No. 266. FEB. 12, 1842. With Supplement, 2s. **The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity: {E. T. Ho B, Fist of the Inner { Temple, Barrister at Law. TENISON EDWARDS, Esq. of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law. House of Commons Elec-[A. V. KIRWAN, Esq. of Gray's Inn, Barrister at Law. tion Committees.. The Lord Chancellor's (E. T. HOOD, Esq. of the Inner Court 1 Temple, Barrister at Law. Master of the Rolls Court {G. Y. ROBSON, Esq. of the Inner ...... Temple, Barrister at Law. Vice-Chancellor of Eng- [TENISON EDWARDS, Esq. of the '{ LONDON, FEBRUARY 12, 1842. Is a case now pending before the Lord Chancellor, (Herring v. Clobury), a discussion has arisen on the question, what is inadmissible in evidence on the ground of being a privileged communication. No point in the intricate and much debated Law of Evidence offers greater intricacies, or has been the subject of greater conflict of decision, than this; and it can hardly yet be said to be settled. The general result of the authorities, at present, seems to be this, that, as to the parties themselves, where the course of proceedings permits them to be compelled to give evidence against themselves, they are compellable to disclose such communications made confidentially to their legal advisers, as have been made without reference to existing or contemplated litigation; but, that they are not compellable to divulge such communications, if made in reference to an existing or contemplated litigation. And that, as to the counsel, attornies, or solicitors of the parties, they are not compellable to divulge matter communicated, or come to their knowledge, in their character of legal advisers, whether made or not in, or in contemplation of, litigation. (See Bolton v. Corporation of Liverpool, and Greenhough v. Gaskell, 1 My. & K. 88, 98; Nias v. Northern and Eastern Railway Company, 3 My. & C. 355; and Phil. Evid., 8th ed., c. 2, s. 3). Such seem to be the general rules of the Courts of Law and Equity on this subject; but, it must be observed, that, in addition to the difficulty arising from some conflict of authority, as to whether the privilege, as it affects disclosures by attornies, is general, or is limited to the circumstances communicated to them in reference to the suit, there is, in every case, a further difficulty in determining whether the facts communicated themselves, or the mode in which the knowledge of them has been acquired, are such as to bring the VOL. VI. E Court of Queen's Bench Queen's Bench Bail Court Court of Common Pleas case within the rule, that the knowledge must have been acquired by the legal agent strictly in his character of legal agent. It is not, however, our present purpose to investigate in detail what is the law on this subject, but to examine the reason of the law; and we confess, that to us it seems that great doubts may be entertained whether the whole foundation of the doctrine is not based on false reasoning. Mr. Phillipps, in his work on Evidence, (8th edit. p. 173), thus states it:-" Communications made on the faith of that professional confidence which a client reposes in counsel, attorney, or solicitor, are not allowed to be revealed in a court of justice to the prejudice of the client. The expediency of this rule must depend, not on the impropriety of violating the confidence reposed, but on a consideration, that the collateral inconvenience which would ensue, if no such confidence were reposed, would preponderate over the direct mischief produced by the chance of misdecision or failure of justice resulting from the want of evidence. If, in the cases within the operation of the rule, the only confidence reposed was a confession of guilt or dishonesty, the rule would be obviously detrimental to the interests of justice; but it is conceived, that, in a multitude of instances, a person possessed of just rights would be materially impeded in vindicating them, if every communication made to his professional adviser might be used against him; if such were the law, it would be necessary, in self-defence, to accompany all communications made to a professional adviser with a statement of the several circumstances and explanations, which, however unnecessary for the purpose of the communication, would be requisite to prevent it from being unfairly used." And Lord Brougham, in the great case of Bolton v. Corporation of Liverpool, (1 My. & K. 88), addressing himself to the argument, that a party should be compelled to produce cases laid by him before counsel in contemplation of proceedings, makes the following observations:-"It seems plain, that the course of justice must stop, if such a right exists. No man will dare to consult a professional adviser with a view to his defence, or to the enforcement of his rights. The very case which he lays before his counsel, to advise upon the evidence, may, and often does, contain the whole of his evidence; and may be, and frequently is, the brief with which that or some other counsel conducts his cause. The principle contended for, that inspection of cases, though not of the opinions, may always be obtained as of right, would produce this effect, and neither more nor less, that a party would go into Court to try the cause, and there would be the original of his brief in his own counsel's bag, and a copy of it in the bag of his adversary's counsel. Nay, as often as a party found himself unprepared, or suspected that something new had come to his adversary's knowledge, he might (at least if he were plaintiff) postpone the trial, and obtain a discovery of those new circumstances, which, in all likelihood, had been laid before counsel for advice. If it be said, that this Court compels the disclosure of whatever a party has at any time said respecting his case-nay, even wrings his conscience to disclose his belief, the answer is, that admissions not made, or thoughts not communicated to professional advisers, are not essential to the security of men's rights in Courts of Justice. Proceedings for this purpose can be conducted in full perfection, without the party informing any one of his case, except his legal advisers. But without such communication, no person can safely come into a Court, either to obtain redress or to defend himself." Now, the substance of these reasonings appears to be, that communications made by a party to his legal advisers, in their character as such, are to be privileged; because, if they are not, a person will not venture to communicate to his legal adviser all the facts of which he possesses a knowledge; that is, he will not be able to communicate to him, in safety, that information which weakens his own case; and, being thus obliged to leave him in the dark, as to his weak points, the legal adviser will be unable to make so good a case for the client as he could, if possessed of full knowledge of the whole. Now, if the principle and end of judicial investigation were, that each party should be able to tell his own story as advantageously as possible for himself, not informing the Court of the real facts, but only of so much of them as supports the case of the party, no doubt, it would be consistent with such a principle, that the confidential communications of the litigant to his advisers should be protected by privilege. But if, on the contrary, the true end of a judicial inquiry is, that the Court may learn the facts, and having learned them, may administer the law accordingly, then what argument of convenience to parties can be put in competition with the overwhelming importance of the Court's being enabled to obtain full knowledge of the true facts? And on what principle of justice can a rule be approved, the very essence of which is to give to a party the advantage of coming into court in the form best calculated to deceive that Court? It is quite clear, that, in so far as the communications of the client to his adviser are of matters which give the client an advantage over his opponent, he has no interest, and will make no endeavour to conceal them. It is only where the circumstances communicated are such, that, if known, they would, pro tanto, turn the CONSTRUCTION OF THE WILL ACT. (Continued from p. 34). 6. ATTESTATION. The act required to be done in the presence of the witnesses is the signature of the testator. Their at testation and subscription, therefore, would seem obviously to have reference to that act, and to be an act which ought to be done subsequently to the other, and which would be unmeaning and ineffectual till the other is performed. In a recent case of rather a singular kind, where the witnesses signed first, and after them the testator, Sir Herbert Jenner refused probate on motion, and reserved the question of the validity of the will for the judicial opinion of the court. (In the Goods of Olding, 5 Jur. 1017)*. The 9th section of the act does not expressly require that the witnesses should subscribe their names at the same time; but the natural construction of the words of that clause appears to be, that, when the signature is made or acknowledged, the witnesses shall then attest and subscribe, not one at one time and one at another. Accordingly, where a testator signed his will in the presence of one witness only, who subscribed it, and afterwards, on a subsequent day, acknowledged his sig nature in the presence of the same witness, who did not then subscribe it, and of another, who did, it was doubted whether this was a sufficient compliance with the act, and probate was refused. (In the Goods of Allen, deceased, 2 Curt. 331). In the interpretation of that part of the 9th section, which requires the witnesses to subscribe "in the presence" of the testator, the same principles of construction seem likely to be adopted as were established with reference to the same words in the Statute of Frauds. * See some observations on this case, Jurist, vol. 5, p. 1049. Thus, where a will was executed by the testator in the same room where the witnesses were, and they attested the will in that room, this was an execution "in the presence" of the witnesses, and an attestation "in the presence" of the testator, although, by reason of the curtains of the bed in which the testator was lying being drawn, the witnesses could not actually see the testator sign, nor the testator actually see the witnesses sign. (Newton v. Clarke, 2 Curt. 320). On the other hand, where the testator signed in the presence of two witnesses, but they then removed into another room, where they subscribed their names as witnesses, this was held an invalid attestation. (In the Goods of Newman, deceased, 1 Curt. 914). If, however, the witnesses, after they withdrew into an adjoining room, were in such a situation in that room that the testator might have seen them from the room where he was, the subscription would, agreeably to the rule established by Shires v. Glascock, and that class of authorities, be valid, though he did not actually see them. But it is observable, according to the same authorities, that, when the testator signed, or acknowledged his signature, it was considered that he ought to be actually, and not merely constructively, present. And, therefore, even if we adhere to the old rule of construction, without taking up any more independent ground, the doctrine of constructive presence cannot be properly applied to that part of the 9th section, which requires the signature, or acknowledgment of the signature, of the testator, to be "in the presence of the witnesses." The reasons which render it advisable, (notwithstanding the provision of the act, that no form of attestation is necessary), to insert a written attestation stating the essential circumstances of the execution, acquire an additional force from the practice adopted in the Ecclesiastical Courts. For, although the will is signed at the foot, and the names of two witnesses subscribed as having attested the will, yet, if there be no attestation clause, or if the attestation clause do not fully state the observance of all the requisite particulars, the Court of Probate will require an affidavit to shew that the statute was complied with. If it appear from such affidavit, though ex parte only, that the statute was not complied with in all respects, the court will refuse probate; but it will not, on motion upon affidavit ex parte, that the will was not duly executed, decree administration of the effects of the deceased, as dead intestate: for that the court cannot do unless the will is propounded. (In the Goods of Ayling, deceased, 1 Curt. 913). If the formalities were correctly fulfilled, one of the witnesses, or the surviving witness, will be competent te depose to all the material facts. In the event of the death of both the witnesses, it is probable that the Court of Probate would shape its practice conformably to the rule prevailing in the superior courts, and admit proof of the witnesses' handwriting as sufficient, upon a consideration of the circumstances of the case, to warrant the conclusion, that the necessary forms were duly observed. 7. ALTERATIONS, OBLITERATIONS, &c. Interlineations and alterations in a will, made after its execution, must, by the 21st section of the act, be executed and attested in the same manner as a will; but if the alterations are deposed to by affidavit (in which both the witnesses should join) as having been made before the execution, probate may pass with the alterations, as stated in the affidavit. (In the Goods of Ibbotson, deceased, 2 Curt. 337; In the Goods of Maria Rhodes, 5 Jur. 1041). Jur. 1016). And in such case, (the alteration being invalid, "except so far as the words or effect of the will before such alteration shall not be apparent"), the obliterations and erasures may be carefully examined, with glasses if necessary, by persons accustomed to inspect writings, in order to ascertain how the will originally stood; and probate shall pass with the obliterated and erased passages restored, if they can be made out; but if it cannot be discovered what those parts originally were, probate must pass with those parts in blank. (In the Goods of Ibbotson, ubi sup.). Thus, where there appeared in a will a legacy of thirty pounds, the word "thirty" being written on an erasure, and the alteration was not signed and attested, as required by the 21st section, and it could not be made out by inspection what the word was over which "thirty" was written, probate was decreed to pass with the legacy in blank. (In the Goods of Rippen, deceased, 2 Curt. 334; S. P., In the Goods of Livock, deceased, 1 Curt. 906). In this case, it was deposed by a party who saw the will before the alteration, that the original word was "fifty." But the court is not at liberty to supply by parol testimony what is not apparent on the face of the will itself. So, likewise, where the testator, after the 1st January, 1838, erased certain words in a will executed in July, 1837, and wrote a memorandum, stating what the words erased originally were; but such memorandum was unattested, probate of the will as it originally stood was refused, the court considering that this memorandum could be looked at to shew what the words were which had been erased. (In the Goods of Brooke, deceased, 2 Curt. 343). There was an appeal from this decision to the Privy Council, where the point has been argued, but no decision has as yet been given. In a case already cited, (Hobbs v. Knight, 1 Curt. 768), it was made a question, whether the cutting out of his signature by the testator, the rest of the paper remaining entire, amounted to a revocation of the will. The 20th section provides, "that no will or codicil, or any part thereof, shall be revoked, otherwise than as aforesaid," (that is, by marriage under the 18th section); "or by another will, &c.," which does not apply to this case; "or by the burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the same by the testator, or by some person in his presence, and by his direction, and with the intention of revoking the same." It was unnecessary to enter into the consideration whether the act done in this case might not be comprehended under the import of the word "tearing;" for the court was of opinion, that in order to bring the act within the meaning of the words "otherwise destroying," it is not necessary that the material of the will should be destroyed; but it is sufficient if the essence of the instrument, independently of its material, be destroyed: and the court considered the name of the testator to be essential to the existence of a will; and if that name be removed, the essential part of the will is removed, and the will is destroyed. In the same case, Sir Herbert Jenner expressed an opinion that a similar excision of the names of the attesting witnesses, if done animo revocandi, would amount to a revocation; and that an obliteration of the testator's signature, in such a manner that it could not be made out, might, consistently with the 21st section, have the same effect. But the word "cancelling," which was in the Statute of Frauds, having been advisedly omitted in the 20th Where the will itself was made before 1838, it may section of the act, the cancellation of the will by strikbe shewn by evidence on affidavit, and from collateral ing it through with a pen, the names of the testator and circumstances, that an unattested and undated alteration the witnesses being likewise crossed out, but not enin it was made subsequently to the commencement of tirely obliterated, will not operate as a revocation. the operation of the new act. (In the Goods of Dyer, 5(Stephens v. Taffrell, 2 Curt. 438). B. Emperial Parliament. NORTHERN. HOUSE OF COMMONS. Monday, Feb. 7. The Attorney-General gave notice of motion for leave to bring in a Bill to amend and explain the Municipal Corporations Act. By a recent decision of the Court of Queen's Bench, it was declared, that, persons holding leases under corporations, were not eligible to sit as town councillors; and, if they did, were liable to a severe penalty. There were, at present, no less than 2400 cases of this kind. In answer to a question from Mr. Buller, Sir Robert Peel contradicted the report that has been circulated as to intentions on the part of government to alter the constitution of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Counsel, and to appoint a Presiding Judge to that Court. The Right Honourable Gentleman said, that the appointment of two new Equity Judges had no direct relation to the Judicial Committee; but, by their appointment, the arrear of causes in Chancery had been reduced from 500 to 200; and, it was possible, that the Vice-Chancellors might have, henceforth, more time at their disposal, and might take an active part in the proceedings of the Judicial Committee. These were reasons for postponing, at present, any alteration of the appellate jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee. Mr. M. Sutton moved for and obtained leave to bring in a Bill to explain and continue to the 1st August, 1843, the Act to amend the Laws relating to Loan Societies. Mr. E. Tennant moved, that the House should go into committee to take into consideration the Laws affecting the Copyright of Designs for the Ornament of Articles of Manufacture. After some observations on the subject, in which Mr. M. Phillips and Dr. Bowring took part, leave was given to bring in a Bill; and the Bill was afterwards brought in and read a first time, and was ordered to be read a second time on Tuesday, the 15th instant. The House of Commons has ordered, that the House will not receive any Petitions for Private Bills after Friday, the 11th; that no Private Bills be read the first time after the 23rd March; and that the House will not receive any Report of Private Bills after the 27th May. Tuesday, Feb. 8. Mr. Godson moved for and obtained leave to bring in a Bill for better securing the Property in the Copyright of Books. His object was to have the Copyrights registered in the Court of Chancery, and to have similar Registrations of Mortgages and Assignments of Copyrights. At a later period of the evening, the Honorable and Learned Gentleman brought in his Bill, which was read a first time. The Attorney-General obtained leave to bring in his proposed Bill for amending the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, (the Municipal Corporations Act). Also, to bring in a Bill to allow of a Writ of Error, in any case of a Judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench on an application for a Mandamus. SPRING CIRCUITS OF THE JUDGES. NORFOLK. Lord Chief Justice TINDAL and Mr. Serjt. ATCHERLEY. Aylesbury, Tuesday, March 8. Bury St. Edmunds, Saturday, March 26. MIDLAND. Lord ABINGER, Chief Baron, and Mr. Justice WILLIAMS. Northampton, Monday, February 28. Lincoln and City, Saturday, March 5. Leicester and Borough, Thursday, March 17. Mr. Baron PARKE and Mr. Baron RoLfe. Mr. Baron ROLFE and Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN. Carlisle, Friday, March 4, Mr. Baron ALDERSON and Mr. Baron GURNEY. Mr. Justice PATTESON and Mr. Justice CRESSWELL. Gloucester and City, Wednesday, March 30. Mr. Justice COLERIDGE and Mr. Justice ERSKINE, NORTH WALES. SOUTH WALES. Mr. Justice MAULE. Swansea, Wednesday, February 23. Carmarthen, Tuesday, March 15. Brecon, Tuesday, March 22. MASTERS IN CHANCERY.-The following gentlemen have been appointed Masters Extraordinary in the High Court of Chancery:-John Joseph Wise, of Ashborne, Derbyshire; Edward Cheney, of Birmingham; Henry Stubbs, of Nottingham: Charles Metcalfe, jun., of Wisbeach, Cambridgeshire. A LAWYER'S POWERS OF ANIMAL MAGNETISM.-Lord Brougham, once, at the Lent Assizes at York, sat for some time intently looking at a witness who was giving evidence, and whom he was to cross-examine. At last the poor fellow, after several efforts to continue his replies, became so dreadfully alarmed, that he declared that "he could not say another word, unless that gentleman," pointing to Mr. Brougham, "would take his eyes off him," London Gazettes. TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8. BANKRUPTS. RICHARD LITTLEDYKE, Brudenell-place, New North- LUKE WHITBY, Green Dragon-yard, Whitechapel, builder, dated Jan. 11. JOHN PROTHEROE, jun., Bristol, iron and tin merchant, JOSEPH GREENWELL and STEPHEN GREENWELL, MEETINGS. Daniel Hodgson and Jon. Wright, Glossop, Derbyshire, cotton-spinners, March 11 at 2, Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester, pr. d.; March 12 at 11, aud. ac.-Thos. Molineux, Manchester, victualler, March 2 at 11, Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester, ch. ass.-Arthur Collos and Alfred Thomson, Brighton, Sussex, sugar-manufacturers, Feb. 12 at 12, Townhall, Brighton, ch. ass.-Wm. Amos, Walbrook, sponge and JOHN WOODCOCK, Stratford, Essex, builder, Feb. 15 at at 2, and March 22 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Belcher; Sol. Plews, 32, Bucklersbury.-Fiat dated Jan. 29. WILLIAM VAILE, Oxford-st., laceman, Feb. 15 at 1, and March 22 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Belcher; Sols. Beaumont & Thompson, 19, Lincoln's-inn-fields.-Fiat GEORGE THOMSON and JAMES FORBES, Crutched-india-rubber merchant, Feb. 22 at half-past 11, Court of friars, corn factors, Feb. 19 and March 22 at 11, Court of melter, March 2 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, last ex. and aud. Bankruptcy, last ex.-B. Marshall, High Holborn, tallowBankruptcy: Off. Ass. Groom; Sol. Taylor, 5, Nicholasac.-Geo. Bradshaw, Welshpool, Montgomeryshire, draper, lane, Lombard-st.-Fiat dated Feb. 1. March 3 at 11, Royal Oak, Welshpool, last ex.-P. Merritt, JOSEPH MILLER, Stockton-on-Tees, patent sail cloth and Huggin-lane, Wood-st., warehouseman, March 3 at 12, Court rope manufacturer, and GEORGE CRADDOCK, Bond-of Bankruptcy, aud. ac.-B. Dix, jun., Roebuck-place, Great gate, Darlington, Durham, patent round and flat rope manufacturer, March 4 and 22 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Edwards; Sols. Bartrum & Son, 112, Bishopsgate-st. Within.-Fiat dated Jan. 25. JOHN BOWERS, Chipstead, Kent, grocer and draper, Feb. 19 and March 22 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Edwards; Sol. Cattlin, Ely-place, Holborn.-Fiat dated CHARLES AUGUSTUS CANTOR, Upper Montagu-st., Montagu-sq., merchant, Feb. 15 at 1, and March 22 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Turquand; Sols. Brundrett & Co., 10, King's Bench-walk, Temple.-Fiat dated Feb. 2. Feb. 1. Dover-st., Southwark, builder, March 3 at half-past 12, Court timber-merchant, March 3 at half-past 1, Court of Bankof Bankruptcy, aud. ac.-Benj. Ingram, Beech-st., Barbican, ruptcy, aud. ac. and fin. div.-Richard Smith and Stephen Marshall, Austin-friars, Russia brokers, March 3 at 11, Court Dryland, Upper Chapman-street, St. George's East, tallowof Bankruptcy, aud. ac. and div.-Jesse Bridgman and Wm. melters, March 3 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, aud. ac. and div.-Richd. Griffiths Welford, Strand, printer, March 3 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, aud. ac.-Richd. Wm. Hugh Jones, Castleman and Mortlake, Surrey, and Bayswater-ter., Middlesex, coal-merchant, March 3 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, aud. ac. and div.-Thos. Hill, jun., and Wm. Brookes, St. Mary Axe, merchants, March 2 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, aud. ac.-Geo. Gandy, Princes-street, Spitalfields, silk manu GEORGIANA GIFFORD, Parson's-green, Fulham, schoolmistress, Feb. 22 at 12, and March 22 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy: Off. Ass. Johnson; Sol. Tyrrell, Guildhall.—facturer, March 2 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, aud. ac.-Miles Fiat dated Jan. 31. EDWARD HALLILEY, Leeds, Yorkshire, cloth manufac- Cheshire, engineers, Feb. 24 and March 22 at 12, Commis. Feb. 3. JOHN GIBBS, Great Yarmouth, Norfolk, tavern keeper, RICHARD WATERS, Newport, Monmouthshire, iron and tin plate manufacturer, and money scrivener, Feb. 24 and March 22 at 11, Westgate Inn, Newport: Sols. Llewellyn, Newport; White & Eyre, 11, Bedford-row.-Fiat dated Jan. 13. Coe, Goldsmith-st., Wood-st., Cheapside, laceman, March 2 at 2, Court of Bankruptcy, aud. ac.-Edward Evans, Carnarvon, coal and flour merchant, March 2 at 11, Castle Inn, Carnarvon, aud. ac.-Wm. Haskayne, Liverpool, ship-chandler, March 2 at 1, Leather's, Liverpool, aud. ac.— John Smith, Deptford-bridge, Kent, hatter, March 2 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, div.-Vincent Robert Alfred Brooks, Robert-street, Hampstead-road, stationer, March 2 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, div.-Jas. Grant and Peter Grant, Coleman-street, merchants, March 1 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, fin. div.-G. Andrews, Sturminster Marshall, Dorsetshire, woolstapler, March 1 at 11, Greyhound Inn, Blandford Forum, aud. ac.; at 2, fin. div.-Richd. Howard Hoskins, Liverpool, victualler, March 14 at 11, Commissioners'-rooms, Manchester, pr. d.; at 12, aud. ac. and div.-Wm. James Holt, Grantham, Lincolnshire, wine-merchant, March 3 at 11, Gilstrap's, Newark, Nottingham, aud. ac.; at 12, div.-Samuel Somv. Jackson, Liverpool, wool and oil-merchant, March 3 at 12, Clarendonrooms, Liverpool, aud. ac.; at 1, fin. div.-Hugh Mackay, Liverpool, and Archibald Fraser Mackay, Glasgow, merchants, March 2 at 1, Clarendon-rooms, Liverpool, div. CERTIFICATES TO BE ALLOWED, Unless Cause shewn to the contrary, on or before March 1. Thos. Eskrigge, Warrington, Lancashire, cotton manufacturer. Anthony Geo. Wright Biddulph, Henrietta-street, Covent-garden, banker.-Jas. Ford, Bristol, cooper.-Thos. M'Swiney, Tonbridge-wells, Kent, builder.-Joseph Maddox, Watling-street, warehouseman. Richard Archard Jones, Friday-street, Cheapside, Manchester warehouseman.--Henry Jos. Reed, Marquis-court, Drury-lane, victualler.- Henry |