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rewards and punishments, with which he crowns the obedience or disobedience of his rational creatures. (4.) In finding out different methods of overruling the free agency of men and angels; and of suspending the laws by which he governs the material world. And, (5.) In stamping different classes of beings with different signatures of his eternal power and Godhead; and in indulging, with multifarious discoveries of himself, the innumerable inhabitants of the worlds which he has created, or may yet condescend to create.

On the other hand, the devil is sunk far below the region of virtue and bliss; neither can he be tempted of good, on account of his consummate wickedness, and fixed aversion to all holiness. His liberty of choice is not then exercised about moral good and evil; but about various ways of doing mischief, procuring himself some ease, and trying to avoid the natural evils which he feels or fears.

This is not the case of man, who inhabits, if I may use the expression, a middle region between heaven and hell; a region where light and darkness, virtue and vice, good and evil, blessing and cursing, are yet before him, and where he is in a state of probation, that he may be rewarded with heaven, or punished with hell," according to his good or bad works." It is then as absurd in President Edwards to confound our liberty with that of God and of the devil, as it would be in a geographer to confound the equinoctial line with the two poles.

A comparison may illustrate this conclusion. As the mechanical liberty of a pair of just scales consists in a power gradually to ascend as high, or to descend as low as the play of the beam permits; so the moral liberty of rationals in a state of probation, consists in a gracious power gradually to ascend in goodness quite to their zenith in heaven, and in a natural power to descend in wickedness quite to their nadir in hell; so immensely great is the play of the moral scales! God's will, by the perfection of his nature, being immovably fixed in the height of all goodness, cannot stoop to an inferior good, much less to evil; and the devil, being sunk in the depth of all wickedness, and daily confirming himself in his iniquity, can no more rise in pursuit of goodness. Thus the presence of all wickedness keeps the scale of the prince of darkness fixedly sunk to the nethermost hell; while the absence of all unrighteousness keeps the scale of the Father of lights fixedly raised to the highest pitch of heavenly excellence. God is then quite above, and Satan quite below a state of probation. The one is good, and the other evil, in the highest degree of moral necessity. Not so man, who hovers yet between the world of light and the world of darkness-man, who has life and death, salvation and damnation placed within his reach, and who is called to "stretch forth his hand" to that which he will have, that "the reward of his hands may be given him."

Nor does it follow from this doctrine that God's goodness is not praiseworthy, and that Satan's wickedness is not worthy of blame : for although God is fixedly good, and Satan fixedly wicked, yet the goodness of God, and the wickedness of the devil are still of a moral nature; and therefore commendable or discommendable. I mean, (1.) That God's goodness consists in the perfect rectitude of his eternal will, and not in a want of power to do an act of injustice. And, (2.) That the devil's wickedness consists in the complete perverseness of his obstinate will,

and not in a complete want of power to do what is right. Examples will explain this :

A rock cannot do an act of justice or an act of injustice, because reason and free agency do not belong to a stone; therefore, the praise of justice and the dispraise of injustice, can never be wisely bestowed upon a rock. If a rock fall upon the man who is going to murder you, and crushes him to death, you cannot seriously return it thanks; because it fell without any good intention toward you; nor could it possibly help falling just then. Not so the "Rock of ages," the parent of rationals and free agents: he does justice with the highest certainty, and yet with the highest liberty: I say with the highest liberty; because, if he would, he COULD, with the greatest ease, do what to me appears inconsistent with the Scriptural description of his attributes. Could he not, for example, to please Zelotes, make "efficacious decrees" of absolute reprobation, that he might secure the sin and damnation of his unborn creatures! Could he not protest again and again that "he willeth not primarily the death of sinners, but rather that they should turn and live;" when, nevertheless, he has primarily, yea absolutely appointed that most of them shall never turn and live? Could he not openly "command all men every where to repent," upon pain of eternal death, and yet keep most men every where from repenting, by giving them up to a reprobate mind from their mother's womb, as he is supposed to have done by the myriads of "poor creatures" for whom, if we believe the advocates of Calvinistic grace, Christ never procured one single grain of penitential grace? Could he not invite "all the ends of the earth to look unto him, and be saved," and call himself the Saviour of the world, and the Saviour of all men, though especially of them that believe, (of all men by initial salvation; and of them that believe and obey by eternal salvation,) when yet he determined from all eternity that there should be neither Saviour nor initial salvation, but only a damner and finished damnation for the majority of mankind? Could he not have caused his only begotten Son to assume a human form, and to weep, yea, bleed over obstinate sinners; protesting that he "came to save the world, and to gather them as a hen gathers her brood under her wings;" when yet from all eternity he had absolutely ordained their wicked. ness and damnation to illustrate his glory? In a word, could he not prevaricate from morning till night, like the God extolled by Zelotes,— a God this, who is represented as sending his ministers to preach the

* When Calvin speaks of the absolute destruction of "so many nations, which, (una cum liberis eorum infantibus,) together with their little children, are involved without remedy in eternal death by the fall," he says that "God foreknew their end before he made man ;" and he accounts for his foreknowledge thus: "He foreknew it, because he had ordained it by his decree:" a decree this, which three lines above he calls "horribly awful." "Et ideo præscivit, quia decreto suo sic ordinarat. Decretum quidem horribile, fateor." And in the next chapter he ob. serves, that, "Forasmuch as the reprobates do not obey the word of God, we may well charge their disobedience upon the wickedness of their hearts; provided we add at the same time that they were devoted to this wickedness, because, by the just and unsearchable judgment of God, they were raised up to illustrate his glory by their damnation." "Modo simul adjicitur, ideo in hanc pravitatem addictos, quia justo, et inscrutabili Dei judicio suscitati sunt, ad gloriam ejus sua damnatione illustrandam." This Calvinism unmasked may be seen in Calvin's Insti tutes, third book, chap. 23, sec. 7, and chap. 24, sec. 14.

Gospel [i. e. to offer "finished and eternal salvation"] to every creature, when his unconditional, efficacious decree of reprobation, and the partiality of Christ's atonement, leave to multiplied millions no other prospect, but that of finished and eternal damnation? Could not God, I say, do all this if he would? Do not even some good men indirectly represent him as having acted, and as continuing to act in that manner? Now if he does it not, when he has full power to do it; if he is determined not to sully his veracity by such shuffling, his goodness by such barbarity, his justice by such unrighteousness; or, to use Abraham's bold expression, if "the Judge of all the earth does right," when, if he would, he could do wrong, to set off his "sovereignty" before a Calvinistic world; is not his goodness praiseworthy? Is it not of the moral kind?

The same might be said of the devil's wickedness. Though he is confirmed in it, is it not still of a moral nature? Is there any other restraint laid upon his repenting, but that which he first lays himself? Could he not confess his rebellion, and suspend some acts of it, if he would? Could he not of two sins, which he has an opportunity to commit, choose the least, if he were so minded? But, granting that he has lost all moral free agency, granting that he sins necessarily, or that he could do nothing better if he would; I ask, Who brought this absolute necessity of sinning upon him? Was it another devil who rebelled five thousand years before him? You say, No; he brought it upon himself by his wilful, personal, unnecessary sin: and I reply, Then he is blame. worthy for wilfully, personally, and unnecessarily bringing that horrible misfortune upon himself: and therefore his case has nothing to do with the case of the children of men, who have the depravity of another entailed upon them, without any personal choice of their own, Thus, if I mistake not, the doctrine of liberty, like the bespattered swan of the fable, by diving a moment in the limpid streams of truth, emerges fairer, and appears purer, for the aspersions cast upon it by rigid bound willers and fatalists, headed by Mr. Edwards and Mr. Voltaire.

SECTION VIII.

The fourth objection of Zelotes to a reconciliation with Honestus-In answer to it the reconciler proves, by a variety of quotations from the writings of the fathers, and of some eminent divines, and by the tenth article of our Church, that the doctrines of free grace and free will, as they are laid down in the Scripture Scales, are the very doctrines of the primitive Church, and of the Church of England-These doctrines widely differ from the tenets of the Pelagians and ancient semiPelagians.

OBJECTION IV. "You have done your best to vindicate the doctrine of moderate free willers, and to point out a middle way between the sentiments of Honestus and mine, or to speak your own language, between rigid free willers and rigid bound willers; but you have not yet gained your end: for, if you have Pelagius and Mr. Wesley on your

side, the primitive Church and the Church of England are for us: nor are we afraid to err in so good company."

ANSWER. I have already observed that, like true Protestants, we rest our cause upon right reason and plain scriptures: and that both are for us, the preceding sections, I hope, abundantly prove. Nevertheless, to show you that the two Gospel axioms can be defended upon any ground, I shall, first, call in the Greek and Latin fathers, that you may hear from their own mouths how greatly they dissent from you. Secondly, to corroborate their testimony I shall show that St. Augustine himself, and judicious Calvinists have granted all that we contend for concerning free will and the conditionality of eternal salvation. And, thirdly, shall confirm the sentiment of the fathers by our articles of religion, one of which particularly guards the doctrine of free will evangelically connected with and subordinated to free grace.

I. I grant that when St. Augustine was heated by his controversy with Pelagius, he leaned too much toward the doctrine of fate; meaning by it the overruling, efficacious will and power of the Deity, whereby he sometimes rashly hinted that all things happen: (see the note, page 185) but in his best moments he happily dissented from himself, and agreed with the other fathers. Take some proofs of their aversion to fatalism and bound will, and of their attachment to our supposed " heresy."

1. JUSTIN MARTYR, who flourished in the second century, says :Si fato fieret ut esset aut improbus aut bonus; nec alii quidem probi essent, nec alii mali. (Apol. 2.) That is, "If it happen by fate (or necessity) that men are either good or wicked; the good were not good, nor should the wicked be wicked."

2. TERTULLIAN, his contemporary, is of the same sentiment: Cæterum nec boni nec mali merces jure pensaretur ei, qui aut bonus aut malus necessitate fuit inventus, non voluntate. (TERT. lib. 2, contra Marc.) "No reward can be justly bestowed, no punishment justly inflicted upon him who is good or bad by necessity, and not by his own choice." In the fifth chapter of the same book he asserts that God has granted man liberty of choice, ut sui dominus constanter occurreret, et bono sponte servando, et malo sponte vitando: quoniam et alias positum hominem sub judicio Dei, oportebat justum illud efficere de arbitrii sui meritis: "that he might constantly be master of his own conduct by voluntarily doing good, and by voluntarily avoiding evil: because, man being appointed for God's judgment, it was necessary to the justice of God's sentence that man should be judged according to [meritis] the deserts of his free will."

3. IRENEUS, bishop of Lyons, who flourished also in the second century, bears thus his testimony against bound will :-Homo vero rationabilis, et secundum hoc similis Deo, liber arbitrio factus, et suæ potestatis, ipse sibi causa est ut aliquando quidem frumentum, aliquando autem palea fiat; quapropter et juste condemnabitur. (Lib. iv, adv. Hæret. cap. 9.) That is, "Man, a reasonable being, and in that respect like God, is made free in his will; and being endued with power to conduct himself, he is a cause of his becoming sometimes wheat and sometimes chaff;*

According to the doctrine maintained in these pages, God is the first cause

therefore will he be justly condemned." Again: Dedit ergo Deus bonum, &c, et qui operantur quidum illud, gloriam et honorem percipient, quoniam operati sunt bonum, cum possent non operari illud. Hi autem qui illud non operantur, judicium Dei nostri recipient, quoniam non sunt operati bonum cum possent operari illud: “God gives goodness, and they who do good shall obtain honour and glory; because they have done good, when they could forbear doing it. And they who do it not, shall receive the just judgment of our God; because they have not done good, when they could have done it." Once more: Non tantum in operibus, sed etiam in fide, liberum, et suæ potestatis, arbitrium servavit homini Deus. (Ibid. lib. 4, cap. 62.) "God has left man's will free, and at his own disposal, not only with regard to works, but also with regard to faith." Nor did Irenæus say here more than St. Augustine does in this well-known sentence: Posse credere est omnium, credere vero fidelium : "To have a power to believe is the prerogative of all men; but actually to believe is the prerogative of the faithful."

4. ORIGEN nobly contends for liberty: he grants rather too much than too little of it: he continually recommends xaλny poɑspeσiv, “a good choice,” which he frequently calls την ροπήν τε αυτέξεσιν, “the inclination of the powerful principle whereby we are masters of our own conduct." He observes that we are not at liberty to see, but (o xpivasτο χρησασθαι την ροπην, την ευδοκησιν) " to judge ; to use our power of choice and our approbation." And in the solution of some scriptures, which seem to contradict one another, he refutes the sentiment of those who reject the doctrine of our co-operating with Divine grace, and who thinks εx ημέτερον έργον είναι το κατ' αρετην βιεν, αλλα παντα θειαν χαριν, "That it is not our own work to lead a virtuous life, but that it is entirely the work of Divine grace."

5. ST. CYPRIAN and LACTANTIUS speak the same language, as the learned reader may see by turning to the seventh book of Vossius' History of Pelagianism. Nor did St. Basil dissent from them, if we may judge of his sentiments by the following passage, which is extracted from his thirty-seventh homily, where he proves that God is not the author of evil:-"What is forced is not pleasing to God, but what is done from a truly virtuous motive: and virtue comes from the will, not from necessity." Hence it appears that, in this father's account, necessity is a kind of compulsion contrary to the freedom of the will. "For," adds he, "the will depends on what is within us; and within us is free will."

6. GREGORIUS NYSSENUS is of one mind with his brother ST. BASIL. For speaking of faith, he says, that it is placed "within the reach of our free election." And again: "We say of faith what the Gospel contains, namely, that he who is begotten by spiritual regeneration, knows of whom he is begotten, and what kind of a living creature he becomes. For spiritual regeneration is the only kind of regeneration which puts it in our power to become what we choose to be." (Greg. Catech. Disc. chap. 36, and chap. 6.)

7. ST. CHRYSOSTOM is so noted an advocate for free will, that CALVIN complains first of him. Part of Calvin's complaint runs thus:-Habet of our conversion, or of our "becoming wheat." But man is the first cause of has own perversion, or his "becoming chaff."

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