Whether a rightly understood and faithfully observed law of neutrality would permit of their receiving supplies in neutral ports, in order to sally forth again to attack the adversary's commerce, seems extremely doubtful. Unless the fighting fleet is able to establish the command of the sea, the cruisers will be liable to be bottled up in a neutral port, as has happened before now to men-ofwar belonging to the weaker belligerent.

It is argued that the risks to which the commercial fleet of any nation will be exposed will depend on its numerical size. Omitting sailing vessels, and taking steamers of 2000 tons and over, we find that the United Kingdom had, in 1906, 2079 such steamers, aggregating 6,212,095 net tons; Germany 587, with 1,637,472 gross tons; the United States 456, with 2,027,448 gross tons; France 136, with 394,854 net tons; and Italy 90, with 245,203 net tons. The average tonnage of the American steamers is nearly 60 per cent. larger than that of the Germans; or, in other words, a larger tonnage goes to a smaller number of ships. A comparison between the total number of steam vessels of all sizes belonging to Norway and Germany shows that the number of ships is nearly equal, while the average tonnage of the German vessels is two and three-quarter times as large. The risk of the larger ship falling in with a cruiser (or an auxiliary cruiser disguised as a merchant-steamer) is the same as that of the smaller vessel; and therefore, although the larger vessel has probably the higher speed and hence a better chance of escape, it is clear that the risks must be calculated, ceteris paribus, on the number of ships, not on gross tonnage. It seems therefore, at first sight, that the risk to which an English steamer of that class is exposed is three-and-a-half times as great as that of a German, over four-and-a-half times that of an American, fifteen times that of a French, and over twenty-three times that of an Italian. A factor that would modify these proportions would in each case be the number of swift cruisers available for the attack and defence, supposing the course of the war be such as to leave the sea equally free to both sides. It might prove too that in a war between any two of these Powers a larger number of such steamers might be captured, and yet their loss be less felt because of their being in a

smaller proportion to the total number. If the cruisers available are in proportion to the number of merchantships at sea, then the larger merchant fleet, if it navigated in convoy, would lose a smaller number, both absolutely and relatively to the whole.

Dr Wehberg maintains (p. 116) that it is precisely England, one of the chief opponents of the abolition of the right of prize, which in a maritime war would suffer in special measure through the application of the existing law. He regards this as a very peculiar fact, and quotes with approval the proposal of Baron von Schleinitz (which he also attributes to Hautefeuille in 1868*) that, if and as soon as private property is hereafter not respected by England or any other State in maritime war, other States should enter into a mutual undertaking to make it a casus belli in common. So Great Britain is to be compelled by force to adopt an alteration in the laws of war which she is so blind as not to perceive would benefit her more than any other nation.

Much has been made of a speech delivered by Lord Palmerston to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce in 1856, in which he is reported to have expressed the hope that private property might cease to be the object of aggression during hostilities by sea; and to have added that it is the conflict of armies by land and of fleets by sea that decide the great contests of nations. Those who quote these remarks are not always careful to cite the later and more deliberate utterance of the same statesman in the House of Commons, when he told his hearers that by accepting the principle of the inviolability of private property at sea they would be inflicting a blow on our naval power and would be guilty of an act of political suicide.' It is difficult to suppose that Lord Palmerston intended to imply that the loss of life in a land battle and the destruction or capture of war-ships at sea are alone sufficient to decide the contests of nations. That would be to reduce such struggles to the rank of mere gladiatorial combats. He must have had in mind the consequences of victory by land or sea-the paralysis of the nation's life, administrative and economic, through the

The reference to Hautefeuille seems to need confirmation, since in his 'Questions de Droit Maritime International,' published in 1868, he avows himself an uncompromising supporter of the existing practice.

occupation of territory, the stoppage of the main arteries of trade, and the consequent loss of wealth.

To refer again to Mr. Bowles' work (p. 12):

'Men who remember the glories of the Nile and Trafalgar neither remember nor have ever really become aware that both battles would have been fought in vain had they not been accompanied and followed up by that constant, ceaseless sap of the enemy's trade, the capture of his property, the raising of his prices, and the consequent drying-up of the sources of his taxation, which more effectually distressed him than any lost battles.'

To refrain from utilising to the fullest extent the advantages thus gained would be to throw away the fruits of victory. The naval triumphs of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars did not, indeed, bring the defeated directly to his knees, but, by enabling the victor to drive his adversary's commerce from the ocean, they contributed potently to eventual peace.

It is often held out, as an inducement to consenting to this proposed alteration of the laws of war, that its adoption would relieve maritime Powers of the necessity of keeping up large navies. Lord Loreburn says (p. 25) that: Half or more than half their [the continental Powers] inducements to maintain costly navies would disappear.' Similarly Sir J. Macdonell remarks (p. 3): 'Liability for capture necessarily and justifiably means large armaments on the part of other countries with property in peril at sea.'

At the Hague Conference of 1907 Great Britain declared that, if an agreement to abolish the right of capture would facilitate the reduction of naval and military armaments, she would be ready to reconsider her attitude on this question. This elicited no response whatever from any other Power. We are told, on the other hand, by Sir John Macdonell (p. 2) that: 'Of course, the only, or indeed the chief, motive actuating the propagandists of the idea of a large fleet in Germany is not a desire to safeguard her commerce.' It is, indeed, difficult to share the widely-diffused belief that the immunity of private property at sea would lead to a reduction of armaments. So long as the seizure of ships for carrying

contraband of war continues, it will be necessary for maritime nations to maintain a sufficient force of cruisers to stop, visit and search all neutral vessels. If-as would be the case if the proposed immunity were granted-the merchant-ships of belligerents could navigate as freely as neutrals, there would be a great addition to the number of vessels to be visited, and a consequent increase, rather than a diminution, of the cruiser squadron for this service. Cruisers will no doubt be required for the convoy of neutral shipping under the rule adopted by the Declaration of London. As the neutral vessel seized for carrying contraband to one of the belligerents may presumably be regarded as a friend, the belligerent for whom the cargo is destined will desire to rescue it, and for that purpose also he must have cruisers.

Moreover, every nation that has oversea possessions must maintain a fleet for the protection of transports carrying supplies and troops for their defence; and the Power which desires to acquire colonies from its adversary must have ships of war to escort its attacking forces. No operations on land on the other side of a narrow sea or across the ocean can be carried on without the protection of a fleet. If the right of capture is abolished, maritime Powers will be compelled to exercise greater diligence in the pursuit of contraband and make greater exertions to blockade the enemy's ports. Should those rights be renounced, as logically they ought to be when one variety of commerce-destroying is abandoned, military expeditions oversea will remain the only means of coercing an adversary who possesses the geographical advantage of not being exposed to invasion by land.

For the foregoing reasons we are persuaded that the expectation that the grant of 'immunity' would result in a decrease of expenditure on naval armaments is likely to prove an illusion. Supposing however that, on the various grounds stated, maritime Powers were disposed to consent, so far as circumstances permit, to the assimilation of the treatment of enemy merchant-ships and their cargoes to that accorded to neutral ships, there would still remain two reasons for hesitation. Of these one is that many merchant steamers are capable of being utilised as transports for troops. Dr Wehberg, in replying to this argument, which was used by Count Vol. 215.-No. 428.

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Caprivi in 1892, admits as a fact that all maritime States have entered into contracts with the great steam-navigation companies, by which they grant subventions for the construction of steamers capable of being converted into cruisers. He adds that, by Art. 23 of the German law of June 13, 1873, ship-owners must, from the date of mobilisation on the outbreak of war, place their ships and vessels at the disposition of the military authorities for war service, which of course includes the transport of troops. If it is true that German law makes all merchant-ships potentially part of the fighting force, is there any reason for treating them as innocent traders up to the moment of such utilisation?

But there is a still more powerful reason for retaining the right of capture, in that at the Hague Conference of 1907 certain Powers claimed the right to convert merchant-ships into cruisers on the high seas. Thus, an enemy ship that had been allowed to pass free on the ground of her peaceful and innocent character might, a few hours later, when out of sight of the adversary, be transformed into a formidable instrument of war. So long as such views are held and acted on by maritime Powers, it would clearly be dangerous to concede the immunity of enemy ships from capture and confiscation.

It is maintained, as we have seen, that the right in question, even when coupled with those of search, capture, and in certain cases confiscation, of merchant-ships carrying contraband, can have but an insignificant influence on the final result of a war. Suppose this position admitted, for the sake of argument, and the consequent deduction drawn-that the right is not worth retention. The concession will entail the surrender of other rights, the exercise of which has been attacked on similar grounds. The confiscation of contraband and the blockade of commercial ports must stand or fall together with the right to capture private property at sea; for all three practices have the same object-the weakening of the enemy's power-and conduce to the same end, a successful peace.

If indeed it could be proved that these rights are ineffective for their purpose, there would be no use in retaining them. But is this so? In regard to contra