law to terminate equally at the period fixed for its ending by the original limitation. But if the limitation were to A. for life, with at proviso that if he married his life estate should cease, the case would be different, the event upon which A.'s estate was to cease being extrinsic, separate, distinct, and collateral to the original limitation, and therefore making no part of it. The limitation over in the latter case is a conditional limitation. Formerly contingent remainders were liable to be destroyed by the determination of the particular estate during its continuance by its merger, forfeiture, or surrender, and accordingly trustees were appointed to preserve them from this until trustees were dispensed with by the provision of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 8. Another Act, i.e., 40 & 41 Vict. c. 33 (see answer to question 220), has enabled them to take effect as executory interests if they can legally be construed as such, without regarding the fact of a particular estate having been created, provided they fail as contingent remainders. Thus they are now practically indestructible, except from natural causes, though not formerly so. Conditional limitations were always indestructible. Contingent remainders have two special rules for their creation, whilst in the case of conditional limitation there is only the rule against perpetuities to be guarded against in their creation. (Wharton's Law Lexicon, 6th ed., 223.) REVERSIONARY INTERESTS. 223. State the principle on which Courts of Equity have generally acted in setting aside a sale of a reversion, and the circumstances necessary to ground a claim for relief. How far is the action of the Court modified by the Act 31 Vict. c. 4? On the principle that equity will not permit any undue advantage to be taken of those who are placed in necessitous circum stances. Previously to the statute (31 Vict. c. 4) fraud was in these cases commonly presumed from inadequacy of consideration; and such transactions were frequently set aside on this ground without proof of any other ingredients of fraud, such as misrepresentation, undue influence, &c. And the fact that the expectant was of mature age, or well understood the nature and extent of the transaction, was immaterial. From the fact of a person selling such an interest, the Court presumed that he was under pecuniary pressure; and it was not incumbent on him to prove that it was so. The onus was on the purchaser to show that the transaction was just and reasonable. By the Sales of Reversions Act (31 Vict. c. 4), however, it is enacted that " no purchase made bona fide, and without fraud or unfair dealing, of any reversionary interest in real or personal estate, shall hereafter be opened or set aside merely on the ground of undervalue." This Act has not affected the jurisdiction of equity in cases of unconscious purchases of reversions. Lord Hatherly said (in Tyler v. Yates, L. R. 6 Ch. 665): "The Legislature has not repealed the doctrines of this Court by which protection is thrown around unwary young men in the hands of unscrupulous persons ready to take advantage of their necessities. I conceive the reason why the law as to sales of reversions was altered to be that the doctrines of this Court had been carried to an extravagant length on that subject." The effect of the statute seems to be that in future the inadequacy of the consideration must be so gross as to amount to evidence of fraud; but it has been held that the burden of proof is still on the purchaser, the circumstances of the case still rendering the Court more suspicious respecting such bargains than in the case of a sale of an interest in possession. (H. A. Smith's Equity, 145-147.) 224. Give the substance of the enactment of 31 Vict. c. 4, as to sales of reversions, and state your opinion how far, if at all, this enactment has altered the law with reference to unconscionable bargains as affecting such interests. The answer to this question will be found to be contained in the preceding answer. 225. What alteration was effected in the law as to sales of reversions by the Act of 31 Vict. c. 4? If relief is given, what terms are imposed upon the parties? As to the former part of the question, see answer to question 223. Equity proceeds on the maxim that "He who seeks equity must do equity," and only grants relief on the terms of the plaintiff paying the sum actually advanced, with interest, and any sums reasonably expended by the defendant in improvements, and of proper costs. Only simple interest at 5 per cent. is allowed, and a defendant will disentitle himself to costs by any improper conduct such as refusal to accept a full sum in discharge before action brought. (H. A. Smith's Equity, 148, 149.) SATISFACTION. 226. Define ademption, satisfaction, and performance (under a will or in case of intestacy), distinguishing carefully between them, and illustrating each by an example. Satisfaction may be defined to be the making of a donation with the express or implied intention that it shall be taken as an extinguishment of some claim which the donee has upon the donor. (Sm. Man. Eq., 12th ed., 414; see Ex parte Pye, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. C. Eq., 338; Haynes's Student's L. C., 280.) Where, for instance, a parent on his son's marriage, and in the marriage settlement, covenants to provide in an unlimited time a sum of £3000, and to invest it in Consols in the name of the trustees of the settlement, and the parent subsequently dies without having performed the covenant, but leaves the son a sum of £6000 by will, the legacy will be deemed a satisfaction of the son's interest in the performance of the above-mentioned covenant. Where a parent leaves his child £10,000 by will, and subsequently during his lifetime advances that child £20,000, and then the parent dies without having altered his will, the £20,000 is deemed a satisfaction of the £10,000, or more strictly, the legacy is gone or adeemed. Satisfaction arises in three cases:-(1) Debts by legacies; (2) legacies by legacies; and (3) portions by legacies, and vice versa. Ademption is another name for satisfaction under certain circumstances, the term being limited to cases of satisfaction of one portion by another, where the first portion is limited under a will or other revocable instrument. Satisfaction as technically understood does not arise under an intestacy. Performance never arises under any will, but only in cases where a person has covenanted to settle or leave property to another and has not done so, but has subsequently done some other act that is capable of being applied towards a performance of his covenant; the presumption is that he did that other act with the intention of thereby practically performing the covenant. It does arise in cases of intestacy where the covenant was like that in Blandy v. Widmore, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. C. Eq. 391; Haynes's Student's L. C. 255, where a husband covenanted with his wife's trustees in their marriage settlement that his executors should within three calendar months after his decease pay to his wife £620 if she should survive him. The husband died intestate and without issue, whereupon his widow became entitled to a moiety of his personal estate, which was much more than £620. That case decided that she must take her share in the intestacy as a complete performance of the cove nant, upon the principle that "equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation." See also Wilcocks v. Wilcocks, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. C. Eq. 389; Haynes's Student's L. C. 254, and Lechmere v. Carlisle, 3 P. Wms. 211; Snell's Equity, 5th ed., 233. The term "ademption " is also used in the case of a specific legacy if the testator should part with the subject matter thereof; e.g., if A. by his will should bequeath his gold watch to B., and should afterwards give it to C. or sell it to D. 227. Explain the doctrine of satisfaction in reference to testamentary dispositions, stating any circumstances essential to its operation. The answer to this question will be found to be contained in the preceding answer. SEPARATION DEEDS. 228. Give an outline of the usual clauses contained in a deed of separation. Date; parties (i.e., husband, wife, and one trustee); recitals. . live separate; (2) that he will not molest her; (3) to pay an annuity to the trustee for wife during joint lives, if separation so long continue, with a proviso that such annuity shall cease on dissolution of marriage by competent Court; (4) that the wife may dispose of other property as if the husband were dead, and if wife die in his lifetime without making any such disposition, her property shall devolve as if the husband were dead; and (5) for further assurance. Second testatum : Covenants by the trustee (1) to indemnify husband against the debts of his wife; and (2) that the wife shall not commence any action for compelling her husband to support her or to live with her. Then follows, if there are any children, an agreement as to their custody and maintenance. Testimonium. (2 Prideaux, 11th ed., 738.) It will be a question whether 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 1, ss. (2), has not now rendered the trustee an unnecessary party. Trustees 229. Husband and wife separate by mutual consent. for the wife are appointed, and a deed of separation executed. The deed provides for the payment of an annuity to the wife, but annuity to cease, and trusts of the deed to become void, in case of the happening of any one of the following events:—(1) Wife not remaining chaste; (2) wife annoying husband; (3) wife receiving pecuniary help from others; (4) husband and wife becoming reconciled, and living together again. The husband afterwards becomes bankrupt, and no one of the above events has happened. What are the rights of the wife's trustees as to proving on the husband's estate in respect of the annuity, and what steps should they take? The wife's trustees have a right to prove against the bankrupt's estate for the value of the annuity if the husband had remained solvent, notwithstanding the conditions upon which it is made to cease, for it is a claim capable of valuation. (Ex parte Blackmore, Re Blackmore, 46 L. J. Bkey. 118; L. R. 5 Ch. D. 372; Ex parte Naden, Re Wood, 43 L. J. Bkey. 105; L. R. 9 Ch. 670; Baldwin's Bankruptcy, 148.) The trustees can prove in the ordinary way, putting in their own estimate of the value of the above annuity, payable by a solvent man, with the above qualifications attached thereto, or make a special form of proof, setting out the fullest |