LANDS, Signed at the Hague, 4th of May, 1818. for the purpose of preventing their subjects from engaging VIII. First Do. communicated by the LORDS, and Ordered X. REPRESENTATION, agreed upon May 20, 1819. by the DIRECTORS of the BANK of ENGLAND, and laid before the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER. Ordered by the HOUSE of COMMONS to be printed, 21st May, 1819. 509 OF THE SPEECH OF THE RT. HON. THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL, ON THE REPORT OF THE BANK COMMITTEE. LONDON: VOL. XIV. Pam. NO. XXVIII. T SUBSTANCE OF THE SPEECH, &c. &c. &c. UPON the motion of Earl Grey for the adjournment of the discussion for a few days, The Earl of Liverpool rose, and commenced by observing that the proposition of the Noble Lord ought, if there was any new matter or new suggestion for their consideration, to operate as an irresistible call upon their Lordships to put off the question. But when every one was aware that the subject matter of the Resolutions had been sifted from time to time as minutely and laboriously as any matter that ever was discussed, when the evidence on the Table was known to contain every thing that could be said on both sides of the question, when the Noble Lord had embodied in his counter-resolutions opinions, which he was known to hold, and which he had frequently explained and defended, when they were even made the subject of correspondence in the public prints, he conceived that to delay the discussion of so important a question, would be attended with the greatest inconvenience, without affording in return any adequate advantage. He could state, from his own knowledge, that there were many among those, who doubted the propriety of the plan, most anxious that the discussion should be brought on as soon as possible. Omitting, therefore, those points which related either personally to himself, or particularly to the official situation in which he stood, he should proceed to state the grounds on which he supported his opinions, and to give that full explanation to which the House and the country were entitled. In doing so, as he had already stated, he should keep the general question clear of other topics, in order that it might be discussed upon the ground of general principle, and without reference to individuals, or the retrospection of what they had done. The question was in its nature so complicated and extensive, and in some of its views so abstract, that it was a formidable undertaking for any man to explain it under all its aspects in the face of their Lordships and of the public. He would endeavour to strip it as much as possible of abstract theories, with which it had no practical connexion, and to state on practicable grounds the principle on which he conceived the question to rest, and on which the Committee had grounded their recommendation. There were three great questions to be considered in the discussion of this subject. First, whether it was expedient to return to some fixed standard of value; secondly, whether it was expedient and practicable to return to the ancient standard; and, thirdly, by what means it was to be done. With regard to the first, he had always contended that the measure of the Bank Restriction, from whatever cause it originally proceeded, had enabled this country to weather that dreadful storm in which she was tossed so long, and to get through those difficulties, which, without its assistance, she could never have surmounted. But, while he contended for this, he had never concealed from himself, from their Lordships, or from the public, that it was a measure which could not be acted on as a general and permanent part of the system of this country. If he was asked whether it was a principle that might be adopted in all wars, he would say that no former war bore analogy to the last. If they could show him a time when the whole Continent of Europe was directed by one man or one government, not merely to the conquest, but to the ruin, and through the ruin, to the conquest of this country; if they could show him any case that had existed, or point out from any probable course of circumstances, that any such was likely to exist, the question might admit of some dispute, from the production or the anticipation of analogous instances. But if they felt, as he did, that the circumstances were extraordinary and unprecedented, and unlikely, at any future time, to find a parallel in history, they must allow, that the principle need not necessarily be extended to other wars. If ever there was a case, with respect to which it could be said that exceptio probat regulam, it was this. The very circumstances of our situation furnished in itself the strongest presumption that it never could be looked to as a permanent rule, Whatever exertions the country might be called upon to make under those circumstances, they were now past, and the time had come at length when it was proper to consider what policy ought to be adopted under a total change of affairs. Parliament had already, by providing for the discontinuance of the system after the first six months of peace, pronounced its opinion on the subject. It had also pronounced its opinion since the peace, particularly in the preamble to the Act of 1816, where it was declared to be a duty to the country that they should return, as soon as it could be done with safety, to the ancient system. The first question was, whether it was expedient that they should return to some fixed standard of value. This was the important point; for in his belief the great mass of opposition to the measure would be found to consist, not in the question whether they should return to cash payments sooner or later, but, (under whatever disguise it might be stated,) whether they should return to cash payments at all. It was an opinion entertained by many, that there should be no standard of value. The first question that suggested itself on looking at such an opinion was, whether this system had ever been acted upon by any civilized country, from the beginning of the world. Besides, he would ask how it must operate. They knew the disgraceful measures resorted to, even in this country, in former times, to depreciate the standard of value; but even that alternative, bad as it was, presented advantages not to be found in the rejection of a standard altogether. It was a change, an alteration, a debasement, of the standard; but still it established something fixed, in the room of something that was also fixed. No body of men, he believed, was ever entrusted with so much power as the Bank of England, or had less abused the power entrusted to them; but would Parliament consent to commit to their hands what they certainly would refuse to the Sovereign on the throne, controlled by Parliament itself the power of making money without any other check or influence to direct them than their own notions of profit and interest? The Bank of England issued 20 millions of notes, for which the public had at one time paid the Bank about one million a year interest; and was it rational that the public should pay a million a year, not for the security of the Bank, but for the Bank making use of the security of the Nation? Might not Government with more propriety proceed to issue its own notes, and save the million a year to the public? He was far from recommending such a course. Nothing could be more unwise than for Government to erect itself into a Company of Bankers; but it seemed to be more reasonable than the other course to which he had just alluded.-This fact was |