ing the procedure of the Court, he and his agent are responsible. When the solicitor thus prepared instructs counsel, the latter is, we conceive, not at liberty in general to question either the correctness of his instructions as to facts, or their propriety as to selection of remedy, provided the remedy selected be one to which the party, if his statement of facts is correct, is legally entitled. It is for him to bring before the Court the case made by his client, according to the tenor of his instructions; and here we apprehend, and not before, begins his duty in controlling the proceedings of his client. What the duty of counsel is, when once set in motion, and how far he is to consider himself, in the words of Lord Lang-living legatee as in chapter 11, or an intelligible bedale, a minister of public justice, we have already endeavoured to point out; and amply sufficient is the responsibility attached to that duty. To extend it to a control over the consciences of the litigant and the solicitor, from the very commencement of proceedings, is not, we submit, warranted by the usage of the profession; and any attempt to do so would be fraught with mischief. It would entail on counsel an almost intolerable amount of responsibility: it would entirely remove the responsibility of the solicitor: and, lastly, it would be wholly inefficacious in the only cases in which it could be of the slightest value, viz. where fraud or injustice is really intended. The order of the work is natural and easy. Though consisting of twenty-seven chapters, it falls into four great natural divisions; the first of which, from chapter to the death of the testator, the place of making his 1 to 10 inclusive, comprehends all that happens prior will, the nature and fashion of it, the capacity of the testator, his devisable property, the objects of his bounty, the modes of execution, revocation, and republication, how far the testator's power extends, and from what time his will speaks, each of which various items has a chapter of its own, wherein its own peculiarities are severally discussed. The second great division which we think that we perceive, comprehends from chapter 11 to 19 inclusive, and appears to comprise all those cases in which there is something wanting, either a quest as in chapter 12, unless made out by parol evidence in chapter 13, or set right by election as in chapter 14. There may be a want of congruity, as in chapter 15; or want of a word, as in chapter 16; or a want of precision in general, giving rise to estates by implication, a resulting trust for the heir, or a constructive 19 are severally occupied. The next division has a geconversion, subjects with which chapters 17, 18, and nerality about it, and contrasts with those cases in which something is wanting, by including all those cases of general gifts, in which more is expressed than may be absolutely necessary; and it accordingly comprises a chapter on the operation of a general devise, (chapter 20), connected with which is the subject of devises by mortgagees and trustees, (chapter 21), and two further chapters on the general words which will respectively comprise real and personal estate. The last division brings you fairly into the midst of your will, and commences with a chapter (chapter 24) on the force and extent of particular words of description, goes on to the discussion of vested, contingent, and executory estates, and ends with a chapter on conditions; with which the present volume terminates. There is a This is a book which it is scarcely worth while to great deal in the order of a book. For a book of rereview; the reputation of its author is now so well ference an intelligible order of arrangement gives great established by his edition of Powell on Devises, that he facility; and for a readable book, it has the advantage is alike beyond the fear of our censure, and the need of of leading one gradually on from one subject to another, our approval. Still it is pleasant to ponder awhile over in a manner the best calculated to beguile the journey, a book of this kind; nor is it altogether useless to trace and impress on the memory the different objects as they the progress of a successful author, and to observe his pass in review. Each subject as it is severally discussfeats of mental vigour, though one may neither possessed and dismissed, prepares the mind for the comprehenhis natural genius, nor altogether emulate his untiring industry. Reviews. A Treatise on Wills. By THOMAS JARMAN, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. [Sweet.] It is now fifteen years since Mr. Jarman made his appearance before the public, not venturing at that time to put forth his essay on Wills on its own unaided merits, but cutting part of it into fragments, to adorn a new edition of Mr. Powell, for the sake of the privilege of introducing the residue in the shape of a second volume "On the Construction of Devises." This was no doubt the wisdom of the bookseller; and the name of Mr. Powell having tardily sold a few copies, the merits of Mr. Jarman at length sold off the rest, and caused a demand for a new edition. This demand has been wisely supplied by the Treatise on Wills, which we now review, and the second volume of which we patiently await. Very little identity will be perceived between the notes to Powell on Devises, and the matter of the new treatise. Much of it is quite new; the rest consists of portions of the old work reconsidered and rewritten. The author, however, is plainly the same. Very little, if anything, we venture to say, has been left to the hands of any pupil or compiler, however skilful; and along with the rest of our profession, we beg to tender to Mr. Jarman our best thanks for this new effort of his genius, an effort which completely establishes his title as an original thinker, an able writer, and of course far better than all, the author of the best practical text-book on the Law of Wills. sion of the next, as well as awakens a wish to examine and understand it. How different the progressive and natural order of Mr. Jarman, from that of the great conveyancer, who began a treatise on his art with the intricate subject of common recoveries, simply because it happened to stand first in his pupil's book of common forms! A clear and intelligible arrangement of diversified, yet similar subjects, is the work only of a masterhand, strong enough to hold them all at once, and skilful enough at the same time to divide them according to their various common qualities. Having thus reviewed, first Mr. Jarman, next his title-page, and then his table of contents, let us now look into the body of the work, and see what it is that such a man, in such a book, in such well-ordered chapters, has actually produced. Here, however, we should undertake a subject much too large for our limits, did we attempt any thing like an account of all that is to be found in the volume. Moreover, we should, perhaps, weaken the already-formed good intentions of the reader to see for himself, and form his own opinion. Presuming, therefore, that our readers intend to peruse the book itself, we shall now venture to mention to them a point or two in which, in our very humble judgment, some of our author's positions might with advantage be modified or explained, in order that our cordial recommendation may not mislead any one into the opinion, either that this text-book, unlike any other, is infallible, or that we think it so. There is no good without its attendant evil; and one of the evils attending an original investigation is, that it is more likely to lead into occasional error than no investigation at all. A blunder in a mere copyist is unpardonable, but a mistake by one who has no precedent to follow, may more readily be forgiven. A writer of a law treatise ought to be a person able and willing to give himself the trouble of thinking, over and above the mechanical labour of compiling; and if he can and will undertake to do so, an error or two may be pardoned for the sake of the new information or new views which original thinking always produces. Not that Mr. Jarman's work requires such an apology; he has thought much, but carefully too; and his book is more free from error than many, the correctness of which can be their only praise. To begin with page 1;-here we find in the second paragraph a general proposition which does not appear to us to be so comprehensively correct as we could wish. Mr. Jarman says: "A will of fixed or immoveable property is generally governed by the lex loci rei site; and hence the place where such a will happens to be made and the language in which it is written, are wholly unimportant, as affecting both its construction and the ceremonial of its execution; the locality of the devised property is alone to be considered. Thus, a will made in Holland, and written in Dutch, must, in order to operate on lands in England, contain expressions which, being translated into our language, would comprise and destine the lands in question, and must be executed and attested in precisely the same manner as if the will were made in England." Now we are all apt to magnify the importance of things with which we are continually conversant, and to an English or an American lawyer, it is no wonder that the laws of England and America should appear of far greater importance in every respect than the laws of any other country; it is not surprising that the laws ke has first learnt and best known, should unintentionally be regarded as the rule, and that other and different laws should be looked upon merely as exceptions. Some such undue regard to the laws of his own country appears to have influenced Dr. Story, when, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, after stating the various opinions of some foreign jurists on the subject in question, he says: "It is hardly possible to conceive a stronger illustratration of the difficulty of undertaking to build up systems of jurisprudence upon mere theory and private notions of general convenience. The common law has wisely adhered to the doctrine, that the title to real property can pass only in the manner, and by the forms, and to the extent allowed by the local law. It has thus cut off innumerable disputes, and given simplicity as well as uniformity to its operations." (Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., pp. 645-647). Our author appears to follow Dr. Story in his views, and to regard the laws of England and America as furRishing the general rule. To us, however, the chapter on the subject contained in the masterly work of our countryman Mr. Burge, (Burge's Commentaries, vol. 4, c. 12), appears to contain by far the most philosophical view of the matter. According to Mr. Burge, "In the jurisprudence of Spain, Holland, and France, and of the greater number of the States of Europe, if the testament be made with the forms prescribed by the law of the place where it was executed, it will be valid, and will effectually dispose of property situated in another country, where the law prescribes different forms." the jurisprudence of England and the United States, a will devising lands in England, or in the States, if the solemnities prescribed by the Statute of Frauds have not been observed, would be ineffectual to pass those 66 By lands. This doctrine is fully warranted by the qualification which has been given by jurists to the rule lex loci regit actum." (4 Burge, Comm. 585, 587). The rule therefore is regarded, and we think rightly, by Mr. Burge to be, that it is sufficient for the testator to conform to the ceremonies of execution required by the law of the place in which his will is made; and that which Mr. Jarman lays down for the rule is taken by Mr. Burge to be merely an exception or qualification appertaining to the local laws of England and America. To say that our laws are right, and all others are wrong, seems too hasty a way of removing a difficulty: while our own laws look upon a will of lands in the light of a conveyance, we should allow the lawyers of other countries to regard, if they please, the expression of the last wishes of a dying man with the same favour as they would a contract; so that they allow us, as they do, to deal more strictly when lands subject to our own law are brought in question. In reading an author, whatever be his subject, it is always to be borne in mind that the subject he has in hand must necessarily occupy his chief attention, and that his remarks on other matters must be taken in connection with it; so that neither should the reader of a book on one subject hope to obtain from it correct and precise information on another; nor, if he reads with any such hopes, should he blame the writer for disappointing him. Thus, in a treatise on wills, one ought not to look for information on the subject of purchasedeeds; though it is still desirable, that, when any such information is given, it should be correct. Now there is a paragraph to be found in the 198th page of our author to which the above observations seem to be applicable. It is to the effect that the statute 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, (commonly called the Statute of Mortmain), is declared by some of its sections not to extend to purchases for a valuable consideration and a reference is made in the note to another statute, (9 Geo. 4, c. 85). It is curious enough that this latter statute contains a recital that the sections in the former statute relating to purchases for valuable consideration were "only intended to prevent such purchases from being avoided, by the reason of the death of the grantor within twelve calendar months after the sealing and delivery of the deed or deeds relating thereto;" but that it had notwithstanding been generally apprehended that the provision was intended wholly to exempt such purchases from the operation of the act, and in consequence thereof the formalities by the act prescribed in relation to the conveyance of hereditaments to charitable uses, had in divers instances been omitted on purchases for a full and valuable consideration; and by reason of such omission, the title to such hereditaments might be considered defective. The act then proceeds to remedy such defects up to the time of its passing, though it expressly provides (sect. 3) that the formalities prescribed by the act shall not be thereby dispensed with in relation to any deed made after its passing. If our author's readers should confine themselves to such a knowledge of the Mortmain Act as may be derived from his epitome, the remedial statute of Geo. 4 may soon require to be reenacted. A little further on in the book (p. 267) occur some observations which induce us to wish that our author himself had more vividly had in view the charitable rule of construction which we have just adduced for his benefit. The observations we refer to are made on the decision of Sir John Leach, V. C., in the case of Haley v. Bannister, (4 Madd. 275), "where," in the words of our author, "the testator had directed certain sums of stock in the public funds to be purchased by his executors, and the dividends accumulated, until one of the children of his daughter, born or to be born, should attain the age of twenty-one years, when the whole was to be transferred to such child and any other 'child or children who might be then living; the will 'contained a residuary clause. Sir J. Leach, V. C., | 'said, the statute prevents an accumulation of interest during the minority of an unborn child; but as to the 'principal, the law remains as before the statute. The 6 excess of accumulation prohibited by the statute would 'form part of the residue." Of this decision Mr. Jarman asserts, that it reduces to insignificance, and renders wholly inoperative, the seemingly important clause in the statute, which authorizes accumulation during the minority of any person, who would, if of full age, be entitled, under the trusts, to the income. And further on he observes, that it seems to place in some peril the accumulating trusts ordinarily introduced into provisions for the maintenance during minority of persons unborn at the testator's decease, which direct the unapplied surplus income from time to time to be added to the principal. Now, with great deference to Mr. Jarman, we really cannot see that there is anything at all in this decision, if the words of the Vice-Chancellor are taken, as we submit they ought to be, in connexion with the subject of them. The direction is to accumulate from the decease of the testator, the time when his codicil began to operate, until an unborn child should attain the age of twenty-one years; and to this the Vice-Chancellor replies, "The statute prevents an accumulation of interest during the minority of an unborn child." Of course it does under the circumstances of this case. If you accumulate before the child is born-for a period limited in law only by the mother's life-you cannot go on acmulating throughout the child's minority. "The excess of accumulation," says the Vice-Chancellor, pro, hibited by the statute would form part of the residue." Viewed in this light, the decision is far removed from a serious attack, either upon an important clause in the statute, or on the ancient common form of accumulation introduced into the provision for maintenance. It is simply a decision that any life in being and a minority afterwards together form too long a term for accumulation, a proposition which we apprehend no one would dispute. We confess we have a sympathy for the common forms, and do not like to see any of them brought into discredit; whilst we should have no objection to see them shorn of a little of the proud luxuriance of their verbiage, any suspicion cast on their integrity immediately awakens our apprehension. The common form in question is clearly within the saving clause, which allows accumulation during the minority or respective minorities only of any person or persons who, under the trusts of the will, would for the time being, if of age, be entitled to the income directed to be accumulated. Even where the vesting of the corpus of a fund is suspended during minority, yet, under the common form, accumulation never begins till all the persons who would for the time being, if of age, be entitled, have come in esse; for, during the lives of the parents the income is, or ought to be, invariably disposed of. There being, therefore, no ground of objection to the form beyond a mere interpretation which may be given to a dictum, and that interpretation opposed, as well by the subject which occasioned the dictum as by the plain words of the statute, we shall still make use of our common form without any anxiety as to the result*. * Since the above was in type, a case at the Rolls has been reported by Mr. Beavan, (Ellis v. Maxwell, 3 Beav. 587), containing a dictum by Lord Langdale, (p. 596), which certainly would, if it were to be relied on, place in great peril the common form. It is, that, taking the words of the statute as they are, they do not appear to permit accumulation during a minority, and any time to elapse between the death of the testator and the commencement of the minority, or in favour of any person who would not, for the time being, if of full age, be entitled to the annual produce of the fund. But, with great submission, the words of the statute, in the 1st section, the There are a few disputed points touched upon in the work, of some of which notice has been already taken in other articles in the Jurist, and on all of which the opinions and reasons of our author are well worthy of attention. This is eminently a book of principles. Our author is always looking for a rule; and his success is in proportion to his keenness and industry. Where others can find nothing but disorder, he will discover some deep-laid principle, by the aid of which he will set the cases smooth, down to the present time. His chapter on Conditions in Restraint of Marriage is a happy example of what may be done in thus reducing to order the most intractable materials. He has moreover escaped the common snare of estimating the importance of a principle by the number of cases that may happen to have been decided on it. Many most important principles of law are supported by very few decided cases; whilst on the other hand, many trumpery points have been decided and reported again and again. Here, we have the principles broadly stated, the authorities set down in a note, and any peculiar case separately discussed; and should any principle occur, supported by reason, though as yet not sanctioned by authority, still it finds, as it ought, admission to the text, whilst those numerous cases which in fact decide nothing, are very properly accommodated in a little note. So much for the present volume. We have no doubt that the forthcoming twin will bear the same wellproportioned features as this its elder brother. J. W. A Practical Treatise on the Law of Interpleader. By HENRY A. SIMON, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law. [Blenkarn, 1842.] We have some hesitation in allowing to this work the name of a treatise, as it contains nothing more than notes of some equity cases on bills of interpleader, very like the marginal notes to the reports, and a similar collection of the decisions of the common-law courts upon the Interpleader Act, with extracts from the act itself. Little appears to have been done in the arrangement of the matter, and still less in attempting to deduce any settled rules of law, or to afford the reader any guide in judging of the weight or authority of the cases. Neither are the cases in some instances cor rectly stated. Thus, in p. 6, we find it laid down, that in equity a bill of interpleader "must shew that each ' of the defendants whom it seeks to compel to interplead, claims a right; and if it fails to do so, both the defendants may take the objection by demurrer; 'the one because the bill shews no claim of right in 'him; the other because the bill shewing no right in 'the co-defendant, discloses no ground for the inter'ference of the court." And the reference for this position is to 1 Vez. 249. Now, without denying the correctness of the position, we must observe, that Metcalf v. Hervey (the case in 1 Vez. 249), certainly did not decide any such point, and indeed could not well decide it. For the case was a bill filed against one defendant, alleging a rumour of issue by A., and suggesting that such issue was entitled to the estate in question; and praying that if there was any such person he might interplead with the defendant; and for an injunction against ejectment by the defendant. The defendant demurred generally, not on the ground mentioned by Mr. Simon, but first, on the ground that the section in question, taken as they are, say nothing about the person in whose favour accumulation may be made, as may easily be ascertained by reference to the act. (Stat. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 98). This dictum, so far, must therefore be an accidental error either of his Lordship or of his reporter. To correspond with the statute, the words "in favour of," should have been exchanged for "during the minority of." COURT OF BANKRUPTCY, The Jurisdiction and Districts of the London Commis sioners under the New Act. affidavit was insufficient, and secondly, that there was no case for relief; and the demurrer was overruled on the ground that it was not a mere bill of interpleader, but a bill of discovery, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the discovery. Nor can we find in any part of the judgment any dictum supporting the position laid down by Mr. Simon. It is plain, that either an incor- Commissions and fiats opened or purporting by the rect reference has been printed, or that the author has proceedings to have been opened at any place in any of mistaken the effect of the case in Vesey. Indeed, he the undermentioned counties or divisions, or parts of has again in the next page, drawn from the very same counties, have been allotted by order of the Commiscase, a further conclusion not warranted by it, citing it sioners to the respective Commissioners whose names as a decision that such a bill could not be supported; are hereunder mentioned, in conjunction with such whereas no decision on that point was given, the demur-county or counties, divisions or parts of counties, rerer being overruled, as we have mentioned, on another. spectively:Again, in p. 7, he says, citing Lownde v. Cornford, (18 Ves. 299; and 2 Story on Eq. s. 811, 812, 821, that "a tenant liable to pay rent may file a bill of interpleader where there are several persons claiming title to it in priority of contract or of tenure;" but that, "if a mere stranger should set up a claim to the rent by title paramount, and not in privity of contract or tenure, or if he should set up a claim of a different nature, such as 'a claim to mesne profits in virtue of his title para-missioner Fonblanque. mount, in such case no bill of interpleader would lie on behalf of the tenant; for the debt and duty is not in 'the same nature or character." And for this Clark v. Byne (13 Ves. 383) is cited. Now, on the first point, there is not in the case in 18 Ves. one word about any question between landlord and tenant; it was a case where an injunction in interpleader was allowed to stay an action brought by bankrupts, indirectly to contest the commission; and with regard to Clark v. Byne, the point decided in that case was, that there may be interpleader by a tenant against his landlord, where the claim arises by the act of the landlord himself. The case deciding that a tenant cannot make his landlord interplead with a mere stranger, is not Clark v. Byne, but Dungey v. Angove, (2 Ves. 304). These instances are sufficient to shew, that, in regard to the cases in equity at least, the author has not bestowed sufficient care upon their examination. No. 1.-Norfolk-Mr. Commissioner Evans. No. 2.-Suffolk, Essex, Herts, Berks-Mr. Commissioner Merivale. No. 3.-Rutland, Huntingdon, Cambridge, Northampton, Bedford, Berks-Sir C. F. Williams. No. 4.-Oxford, that part of Dorset which is not within the Exeter District, as settled by the Order in Council, South Wilts, North Hants, Surrey-Mr. Com No. 5.-South Hants, West Sussex-Mr. Commissioner Fane. No. 6.-East Sussex, Kent-Mr. Commissioner Hol royd. GENTLEMEN CALLED TO THE BAR, LINCOLN'S INN.-Nov. 8. Walter Pemberton, Esq. Nov. 21.-Thomas Fenwick, Henry John Hodgson, Francis Thomas Allen, Thomas Clifton Paris, Joseph Trounsell Gilbert, and Jacob Waley, Esqrs. Nor. 23. -William Pitt Manson, Zachary Mudge, Lucius Henry The part containing the decisions at law is not, so far as we have been able to examine the positions laid down, Fitzgerald, Thomas Fassett Kent, John Edward Johnwith the cases themselves, open to the charge of inac-son, James William Freshfield, Christopher Good, and Frederick Cosens, Esqrs. curacy, but only to that which we have before mentioned, that it is constructed on the too prevailing notion of the present day, that to pick out of the books short notes of cases, and to string them together in a neatly printed octavo, is to make a text-book. If we could agree with the author in the observation made in the preface upon the absence of any other work on the subject, we might perhaps not be so disposed to blame him for doing what is after all only following the example of many of his learned brethren, and yielding to the attraction of a supposed demand for little indexes on every subject. But though there may not be any separate work like the present on interpleader, yet we could name several books in constant use by both barristers and attornies which contain all that is here offered. As Mr. Simon has not in a single instance departed from his plan of stating merely the decision of the court, we forbear to make any extracts, and must conclude with saying, that, subject to the preceding observations on the character of his work, the manner of its execution demands neither much praise nor much censure. The first days of Sittings in London are-Common Pleas, Wednesday, Dec. 7th; Exchequer, Thursday, Dec. 8; and Queen's Bench, Friday, Dec. 9th. MASTER IN CHANCERY.-The Lord Chancellor has appointed Lawrence Smith, of Hurstperpoint, Sussex, Gent., to be a Master Extraordinary in the High Court INNER TEMPLE.-Nov. 4.- William Henry Rough, John Simon, Henry Thomas Cole, and William Baynes, Esqrs. Nov. 18.-Bentley Stocks, John James Hamil ton Humphreys, Edward Salmon, Henry Birch Reynardson, William Cooper, Francis Charles Trover, Richard Walmesley, Augustus Goldsmid, Henry Anthony Littledale, and Robert Mynors, Esqrs. MIDDLE TEMPLE.-Nov. 25.-Robert Henry Hurst, Peregrine Birch, Edmund Lynch Nugent, Alan Ker, Anthony Henderson Fowke, William John Bernhard Smith, William Thomas Carr, Henry Sedgfield Southey, Oriel Viveash, Joseph Thomas Humphry, Robert Scarr Sowler, Henry Bold Williams, Henry Stonor, and James Edward Davis, Esqrs. EQUITY SITTINGS AFTER MICH. TERM, 1842. Court of Chancery. Before the LORD CHANCELLOR, at Lincoln's Inn. .... Saturday 14 .... Consent Causes, Short Causes, and Consent Petitions, every Tuesday, at the Sitting of the Court. Vice-Chancellors' Courts. Before the VICE-CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND, at Saturday Dec. 3 First Seal.-Motions. .... Unopposed Petitions, Short Causes, and Ditto. Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, and Further Directions. Petitions and Ditto. Fourth Seal.-Motions and Causes. London Gazettes. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 29. BANKRUPTS. THOMAS ROWELL, Cambridge, linen draper, Dec. 5 at THOMAS FEAVER, Ludgate-hill, mercer and draper, Dec. Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, JOSEPH PHILLIPS, Hercules Tavern, Hercules-passage, 9{ Unopposed Petitions; paport Causes, MARGARET EDMONDS, Park-pl. and Cottage, Hear ב10 previous to General Paper. 12 Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Monday. 5 Tuesday. 6 and Further Directions. Wednesday 7 Thursday. 8 Second Seal.-Motions. 13 Wednesday 14 Thursday 15 Third Seal.-Motions. 17 20 21 Unopposed Petitions, Short Causes, Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Petitions. 22 Fourth Seal.-Motions. hill, Surrey, boarding, lodging-house, and hotel keeper, Dec. 14 at 1, and Jan. 11 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Johnson; Sol. Pollock & Co., Parliament-street. -Fiat dated Nov. 28. EDWARD EVERALL, Liverpool, coal merchant, Dec. 3 at 1, and Dec. 28 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Bird; Sol. Rodgers, Liverpool.-Fiat dated Nov. 21. BENJAMIN PRICE, Birmingham, general dealer, Dec. 5 at half-past 11, and Jan. 5 at 12, Waterloo-rooms, Birmingham: Off. Ass. Whitmore; Sols. Heywood & Webb, Birmingham.-Fiat dated Nov. 24. SAMUEL APPLEYARD, Manchester, stuff merchant and MARY MANWARING, Gornal, Sedgley, Staffordshire, RICHARD WARREN, Liverpool, druggist, Dec. 9 and Jan. |