taking this view of affairs, that I had, as early as the 7th of February, asked him to consider whether an evacuation, commencing at the earliest date possible, would not be feasible.

This could have been done, in my opinion, without compromising any interests.

From a political point of view, a longer occupation of the French territory was useless, if we were granted the right of returning with a German army, without previously declaring war, the very instant the French Government sent a single man more into the departments than was allowed for the maintenance of order.

To this, then, was added the certainty that France had neither the intention nor the power of violating, during the months of May, June, July, and August, the Treaties concluded with us.

I, therefore, feeling much concerned, had the right of submitting once more to your Highness (M. Thiers being ill, I could not negotiate with him) the question whether, with regard to the period of the evacuation of France, a slight modification of the provisions of the Draft Convention sent me, would not be possible.

On the morning of the 8th of March, 1873, I addressed to youyou before having seen

M. Thiers, and before knowing whether I should see him during the day-the following Telegram on this question:

"The occupation of Belfort until the complete liquidation of the war indemnity is a point that is being turned to account by the personal adversaries of the President, in order to depreciate his merits; and they are so much the more successful in that the populace imagine Belfort to have a legendary importance. As it is naturally impossible to make any concession with respect to Belfort, I take the liberty of requesting you to consider whether it would not be practicable to begin the evacuation of the four departments as early as the 15th of May, in the event of the four milliards having been paid by that date, with the stipulation that this evacuation must be completed by the 15th of June. As a security for our demands, this concession is, I think, as satisfactory as the proposal sent to me, because the commencement of the evacuation at an earlier date would very greatly benefit M. Thiers. I am still without news as to the health of the President.

This Telegram furnishes the proof:

(1) That as regards myself, I declared from the outset that any concession about Belfort was entirely inadmissible.

(2) That also as regards myself, I endeavoured to be useful to M. Thiers.

M. Thiers was, naturally, entirely ignorant of this. Persons in other quarters have, since then, succeeded in making him believe that I had secretly striven to injure him by a feigned influence with the monarchical parties in Paris. This, even you yourself have asserted so often, repeated and caused to be repeated, that every one, including M. Thiers himself, believes it. And yet, in support of your assertion, no other proof has ever been furnished than a paragraph in the Gaulois.

I seize this opportunity of giving a denial to your assertion. My confidential correspondence with you is not a secret course of action directed against M. Thiers. In any case, my Telegram proves that, far from wishing secretly to injure M. Thiers, I, on the contrary, endeavoured to be useful to him.

You declined my request to consider the

proposal made to you by me without giving the reasons for so doing.

It was refused in the following Telegram:

[Paris. No. 9.]

"Berlin, March 8th, 1873.

"To Count Arnim.

"I have received Telegram No. 12. In case the proposals in their present form should not be accepted* we will evacuate two departments after the payment of the fourth milliard, but we will occupy the other two as well as Belfort, until the final settlement. I beg that your Excellency will be good enough to follow more closely the instructions of the 3rd instant. After having told you already on the 2nd of March, by telegraph, that they are "à prendre ou à laisser," I am surprised to receive only an unacceptable proposal of modifications conceived proprio motu by your Excellencyinstead of a report of the reception that our proposals have met with from M. Thiers, or, if he happened to be ill, from M. Rémusat.

"I beg of your Excellency to communicate * I had never said that they would not be accepted.

without delay, the whole of our proposals to the French Government, and to inform me of the answer.

This Telegram is remarkable on more than one account :

(1) You implicitly assert that an ambassador goes beyond his instructions, when he asks if they cannot be modified on a point of detail.

(2) You ask for a communication touching the reception our proposals have met with at the hands of M. Thiers, or at those of M. de Rémusat, in case M. Thiers happened to be ill, although you knew that M. Thiers was ill, and that he was anxious to negotiate personally with me.

(3) Your mysterious phrase "c'est à prendre ou à laisser" is repeated, without saying what is "à prendre ou à laisser."

But as to the order to acquaint M. Thiers or M. de Rémusat with the exact and complete text of the Draft from Berlin, it is not comprised even in this Telegram.

The change which had taken place in your intentions after the 2nd of March was inexplicable