Parker v. Wilson. the plaintiff replied that he was ready to pay it, but had been trusteed. On the 7th of November, said installment not having been paid, Bugbee instructed the defendant to take the horse and surrender the note. The defendant under such instructions, took the horse and tendered the note to the plaintiff. But he declined to receive it. Upon that state of facts, the legal effect of the judgment so rendered against the plaintiff as the trustee of the defendant is to be determined. It was the duty of the plaintiff, in making his disclosure, to have stated what it is found he knew of the claim that Bugbee had the note, and the security given for its payment, so that he might have had an opportunity to appear and assert his rights. If Bugbee had appeared, and been admitted as a party in the suit, he might have shown that the consideration of the note was properly exempt from attachment, and that the payor of the note could not be held liable or chargeable as trustee. R. L. sec. 1076; Hastie v. Kelley, 57 Vt. 293; Drake on Attach., sec. 480. While the law generally protects a trustee in those cases where it appears that he has once paid a judgment rendered against him, it at the same time exacts the utmost good faith on his part, and requires the disclosure of all the material facts affecting his liability, and the legal and equitable rights of other claimants of the funds in his hands. It was said in Holmes v. Clark et al., 46 Vt. 27, if the trustee fails fully to discharge the duty which the law imposes upon him, in regard to making his disclosure, and therein setting forth all the facts within his knowledge, which would affect his liability as trustee in the suit, he might be adjudged trustee of the payee of the note and such judgment not be a protection against the collection of the indebtedness in a suit in favor of the transferee of the note. Drake on Attach., secs. 507, 508. In Larabee v. Knights, 69 Me. 370, the duty of a trustee in making a disclosure to entitle him to protection under a judgment rendered upon it, was held to be as we have stated it. The judgment is affirmed. Langdon v. Templeton. JAMES R. LANGDON v. HORATIO TEMPLETON. Chancery. Bill to restrain the bringing of vexatious suits. Tax title. 1. Ordinarily a Court of Equity will not entertain a bill to restrain the bringing of vexatious suits, until the right involved has been first determined by an adjudication at law. 2. Where, however, from the very nature of the suits sought to be restrained, no opportunity is offered the orator by which he can first so establish his right, such a bill may be maintained without a previous adjudication in a law court. 3. An adjudication in a suit of trespass qua. clau. against the tenant, does not determine the landlord's title; hence a landlord may maintain a bill of the peace to restrain the bringing of such vexatious suits against his tenant, whom he is bound to secure in the possession of the premises. 4. The vendor in a tax sale, conducted with due formality, who enters in good faith and in reliance upon his title and occupies, but who never receives a deed from the collector, has such an equitable interest in the premises that he may maintain such a suit. This was a suit in chancery brought to the 'Washington County Court of Chancery. The bill alleged that in the year 1822 the General Assembly of the State of Vermont laid a tax of three cents per acre on the lands in the township of Worcester, in the county of Washington, for the construction and repair of the public highways, and that one Joshua Y. Vail was by the act appointed the collector to collect the said tax; that the tax on lot No. 52 in the second division of lands not having been paid, the said collector proceeded to sell the same with due formalities to Charles Bulkley and James H. Langdon, the highest bidders therefor, for the sum of eleven dollars and sixtyeight cents; that on April 29, 1824, the collector caused his warrant and return, together with a certificate of the oath taken by him, and all other papers and documents required to be recorded, to be so recorded in the town clerk's office in the said. town of Worcester, and subsequently at different times in the Langdon v. Templeton. year 1825 caused lists of the lands sold and not redeemed on the 1st of April, 1825, to be so recorded, and that lot No. 52 aforesaid was among the number so named; that the said Bulkley and Langdon thereupon became entitled to receive from the said collector a deed of the said land, which should contain a covenant of warranty, and should be good and valid in law, and acquired a right to compel the execution of such a deed by the proper proceedings; that the said collector did execute deeds of some of the lands so sold by him, but whether he ever executed one to the said Bulkley and Langdon the orator knew not, but if so, it had been lost or accidentally destroyed, and that no record thereof remained; that said collector had deceased and his estate been administered upon many years ago; that the said lot had come from the said Bulkley and Langdon to the orator, who was the owner of the same; that Bulkley and Langdon, and those claiming under them had, ever since the tax sale, treated the lot as theirs, had paid the taxes on the same, and cut timber thereon, and that the orator in 1885 had put one Clogston into possession of the same under a contract by the terms of which he was obliged to assure the title and possession to the said Clogston, and that the said Clogston was then in possession; that the defendant, well knowing the rights of the orator in the premises, had procured from various persons, who had no interest whatever in the premises, quit-claim deeds to the same; that in July, 1886, the defendant had brought a suit in trespass against the said Clogston for cutting timber on the said lot, and in February, 1887, began another suit against the said Clogston containing thirteen counts in trover for the conversion of the timber on said lot, and that these suits were then pending in the County Court for the county of Washington. The prayer of the bill was that the defendant might be perpetually enjoined from asserting his title to the said lot under the said deeds, from prosecuting his suits already begun, and from beginning any more in that behalf. Upon the filing of the bill a temporary injunction was granted in accordance with the prayer. The defendant made answer in which the defendant Langdon v. Templeton. insisted among other things that the bill should be dismissed for want of equity, inasmuch as the orator had a complete remedy at law, and craved the same benefit of this objection, as though the same has been made by demurrer. At the March term, 1888, the case was brought on for hearing upon this demurrer so incorporated in the answer; whereupon Rowell, chancellor, without hearing and pro forma, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill. The orator appeals. Pitkin & Huse, for the orator. The tax sale was valid. At the expiration of the time allowed for redeeming, the purchasers acquired a vested equitable interest in the land, and a right to compel the giving of a deed by the proper proceedings. Laws of 1822, p. 64; Slade's Com. pp. -662-669; Isaac v. Shattuek, 12 Vt. 668; Wells v. Austin, 59 Vt. 157; Blackw. on Tax Titles, pp. 298, 299, 372-4; 2 Desty on-Taxation, pp. 907, 912, 915; McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356; Clippinger v. Tuller, 10 Kan. 377; Douglass v. Nuzum, 16 Kan. 515; Maxey v. Clabaugh, 6 Ill. 26; Graves v. Bruen, 6 ib. 167; State v. Wynn, 19 Wis. 304; Woodman v. Clapp, 21 Wis. 350; Eaton v. North, 32 Wis. 303. If the defendant owns this land, he can bring a suit which will establish his title to it. The suits which he has brought do not, and are therefore strictly vexatious suits and should be restrained. Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105; King v. Chase, 15 N. H. 9; Roberts v. Robeson, 27 Ind. 454; Arnold v. Arnold, 17 Pick. 4; Morse v. Marshall, 97 Mass. 519; Parker v. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn. 321. The orator has such a title that he cannot establish it at law, hence he may apply to a court of equity. J. A. &.G. W. Wing and S. C. Shurtleff, for the defend ant. A deed was necessary to give the orator any title under the tax sale. There is no equity in such a title. The statute prescribes the formalities and requisites of the sale, and these must be strictly followed or nothing passes. The statute in force at Langdon v. Templeton. the time of this sale required the collector to give a deed. No deed was given, hence no title was acquired by virtue of the sale. Cooley on Taxation, 352; Tilson v. Thompson, 10 Pick. 361-3; Hoffman v. Bell, 61 Pa. St. 444; Ives v. Lynn, T Conn. 505; Donohoe v. Veal, 19 Mo. 331; Blackw. on Tax Titles, 364 to 391; Douglass v. Dangerfield, 10 Ohio 152, 159. We are unable to find a case where a court of equity has ever interfered to supply any omission in a tax title. In this case it is asked to supply the deed itself. "A person who seeks the benefit of a statute law must adhere closely to its provisions." The burden of proof is on the person who claims under a tax title. Amson v. Baker, 49 N. H. 161, 171, 168; Livingston, Admr., v. Pendergast, 34 N. H. 544; Sullivan v. Merriam, 16 Neb. 157; Baldwin v. Merriam, 16 id. 199; Seaman v. Thompson, 15 id. 246; Shelley v. Tole, 16 id. 194; Donahue v. Veal, 19 Mo. 331. Equity will not interfere to assist the orator. It might compel the collector or his representative to execute a deed, but the defendant in this case is a stranger to that transaction. McGinnis v. Freedman, 17 Pac. Rep. 635, 636; High on Injunctions, sec. 651; Blackw. on Tax Titles, 498, 499; Young v. Dawling, 15 Ill. 481; Strade v. Washer, 16 Pac. Rep. 929. The payment of taxes does not aid the orator. Reed v. Field et al., 15 Vt. 672; Kidder v. Kenady, 43 Vt. 717; Wells v. Austin, 59 Vt. 165-7; Thompson v. Benham, 61 N. Y. 52. The opinion of the court was delivered by TAFT, J. This case was heard upon demurrer to the bill. It is alleged in the bill that, under the orator, Clogston went into possession of the lot in controversy, in the latter part of the year 1885, and has since remained in possession. Whatever the title of the defendant may be to the land, upon the facts alleged, Clogston has a full defense to the suits at law, brought by the defendant against him, at least as to the action of trespass. The gist of the action is the injury to the possession, and the general rule is, that unless at the time the injury was committed the plain |