come out; that he is playing tricks, producing false witnesses, and misrepresenting the real facts of the case. All this I shall prove by such strong and cogent evidence, that you will all plainly see, that I am speaking the truth, and not a word the plaintiff has said is to be trusted. I shall commence with a statement of those particulars, which will best enable me to give you a clear insight into the case.

I commenced actions, men of the jury, against Demophon, Therippides, and the plaintiff, for breach of their trust as guardians, having been defrauded by them of all my property. On the trial of the cause against Aphobus, I proved clearly to the jury, as I shall prove to you, that he had conspired with his colleagues to deprive me of all the estate bequeathed to me. That I substantiated the charge not by means of false evidence, is manifest from this circumstance. A multitude of depositions having been read at the trial, some of the deponents stating that they delivered to the plaintiff certain of my effects, others that they were present when he received them, others again that they had made purchases from him and paid him the prices, not one of them has he sued for false testimony. The only witness against whom he has proceeded is this man, whose evidence he cannot show to have fixed him with the receipt of a single drachm. The amount of damages which I claimed was not computed from the defendant's deposition, in which there is no mention of money, but by casting up the sums deposed to by the other witnesses, whom Aphobus has not sued. It was upon hearing their statements, that the jury found a verdict against him for the whole amount demanded in the plaint. Why then did he pass them over, and sue the defendant alone? I will tell you. He well knew, that the witnesses who proved his receipt of money would only fix him with it the more strongly, as every item in the account was more closely investigated; which it would be on the trial for false testimony: for every charge, which occupied but a part of my former case in conjunction with other charges, would then be opened separately and form the subject of an entire speech. On the other hand, in suing a witness who deposed to his answer, he thought it would be in his own power to deny what he confessed before. Therefore he brings an action against the defendant, of the truth of whose testimony I shall endeavour

to convince you, not by a suggestion of probabilities, not by arguments concerted for the present occasion, but by reasoning which I am sure you will all think sound. Listen and judge for yourselves.

Being aware, men of the jury, that the whole contest at the trial would be about the deposition set out on the record,1 and that you would have to judge of its truth or falsehood, I considered the first step to be taken was to challenge the plaintiff to a test. What is it I do? I offered to deliver to him, to be examined by torture, a young slave who had learned to read and write, who was present when Aphobus made the admission in question, and took down the very statement deposed to by the witness. This youth had not been ordered by me to play any tricks, to write down some of the plaintiff's words and suppress others; he was there simply to make a true report of every word the plaintiff spoke. Now I ask, could there be a fairer opportunity of convicting us of falsehood, than putting my slave to the rack? Aphobus declined this test, because he knew better than any man living that my witness had spoken the truth. There are plenty of persons who can speak to this challenge, for it has not been made in secret, but in the centre of the market place before many bystanders. Call the witnesses.

[Witnesses.]

The plaintiff is so cunning and determined to affect ignorance of what is right, that, although he has preferred a charge of false testimony, upon which you are sworn to give your verdict, he declined to question the slave as to the truth of the deposition (the point about which he ought to have been most anxious), and now falsely asserts that he requires him to be delivered up for a different purpose. Is it not monstrous, that he should complain of my refusal to deliver to him a freeman (for such I shall clearly prove Milyas to be); and should not consider my witnesses hardly treated, when I offer to him a person, who is confessedly a slave, and he refuses to put their evidence to the test by examining him? He surely cannot contend, that the torture is for

1 A tablet hung up in court, containing a statement of the cause and issue to be tried; which thus may be compared to our nisi prius record, which is laid before the judge at the trial.

some purposes (which he desires) a certain criterion of the truth, and for other purposes uncertain.

Besides, men of the jury, this very fact was first deposed to by Esius, the plaintiff's brother. He is now leagued with Aphobus and denies the fact, but at the trial he deposed to it with the other witnesses, not choosing to forswear himself or to incur the penalty which would immediately follow. Surely, if I had been getting up false evidence, I should not have put this man in my list of witnesses, seeing that Aphobus was his most intimate friend, and knowing that he meant to plead for him in the cause, and that he was an adversary of mine. It is absurd to suppose, that I should call as witness to a falsehood a person who was at variance with myself and brother of my opponent. I have many witnesses to speak to this point, and as many circumstantial proofs. In the first place, if he really never gave this testimony, he would have denied it, not now for the first time, but immediately upon its being read in court, when denial would better have served his purpose. In the next place, if I had without cause exposed him to a suit for giving false testimony against his brother, (a charge, on which men run the risk of degradation, besides pecuniary penalties,) he would not have let the matter rest, but would have brought an action against me for damage. Further, to sift the thing to the bottom, he would have demanded of me the slave who wrote the deposition, so that, if I had refused to give him up, I might have been deemed unworthy of credit. So far from his adopting any of these courses- when I, finding he denied having given the evidence, tendered him the slave to be questioned, he declined my offer; his brother and he being equally averse to try this point also by the torture. In support of each of these statements I shall produce witnesses, who will prove, that Æsius stood by the plaintiff in court when the deposition was read, that he appeared with the other deponents and assented to it, and that, when I tendered him my slave to be questioned on all these matters by Aphobus and himself, he did not choose to receive him. Call the witnesses up here.

[Witnesses.]

I am going to lay before you, men of the jury, a stronger proof than any which I have brought yet, of the plaintiff

having given this answer. When he asked for Milyas (notwithstanding the admission which I have proved), I thought I would expose the manœuvre, and what do you think I did? I summoned him to give evidence against Demon, his uncle, and a partner of his frauds. I wrote out the evidence of the witness whom he now sues for false testimony, and required him to depose thereto. At first he flatly refused; but when the arbitrator bade him depose or take the oath of denial, he deposed very reluctantly. Now, if the man was indeed a slave, and had not previously been admitted by Aphobus to be free, what could induce him to make this deposition? Why did he not at once deny, and get rid of the affair? As to this matter also I offered to let him examine the slave who wrote the deposition, who would know his own handwriting, and well remembered Aphobus deposing. I made the offer, not for lack of witnesses who were present, for there were some; but in order that he might not accuse these men of perjury, when confirmed by the result of the torture. Surely this ought not to prejudice you against these witnesses, who are a singular example of defendants whose case is made out by the plaintiff's own evidence. To prove the above statements, take the challenge and the deposition.1

[The Challenge. The Deposition.]

1 Aphobus having persisted in demanding that Milyas should be given up to the question, notwithstanding the evidence which Demosthenes had put in, showing his opponent's admission of Milyas being a freeman, Demosthenes, to confirm and protect the witnesses who deposed to that admission, took the bold course of summoning Aphobus as a witness in his action against Demon, which had been sent for trial before an arbitrator. He wrote a deposition containing the substance of what Phanus and Philip had proved, which (being, as we may presume, relevant to the cause against Demon) he required Aphobus to depose to, or take the oath of disclaimer in the usual way. Aphobus, being afraid to incur liability as a false witness, deposed to it. His deposition to that effect is put in as evidence against him on the present trial; and it is proved by the production of a challenge which Demosthenes had given him to question the slave who wrote it out. "I gave this challenge," says Demosthenes, "not because I could not have proved the deposition by ordinary witnesses, but that I might deter Aphobus from bringing a charge for false testimony against Phanus and Philip (ἵνα μὴ τούτους αἰτιῷτο τὰ ψευδή μαρτυρεῖν), when they (Phanus and Philip) had their evidence confirmed by the questioning of the slave (τὸ πιστὸν ἐκ τῆς βασάνου τούτοις υπάρχοι). You must not condemn my

These are the tests which he has declined; all these circumstances prove the malice of his charge; and yet he calls upon you to believe his own witnesses, while he calumniates and impeaches the veracity of mine. Let me now say a few words on the probabilities of the case. I am sure you will all agree, that men who give false testimony are induced by one of three motives; either by a bribe to relieve their poverty, or by friendship, or by enmity to the adverse party. Not one of these motives can apply to my witnesses. Not friendship certainly; as they are not men of the same pursuits or the same age with me, or even with each other. Not enmity to the plaintiff; for one of them was his brother and pleaded for him; Phanus was his friend and belonged to the same tribe; Philip was neither friend nor foe: so it is clear this motive cannot be alleged against them. Nor was it poverty; for they are all men of large fortunes, out of which they defray the charges of public offices, and cheerfully perform the duties imposed on them. Besides, you know something of them, and what you know is to their credit, as respectable persons. This being so; the meu being neither poor, nor friends of mine, nor enemies of my opponent; what grounds are there to suspect them of giving false evidence? I myself cannot imagine any.

witnesses, Phanus and Philip, on this account (kaтayvŵvαι тŵv μaρтúρwv dià TOûTO), i. e. because I took the course of giving the challenge, instead of proving the deposition of Aphobus by the evidence of witnesses who were present: for the torture of the slave would have been the most infallible test of the truth, and Aphobus has declined it.

This passage appears to be somewhat obscure, and Reiske confesses that he does not understand it. We must bear in mind however, in this as in other cases, that we have not the whole history of the trial before us: we have a speech for the defence, without that of the plaintiff. Perhaps Aphobus had commented upon the fact, that on the former trial, as on the present, the evidence of Phanus was not confirmed by the testimony of witnesses present before the arbitrator: to which Demosthenes replies in effect-"There is nothing in that; for when Aphobus declined the challenge, I considered the fact as incontestably proved."

I prefer the reading of πρόκλησιν to πρόσκλησιν. The challenge at all events is put in, verified by the testimony of the arbitrator or some other witness.

Philip and Phanus are both referred to under the terms TOUTOUS, TOUTOIS, because, though the present trial was that of Phanus only, yet Philip's case was virtually on its trial, and he was doubtless in court, and anxiously waiting the event.