No. 264.

JAN. 29, 1842.

With Supplement, 2s.

*The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity:

LONDON, JANUARY 29, 1842.

It is well known to be now a settled doctrine, that, as between incumbrancers or purchasers of an equitable interest in personalty, priority belongs to that one who first gives notice to the person in whom the legal title is vested; thus, if A., being entitled as cestui que trust to a life interest in a personal fund, mortgages or sells his interest to B., who gives no notice to the trustees, and afterwards mortgages or sells it to C., without notice of B.'s charge, and C. does give notice to the trustees, C. will have priority over B. (Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1; Loveridge v. Cooper, 3 Russ. 30, and several later decisions).

We believe, Jones v. Jones is the first and only case in which the point in question has been directly determined. But it appears to us, that the distinction taken in it is not only in accordance with the earlier indirect authorities and dicta, (Beckett v. Cordley, 1 Bro. C. C. 353; Ex parte Cawthorne, 1 Gl. & J. 240; Martinez v. Cooper, 2 Russ. 214), which lay down as a general proposition, that, as between equitable incumbrancers on real estate, priority in point of time alone gives priority in equity, and that, to rebut that equity, there must be something like fraud;-but that it is warranted by the very cases which are supposed to be in hostility to it. It is to be observed, that the decisions in Dearle v. Hall, and Loveridge v. Cooper, do not affect to proceed on the ground of an equity in the subsequent incumBut in Jones v. Jones, (8 Sim. 683), it was decided, brancer, arising out of his prevention of fraud upon that the doctrine in Dearle v. Hall has no application subsequent purchasers, but on the ground of his having "The plaintiffs say, to the case of several mortgagees of real estate; and says Sir J. Leach in Dearle v. Hall, "that they were done more to perfect his title. that, if there be a mortgage of real estate to A., then a not bound to give notice to the trustees; for that, notice second to B., who gives no notice of his mortgage to A., does not form part of the necessary conveyance of an and a third to C., who does give notice of his mortgage equitable interest. I admit, that, if you mean to rely to A., C. shall not be preferred to the second mortgagee*. on the contract with the individual, you do not need to We have understood, that this decision has been give notice: from the moment of the contract he, with whom you are dealing, is personally bound; but, doubted by some eminent conveyancers; and that oppo- if you mean to go farther, and to make your right attach site opinions on the point have been given. It is said, upon the thing which is the subject of the contract, it is that the principle of the decisions is as applicable to necessary to give notice; and, unless notice is given, you cases of realty as of personalty; that, as between merely do not do that which is essential in all cases of transfer equitable incumbrancers, he who obtains the nearest ap- Rowley, (1 Ves. sen. 348), in which the Judges held, of personal property."-And citing a case of Ryall v. proach to a claim on the legal estate-he who takes the that, in the case of a chose in action, you must do every most pains to prevent a fraud being practised on subse- thing towards having possession that the subject admits, quent incumbrancers, has a better equity than one his Honor went on to lay down, that, as regards an prior in point of time, who has not taken any such pre-equitable interest in personalty, notice is necessary to cautions; and that there is no distinction between the perfect the title-to give a complete right in rem, and title to land and the title to personalty, which has the not merely a right as against him who conveys his effect of destroying the application of this equitable doctrine to realty.

interest.

And in Loveridge v. Cooper, on appeal before Lord In Jones v. Jones, as the facts are stated, the mortgagor Lyndhurst, C., the observation of his Lordship was, had an equitable estate only in part of the premises, and had that, "in cases like the present, (that is, cases of equithe legal estate in respect of other part. Whether this circum-table interests in personalty), the act of giving the trus stance affects the decision, may deserve consideration. tee notice is, in a certain degree, taking possession of

VOL. VI.

C

the fund: it is going as far towards equitable ownership as it is possible to go; for, after notice given, the trustee of the fund becomes a trustee for the assignee, who gives him notice."

The principle, then, of these decisions, proceeds on the ground, that, as possession in respect of personalty determines the apparent ownership, and as notice to the legal owner is the nearest, and indeed, only approximation which the equitable incumbrancer can make towards possession, such notice shall have the effect of giving him a quasi possession. And it goes no farther than this, that notice to the legal owner is a necessary act in the purchaser of the equitable interest, where such notice has the effect of adding something to his title.

ON SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SALE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE JURIST.

Sir,-So far as my information enables me to judge, I should have thought that it had been agreed alike by conveyancing counsel, and by the higher class of solicitors, that Conditions of Sale, restrictive of the ordinary rights of purchasers, have, of late years, been carried to an unreasonable and mischievous extent. I was, therefore, surprised by the tone of the remarks in THE JURIST, of the 15th instant, upon a late resolution of the Committee of the Birmingham Law Society. Those resolutions may not state the case very happily, or base the opposition of the committee upon good grounds, But if these cases are to be applied to mortgages of but they point plainly enough at an existing evil, and real estate, the question is, what is the effect of notice have a tendency to abate it; and, at all events, may be on the title? Is giving notice doing every thing towards made a text for useful comment. Since a good title, obtaining the legal title that the subject admits? Has sufficiently proved, does not require the aid of special it, in fact, any effect whatever upon the title? That it conditions, it would seem to be sufficiently obvious, has none, is decided, as it appears to us, by the case of that every restrictive condition is, pro tanto, the admisPeacock v. Burt, (13 Law Journ. 35), referred to by his sion of a defect, and, therefore, objectionable on the Honor the Vice-Chancellor in Jones v. Jones. There, part of the vendor as well as of the purchaser; yet it is the second mortgagee of real estate had given notice of notoriously now common for solicitors (more particuhis mortgage to the first mortgagee; and the third (with-larly in the country) to offer all property, indiscriminout notice) paid off the first, and took a conveyance of ately, for sale by auction, under conditions extremely the legal estate from him; and the Master of the Rolls prejudicial to a purchaser, and, in numerous cases, not held, that the third mortgagee should have priority over called for by the circumstances of the titles; and surely the second. In other words, that the notice given by the they do not then do the utmost that can honestly be second was valueless. That his Honor treated the no- done for the interest of their clients. Such conditions tice in that light, appears from what fell from him in daily injure opposite parties: first, the vendors, by rehis judgment. It is clear, in fact," said his Honor, pelling trustees, and such persons as are cautious enough "that, to give a third mortgagee, who has obtained the to consult their professional advisers before purchasing legal estate, a priority over the second, nothing further at an auction; and next, the numerous purchasers, who is necessary than to have advanced his money without reasonably assuming that they are to have a sufficient notice of the second mortgage; and this priority may title, make their purchases upon a fair estimate of be obtained, even during the pendency of a suit; for value, without deduction for extraordinary expenses the equities of the two parties being equal, this court to which they may be subjected, or for the risk of a refuses to interfere; not because one has a better, but bad title. In the most favourable case, the vendor and because they have equal rights:" an expression clearly purchaser do not stand upon even ground, when special inconsistent with the supposition that notice had any conditions are resorted to; for the vendor knows exeffect on the title; for, if it had, then the two mortga-actly the way in which they will operate, while the gees would not have had equal rights.

purchaser is necessarily ignorant of this; and, if conThere is another point of view in which the question scious of his risk, must insure against it by a reduction may be considered, to shew that in the case of mort- in the price which he would otherwise give. Not only gage of real estate, notice has no effect upon the title; honesty, but a vendor's interest, therefore, requires that and that is, that it will not prevent the first mortgagee, a purchaser should be pretty distinctly apprised of the not only from being at liberty, but from being bound risk which he must bear, and of the extraordinary exto re-convey and return the title deeds to the mortga- pense which he may be put to; in other words, special gor; for it has been decided, that, if there be first and conditions, to be really beneficial, should be always second mortgagees, and the second has given notice of framed with reference to the particular title in queshis incumbrance to the first, yet, if the mortgagor ten- tion, and should inform the purchaser of its general ders payment to the first mortgagee, he can demand the state. Thus qualified, such conditions afford all the prodelivery of the title deeds. Dixon v. Wigram, (2 C. & tection that can fairly be desired by a vendor, and will J. 613). That case was an application under the 7 really benefit him; while they cease to be objectionable Geo. 2, c. 20, for stay of proceedings by a first morton the part of the purchaser. And conditions thus gagee, and to compel re-conveyance and delivery of framed would probably meet the views of the Birmingthe title deeds, on the mortgagor bringing the mort-ham Committee, who, I would fain hope, were not acgage money and interest into court. And for the mort- tuated by merely selfish motives in framing their regagee, one of the grounds of opposition was, that he solution. had received notice from a second mortgagee of his incumbrance; but the court held, that the first mortgagee must re-convey and deliver up the title deeds, as the second would be in no danger, because several modes might be adopted for his protection against a subsequent incumbrancer. This case proves that the notice does not give to the second mortgagee any claim or right whatever over the legal estate. In other words, it leaves his title exactly as it was before; whereas, in the cases referred to upon equitable estates in personalty, the very essence of the decision is, that the notice converts the trustee of the fund into a trustee for the assignee who gives him notice; and it seems to follow, that it would be a breach of trust in the trustee to hand over the fund to the mortgagor, unless with the acquiescence or direction of the mortgagee giving notice.

The objection to unnecessary Conditions of Sale is increased by the existing doubt, whether their adoption by trustees for sale, (including of course mortgagees, with a power of sale), is not such a breach of trust as renders a contract for sale under them void in equity. And it may not be useless to your country readers to add, (what you are, doubtless, aware of), that several of the most distinguished conveyancing counsel act upon this doubt, so far as to reject at once titles submitted to them by purchasers under such contracts. I am, &c. A CONVEYANCER OF FIFTEEN YEARS' STANDING. London, 19th January, 1842.

Our correspondent has discussed this question as it ought to be discussed, with reference to the interests and convenience of vendors and purchasers, and not with

CONSTRUCTION OF THE WILL ACT.

In the courts of common law, where the validity of a will only comes in question incidentally on trials of devisavit vel non, the Statute for the Amendment of the title to real property, or on the occasion of an issue the Laws with respect to Wills does not appear from the reports to have yet become the subject of judicial interpretation. But the Ecclesiastical Courts, engaged in the constant examination of a multiplicity of wills, many of them of the most informal and irregular deof the provisions of that statute; and, in those courts, scription, have, necessarily, been led to the consideration as might be expected, we find cases on the construction of the Will Act occurring in great number and variety. Some of the decisions of the Courts of Probate on these cases differ from the opinions expressed in other deor in the pages of legal writers, and may, therefore, seem not unlikely to furnish materials for future investigation and discussion before the superior tribunals; while, on many points, they begin to be of sufficient volume and importance to afford grounds for determinstrictly conformable to the letter or spirit of the act. ing the prudence of contesting a will that may not be

reference to whether the business of lawyers would be greater or less by the adoption of a different practice. We do not, however, alter our opinion as to the expediency of leaving the class of buyers and sellers of estates to manage their own affairs according to their own discretion, just like any other class of buyers and sellers. There can be no doubt, as our correspondent suggests, that every restrictive condition of sale is an admission of a defect pro tanto; that is, of either a defect of title, or a difficulty in procuring evidence on particular points. Nor can there be much doubt, that the result is to diminish to some extent the price that the buyer gives. The compact between the buyer and seller is, in effect, this: that the seller finds it convenient not to be called upon to establish by proof every point of title, which, in the absence of special compact, the purchaser would be en-partments of the law, in the course of private practice, titled to call for; and the purchaser, as our correspondent observes, insures against his "risk" by giving less money. Where is the evil of such a compact? and what is it, in effect, but an agreement between parties, in dealing together, to submit to the evil of, respectively, waiving some advantages, for the purpose of avoiding The first and most material question would seem to that which, in their calculation, would be a greater evil, be, what wills are within the act? And the clause of the viz. a suit for specific performance. Whether such a cal-act that professes to determine this point, has unfortuculation be correct or not, we do not pretend to judge; nately, though, as we must think, without adequate we are content to suppose, that, as a body, the sellers cause, given rise to much diversity of interpretation. and purchasers of land, like the sellers and purchasers of tend to any will made before the 1st day of January, The 34th section enacts, "that this act shall not excotton or iron, or of any other commodity, know their 1838; and that every will re-executed or republished, own interests best; and we hold, that the functions of or revived by any codicil, shall, for the purposes of this the lawyer are not to advise traders as to what are act, be deemed to have been made at the time at which their true interests as traders, but to advise them how, the same shall be so re-executed, republished, or relegally, to carry into effect those arrangements, which vived." With reference to this enactment, Sir Herthey, in their own judgment, think most for their in- 768), before the Prerogative Court in 1838, observed: bert Jenner, in the case of Hobbs v. Knight, (1 Curt. terest. We perfectly agree with our correspondent," But for this clause, every will made after the passing that much mischief may arise from the adoption, by solicitors, of a general form for conditions of sale; and that special conditions of sale should always be framed with reference to the particular title. But to forward this object, the resolution of the Birmingham Committee needed not to have been quite so ambitious as it was. A resolution, that it is the duty of solicitors to apply great skill and care in the preparation of special conditions of sale, would have been sufficient; and though we do not see, that, for the promulgation of so simple a truth, it was necessary to call into action the powerful machinery of a Law Institution, and the deliberations of a committee, yet, if the members of the Birmingham Committee had confined themselves to some such novel doctrine, their labours would at least have escaped censure, if they had not deserved commendation.

SPRING CIRCUITS, 1842.

NORFOLK.

TINDAL, Lord Chief Justice, and Mr. Baron PARKE.
HOME.

Mr. Baron ALDERSON and Mr. Baron GURNEY.

WESTERN.

Mr. Justice COLERIDGE and Mr. Justice ERSKINE.
OXFORD.

Mr. Justice PATTESON and Mr. Justice CRESSWELL.

MIDLAND.

Lord ABINGER, Chief Baron, and Mr. Justice WILLIAMS.
NORTHERN.

Mr. Baron ROLFE and Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN.

WELSH.

South-Mr. Justice MAULe.

North-Mr. Justice COLTMAN.

of the act, namely, the 3rd July, 1837, in order to be valid, must have been executed in the manner prescribed by the statute; but, by this section, any will to the passing of the act, would be valid, if made before executed in the manner allowed by the law, previous the 1st January of this year; and, it appears to the court, that this clause was inserted for the purpose of the alteration in the law becoming known before it should come into effect; but the court cannot think that the Legislature intended, that wills executed before the 1st Jan. 1838, should be subject to the old law for an indefinite term, and that they might be altered, obliIf this were the true interpretation of the statute, what terated, or interlined, and still continue to have effect. would be the effect? Suppose a will executed on the day before the act came into operation, that will would require neither witness nor signature: the consequence would be, that the testator, if he lived sixty years, might from time to time alter the will to any extent; he might remove the names of legatees and substitute others; he might substitute one residuary legatee for another, and one executor for another, and make an entirely new disposition of the property without the necessity of having any witnesses, or of any persons being privy to the alterations, if these changes and alterations were capable of being identified as his act. This is one of the inconsistencies that would arise from an extended application of the 34th section of the act. Again, the 18th clause of the statute enacts, that a will shall be revoked by the subsequent marriage of the testator; but a will executed before the 1st January, 1838, would not be revoked by marriage alone, and would be revoked by presumption arising from an alteration in the circumstances of the testator, contrary to the provisions of the 19th section. These are consequences so inconsistent

of Donaldson, 2 Curt. 386); also, to the will of a seaman, serving on board a ship, though on shore at the time of making the will. (In the Goods of Lay, 2 Curt. 378).

par

The statute 1 Vict. c. 26, does not extend to the colonies, for the colonies are not bound by an act of liament, unless particularly named. (Anon., 2 P. W. 291; Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 Ves. 487). If, therefore, the testator have landed property as well in England as in the colonies, where the Statute of Frauds is in force, (ie. all the colonies in the West Indies, except Bermuda, British Guiana, Trinidad, and St. Lucia; and those of North America, except Lower Canada, (4 Burge C. L. 478),) he must execute his will, so as to comply

both with the Statute of Frauds and the new act.

The authorities in the East Indies have, with certain exceptions, re-enacted the Will Act, but such act was not to come into operation till the 1st February, 1839. Accordingly, (In the Goods of Foy, deceased, 2 Curt. 328), an unattested will, made in 1838, by an English officer in the East India Company's service in India, (whereby, it seems, he acquired a domicile in India, Brace v. Bruce, 8 Bro. P. C. 566; Marsh v. Hutchinson, 2 B. & P. 231), having been proved at the Cape of Good Hope, whither he had gone on leave for the benefit of his health, and died there, was admitted to probate also in the Prerogative Court.

(To be continued).

London Gazettes.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 25.

B.

DECLARATIONS OF INSOLVENCY. WILLIAM CURTIS, King's Lynn, Norfolk, common brewer. THOMAS TOWNSHEND, jun., North Petherton, Somersetshire, builder.

JOHN PARSONS, Pleasley-hill, Mansfield, Nottingham-
shire, maltster.

CHARLES AUGUSTUS CANTOR, Upper Montagu-st.,
Montagu-square, merchant.

ROBERT JOHNSON SHARP, Liverpool, victualler, Feb. 5
and March 8 at 1, Clarendon-rooms, Liverpool: Sols. Jones,
Liverpool; Vincent & Sherwood, King's-bench-walk, Tem-
ple.-Fiat dated Jan. 21.
SAMUEL EDDLESTONE WELLDON, Cambridge,
butcher, Feb. 4 and March 8 at 11, Hoop Hotel, Cambridge:
Sols. Eaden, jun., Cambridge; Clark & Davidson, 36, Es-
sex-street, Strand.-Fiat dated Jan. 20.

MEETINGS.

Charles Daly, Red Lion-square, publisher, Feb. 3 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, last ex.-William Blatch and William Lampert, Grove-place, Brompton, printers, Feb. 8 at 1, Court road, Surrey, brush manufacturer, Jan. 28 at 11, Court of of Bankruptcy, last ex.-George Webb Bromfield, BlackfriarsBankruptcy, last ex.-P. Saunders, Kingston-upon-Hull, merchant, Jan. 28 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, last ex.-G. Henley, Pall-mall, and Savoy-street, Strand, auctioneer, Feb. 4 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, last ex.-William Ridge, Chas. Ridge, and William Newland, Chichester, Sussex, bankers, Feb. 16 at 1, Dolphin Inn, Chichester, last ex.-David Buglass, Sunderland, Durham, victualler, Feb. 17 at 11, Bridge Hotel, Sunderland, last ex.-Thomas Saunders, Northampton, linen draper, Jan. 28 at 11, Cross Keys Inn, Northampton, last ex. – G. Thompson, South Shields, Durham, victualler, Feb. 16 at 11, Horner's Hotel, Sunderland, last ex.; at 12, aud. ac. and st., Cheapside, warehousemen, Feb. 17 at 11, Court of Bankdiv.-James Lewis Willson and Wm. Allen Turner, Woodruptcy, aud. ac.--John Corke Knell, Millbrook, Southampton, cattle dealer, Feb. 17 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, aud. ac. and div.-James Coulsell, Richmond, Surrey, builder, Feb. 16 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, aud. ac.; Feb. 18 at 12, div.-Edm. Grove, Dawley, Shropshire, draper, May 20 at 11, Crown Inn, Bridgnorth, aud. ac.-John Baker, Woodlands, Blagdon, Somersetshire, scrivener, Feb. 15 at 12, aud. ac.; Feb. 18 at 12, div.-Hen. W. Fernyhough, Reading, Berkshire, bookseller, Feb. 17 at half-past 12, Court of Bankruptcy, fin. div.-John Banfield, Cheapside, silversmith, Feb. 17 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, fin. div.-Rich. Perkins, Upper-st., Islington, upholsterer, Feb. 17 at half-past 1, Court of Bankruptcy, fin. div.-J. F. Lewis, Oil-mills, Ebley, near Stroud, Gloucestershire, woollen cloth-manufacturer, Feb. 17 at half-past 11, Court of Bankruptcy, div.-J. Philpot, Robt. Marriott, and Benj. Burnell, Crigglestone, Sandal Magna, Yorkshire, coal merchants, Feb. 15 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, div.—Wm. May, Fenchurch-st., commission agent, Feb. 15 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, fin. div.-John Philpot, St. Swithin's-lane, victualler, Feb. 15 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, div.-John Peirce, Bedford, tailor, Feb. 16 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, div.-Geo. Williams, Aldgate, and New Kingston, Surrey, Rowland, Horsham, Sussex, linen draper, Feb. 15 at half-past linen draper, Feb. 15 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, div.-D. 11, Court of Bankruptcy, div.-Henry Cunliffe, Green Haworth, Oswaldtwistle, Lancashire, shopkeeper, Feb. 18 at 11, Town-hall, Preston, aud. ac.; at 12, first and fin. div.-John G. Bird, Bridgend, Glamorganshire, stationer, Feb. 24 at 11, Prothero & Towgood's, Newport, Monmouthshire, aud. ac.; at 12, fin. div.--Fras. Parker, Masbrough and Ickles Mills, JOHN BURNIE, Tokenhouse-yard, merchant, Feb. 4 at 2 and March 8 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. ass. Edwards; hall, Sheffield, aud. ac.; at 1, div.-Henry Morse, BirmingRotherham, Yorkshire, seed crusher, Feb. 19 at 12, TownSols. Brown & Co., Commercial Sale Rooms, Mincing-lane.ham, laceman, Feb. 16 at 11, Waterloo-rooms, Birmingham, WILLIAM WILCOCKS, Bracknell, Berkshire, saddler and harness maker, Feb. 1 and March 8 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. ass. Graham; Sols. Bridger & Co., 32, Finsbury-circus.-Fiat dated Jan. 15. GEORGE OGILVY SPEARE, Fleet-street, laceman and warehouseman, Feb. 7 at 1 and March 8 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. ass. Graham; Sols. H. W. & W. C. Sole, 68, Aldermanbury.-Fiat dated Jan. 24. JAMES LAYCOCK, Colne, Lancashire, tallow chandler, grocer, and draper, Feb. 2 and March 8 at 11, King's Head Ian, Colne: Sols. Hardacre, Colne; Wiglesworth & Co., Gray's-inn.-Fiat dated Jan. 10. CHARLES CHRISTELOW, York, woollen draper, Feb. 15 and March 8 at 11, Guildhall, York: Sols. Blanchard & Richardson, York; Williamson & Hill, 4, Verulam-buildings, Gray's-inn.-Fiat dated Jan. 19.

BANKRUPTS.

EDWARD THOMAS MURRAY, Church-street, St. Mary,
Newington, leather seller, and Gt. George-st., Bermondsey,
japanner and enameller of leather, Feb. I at half-past 1, and
March 8 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. ass. Belcher;
Sol. Loughborough, 23, Austin-friars.-Fiat dated Jan. 24.
JOHN CUISSET, Blackfriars-road, jeweller, Feb. 3 and
March 8 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Gibson;
Sol. Rolfe & Edmunds, South-square, Gray's-inn.-Fiat
dated Jan. 21.
WILLIAM CHRISTIE, New North-st., Red Lion-square,
bookbinder, Feb. 3 at half-past 11 and March 8 at 12, Court
of Bankruptcy: Off. ass. Green; Sol. Starling, 40, Leices-
ter-square.-Fiat dated Jan. 17.

-Fiat dated Jan. 19.

ALFRED WEBB, Liverpool, carpet seller, Feb. 9 and March
8 at 2, Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester: Sols. Higson &
Son, Manchester; Johnson & Co., Temple.-Fiat dated
Jan. 8.

aud. ac.; at 12, fin. div.-Thos. Smith, Preston, Lancashire, flagger, Feb. 18 at 11, Town-hall, Preston, aud. ac.; at 12, fin. div.-Thos. Burbey, Rich. Loe, and James Loe, Portsmouth, bankers, April 18 at 1, George Inn, Portsmouth, aud. ac.; at 3, div.-E. S. Boult and T. Addison, Liverpool, stock brokers, Feb. 26 at 12, Clarendon-rooms, Liverpool, aud. ac.; at brick maker, Feb. 21 at 11, Commissioners'-rooms, Mancheshalf-past 12, div. sep. est. E. S. Boult.-J. Austin, Manchester, ter, pr. d.; at 12, aud. ac. and div.-Robt. Arthur and Jos. Forster, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, woollen drapers, Feb. 18 at 11, Bankrupt Commission-room, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, aud. ac.; at 12, div.-Andrew Morison, Great Malvern, Worcestershire, lodging housekeeper, Feb. 15 at 11, Golden Lion Inn,

Worcester, aud. ac.; at 12, div.-Cuthbert Potts, Andrew

Potts, and John Potts, Monk Wearmouth Shore, Durham,
ship-builders, Feb. 16 at 12, Horner's Commercial Hotel, Sun-
derland, div. sep. est. C. Potts.

CERTIFICATES TO BE ALLOWED,
Unless Cause shewn to the contrary, on or before Feb. 15.
John C. Knell, Millbrook, Southampton, cattle dealer.-