.' infer that Deacon's work in te bankruptcy courts had not extinguished his vein of humour and irony.

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The fourth edition was published in 1856. For this a new editor was requisitioned, namely, H. . J. Macnamara, who dedicated the work to Sir William Erle. Jervis' Acts having been placed upon the statute-book since the date of the previous edition had to be taken account of, and much other new matter was added, but the editor made it his aim "to preserve as far as possible the clear and scientific arrangement adopted by the author, together with his well-considered and lucidly expressed comments upon this branch of our jurisprudence. Another interesting feature of this edition consists in this, that Mr. (now Sir Harry) Poland, then a barrister of five years' standing, gave some assistance in its preparation-probably one of the earliest of the many instances of similar help given by the now veteran Sir Harry in connection with law books. Ten years after the issue of the fourth edition the fifth was called for, again appearing under the editorship of H T. J. Macnamara, who by this time had become Recorder of Reading. The dedication was again to Sir William Erle, now Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. A new chapter was added dealing with the power of justices to state a case for the opinion of the superior court under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. A small typographical point of difference between this and the preceding editions may be noted, judges no longer being referred to in the text or notes as "Mr. J. So-and-So," but in the now usual way, "Mr. Justice So-and-So."

By the time the sixth edition came to be published-in 1879H. T. J. Macnamara had passed away, but a worthy editorial successor had been found in his son, Mr. Walter H. Macnamara, now Master Macnamara. It had been intended, indeed, that father and son should be jointly responsible for the edition; for, notwithstanding the fact that H. T. J. Macnamara had been for some time one of the members of the Railway Commission, he had retained a great interest in Paley's work, and had, in fact, made some progress with its revision at the time of his death The new edition was, appropriately enough, dedicated to the Right Hon. Richard Assheton Cross, the then Home Secretary, who had just carried through Parliament the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879. The passing of that statute involved very material alterations in the work and in the appendix of forms. Fewer radical changes were necessitated for the seventh edition which came out under the same editorship in 1892. In this issue the quaint forms that had given a certain picturesqueness to the earlier editions were eliminated and the more prosaic statutory forms substituted.

As an

In 1904 the eighth-the present-edition was published under the editorship of Mr. Macnamara, by this time a Master of the Supreme Court, and Mr. Ralph Neville, LL.B. The passing of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 necessitated various changes, in addition to the ordinary work of noting up fresh cases. illustration of the wide constituency to which an established legal text-book may appeal, it may be noted that in this edition much of the matter that had been omitted ever since the passing of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 was restored on the suggestion of practitioners in Ireland and the Australian colonies to which at that time provisions similar to those in the Act of 1879 had not been applied.

During the hundred years that the book has been before the Profession, it is interesting to notice that for nearly sixty of them its editorship has been in the hands of the late H. T. J. Macnamara and his son, Master Macnamara, and the hope may be expressed that in the next edition, which will be due ere long, the same name may appear on the title-page which it has adorned for so long. J. S. H.




IT was pointed out in a previous article that dock and harbour authorities are in almost all instances bodies possessing statutory powers and that they have also obligations in respect of damage caused to ships, the rules governing their liability having been laid down in a series of decided cases. Some of the more important of these cases are the subject of the present article. A dock or harbour authority are liable to make good to the persons using the dock or harbour any damage occasioned by neglect in not keeping the works in proper repair. This is so whether the dues or tolls are levied for the profit of the authority (Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal Co. (1839) 11 Ad. & El. 223) or whether the receipts are devoted to the maintenance of the works and are subject to diminution if they yield a surplus, so that no profit is made (Mersey Docks Board v. Gibbs, 14 L. T. Rep. 677; L. Rep. 1 H. L. 93). Further, it is clear from the

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last mentioned case that the authority are responsible for injury
resulting from a cause of mischief whether they know of its
existence or whether, through their culpable negligence, its
existence is not known to them.

The broad position was well expressed by Mr. Justice Black-
burn in Mersey Docks Board v. Gibbs in the statement that a
person who pays rates for dock accommodation or for warehouse
accommodation and services "is entitled to expect that reason-
able care should be taken that he shall not be exposed to danger
in using the accommodation for which he has paid."

In Reg. v. Williams (51 L. T Rep. 546; 9 App. Cas. 418) the principle was applied to a New Zealand harbour under the control and management of the Government, although no harbour dues were received, but only wharfage and tonnage dues in respect of staithes and wharves in the harbour.

The principle of Mersey Docks Board v. Gibbs was applied to a graving dock in Pyman Steamship Company v. Hull and Barnsley Railway Company (1914) 2 K. B. 789), where the unevenness of the blo ks upon which the ship rested caused damage, and Mr. Justice Bailhache held that the duty of the dock owner was not an absolute duty to provide blocks reasonably fit for the purpose for which they were to be used, but only to use due care to see that they were fit. The same duty to exercise reasonable care applies where a dock or harbour authority undertakes and regulates towage: (The Ratata, 78 L. T. Rep. 797; (1898) A. C. 513).

Another rule applying to the class of case under discussion is that where the wharfingers, in consideration of their charges, load or discharge ships at a wharf or jetty in circumstances such that the ship must necessarily ground at low water, they are liable if the ship on grounding is damaged owing to the condition of the berth. This is so even if the wharfingers have no control over the place where the ship lies. There is an implied warranty that they have taken eason ble care to ascertain that the berth is safe: (The Moorcock, 60 L. T. Rep. 654; 14 P. Div. 64).

In the case of The Bearn (94 L. T. Rep. 265; (1906) P. 48) it was laid down that neither a harbour authority nor wharfingers may rely on the duty of others to make periodical inspections and take soundings. In that case pilots, who were licensed by the London Trinity House and were not servants of the harbour authority or of the wharfingers, were required by pilotage by-laws to take soundings. The harbour authority and the wharfingers, in reliance on this, took no steps at all, and it was held that they had negligently omitted to perform their duty of taking reasonable care that the harbour, including a berth which was in question, was in a fit condition, and consequently that they were both liable for damage to a ship resulting from the defective condition of the berth.

The question of the exercise of due diligence by a harbour authority, having regard to what may be considered the reasonable standard of their responsibility. was further discussed in the case of Bede Ste mship Compauy v. River Wear Commissioners (96 L. T. Rep. 370; (1907) 1 K. B. 310). The harbour authority advertised that there was a certain depth of water on the sill of a dock belonging to them, and it was held that by so doing they incurred towards shipowners the obligation of at least using reasonable care to provide an approach channel with a sufficient depth of water under normal conditions for all ships of such a draft as would enable them to pass over the dock sill. Silt having been allowed to accumulate in the entrance channel, and a ship which had been loaded in the dock having in consequence of the obstruction been delayed in departure, the harbour authority were liable in damages for the detention.

An earlier case, in which the question of an advertisement by the dock company was also involved, was Thompson v. NorthEastern Railway Company (6 L. T. Rep. 127. The defendants advertised that docks, which were incomplete and in process of excavation, were fit for the reception of ships of 1000 tons. A ship of 674 tons grounded on an obstruction. The defendants were held guilty of breach of the duty to take reasonable care. An argument for exoneration on the ground that the pilot knew the state of the dock was (as in the case of The Bearn) unsuccessful.

In the case of The Ydun (81 L. T. Rep. 10) the issue by the harbour authority of a book giving particulars as to the port was in question, but the court was of opinion, having regard to all the circumstances, that there had been no improper information given, nor any failure to give roper information, and the authority were held not liable for the damage resulting from the stranding of a ship through insufficiency of water. The case is also an illustration of the line of separation between the pilotage service of a port and the harbour administration.

A harbour authority may, by virtue of the Harbours Clauses Act 1847, sect. 51, appoint a harbour master to regulate the working of the harbour and the movement of shipping, and shipmasters are bound under a penalty to conform to the harbour

master's directions.


A dock or harbour authority may be responsible, not only for damage resulting from what they themselves do or fail to do, but also for the conduct of their servants. Thus in the cases of The Apollo (65 L. T. Rep. 590; (1891) A. C. 499) and The Burlington (72 L. T. Rep. 602) the authorities were held liable for damage to ships which had been directed by the harbourmasters to ground in particular places which were in fact unfit. See also Reney v. Magistrates of Kirkcudbright (67 L. T. Rep. 474; (1892) A. C. 264. In the case of The Bien (104 L. T. Rep. 42) a conservancy board were held liable to the lessee of an oyster bed which was damaged owing to a vessel which had foundered being removed and placed for repair on the oyster bed under the harbour-master's directions. An authority are, however, responsible only so far as their servants are acting within the scope of their duty. Where, for instance, a harbour-master acted as pilot, the authority were not responsible for the loss of the ship which was being piloted: (Shaw v. Timaru Harbour Board, 62 L. T. Rep. 913; 15 A. C. 429). Moreover, in a dockyard port the Crown is not liable for the acts of its officials, though they may render themselves responsible if they invite a ship to moor at an unsafe place: (Wright v. Lethbridge, 63 L. T. Rep. 572).

THE JUDGES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. THE following is the official list of the judges stated to have been present in the House of Lords on the occasion of the opening of Parliament by His Majesty in person on Wednesday, the 11th inst.: The Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, Lords Just ces Buckley and Kennedy, the President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, Lords Justices Swinfen Eady, Phillimore, and Pickford, Justices Darling, Joyce, A. T. Lawrence, Neville, Rowlatt, Sargant, and Sankey.

In the early Parliaments of England, the judges used to receive writs of summons to Parliament. But when the original conception of Parliament changed and the council of the King became distinct from the legislative assembly of the nation, the position of the judges appears also to have changed. Mr. Pike states that this may have been in the reign of Richard II, but was certainly before the reign of Henry VIII: (Constitutional History of the House of Lords, 247). Pursuant to an order of the House dated the 4th June 1660, the Lord Chancellor moved His Majesty that be would be pleased to give order for writs to the judges that they may attend the House as assistants." And this has been the position since assigned to them. Their attendance was formerly enforced on all occasions, but they are now summoned by a special order when their advice is required. Since the Judicature Acts, all the judges of the High Court of Justice and of the Court of Appeal have been summoned. The judges' place is on the woolsacks, which are technically deemed to be outside the House. Messages touching Bills relating to the Crown or Royal Family were formerly sent to the Commons by two judges. The last occasion when the Lords observed this custom took place in the year 1871, Princess Louise's Annuity Bill: May, Parliamentary Practice, 436, note). The judges of the three Common Law Courts were declared to be disqualified from sitting in the House of Commons by a resolution of that House in 1605, they being "attendants as judges in the Upper House." vision of the Judicature Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 77), s 5, has taken the place of this rule. Before 1875, he Master of the Rolls could be, and, in fact, often was, a member of the House of Commons.

The pro

The judges were formerly summoned to the House of Lords in appeals of any great importance. The creation of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 has caused the practice to fall almost into desuetude. It, however, still exists, and was exercised in 1897 in Allen v. Flood (77 L. T. Rep. 717; (1898) App. Cas. 1). In that case eight judges attendedseven from the Queen's Bench Division and one from the Chancery Division. They differe, and delivered separate opinions. It is noteworthy that the majority of the Lords agreed with the minority of the judges.

In Rex v. Earl Russell (85 L. T. Rep. 253; (1901) App. Cas. 446) the judges were summoned, and the President of the Probate Division, seven judges of the King's Bench Division, and three of the Chancery Division attended. A question seems to have been put to them y the Lord High Steward. In all criminal trials, whether of peers or commoners, before the House of Lords, the judges attend as the assistants of the tribunal.

For the distinction in form and effect between the writ of summons issued to the peers and the writ of attendance issued to the judges, see the late Sir William Ansons Law and Custom of the Constitution, vol. 1, pp. 55-59. It is clear that the writ of attendance would not be issued to a judge who is entitled to the writ of summons as a peer: (Macqueen, H. L. Practice, 47). The judges come as assistants, not as peers of Parliament,

and, though their attendance when the Sovereign opens the session in person may be regarded as a dignity rather than an obligation, still the occasion does not alter the character in which they attend. It is thus difficult to see how the present Lord Chief Justice and Master of the Rolls could be described as amongst the judges attending. Lord Reading and Lord Cozens-Hardy are both peers of Parliament, and their places should be, not upon the woolsacks, in judicial robes, but upon the barons' benches, in Parliamentary robes. If Lord Coleridge were present, he would be in exactly the same position.

The distinction is well illustrated by the report of Reg. v. Millis (1843, 10 Cl. & F. 534)—the great marriage case in which the Law Lords were equally divided. Those taking part in the decision were the Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst, Lords Brougham, Denman, Campbell, Cottenham, and Abinger. At the time, Lord Denman was Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench; Lord Abinger was Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer. The judges were summoned, and their unanimous opinion delivered by the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (Sir Nicolas Tindal). Lord Denman and Lord Abinger were not among the judges consulted. They delivered their several opinions as peers and members of the tribunal.



A MEETING of the United Wards Club of the City of London was held on Wednesday at Cannon-street Hotel, the president, Mr. J. G. Howell, C.C., taking the chair.

His Honour Judge Atherley-Jones, K.C., addressed the meeting upon "The Declaration of London." He pointed out that the Declaration of London had never been ratified, but by an Order in Council it had been declared that, subject


certain modifications, and as far as could be, the Declaration of London would be observed by those who belonged to the triple entente. The old rule was that the destination of a ship was primary evidence as to whether the foodstuffs which it might contain were contraband or otherwise, but by the Declaration of London it was sought to be laid down that a cargo destined for a base of supply, naval or military-the Germans put in the words "base of supply"-should be liable to capture and forfeiture. As finally settled, the words "of supply " were struck out, leaving the word "base

standing naked by itself. It was pointed out that it would be open to any belligerent-as it would be now to Germany if our ports were not adequately protected and the trade routes fairly well protected by the navy of this country— to seize any ship of a neutral carrying food supplies to, say, Hull or Liverpool, on the ground that they were being carried to a base of supply. He need hardly point out that the German Prize Court, which would be the final tribunal to decide the question, would undoubtedly, and not unreasonably, regard these ports as bases of supply of food to the military and naval forces of this country. The Declaration constituted a large departure from the principle, consecrated by the usage of generations, that food supplies carried for the use of the civil population should be immune from capture. But the Declaration went further, because, although the destination of a ship and its cargo was evidenced by the ship's papers, and was, according to art. 35, to be the final and conclusive test, the very distinguished representative of France interpolated a clause that this must not be construed too literally, and that if it could be inferred that it was the intention, despite the ship's papers and the port to which it was destined, that the goods should serve the purpose of the enemy, the ship should be properly subject to capture and forfeiture. That was accepted by the British navy as conclusive. Of course, so long as we were mistress of the sea and could adequately protect our trade rights, that rule would be a matter of no account. But we had had illustrations that, however great and powerful our navy might be, it could not be equal to the task of protecting ships scattered all over the ocean. If Germany could control our seas she could, he would not say starve our population, but she could so interfere with the carriage of goods to our shores as to inflict grievous suffering, Germany was part of a continent and was able through Roumania, Austria, and Italy, and, if those countries were not at war with her, France and Russia, to have conveyed to her by overland transit practically all the articles which go to the support of the civil population, or the maintenance of a war. It was on a that account that he, and many others, took up an attitude in opposition to the Declaration in the House of Commons. What was the tribunal to which in the ultimate result the aggrieved shipowners had resort? It was an international court, the members of which were mainly continental Powers. He did not like to say invidious things, but he thought it was the genius of the lawyers, the judges of conti.


nental States, to carry out the behests and desires of their respective Governments. It had been the great pride of the British Court of Admiralty that it had recognised itself as being an international court, not a court under the control of municipal law, but one representing the interests of all nations, and not simply those of Great Britain. The aggrieved shipowner would probably have his rights declared and his wrongs rectified only after the termination of the war, for the mills of law grind slowly, and, so far as the State was concerne 1, the decision of the court would probably be nugatory for the purpose of rectifying a wrong which ought to be redressed at once. was another provision of the Declaration. He believed that throughout the long history of this country there had never been a case in which a neutral ship carrying contraband had been destroyed when captured by a belligerent. The rule had always been that a ship might be captured and taken into port for adjudication, the passengers and crew being afforded every facility for being sent to their destination in the captured ship. The Declaration of London legalised the power of a naval commander, when he captured a ship upon the high seas-anywhere, that was, but in territorial waters-to sink that ship and to take the passengers on board his own vessel, thereby exposing them to the imminent risk of being conveyed on a combatant ship whilst engaged in action. Having removed the passengers, the commander had power to sink the neutral ship He could conceive of no more reactionary regulation than that. It was cruel, it was unjust, it was unnecessary. It was true that this power was guarded by some provision to the effect that the commander must not sink the ship unless he conceived that it was necessary for the safety of his belligerent operations; but it could be well imagined that every German captain would regard it as necessary for carrying out his belligerent operations to sink the ship. This was a departure from the old practice, and it was a principle to which no civilised nation could properly give its assent. Some controversy had arisen about the conversion of a merchant ship into an armed vessel on the high seas, but it was an open question why a ship should not be converted as much on the high seas as in a port. These were three great blemishes upon the Declaration of London. But there was another consideration. It had been the genius of this country and of other civilised States to render war as little as possible harmful to the civil population of the countries engaged in the war, and to neutrals. The development of international maritime law had been slow, and there had been great difference of opinion upon some topics, as, for instance, whether private property at sea should be molested, even when enemy property in enemy ships. The tendency of our policy had been to observe the rule that the enemy merchant ship should be at the mercy of the other belligerent. Much might be said for the abrogation of that rule, but he agreed that it was a controversial question, upon which the most learned and accomplished jurists entertained different opinions. It was not to the interest of this country to jeopardise for all time those principles to which our fathers had consistently adhered. It must be remembered that it was not for to-day, but for all time perhaps, that precedents might be laid down which might cause that great system of international law which we had for so long and with so much labour built up to be shattered.

A discussion ensued, the speakers without exception condemning the Declaration. Among those who took part were Mr. Yamasaki (Japanese Consul), Dr. T. Baty (secretary of the International Law Association), Mr. Deputy Heilbuth, Mr. H. S. A. Foy, C.C., Mr. D. Haydon, C.C., and Mr. Allan S. Ramsay.


BUTTERWORTH (Maria Phoebe). Next of kin living on March 11, 1913, or their legal personal representatives, to come in, by Dec. 11, at chambers of Master Watkin Williams, Room 254, Royal Courts of Justice. Hearing Dec. 15, at 12, at said chambers.


SHIELDS (James), who died Oct. 9, 1873. His children or grandchildren, or their legal representatives, and brothers and sisters of the testator's father, Thomas Shields (other than William Shields), and of his mother. Eliza Shields, or their issue, or legal personal repre sentatives, claiming under nquiries made in the matter the trusts of the will and codicil of James Shields, deceased, and in an action, Travis and another v. Graham and another, to come in, by Dec. 15, and enter their names at Room 705, Royal Courts of Justice, and prove their claims by Dec. 18, at chambers of Neville, J. Hearing Dec. 18, at 11.30, at said chambers, Room 704. WILLIAMS (Richard Henry), Camberwell, who died Feb. 5. 1861. Children of his widow, Emily Williams, who died Dec. 20, 1912, or his children (if any) who survived him, and any persons described in the testators will as Jacob Morris, the daughter or daughters of William Handley, of the daughters of Richard James and Almeley, and Ann Kedward, daughter of Elizabeth Kedward, of the same place," or their respective legal personal representatives, claiming under inquiries made in the matter of the estate of Richard Henry Williams, and in an action, Francis Westby Percival and another v. Fanny Munden (wife of Alfred Munden), to come in, by Dec. 15, and enter their names at Room 705, Royal Courts of Justice, and prove their claims by Dec. 18, at chambers of Astbury, J. Hearing Dec. 18, at 11.30, at said chambers, Room 704.

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AUSTIN MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED (not the company of the same name
(1914) which took over the business of the first-named company as
from Oct. 1, 1913).-Creditors to send in, by Dec. 14, to E. M.
Carter, 33, Waterloo-st. Birmingham. Ryland, Martineau, and Co.,
Birmingham, sols. to liquidator.
CASTLE'S DIRECTORIES LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Nov. 28, to
J. H. Sampson, Green-st, Truro, or J. C. R. Crewes, Parkvedras-
ter, Truro.
LIMITED. Creditors to send in, by Dec. 18, to T. Baxter, 56,
Hamilton-sq, Birkenhead.

DAY DAWN P.C. GOLD MINES LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Dec. 19,
to F. C. Anscombe, 284, Winchester House, Old Broad-st, E.C.
ELECTRO STEEL FOUNDRIES LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard
Dec. 1, at Royal Courts of Justice. Helder, Roberts, Walton, and
Giles 3 and 4, Clement's-inn, Strand, W.C., agents for Tunbridge
and Co., Birmingham, sols. for pet. Notices of appearance by
Nov. 30, to Helder, Roberts, Walton, and Giles.

FAYS LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Dec. 1, at Royal
Courts of Justice. Dennison, Horne, and Co., 55, Gracechurch-st,
E.C., sols. for pets. Notices of appearance by Nov, 30.

HIATT AND JUZI LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up under supervision of
the court to be heard Nov. 24, at Royal Courts of Justice. Peacock
and Goddard, 3. South-sq, Gray's-inn, W.C., sols. for ret. Notices
of appearance by Nov. 23.

H. MOSS LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Dec. 1, at Royal
Courts of Justice. R. Chapman, Moorgate Station-chmbrs. E.C.,
sol. for pet. Notices of appearance by Nov. 30.
JACKSON, RUSSELL, AND CO. LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Dec. 13.
to J. S. Cotman 10 Coleman-st. E.C. Herbert Oppenheimer and
Nathan, Parr's Bank-bldgs. 1, Finsbury-sq. E.C., sols, for liquidator.
MARINE PROPULSION LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Dec. 29, to C.
Spencer, at the offices of Seatle and Morrison, 47, Victoria-st, West-
minster, S.W.
MIDWAY SYNDICATE LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Nov, 23, to A. L.
Butcher, 35 Copthall-av, E.C.

NEDENES MOLYBDENITE LIMITED.--Creditors to send forthwith, or by
Nov. 30, to A. A. Lowe, 12, Coleman-st E.C.
PEARSALL-WARNE LIMITED. Creditors to send in, by Dec. 28, to E. F.
Norman, 19 and 21. Queen Victoria-st, E.C.

claims to the 6th inst., at once, to A. E. Sherrey, 131, Edmund-st,
SAVONA LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Dec. 18, to A. Fabry. 107,
Winchester-st. Eccleston-sa, S.W. Allen, Edwards, and Oldfield,
16. Eastcheap E.C., sols. for liquidator.
SECOND MIDWAY SYNDICATE LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Nov. 23,
to A. L. Butcher. 35, Copthall-av, E.C.
once, to F. G.
Schofield. 16, Clegg-st, Oldham.
TALYSARN COPPER MINES LIMITED. Creditors to send in, by Nov. 30, to
G. A. Scott. 5 and 6, Great Winchester-st, E.C.

to send in. at

W. W. HARRISON AND CO. LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Dec. 14, to
W. B. Douthwaite. 1, George-st, Sheffield. W. Smith and Sons,
Sheffield, sols. for liquidator.


ALEXANDRA BAKERY COMPANY, Rugby.-Creditors of the business carried
on by Walter William Shillitoe (as a limited partner) and Charles
Edward Wheeler, under style of "The Alexandra Bakery Com-
pany, to send in forthwith, or by Nov. 23, to W. G. Atkinson,
receiver. 42. Albert-st. Rugby. C. H. Fuller, registrar of Rugby
County Court.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35.

ALEXANDER (George). St. Mary-at-Hill, E.C. Dec. 12; H. S. A. Foy,
4. Walbrook, E.C.

ARCHER (Frederick John). Stanmore and Gresham-st, E.C.
Morgan and Upjohn. 10, Serjeants'-inn, Temple.

Dec. 21;

ATKINSON (Elizabeth), Rotherham. Dec. 29; Oxley and Coward, Rother-

BARNARD (Harriet), Colwyn Bay. Dec. 10; T. H. Morgan and Co.,
Colwyn Bay.

BARTLEMAN (George Henry), Kensington. Dec. 11; A. Holmes, 32, King-
st, Cheapside, E.C.

BENSON (Elizabeth), Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Dec. 31; R. Brown and
Son, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

BENTLEY (Charles), Leicester. Dec. 15; Herbert Simpson and Bennett,

BOCKING (John Walter), Godalming. Dec. 10; D. S. Page, King's Lynn.
BRADD (James), Stifford, or BRADD (Eliza). Dec. 28; Hatten and Asplin,

BREEDON (John), Thurnby. Dec. 21; W. E. Richardson, Leicester.
BROWN (George Benson), Toronto, Canada. Dec. 14; Maddison, Stirling.
Humm, and Davies, 33. Old Jewry, E.C.

BRYANT (Jon), Herden. Dec. 5; E. R. Wood, 20, Finsbury-s. E.C.
BUCKLEY (William). Blackpool, or BUCKLEY (Mary), Oldham. Dec. 9;
T. W. Kay. Blackpool.

BURGESS (James Henry), Mumbles, or BURGESS (Laura). Dec. 31; D. S.
Owen Swansea,

BURKINSHAW (John William). Hillsborough. Dec. 22; Smith, Smith, and
Fielding. Sheffield.

CAPNER (Edwin Joseph). York Town. Dec. 7; Public Trustee, 3 and 4,
Clement's-inn, Strand, W.C. Sols., Cooke, Cooper, and Barry,

CARR (Henry Foster), Pinhoe and Exeter. Dec. 22; J. and S. P. Pope,

CHIPPINDALL (Rev. William), Tilton-on-the-Hill. Dec. 31; W. S. Chippin-
dall. Gonville, and Caius College Cambridge.

Coors (William), Stockport. Nov. 27; T. Redfern, Stockport.

CRADDOCK (Charles), Littleworth, Hednesford. Dec. 15; Gardner and
Sons. Rugeley.

CURTIS (John), Quainton. Dec. 11; Wilkins and Son, Aylesbury.
D'AMBRUMENIL (Isabella), Kensington. Dec. 11; Ince, Colt, Ince, and
Roscoe, St. Benet chmbrs, Fenchurch-st. E.C.

DAVEY (Catherine), Westerfield. Dec. 15, Block and Cullingham,
DAVEY (Philip), Westerfield. Dec. 15; Block and Cullingham, Ipswich.
DAVIES (Mary), Llangorwen. Dec. 18; J. Evans, Thomas, and Co.,


DAVIES (Stephen), Ebbw Vale. Nov. 26; Powell, Hughes, and Jones,
Ebbw Vale.
Dec. 20; Harvey and Clarke,

DAY (Arthur Frederick), Stoneygate.


DERRICOTT (Rebecca), Tipton. Dec. 14; C. Round, Tipton.

DERRY (Lucy Watson), Long Sutton. Dec. 12; Mossop and Mossop, Long

ELLIOTT (Robert), Ashford and Little Hothfield. Dec. 11; Hallett,
Creery, and Co., Ashford, Kent.

FEARON (Francis), Greenwich. Dec. 12; Fearon and Co., 11, Victoria-st,

FOSTER (June), Chislehurst. Dec. 31; Nelson, Son, and Plews, 81,
Cannon-st. E.C.

GREVESON (Edwin), Burley in Wharfedale. Claims of heir-at-law, next
of kin, creditors, or others. Dec. 10; C. R. Ballard, 1, Hare-ct,
Inner Temple, E.C.

GEORGE (Robert), Brynmill. Dec. 12; A. M. James Swansea,
GIRLING (Jane), York. Dec. 13; E. J. and A. Peters, York.
GLANVILLE (Mary Agneta), Langham-hill, Ivybridge. Dec. 17; Prance
and Prance, Plymouth.

HANBIDGE (Robert), Sheffield. Dec. 30; Howe and Co., Sheffield.
HARWOOD (Alice Ann Croft), Clitheroe. Dec. 12; Wilson, Eastwood, and
Ramsbottom, Clitheroe.

HAYHOW (Harry), South Norwood. Dec. 17; Theodore Goddard and Co.,
5 and 6, Clement's-inn, Strand, W.C.

HILTON (Robert), Holcombe Brook. Dec. 15; Wood and Lord. Man-

HODGSON (Thomas), Over Kellet.
Sturton, Lancaster.

Dec. 1; Maxsted, Gibsons, and
Dec. 15; C. J. R. Brown and

HUGHES (Alexander). North Shields.
Holliday North Shields.
JOHNSTON (William Nassau), Bowdon. Dec. 21; H. H. Speakman, Man-

KNIGHT (Elizabeth), Scraptoft. Dec. 21; W. E. Richardson, Leicester.
LLOYD (Benjamin), trading as Lloyd and Millward, Darwen. Nov. 27;
Hindle, Son, and Cooper. Darwen.

MCLAUGHLIN (Major Gen. Edward). Worthing, or MCLAUGHLIN (Anne).
Dec. 28; F. C. Gates, Worthing.

MARKS (Moss), Hampstead. Dec. 29; Russell and Arnholz, 3-4, Great
Winchester-st E.C.

MEARS (Alfred John), Fulham, and Putney-hill. Dec. 15; W. W. Young.
Son, and Ward, 24. Ely-pl. E.C.
MIDDLETON (James Henry), Banbury. Dec. 18; Fairfax and Barfield.


MOLFSWORTH (Dame Jane), Trewarthenick. Dec. 15; Whatley and Son,
Lincoln's-inn-flds, W.C., agents for Hearle Cock and Parkin,
MUNRO (Honor), Walthamstow. Dec. 12; J. Barrett and Son, 7,
Leadenhall-st, E.C.

OWEN (Henry Humphrey). Newport. Dec. 18; P. Laybourne and Co.,
Newport. Mon.
PARTRIDGE (Capt. Robert Charles). Eaton, Norwich. Dec. 24; Trotter
and Patteson, 64. Victoria-st, Westminster.

PETERS (Philip), Tunbridge Wells. Dec. 11; Buss and Levett. Tun-
bridge Wells.

PHILLIPS (Thomas), Llandovery. Dec. 24; A. W. Davies. Lampeter.
PUGH (David), Bryngwyn. Dec. 14: E. L. Wallis, Hereford.
RAE (William), Sale. Dec. 11; A. Wilson and Cowie, Liverpool.
ROBINSON (John), Harrop.


Jan. 12; Baldwin, Weeks, and Baldwin.

ROOKE (Josiah), Birmingham. Dec. 31; A. and W. H. Green, Birmingham.

SANDES (Rev. Samuel Dickson), Thornton Heath, Dec. 14; W. R. Smith
and Smyth, 133, Aldersgatest. E.C.

SAUNDERS (Nathaniel), Dedham. Dec. 14; Elwes, Turner, and Hawkins.

SENNITT (George Perry), Stretham. Dec. 24; Archer and Archer, Ely.
SHAW (John), Forton. Dec. 1; Maxsted, Gibsons, and Sturton, Lan-


SILKE (Louisa Caroline). Tunbridge Wells. Dec. 14; Greenip, Snell, and
Co. Tunbridge Wells.

SMITH (Benjamin), Davenport. Dec. 22; the executors, at the offices of
Farrar and Co., Manchester.

SMITH (Frederic), Bowdon and Hothfield. Dec. 22; the executors, at
the offices of Risque and Robson, Manchester,

SPENCER (Jane Anne), Drayton. Dec. 5; E R. Wood, 20, Finsbury-sq,

SYMONDS (John) Leatherhead and Ashtead. Dec. 28; Hart, Scales, and
Hodges, Dorking.

TARPLEE (George) Solihull. Dec. 11; P. H Sharpley. Solihull.
THOMPSON (Charles). Liverpool. Nov. 23: Ellis and Johnson, Liverpool.
THURNALL (Henry Metcalfe), St. Ives. Dec. 15; H. Copley, St. Ives,

TIMS (Luke), Pendleton, Salford. Dec. 19; Walker, Dean, and Co., Man-

WADE (William). Rogerstone and Newport. Dec. 14; Wade and Son,
Newport. Mon.

WATTS (Reading William), Ramsgate. Dec. 31; Druces and Attlee, 10.
Billiter-sq E.C.

WELDON (Frederick) Knightsbridge. Dec. 11; Anderson and Sons, 17,
Ironmonger-la E.C.

WHITTON (Charlotte Mary). Caversham. Dec. 7: Hyman Isaacs and
Lewis, 2 Guildhall-chmbrs, 31. Basinghall-st. E C.
WILLIAMS (Henry), Trewollack, St. Just-in-Roseland. Dec. 31; W. N.
Watson, Penryn.

WILSON (Jesse), Clifton. Dec. 8; C. J. Veasey, Baldock.
WOOLFORD (Sarah Elizabeth), Swindon. Dec. 31; Townsend, Jones, and
Wood, Swindon.

The Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 4, Norfolk-street, Strand. London, do not impose any extra premium on civilians insured with them who volunteer for service during the present



THE Master of the Rolls presided at a meeting of the Solicitors'
Managing Clerks' Association, which was held in the Old Hall,
Lincoln's-inn, on Tuesday.

Mr. Dighton N. Pollock lectured on "Covenants in Restraint
of Trade." He said that, as Lord Herschell had said in his judg
ment in the great case of Nordenfelt v. Maxim- Nordenfelt Guns and

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