THE consignor of this cargo, authorizing the shipment of it, FRANCES, was produced or offered to be produced in the Court (FRENCH's below; and this Court, therefore, is warranted in beCLAIM,) lieving that none such was ever given. Indeed, no inBOYER, terest whatever in these goods is asserted to have exMASTER. isted in A. and J. Auchincloss, but the same is claimed by Wm. French, a citizen of the United States, who, under the order for further proof, produced, in support of his claim, a letter from himself to A. and J. Auchincloss, dated the 20th February, 1812, in which he requests them to order from his friends in Scotland, a quantity of goods enumerated in the letter not to exceed 1,000l. sterling, to be shipped as soon as the orders in council should be revoked, and adding that he should consider the goods at his risk from the time they should be shipped; also an invoice of these goods sent by A. and J. Auchincloss to Wm. French, together with a letter from them, dated the 20th of September, 1812, advising him of the capture of the Frances with the goods shipped on his account, and recommending it to him to take the necessary steps to vindicate his right to the property. This letter made its appearance in the Court below, with the outer leaf, on which the postmark would have been placed, had there been any, torn off. To do away the suspicion which this circumstance might well excite, the affidavit of Darius Hodson was produced, in which he states that he forwarded this letter to the Claimant, at Providence, having first torn off the outer leaf with a view to lessen the rate of postage.

The affidavit of the Claimant is added, which is fully to the purpose of supporting his interest in these goods, so far as his order to A. and J. Auchincloss can vest such an interest in him. But passing over those observations which might fairly be made upon the mutilated state of the letter from A. and J. Auchincloss to the Claimant, and the suspicious manner in which that circumstance is attempted to be explained, it may be observed that the claim of Wm. French is in no respect stronger than if it had been made by A. and J. Auchincloss. Admit that he wrote to A. and J. Auchincloss the letter of the 20th of February, 1812, and received from them that of the 20th of September, the inquiry still remains to be answered, where is the order for this

shipment from A. and J. Auchincloss as the agent of the Claimant ?

THE FRANCES, (FRENCH'S

The truth is, that in whatever light this question is CLAIM,) viewed, these goods were at the risk of the shippers BOYER, until they should be received by the consignee, and, MASTER. consequently, were, by the capture, made good prize, as property belonging to the enemy.

THE FRANCES, BOYER, master,

(Gillespie's claim.)

THIS, also, was an appeal from the sentence of The commer. the Rhode Island Circuit Court condemning certain cial domicil of goods captured on board the Frances, by the Yankee the time of the privateer.

a merchant at

capture of his goods, determines the cha

or neutral.

These goods were shipped by Colin Gillespie, the racter of those Claimant, who had been naturalized in the United goods, hostile States, and consigned to Archibald Bryce and Alexander Muirhead, for sale and remittance to the shipper at Glasgow.

To ascertain the national character of the Claimant, further proof was ordered by the Court below, calling upon him to show how long, after his naturalization, he resided in the United States, before he went to Great Britain; how long he had since resided in the United States, at any time or times; how long in Great Britain; what was the nature of his business in the latter country; and in whom the property vested at the time it was shipped.

Upon the production of this further proof, it appeared that the property was vested in the Claimant at the time of its being shipped; that he was a native of Great Britain; that he emigrated to the United States in 1793; was naturalized in 1798; having, in the interim, returned to his native country on mercantile business in 1794 and 1796, and re-visited the United States in 1795 and 1797; that he again returned to his native country in 1799, was there married and re-visited the United

THE

States with his wife, in the same year; that he continuFRANCES, ed to reside in New York until June, 1802, when he (GILLES- once more returned to Great Britain, and resided there PIE'S until November, 1805, when he came to the United CLAIM,) States, (Mrs. Gillespie having died in Scotland) formed BOYER, a partnership with John Graham, of New York, and reMASTER. turned to Glasgow in the same year, where he carried

on the business of the partnership under the firm of Colin Gillespie & Co.; that he remained there until the partnership was dissolved, and until the 2d of July, 1813; on which day he left the enemy's country, and arrived in the United States with his family, in October, 1813; that he kept house at Glasgow, and built a ware-house there, which he still owns, and kept his counting-house therein. He formed a determination to return to the United States, as he deposes, on being informed of the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain, which took place on the 18th of June, 1812, and was known in England about the 20th of July following, but was prevented, by his engagements and commercial concerns, from carrying that intention into effect until the period above mentioned, still leaving some of his affairs unarranged.

Upon this evidence, the property was condemned in the Circuit Court; and an appeal was taken, by the Claimant, to this Court, where the cause was argued by JONES, HARPER, and DEXTER, for the Claimant ; and PINKNEY for the captors.

JONES, for the Claimant.

The goods in question were purchased early in July, 1812, they were shipped on the 14th of that month, at which time the declaration of war was not known in England. It does not appear that the Claimant shipped any other goods than those in question. In less than a year after he had received information of the war, he returned to the United States with his family, thereby giving unequivocal evidence of the quo animo of his residence in Great Britain. In such a case, even the property of a neutral would be protected; a fortiori, ought the property of one of our own citizens to receive protection. Cases of this kind are analogous to cases of confiscation. If there be any particular period at which

"

THE

we can consider this property as assuming a hostile character, it must be that, at which it would have been FRANCES, confiscable by the enemy, supposing the party to con- (GILLEStinue an American citizen. Had that period arrived ? PIE'S Were the circumstances such as would have justified CLAIM,) Great Britain in confiscating this property? If not, BOYER, surely the United States ought not to condemn it. Vat- MASTER.

tel, B. 3, sec. 63.

This case may be considered in another point of view, viz: whether the case of a naturalized citizen returning to his native country, and carrying on trade, as in the present case, is distinguishable in its consequences, in the event of war, from that of a native citizen going to a foreign country and engaging in trade. We contend that it is not. One authority, and one only, seems to favor the distinction; and that is the case of La Virginia, 5 Rob. 99. But in that case, it does not appear that the American character of Mr. Lapierre was acquired by naturalization. It might and very probably did depend on domicil alone. We contend that a person naturalized in this country, is as much a citizen of the United States, to all the intents and purposes of the present case, as a native. The naturalization law of the United States requires of the applicant for the privileges of naturalization, unqualified abjuration of allegiance to his former sovereign. The law of England on the subject goes to an equal extent. Naturalized and native subjects are looked upon as the same, to all legal purposes. 4 Cranch, 321. Dawson's Lessee v. Godfrey.

A denizen may be made such for life or in tail; " but one cannot be naturalized either with limitation, for life or in tail, or upon condition; for that is against the absoluteness, purity and indebility of natural allegiance." Co. Lit. 129, (a.) 2 Domat, 376.

If, according to the doctrine of perpetual allegiance, on the return of a naturalized citizen to his native country, his former duties return, and his duties to his adopted country still continue, under what contradictory obligations would he be placed. This was lord Hale's doctrine, but it is now done away. Foster's Crown Law, 185, séc. 4.

THE

It has been decided in England, in the case of Marryat FRANCES, v. Wilson, 1 Bos. and Pul. 430, that natural born sub(GILLES- ject of that country admitted a citizen of the United PIE'S States of America, either before or after the declaration CLAIM,) of American independence, may be considered as a subBOYER, ject of the United States, so as to entitle him to trade MASTER. to the East Indies under the 13th article of the treaty of 19th November, 1794.”

HARPER, same side,

Asked whether the Court, in the case of the Rapid, had decided the question as to the difference between the British acts concerning letters of marque, prizes and prize goods, which authorize the capture of the property of inhabitants in hostile countries (and on which the British admiralty decisions are founded,) and the act of congress declaring war, which only gives a right to capture the property of British subjects.

JOHNSON, J. said the Court had fully considered that point and decided it in the case of the Rapid.

PINKNEY, for the captors.

We contend that the property even of a native American citizen domiciled in an enemy country at the time of the capture of such property, is liable to condemnation as prize of war; and, a fortiori the property of a naturalized American citizen, a native of the enemy country, under like circumstances; which is the case before the Court, and which will be first considered.

It has been contended on the other side, that a person naturalized in the United States is as much a citizen of this country as a native, and that he continues to be so, though he return to his native country and there engage in trade. It has been argued that, in order to become an American citizen, he must abjure his allegiance to his former government, that, consequently, though he should return to his native country, he can no longer be considered as under the protection of that government that his new allegiance to the United States continues, and that our government is bound to protect him that he is therefore to be considered in the