To understand this, let us invoke a precedent. It is indisputable that Italy is no longer as ardent a member of the Triple Alliance as heretofore. In spite of the treaty which binds her to Berlin, her relations with France and England have become excellent; it is even probable enough that, in case of war, Italy would not march except under compulsion. Now, something like what has happened in Italy may very well happen in Austria. There is no truth in the idea prevalent in France, in England, and in Russia, that Austria-Hungary is bound for an indefinite time to remain the docile ally of Germany. Is it not conceivable that Austria-Hungary may also have an interest in freeing herself from the strict tutelage of Berlin, which often irritates her though she will not avow it? No doubt, at present, the Austrian Government continues to wear German livery and appears still as the 'brilliant second' of Berlin; but it should be clearly understood that Austria-Hungary is undergoing a profound domestic evolution. This evolution, though retarded in every possible way, is proceeding irresistibly, and will ultimately result in the transformation of Austria-Hungary from the Germano-Magyar hegemony of to-day into a great State in which the different nationalities, hitherto hitherto oppressed, will enjoy equal political rights and will consequently exert an influence on foreign policy proportional to their numbers. Now, in this transformed Austria-Hungary the Slav and the Latin races will form the majority; and they do not wish, any more than the clearer-sighted among the Germans of Vienna, to remain mere vassals of Berlin. One can foresee, then, in the near future, an AustriaHungary very different from that of to-day, which would constitute a State powerful enough to contribute towards counterbalancing Germany, and would also be the best basis for peace in Central Europe. Supposing this evolution possible, should not the Triple Entente comprehend it in time and facilitate its accomplishment? The fact that the Hapsburg dynasty is German is no obstacle, for this dynasty will naturally hold above all to its crown; and it will feel-it even feels alreadythat it can no longer preserve its power without the concurrence of the majority of its peoples. Besides, there is in reality no advantage that Germany could assure to Austria-Hungary which could not, in reality, be secured for the Empire of the Hapsburgs by the aid of France, England, and Russia. During the last few months, there has been revived in Austria the idea of trialism,' that is to say, the amalgamation of all the Servo-Croatian countries of the Monarchy into a unit, which, with the German States and Hungary, would form a kind of federal empire. This triune federation would be completed by the union of the kingdom of Servia with the existing AustroHungarian territories. The Servian dream of unity would thus be realised; and the King of Servia would find himself in a relation to the Emperor of Austria almost similar to that in which the King of Bavaria stands to the German Emperor. Thus the prestige of Austria-Hungary would be safe-guarded and and even increased, while the union of the interesting Servian people could be effected at one blow. Further, with regard to Albania and to the intervention of Bulgaria in Macedonia-since it is probable that the mistakes of the Young Turks will make these problems once critical-why should the Triple Entente not attempt to conciliate the interests of Austria with those of Bulgaria? The question of Albania is already prominent. Austria and Russia are intervening at Constantinople on behalf of the Albanians and of Montenegro. Germany, faithful to her tactics of supporting the Turks at all costs, refuses to join hands with her ally of Vienna, whose attitude hampers her at Constantinople. France and England should seize the opportunity of uniting their efforts with those of Austria and Russia. In Vienna this would certainly cause satisfaction; and the way would thus be open to better relations between Vienna, London, Paris, and St Petersburg. These are solutions which will appear audacious only to those who, clinging to antiquated opinions, are unaware of the mighty current of new ideas that is running through the Balkans, and of the slow but profound upheaval which is actually in progress in the Empire of the Hapsburgs. Nor is there any reason why Russia should oppose solutions of this nature, since the gradual result would be the transformation of AustriaHungary into a great State with a Slav majority, whose relations with Russia might be as friendly as those with the Western Powers. If this policy were to triumph, it would first of all have the advantage of showing the Turks that we are not to be for ever the dupes of their fine words; and that, if we showed confidence in them at the time of their revolution, it was on behalf of an Ottomanism honestly applied to all the Ottoman nationalities, and not of a Germanophile-Turkism ill-disguised under vague protestations. Germany, deprived of all chance of keeping Austria-Hungary in vassalage, would then find herself still more inclined towards a pacific policy; and the balance of power on the Continent would rest on infinitely more solid foundations than it does at present. But, it will be objected, this transformation of AustriaHungary is only in the far distance; we cannot act as if it were a fact. To such objections we may reply that from this moment the Triple Entente can, in view of it, labour for the restoration of its prestige. If it wishes to inspire confidence and to develope its authority, it must display activity in the daily details of diplomatic life. This is actually what it has recently done in a very efficient manner, at the moment when France found herself obliged to intervene in Morocco. The Tsar, with the greatest courtesy, while expressing a desire to maintain the best possible relations with Germany, made it clearly understood in Berlin that in certain cases Russia might find herself compelled to fulfil her obligations as the ally of France. There are reasons for believing that the British Government has made similar representations.* If this be so, it is clear that, in spite of all criticisms, the Triple Entente is still in existence; but, apart from Morocco, its most immediate and most important field of action is evidently still the Near East. It is in the Balkans and in Turkey that the agreement between the three Powers calls for definiteness and permanence. Every opportunity for mutual support should be seized. France and Russia can also co-operate with England in the matter of the projected railway between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. England and France, on their part, * Since these lines were in type, the appearance of a German cruiser at Agadir seems to show that the above-mentioned representations, if made, have failed of their effect. can comply with the desire of the Russians when the Government of the Tsar manifests the wish to regain its prestige in the Balkans. The recent Russian note to the Ottoman Porte, in which the Government of Nicholas II invited Turkey to refrain from taking threatening measures against Montenegro, had an importance which was not, perhaps, sufficiently grasped by public opinion in France and England. The attitude of Russia, however, was perfectly justified, not only from the Slav point of view, but also from that of the European balance of power. It would be desirable, moreover, for France and England to discard the erroneous idea that it is the business of Russia alone to occupy herself with the Slav groups in the Balkans and Central Europe. In reality, these Slav races are at least as important to the Western Powers as to Russia. France and England should consider in these populations, not their character as Slav races, but the fact that they constitute ethnographic groups which for many reasons have no interest in submitting to the influence of Germany, but desire, on the contrary, to find the support of moral encouragement not only in Russia, but also among the Western Powers. By gaining a clear understanding of the aspirations of the Slavs and the Latins of Austria-Hungary, of the Servians, of the Bulgarians, and of the Ottoman nationalities which are opposed to the Germanophile Turkism now dominant in Constantinople, the Triple Entente can create for itself, outside its own territory, a vast field of legitimate influence over sixty millions of men who have an interest in its maintenance and in its power. The Triple Entente between England, France, and Russia, to become permanently efficient, requires to be better organised and to establish more consistent and continually improving relations with Italy and Austria-Hungary. Are there not in this combination of circumstances the elements of that positive programme of action which has hitherto been lacking to the Triple Entente ? ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME. Art. 12.-THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE. 1. The Imperial Conference. By Richard Jebb. Two vols. London: Longmans, 1911. 2. A Project of Empire. By J. Shield Nicholson. London: Macmillan, 1909. 3. Speeches in Canada. By Viscount Milner. Toronto: Tyrrell, 1909. 4. The Broad Stone of Empire. By Sir Charles Bruce. Two vols. London: Macmillan, 1910. 5. The Organization of Imperial Trade. By Geoffrey Drage. London: Smith Elder, 1911. POLITICAL students and theorists may dissect the composition and constitution of the Imperial Conference as they will. To the man in the street-whether that street be in London, Ottawa, Sydney, Cape Town, or Wellington -it represents an attempt on the part of the scattered units of empire to organise themselves as a responsible body. It must not be supposed that the attempt meets with universal approval in any part of the Empire, or that members of the six Conferences have come to them with this single aim in view. The commissions they have received from their own Governments have included, not infrequently, quite as much caution against going too far in the direction of unity as injunctions to promote that end. The growth of nationalism in the overseas Dominions was just becoming a serious factor at the time of the first Conference in 1887. It is an accomplished fact in 1911. Nothing illustrates this better than the evolution of the Conference itself. In 1887 the Prime Minister, instigated by the Imperial Federation League, invited delegates from the Colonies and from India, and others, to meet a number of equally distinguished persons in London for the purpose of exchanging ideas. There were no formal resolutions, and therefore there was no voting. Imperial Federation, which nowadays one is almost afraid to mention, was on everyone's lips. Sir Samuel Griffith said, 'we may look forward to seeing this informal council of the Empire develope until it becomes a legislative body'; while Lord Salisbury, with more |