mess. : Ammunition Company (71 L. T. Rep. 489; (1894) A. C 535), which was the leading case on the principles of the law relating to the matter, "In early times all agreements in restraint of trade, whether gereral or restricted to a particular area, would probably have been held bad"-i.e., as against public policy; but as time went on this rule was relaxed, and a distinction came to be made between covenants in general restraint and covena ats where the restraint was only partial. Owing to improved means of communication and the consequent increase of commerce, contracts which would have been held to be invalid in previous centuries were now valid, as, for example, a covenant not to trade in a particular trade might be unlimited in space. Even the distinction between general and partial restraint was now less stereotyped and important than it was formerly. At one time it was thought that a restraint must be void if it was unlimited in space, and a restraint extending to the whole of the United Kingdom was regarded as unlimited (Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1712, 1 P. C. 181), though it was otherwise if unlimited as to time. And, generally speaking, except in such extreme cases as covenants not to carry on trade at all, or a covenant in general restraint without limitation of time and space, as to which the old rule of public policy prevailed (Davies v. Davies, 36 Ch. Div 359; Underwood v. Barker (80 L. T. Rep. 306; (1899, 1 Ch. 300, both cases in the Court of Appeal), the question of the validity of the covenant might be said nowadays to be merged in the question of its reasonableThere appeared to him to be three requisites of valid restraint (1) Reasonableness. (2) some valuable consideration, and (3) that the covenant should be clear and certain. The first was a question of law to be decided by the judge, and never a question for the jury, as stated by Lord Haldane in Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Company Limited (109 L. T. Rep. 449; (1913) A. C 724). Lord Macnaghten, in his judgment in the Nordenfelt case, had said that it was quite impossible to define generally what was reasonable, and that every case must depend on its own facts, and that different considerations applied in different kinds of contracts. He went on: "Different considerations must apply in cases of apprenticeship and cases of that sort on the one hand and cases of the sale of a business or dissolution of partnership on the other. There is obviously more freedom of contract between buyer and seller than between master and servant, or between an employer and a person seeking employment." But quite generally, as a result of various decisions, it might be said that the restraint might be unlimited in time. Thus, it need not be limited to the life of the covenantee, but might be for the whole life of the covenantor. As regarded a limit of space, practically some limit seemed almost invariably necessary, though there was no absolute rule against a restraint entirely unlimited as to space if it was required by the nature of the business. What the limits in particular cases should be was dependent upon the nature and extent of each business and other circumstances. With regard to the requisite of legal consideration, the lecturer said that previously to Hitchcock v. Coker (1837, 6 A. & E. 438) it was supposed that an adequate consideration was necessary-in other words, it was necessary in the interests of the covenantor to prove that the consideraiton for the entering into the covenant was an adequate one; but it had since been laid down that the court would not consider the adequacy of the consideration, and that valuable consideration sufficient to support any contract not under seal was enough. The third requisite was that the covenant should not be too vague. The court would not make a new contract for the parties, so that great care should be taken to express the exact meaning of the parties as clearly as possible in all points, both grammatically and geographically. By grammatically he meant that the covenant should be expressed so that there should be no doubt whether, for instance, the limitation of time or space applied to the whole covenant. By geographically he meant that the exact radius and points of measurement should be given so that, as far as possible, there should be no doubt whatever as to the limits of space. The lecturer dealt also with the subject of restraint in the discharge of a covenant by breach of the covenant and with other matters, quoting throughout the lecture numerous cases in support of his state ments. The Master of the Rolls, responding to a vote of thanks, said that the subject of covenants in restraint of trade was an illustration of that which we were sometimes apt to forgetnamely, that we owed but little of our law to the statute-book; we owed almost everything to the common law, the unwritten law of the land. One might look through the statute-book from beginning to end and one would not find a definition of a contract at least, he did not know of one-and so one had to come back to the common law. It must be recognised that the views of the courts-for it was for the courts to direct this and not the jury-really depended up n the ideas of public policy prevalent at a particular time. At one period of our history it was thought that no kind of res'raint ought to be allowed at all. At another period restraints were favoured, and, even in our own lifetimes, he thought there had been currents, some in one direction and some in another, so that one could not know so positively and clearly which way the current was going. He wa glad the lecturer had made a point of the great distinction there was, and ought to be, between covenants in restraint of trade in transactions between vendor and purchaser and those between master and servant. He had had in his time, as counsel and judge of first instance, a good deal to do with a class of contracts which almost shocked him. There was a custom, he hoped it did not prevail still, for dairymen employing a wretched milkman at some very small wages to impose upon him a contract which he (the Master of the Rolls) was quite sure he never understood, that he should not at the end of a week's notice solicit customers for the sale of milk for anyone else within an area of twenty-five or ten miles. It was perfectly shocking that the courts should be asked to support covenants like that, if it were t ue, that the interest of the covenantor had to be consi lered as well as that of the covenantee. When one came to contracts between vendor and purchaser, he had little sympathy with any attempt to upset them. He supposed that a time would never come when two minds could agree as to whether in the circumstances of a particular case a covenant was or was not reasonable. He had decided a good many cases of this kind in the Court of Appeal. He thought they might say this, that, having before them the great judgment of a great judge, Lord Macnaghten, in the Nordenfelt case, the courts had now a guidance and a lead which formerly they did not possess. The next meeting will take place in the Inner Temple Hall on Tuesday, the 8th prox., Lord Justice Kennedy taking the chair, when Mr. E. W. Hansell will lecture upon "Some Recent Changes in the Law of Bankruptcy and Deeds of Arrangement." : THE following were called to the Bar on Tuesday last :LINCOLN'S INN.-W. L. W. Campbell, Magd. Coll., Oxford, B.A.; Mohamed Wahed. Uddin Hyder, Oxford Univ.; Sahijram Bulchand Alimchandani; Dwarka Das, Jesus Coll., Cambridge, B.A.; Chunilal Harcharndas Puri, Univ. Coll, London; Syad Mohammad Sami Ahmad; Chaman Lal Gulati; T. M. S. O. Mahendran (Advocate of the Supreme Court, Ceylon); G FitzGibbon, King's-inns, Dublin, K.C.; Narhar Mahadeo Patvardhan, Bombay Univ., B.A, LL.B., a Vakil of the High Court of Bombay. INNER TEMPLE.-W. H. Dinsmore, M.A., LLB, Dublin; W. T. Chapman, B.A., Camb.; A. C. Jacob, B.A, LL.B., Camb.; J. W. Rowlands, B.A., Oxford; C. Richardson, B.A., Camb.; J. Woodman, B A., Oxford; A. H. Roberts, B.A., Camb.; B. B. Stonham, B.A, Oxford. MIDDLE TEMPLE.-Sir R. W. Aske. LL.D. (London), Certificate of Honour; J. P. Jordon; J. K. F. Coutanche, B.A. (Oxon.); Mohamed Abdul Hamid; Syed Abdul Majid, B.A. (Oxon); Bansi Dhar Kapoor, B.Sc. Edin.; Shah Muhammad Naimutullah; Ranji Lal Kapur; R. Struthers; Abdul Majid Hussanally; Abdul Hamid Hussanally; J. C. Macne llie, M.B., M.Ch, Glasgow; Padmanabha Raman Pillay, B.A,, Madras, B Sc. Edin; Amarendra Nath Sen, B, A., Hons., Calcutta; G. W. Knowles, M.A.; Tsun Nin Chau; B. M. Goodman, B.A., LL.B. Camb; G. K. Jenkins. GRAY'S-INN.-E. Tremlett, Private, Public Schools Brigade, Royal Fusiliers, Inns of Court Studentship, Arden and Holt Scholar, Gray's-inn, LL.B., and University scholar, London Univ.; A. B Sully, some time open scholar, Linc. Coll., Oxford, M.A., London Univ. B.A., Holt Scholar, Gray's-inn; Saiyed Abu Ali; C. H. Hodge; T. W. C. Evans; H. A Russell; W Collingridge, M A., LL.M., MD, D.P.H., Christ's Coll., C mb., M.R.C.S., Eng.; W. E. Dickson, 2nd Lieut., 4th Lancashire Fusiliers, Joint Holt Scholar, Gray's-inn; L. O'S Kelly, member of the Irish Bar; J. H. Vanniasinkam, member of the Ceylon Bar J. C. Clerides. THE LAW SOCIETY. THE annual general meeting in connection with the Students' Rooms at the Law Society's Hall was held on Monday, the 9th inst., in the Students' Common Room, the vice-president (Mr R. S. Taylor) taking the chair. The report stated that the committee were pleased to be able to record that the rooms had become very popular among articled clerks attending the society's classes. Men had not been slow to realise that the rooms afforded an excellent opportunity of meeting others embarking on the same career, and that they, in fact, comprised all the advantages of a London club for a merely nominal payment. Membership of the rooms had now been extended to those students who had been enrolled under the exemption order of the 16th June 1913. The committee desired to draw attention to the fact that articled clerks, after passing their final examination, could still remain members of the rooms, so long as they had not taken out a practising certificate, on payment of a fee of £1 18. a year, or 10s. 6d. for six months. The report was adopted and the committee were elected. STUDENTS' SOCIETIES. MANCHESTER At an extraordinary general meeting of the Law Students' Society held at the Law Library, Kennedy-street, Manchester, on Friday, the 13th inst., the following motion was passed: "That in view of the fact that the majority of the ordinary members of the society are serving with His Majesty's forces, the meetings and other proceedings of the society be suspended sine die." It was then announced that thirty-nine members of the society were serving with the forces. (Q. 1.) WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.-With regard to "T.'s query, Workmen's Compensation, we might draw his attention to a case in which we acted in 1906 (Lowe v. Myers and Son (95 L. T. Rep. 35). In that case the application was made on behalf of a man who at the time was in a lunatic asylum and was there prior to the request for arbitration, and the claim for compensation succeeded. LEWIS MORgan and Box. With reference to the query in the LAW TIMES of the 7th inst. by "T.," possibly he refers to McNally v. Furness, Withy, and Co. (109 L. T. Rep. 270; (1913) 3 K. B. 605). KENNETH C. BERRINGTON. LEGAL OBITUARY. Lieutenant RAYMOND PHILIP DRUMMOND NOLAN, barristerat law, of Ballinderry, County Galway, and of the Black Watch, has been killed at the front. He was the elder son of the late Mr. Philip Nolan, I.C.S., and was born in 1883. He was educated at Beaumont, Stonyhurst, and New College, Oxford, and was called by the Inner Temple in 1908. Captain EDGAR WILMER WALKER, barrister-at-law, of the East Yorkshire Regiment, has been killed at the front. Captain Walker was called by the Inner Temple in 1901. Mr. EDGAR FRANCIS ROBINSON, barrister-at-law, died at Queen's House, St. James'-court, Buckingham-gate, on the 15th inst., aged thirty-three. Mr. Robinson was called by the Inner Temple in 1909. EASTWOOD, JOHN WALTER, late Otley, draper. Ct. Leeds. Nov. 9. GILLIS, WILLIAM, Tenbury, painter. Ct. Kidderminster. Nov. 7. HINCHCLIFFE, MARY ELIZABETH, Barnsley, grocer, widow. Ct. Barnsley. HOWELL, JARRETT DOUGLAS, Swansea, grocer. Ct. Swansea. Nov. 9. tainers. Ct. Hastings. Nov. 10. Moss AND PAPE, Dartford, cowkeepers. Ct, Rochester. Nov. 10. SAVAGE, WILLIAM HENRY, Cockfosters, retired engineer. Ct. Barnet. SEYMOUR, ADA ELIZABETH, Leicester, beerhouse keeper, widow. Ct. TOWLER, TOM. Bradford, late beerhouse keeper. Ct. Bradford. Nov. 9. VICKERS, JOHN ALFRED, Retford, county court clerk Ct. Lincoln. WADE, FRANK, Lincoln, grocer. Ct. Lincoln. Nov. 9 Ct. Chesterfield. Nov. 11. GAZETTE, Nov. 17. To surrender at the High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. J. SINGER AND Co., Mile End-rd, costume manufacturers. Nov. 12. To surrender at their respective District Courts. BILL, JOHN THOMAS. Dudley, late fried fish dealer. Ct. Dudley. Nov. 12. CLUTTEN, JAMES VALENTINE CHAPMAN, Oxford, stationer. Ct. Oxford. COOK, WALTER, Brierley Hill, bricklayer. Ct. Stourbridge. Nov. 12. NEWNHAM, ERNEST HENRY, late Rochester, commercial clerk. Rochester. Nov. 14. Ct. SEWELL, WILLIAM, Wymondham, farmer. Ct. Norwich. Nov. 14. SPITTLE, WALTER WILLIAM (trading as W. and B. Spittle, and late as SUDDABY, JAMES, Beverley, grocer. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hull. Nov. 13. SWIFT, THOMAS, late Droitwich, farmer. Ct. Worcester. Nov. 13. TANNER, THOMAS, Henley-on-Thames, carrier. Ct. Reading. Nov. 12. WILLIAMS, WILLIAM EWART, Brighton, ham dealer. Ct. Brighton. Nov. 13. EASTWOOD, JOHN WALTER, late Otley, draper. Ct. Leeds. Ct. Nov. 9. Nov. 10. Birmingham. Nov. 11. FOSTER, JOSEPH, Bishop Auckland, grocer. Ct. Durham. HAYES, PHILIP VYVIAN EVERSLEIGH (in the receiving order named as HAYWARD, ROBERT ARTHUR, late Manchester, secretary. Nov. 10. Ct. Salford. HINCHCLIFFE, MARY ELIZABETH, Barnsley, grocer, widow. Ct. Barnsley. Nov. 10. JESSOP, FREDERICK CHARLES (trading as E. White), Tunbridge Wells, fruiterer. Ct. Tunbridge Wells. Nov. 10. JONES, THOMAS, Ogmore Vale, grocer. Ct. Cardiff. Nov 9. KAYE, SIR JOHN PEPYS LISTER, Baronet (described in the receiving order as Sir John Lister Kaye, Baronet), Piccadilly. Ct. High Court. Nov. 9. KERSHAW, JOHN (trading as John Kershaw and Co.), Droylsden, cotton doubler. Ct. Ashton-under-Lyne and Stalybridge. Nov. 9. KINSELLA, EDWARD PATRICK, and COLLARD, HARRY, late Bexhill, entertainers. Ct. Hastings. Nov. 10. LANDSBERG, HARRY MAX, Redcross-st, Barbican, merchant. Ct. High Court. Nov. 11. PATRICK, FREDERICK, Much Wenlock, threshing machine proprietor. Ct. Shrewsbury. Nov. 10. Ct. PICKLES, JAMES ROBERT, Trawden late dairyman. Ct. Burnley. Nov. 10. SEYMOUR. ADA ELIZABETH, Leicester, beerhouse keeper, widow. Leicester. Nov. 11. Nov. 9. TOWLER, TOM, Bradford, late beerh use keeper. Ct. Bradford. Nov. 10. ADAMSON, MATILDA (trading as the Woodseats General Stores), Sheffield, widow. Ct. Sheffield. Nov. 12. BAILEY, GEORGE ROBERT (trading as R. Bailey and the King-st Café), Sutton-in-Ashfield, grocer. Ct. Nottingham. Nov. 12. BILL, JOHN THOMAS, Dudley, late fried fish dealer. Ct. Dudley. Nov. 12. CHESTER, CHARLES EDWARD, Southampton, mortgage broker. Ct. Southampton. Nov. 13. COOK, WALTER, Brierley Hill, bricklayer. Ct. Stourbridge. Nov. 12. EAST, GEORGE EDWARD (described in the receiving order as Edward East), late Randolph-cres, Maida Vale surgeon. Ct. High Court. Nov. 12. FROUDE, FRANK, Beaconsfield, builder. Ct. Aylesbury. Nov. 12. GRENFELL, ARTHUR MORTON, Princes-st. banker. Ct. High Court. Ct. Tunbridge Nov. 12. GURR, FREDERICK, jun.. Tunbridge Wells, coal merchant. Wells, Nov. 14. Ct. Blackburn and HALL, SAMUEL, Heywood, saddler. Ct. Bolton. Nov. 12. HOGG, GEORGE, Kimberley, late butcher. Ct. Nottingham. Nov. 12. LARK. THOMAS HENRY (described in the receiving order as Thomas Lark). Moss, BENJAMIN (a member of the firm of Moss and Pape), Dartford, ROSE, CHARLES EDWARD (described in the receiving order as Charles Rose), SUDDABY, JAMES, Beverley, grocer. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hull. Nov. 13. Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, July 10. JERMANSKY, ABRAHAM (trading as A. J. Taylor and Sons), late Leeds, general dealer. Ct. Leeds. July 7. ADJUDICATIONS ANNULLED. GAZETTE, Nov. 17. HALE, STAFFORD HARRY, and HALE JOHN CHARLES ELTON (trading as S. and BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS AND MARRIAGE. CHAPMAN ANDERSON-DOWDALL.-On the 10th inst., at St. Matthew's Church, Kensington, James Chapman Anderson, M.A., Barrister-atlaw, to Dolores Augusta (Lola), elder daughter of the late Lieut.Colonel L. R. Dowdall, Royal Dublin Fusiliers. DEATHS. PEPYS. On the 4th inst., at 42, Royal-av, Chelsea, the Hon. Walter Courtenay Pepys, late 60th Rifles, and of Lincoln's-inn, Barristerat-law, aged 73. PIGOT. On the 7th inst., Alice Maud, wife of John H. Pigot, K.C., o 21, Pembroke-rd, Dublin, PRINSEP. On the 8th inst., in his seventy-ninth year, Sir Henry Thoby Prinsep, K.C.I.E., of 3. Holland-pk, W., retired Judge of the High Court, Calcutta. RAWLINGS. On the 8th inst.. at 14, King Charles-rd, Surbiton, Frank Rawlings. Solicitor, of 9, Gray's-inn-sq, W.C. WEBSTER.- On the 10th inst.. at a nursing home in London, Charles Clement Webster, Barrister-at-law, aged 71. WHITFIELD. On the 12th inst., at Northolme, Chorley, after three days' illness, John Whitfield, Solicitor, aged 61 years. No flowers, by request. FOUNDED 1884. FLOWERDEW & CO. PROCESS DEPTS. RAPID SERVICE OF DOCUMENTS EFFECTED THROUGHOUT GREAT BRITAIN AND IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD. SATISFACTION FOR THE CLIENT, SECURITY, ECONOMY, AND SPEED FOR THE SOLICITOR. This Edition will be a Great Boon -in fact, indispensable." "Permit me to express my pleasure at the publication of HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND in the Turnover' India Paper issue. "Prior to its receipt I was compelled to use the thick edition, which was very cumbersome when travelling; but it is a real pleasure to have the same work in this edition, as one can carry three or four volumes of it in the same space as was occupied by one of the thick edition. "To any practitioner who practises outside the town where his office is situated, this edition will be a great boon -in fact, I might say indispensable. The work is most accurate and reliable, and is just as legible in the thin paper edition as in the thick." TO BE FOLLOWED BY The English and BUTTERWORTH AND CO., To Readers and Correspondents. All communications must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith. Anonymous communications are invariably rejected. All communications intended for the Editorial Department should, in order to prevent delay, be addressed to the EDITOR OF THE LAW TIMES.' 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ATTORNEY-GENERAL at the relation Re AINSLEY; KYRLE V. TURNER KING'S BENCH DIVISION. 5471 Couservators MACPHAIL (app.) v. JONES AND 541 547 549 92 GENERAL INTELLIGENCE.- Heirs at- PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS LEGAL OBITUARY, Mr. Charles THE GAZETTES...... 551 BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS The Law and the Lawyers. English Companies and German Shareholders. WE have little doubt that the decision of Mr. Justice LUSH in Continental Tyre and Rubber Company v. It was conThomas Tilling (post, p. 83) is correct. tended that the plaintiffs, an English company incorporated and carrying on business here, could not recover in the action because the whole, or practically the whole, of the shares were held by alien enemies, and so it was said the payment would be made for the benefit of those alien enemies. This, however, ignores the fact of the existence of an entity, the company, and, although payments by the company to their alien enemy shareholders would be illegal, payment of debts to the English company by persons in this country and trading by them with such company would be clearly lawful. Mr. Justice LUSH further held that by the Trading with the Enemy Act and the proclamations thereunder the legality of the trading depends upon where the trader resides, where the trading is effected, and where the business is carried on and the payments made. Transmission of money so earned to alien enemies in the enemy country would certainly be illegal, and if such were attempted by any company registered in this country, the necessary steps to prevent it could easily be taken. Cargoes Shipped before War. IN the Miramichi (post, p. 89) the President, sitting in the Prize Court, had to consider the position of cargoes in British vessels shipped before the war by neutrals to alien enemies without any anticipation of imminent war. In the case in question the buyers when the documents were tendered to them refused to accept them or to pay, and the sellers or their bankers held the bill of lading, which was indorsed generally, and the bills of exchange. Sir S. T. EVANS pointed out that as all the material parts of the business took place bona fide during peace, the sole question for decision was whether the property in the goods had passed to the alien enemies, and on the authorities the President had little difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the property had not passed, and that the sellers had reserved a jus disponendi over the goods until the shipping documents had been taken over by the buyers and the bills paid. Enemy goods in British vessels can be seized both at sea and in port during war, but neutral goods shipped bona fide as in this case are not subject to seizure. It should be noted, however, that Sir S. T. EVANS expressly pointed out that nothing laid down in the case under discussion was "applicable to capture or seizure at sea or in port of any property dealt with during the war or in anticipation of war. Questions relating to such property are on an entirely different footing from those relating to transactions initiated during times of peace." HOSTILE AIRCRAFT AND REPAIRING COVENANTS. HAPPILY as yet, the courts have not been called upon to decide, as between landlord and tenant, the party on whom the ultimate loss caused by bombs dropped from hostile aircraft is to fall. Very likely this question will never have to be determined in our courts. But it will be of interest to inquire into the legal aspect of this subject notwithstanding our hope that the question may never arise. It is notorious, of course, that a large number of persons are insuring against the risk in question. How much of this is prompted by undue nervousness and how much by reasonable caution is a matter with which we are not concerned. But this much is certain, that the destruction to property from this unpleasant source of mischief, if it ever takes place, must be ultimately borne by someone. Possibly after the event the State itself would step in and compensate the individual citizen for his loss. Such a course would be obviously just and politic. In this article we propose to discuss the matter from the purely legal point of view. We propose to examine all the authorities in point, and lay before the reader the materials with which the lawyer must decide the questions of the respective rights and liabilities as regards the making good of the damage occasioned by bombs from hostile aircraft. We shall give our own conclusions. If the reader is disposed to disagree with those conclusions, he is, of course, at liberty to do so. In that event he will, at any rate, find in the following review of the authorities the materials for formulating his own opinion. No person would, of course, expect to find in the reports of decided cases any express decision on the relative liabilities of landlord and tenant to make good the loss occasioned by bombs dropped from aircraft. Ten years ago the liveliest imagination would barely have pictured such a form of invasion. Even the possible invasion of England by any force has rarely, if ever, formed the subject of an obiter dictum concerning the relative rights of lessor and lessee. But it is somewhat surprising to find how little satisfactory authority there is even upon the principles which would necessarily be involved were such a contingency to happen. We may, at any rate, commence with these general statements of the law as between landlord and tenant. A tenant's liability to his landlord in respect of damage suffered by the demised premises during the tenacy is a liability either based on the law of waste or arising out of contractual obligation. As a rule, the relative rights and liabilities of the lessor and lessee in this matter of damage to the demised premises is governed by covenants and agreements. Reparation is usually so particularly provided for by the express provisions of the lease or tenancy agreement that little or no room is left for the application of the rules of the law of waste. The law of waste protects the lessor. It does not help the lessee. There is this good reason for this unilateral aspect of the law of waste-it is in the lessee's power to damage the lessor by damaging the latter's property of which the lessee is in possession, whereas, the lessor not being in possession of the lessee's property, the lessee requires no law of waste to protect him. The lessee, however, has the law of warranty to help him. But the law of warranty, when it applies as between landlord and tenant, applies in what may be called the initial stages of the tenancy. Unlike the law of waste, which applies in every case where the relationship of lessor and lessee exists, the law of warranty only applies occasionally. Thus, under certain statutes the law implies a warranty that houses in certain areas and of certain descriptions are reasonably fit for human habitation, and the landlord is liable to the tenant in damages if the premises are found not to come up to expectation. Again, a landlord may undertake that such and such is the condition of his house, and the intending lessee on that undertaking may take a lease of the premises. If it turns out that the state of the property is not such as the landlord has warranted, the lessee has his rights under the warranty. As no landlord would ever have thought of warranting that his premises were free of the possibility of destruction by a German airship, it is unnecessary to pursue the matter further. It is clear, then, that the question who is liable to make good damage to buildings caused by the bombs of the enemy-the landlord or the tenant-must depend either on the law of waste or on the construction of covenants express or implied. If the answer to this question were to depend solely on the law of waste, it seems abundantly clear that the loss caused by the damage to buildings would fall on the landlord. Thus, in the old case of Paradine v. Jane (1647, Aleyn, 27) it is stated: "In the case of waste, if a house be destroyed by tempest or by enemies, the lessee is excused." It was also said in the same case that "where the law creates a duty or charge and the party is disabled to perform it without any default in him, and hath no remedy over, the law will excuse him." The rule has been recognised in modern cases: (see,e.g., Carstairs v. Taylor, L. Rep. 6 Ex. 217, at p. 223). In an anonymous case reported in Dyer (Dyer, 33a) it appears to have been the opinion of Fitzherbert and Shelley, two judges in the reign of Henry VIII, that the lessee would not be liable if the house was burned by lightning or overturned by the wind," for the reason that such damage would be the result of an act of God which could not be resisted. Lord Coke lays it down that if land becomes "surrounded suddenly by the rage or violence of the sea occasioned by wind, tempest, or the like, without any default in the tenant," that is not punishable waste. There is also the still more ancient authority of Fleta, cited by Lord Coke (Co. Litt. 536): “Fortuna autem et ignis vel hujusmodi eventus inopinati omnes tenentes excusant." 66 In the light of the foregoing authorities it is not to be doubted that, where a lease or tenancy agreement is silent with regard to repairs to and the rebuilding of houses and other buildings, the tenant is not liable to contribute in any way towards making good the damage resulting from bombs thrown from hostile aircraft. Under such a lease or tenancy agreement the tenant's liabilities in respect of damage suffered by the demised premises would be defined by the law of waste, and under the law of waste he would not be liable for damage done by the King's enemies. This does not necessarily mean that the landlord would be liable to repair. Nor does it necessarily mean that the tenant would thereby be absolved from his liability to pay rent. It seems, indeed, quite clear that in the case of a lease silent as to repairs and so forth, but containing a covenant for payment of rent, the fact that the buildings were destroyed would not allow a tenant to escape the consequences of his covenant to pay rent. It has often been held that a tenant must pay rent under his covenant although he is deprived of the enjoyment of the premises by something in the nature of force majeur. Thus, if the premises |