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to gratify the most insatiable thirst of power and dominion; but such were the extravagant expenses of Pericles, in unprofitable negotiations abroad, and satisfying the craving importunities of his dependents at home, who always rose in their demands in proportion to the difficulties, in which they saw him engaged, and the want he had of their service, that though he feared no repulse to the most unreasonable demand of new supplies, yet being conscious himself of his exorbitant expenses, he began to be ashamed that the people should see what money he consumed. He therefore resolved to make one bold step more, to secure himself of a fund, which would at once fully answer his purposes and conceal his profusions. This he put in execution, by seizing upon the sacred treasure at Delos, which was deposited there by the common consent of the states of Greece, to be kept inviolable, never to be touched but in case of the utmost extremity, and that not without their unanimous advice and consent.

Such an open violation of the public faith raised the clamors of all Greece upon Pericles; which he endeavored to palliate at first with the pretence of its being in greater safety, and the advantages, that might be made of it, by employing it for the benefit of the public; but when he saw how few there were, who had the virtue or courage to oppose him, even in this extreme act of violence, he grew bolder, in a little time, and being pressed upon this article, openly defied them in the public assemblies, and with the most assuming arrogance declared, that the money, when it was once granted, was no longer theirs who gave it, but theirs who received it.

He soon after followed this with another declaration; that the necessities of the state, of which he was to be the judge himself, were above all laws, and that nothing was so sacred but that even the plate and riches of the temples might be seized, and restitution made afterwards; well knowing that it would not be in his time, nor any part of his concern.

This great treasure being now wholly in the possession of Pericles, he had no farther trouble than to give such account of it to the public as he thought fit; for any proposal of appointing persons (as was the ancient custom) to examine his books, or count the talents remaining, was opposed with the old cant of distrusting so virtuous an administration, as his creatures had the impudence to call it, and forwarding the designs of the enemy, by raising divisions at home; the constant artifice of those, who are engaged in measures destructive to their country, and are sensible that their actions will not bear examination; whereas, in truth, no enemy is so dangerous to a free people as these domestic spoilers; for though nations may, and often have been, laid waste by foreign invaders; yet many of them have recovered

their ancient freedom and prosperity, as Athens itself had lately done, after all the malice of the Persians; whereas history affords us no example of any nation, that ever regained their liberties, when they had tamely consented to the loss of them, or infamously sold them to their governo's for the present supply of their luxury and vices; but their unhappy posterity have for ever groaned under the inheritance of slavery, delivered down to them by their forefathers. But to return to Pericles:

His success, which even exceeded his own expectations, struck every honest Athenian dumb with astonishment at the continued, abject compliances of their fellow citizens. Pericles now flattered himself that his authority and power were so firmly established, as to be out of the reach of all accidents. This made him so haughty and insolent, that he became grievous to his own creatures, and the object of universal odium; which was not a little heightened by the growing necessities of the state, and the poverty of the people; so that the former clamors were again renewed with great warmth and violence for an account of the disposition of the money which had been dissipated during his long and expensive administration. This roused his apprehensions and threw him into great perplexities; which his relation Alcibiades taking notice of one day, when he was more melancholy than usual, he asked him the reason of it. Pericles told him that he was considering how to make up his accounts with the public; to which this young profligate (who gave such an early instance of the mischiefs he was one day to bring upon his country) replied that he had much better consider how to avoid giving any account. Unhappily for Athens, he took his kinsman's advice, and seeing no other way to escape and divert the impending storm from bursting upon himself, he chose to turn it upon his country, by plunging them into a war with Sparta.

The Spartans, notwithstanding the inclination they had shown to begin the war, yet when things came near to an extremity, still expressed a desire of continuing the peace; and at last offered to desist from it, in case the Athenians would consent to take off the restraint from the trade of the Megareans.

Pericles, in a long speech, dissuaded them from accepting the conditions offered, by telling them that though this was a matter' of no great consequence, (as, in truth, it was not,) yet the manner, in which it was asked, made it necessary for the commonwealth to show their firmness on this occasion, in order to support their honor, and prevent the attempts of future impositions upon them, in matters of greater concern.

This determined the venal assembly for war, which was soon after egun by the siege of Platea, a strong town of great importance, and the only acquisition of the Athenians by all their

glorious successes over the Persian; which however, in the course of the war, was scandalously neglected by the Athenians, and fell a sacrifice to Sparta.

Some endeavors were used to terminate the war soon after it begun by a truce made for a year, in order to agree upon preliminary articles of peace; but they were never settled in such a manner as to take effect; and a peace, that was afterwards concluded between them, had little better success, the articles being never put in execution, or complied with on either side; but the short time it lasted was spent in breaking and renewing alliances with their neighbors in such a manner, that it would require copying out the fifth book of Thucydides to repeat the mutual infidelities and treacheries practised by Athens and Sparta, during this cessation, which both sides were more tired with than the war; and all Greece, with the neighboring powers, being now one way or other engaged, it was soon renewed with the greatest animosity, and at last ended in the entire reduction of Athens to the subjection of Sparta; a fate, which they might in all probability have escaped, if Pericles had either had the honesty to have preserved the peace, by forbearing to intermeddle, where he had nothing to do, or the spirit to have begun the war sooner, before Athens was quite exhausted, and had lost all credit abroad by his wretched management.

It ought, however, to be remembered, for the honor of that learned state, that the most celebrated wits and poets of Athens endeavored to open the eyes of their countrymen, and animate them against Pericles, by exposing his conduct in satirical poems and invectives, but they were too far gone in luxury and corruption to recover their ancient spirit, being continually soothed in their vices by a set of profligate writers, whom Pericles had picked up and employed in his service. These fellows were so abandoned, that they not only made a jest of liberty, and justified all the methods of arbitrary government, but put their patron. in competition with Jupiter himself, and flattered him with the appellation of Olympius, at the same time that he was precipitating the destruction of their country.

Thus we see that the overgrown power, ambition and corruption of one man brought ruin upon the most flourishing state in the universe; and there are not wanting instances of the like kind in history to convince us that the same conduct will have the same consequences in all ages and all nations.

I am, sir, &c.

PHIL-ATHENUS.

ON THE

POWER OF THE PRINCE,

AND THE

FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLE.

Furono veramente tutti i rè principio capi, e non rè, di republiche, e non di regni. Ma poi il lungo uso ha fatto che i populi si siano disposti et anuezzati all' habito dell' intiera ubbidienza, come apunto suole assuefarsi una pianta, & un corpo humano a viuere, in terreno, e sotto clime diuerso dal suo naturale.

CARD. BENTIVOGLIO, Relatione delle Prov. unite de Fiandra. Lib. 3.

CARDINAL BENTIVOGLIO, from whose writings I have taken the motto to this paper, was a man on all accounts little to be suspected of favoring the cause of liberty; much less of writing strongly and boldly for it. But the love of it is innate in the mind of every man; and however we may be depraved by bad education, however inflamed by party, interest, or the spirit of opposition, yet whenever we grow cool, and are not immediately agitated by our passions, that spirit breaks out, and shows itself even in those, who are the greatest abettors of arbitrary power.

Thus the cardinal, borne down by the force of reason, and the influence of this principle of nature, expresses in this sentence not only his own opinion, but that of all mankind, though private reasons may induce many to profess themselves of contrary sentiments; nor is it impossible for some men, weak in their natures and warm in their tempers, to be either so far seduced by the arguments of designing men, or so heated by political contentions, as even to become in some manner convinced, that they have no natural right to liberty; and that their princes are born with a just title to that arbitrary power, which is always the child of fraud, or usurpation.

It is our great happiness that his present majesty's dominion is founded upon a better title than either the jus divinum, or hereditary right. He owes it purely to the voice of the people in parliament. He got it by their favor, and will keep it by their affection; nor is it less for the advantage of his family, or for that of the nation, that he came to the throne upon these terms. The limitations and conditions, by the due observance of which he is entitled to it, will serve as a certain rule to his posterity, by which if they guide themselves, they may depend upon the hearts and purses of their subjects to all eternity. His predecessors had not the same advantages. They were bred up in a notion that their prerogative entitled them to do what they pleased; nor were the privileges of the people so firmly ascertained. This occasioned perpetual jealousies, gave opportunities for evil ministers to impose upon the prince, and for seditious persons to inflame the people. It often gave rise to unwarrantable acts of power; and thus frequently exposed both the royal family and the nation to the utmost confusion.

Machiavel, in his political discourses, lays down this position; that no government can long enjoy liberty, unless it be frequently brought back to its first principles. It is the nature of all government to degenerate. As it grows older, it gradually deviates and flies farther from its first intention, which is singly the advantage of society; till at last it attains such a degree of corruption, that its order becomes entirely inverted; and that institution, by which the prince was first only the servant of the public, obliges the public to be slaves to the prince. For this reason he recommends a frequent renewal of the constitution. The various revolutions in this kingdom have, in a great measure, answered this end. They have purged off the luxuriances of power; and though few of them have gone so deep as to bring us back to the primitive purity of our constitution, yet they have still preserved us a free people, when liberty is lost in almost every other part of Europe.

The last revolution has done more for us than any of the rest. I would not be understood to speak of that, which was brought about in favor of our great deliverer the prince of Orange. I mean that, by which the present royal family were seated upon the throne. This happy change in our government, though it is not marked out by any such appellation, is the most important we have had. It has amounted within a few degrees of that reduction to the first principles of government, which Machiavel recommends. Our constitution has received a new spring from it; and had we taken care to guard against a few inconveniences, as we might have done, or used the same caution to prevent new dangers, as to redress old grievances, our liberties had been