บ. his own honest opinion. It is not like the case of capture CROWELL as prize of war, where the officer acts at his peril, and & OTHERS must exercise a sound discretion and must have reasonable grounds of suspicion. But here it is put upon the MFADON. - opinion of the collector, and he is bound to act upon that opinion. If he fails to do so, he is liable for a misdemeanor in his office. If he honestly errs in his suspicion he is excused. Whether it be his honest opinion is a matter for the decision of the jury. This cause was argued at last term by the Attorney General & Jones for the Plaintiffs in Error, and by Amory & P. B. Key for the Defendants in Error. PINKNEY, attorney general, Suggested a doubt whether an action for damages for a seizure on navigable waters was not as much a cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as if the proceedings were in rem. AMORY & KEY, Contended, that the 11th section of the act of 25th April, 1808, only gave authority to the collector of the district who was to grant the clearance, to detain the vessel, and that the collector of another district had no right to stop a vessel passing through an intermediate district. The law gave no right to seize, but merely to detain, which shows that the authority is given only to the collector within whose official control the vessel is. The collector to whom application is to be made for a clearance is the only person to whom the discretion is entrusted. He has the best means of information, and if suspicion should be excited, it is there only that the owner can furnish the means of removing it. The opposite construction of the law would give to collectors at the mouths of our bays the whole control of our commerce, and would subject it to much vexation. The whole trade of the Chesapeake would be subject to the control of the collector of Norfolk. JONES, in reply, Contended, that the law authorised any collector of VOL. VIIL 13 CROWELL any district to stop and detain any vessel which might & OTHERS be passing through his district, if he really suspected her of an intention to violate the provisions of the emM'FADON. bargo laws. บ. Feb. 28th....DUVALL, J.* after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the Court as follows: "This Court is unanimously of opinion that the direction of the judge of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was erroneous. The law of congress under which the collector acted is clear and explicit. The collector was bound by law to seize and detain the Union, on her arrival in his district, if, in his opinion, it was the intention to violate or evade any of the provisions of the embargo laws, and his conduct was approved and confirmed by the president. The landing and storing the cargo, whether to preserve it from injury or to secure it from ruin, (which, in this case, was done with the consent of the agent of the owner,) was a necessary consequence of the detention. The law places a confidence in the opinion of the officer, and he is bound to act according to his opinion; and when he honestly exercises it, as he must do in the execution of his duty, he cannot be punished for it. ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district of statute of limi-Columbia, sitting at Washington. The Maryland * JUDGE LIVINGSTON was absent when this opinion was delivered. Junge STORY gave no opinion, having some impression that he was, at a former period, retained as counsel in the cause, although he did not remember argu→ ing it. The case as stated by STORY, J. in delivering the BEATTY'S opinion of the Court, was as follows: ADM'RS. บ. tations of three This is an action for money had and received brought BURNES's by the Plaintiffs as administrators of Charles Beatty, ADMʼr. deceased, against the Defendant as administrator of David Burnes, deceased. The declaration alledges the pro- years is a good mise to have been made in the life time of the respective bar to an acintestates. The Defendant has pleaded the general is- tion of assumpsue, and the statute of limitations of Maryland. sit for money had and receiv ed brought to lands in the Upon the trial in the Circuit Court for the district try a tille to of Columbia, the Plaintiffs sought to support their ac- city of Washtion under the 5th section of the statute of Maryland, ington, under of Nov. 1791, ch. 45, concerning the territory of Col- of the act of umbia, and the city of Washington, that section is as Maryland, of follows: the 5th sect: Nov. 1791, Columbia to “And be it enacted, That all the squares, lots, pieces Maryland act ❝and parcels of land within the said city, which have of cession of "been or shall be appropriated for the use of the Uni- the district of ❝ted States, and also the streets, shall remain, and be the U. States, "for the use of the United States; and all the lots and the state con"parcels which have been or shall be sold to raise mo- United States veyed to the ney as a donation as aforesaid, shall remain and be to the vacant and "the purchasers according to the terms and conditions unappropria"of their respective purchases." 66 "And purchases and leases from private persons "claiming to be proprietors and having, or those under "whom they claim having, been in possession of the "lands purchased or leased, in their own right, five "whole years next before the passing of this act, shall "be good and effectual for the estate, and on the terms "and conditions of such purchases and leascs respec❝tively, without impeachment, and against any contra❝ry title now existing; but if any person hath made a ❝ conveyance, or shall make a conveyance or lease, of "any lands within the limits of the said city, not hav"ing right and title to do so, the person, who might be "entitled to recover the land under a contrary title "now existing, may, either by way of ejectment against "the tenant, or in an action for money had and receiv❝ed for his use against the bargainor or lessor, his heirs, executors, administrators or devisees, as the case may require, recover all money received by him ted lands in the district? BEATTY's "for the squares, pieces or parcels appropriated for ADM'RS." the use of the United States, as well as for lots or v. “parcels sold, and rents received by the person not BURNES'S "having title as aforesaid, with interest from the time ADM'R. "of the receipt; and on such recovery in ejectment "where the land is in lease, the tenant shall thereafter “hold under, and pay the rent reserved, to the person making title to and recovering the land, but the pos"session, bona fide acquired, in none of the said cases shall be changed." The Plaintiffs offered evidence, that on the 16th of April, 1792, Charles Beatty, the intestate returned into the land office for the Western Shore of Maryland, a certificate of survey dated on the 3d of April, 1792, and then paid the usual caution money for the land described in said certificate. On the 23d May, 1792, a caveat against the issuing of a patent for the lands on said certificate, was filed by David Burnes the intestate, which caveat was discontinued on the 23d of May, 1801, by virtue of a certain act of the state of Maryland. On the same day a patent issued from the land office to Charles Beatty for the land described in said certificate, which land is within the limits of the city of Washington, and was taken up by Beatty as a vacancy; but Beatty never had actual possession thereof, nor ever claimed to make division thereof with the city commissioners as an original proprietor pursuant to the statute of Maryland, 1791, ch. 45. In fact the same land had been held and claimed by David Burnes in his own right, for more than five years before the passing of the statute aforesaid, as included in the lines of a grant made as early as 1720. The Plaintiff offered evidence however that the land included in Beatty's patent, was without the lines of the land to which Burnes was, under his grant, really entitled, and that it was vacant land of the state of Maryland. The warrant, under which Beatty's patent was obtained, was, (before the location within the limits of Washington,) in part located upon and applied to other lands of the state of Maryland, not within the said city, or the county in which it was situate while belonging to Maryland. Burnes in his life time, and before the statute of 1791, ch. 45, made a conveyance of the land in controversy as an original proprietor to certain trustees for the purposes named in that statute, and received of the city commissioners on BEATTY'S F. S. KEY, for the Plaintiffs in error. Two questions arise in this case. 1st. Whether the Plaintiffs have a good cause of action under the patent to Beatty, if not barred by the statute of limitations: and 2d. Whether the statute of limitations is a bar to the action. 1. As to the title of Beatty. The caveat by Burnes was pending when Congress assumed the jurisdiction over the district of Columbia, which was on the 27th of February, 1801. The patent did not issue until the 23d May, 1801, but according to the law of Maryland, |