Redfield v. Gleason. tract and upon principle a cross-bill would be unnecessary and out of place. 3. Several questions arise upon the master's report in reference to certain charges of the defendant for personal services in caring for the property owned by him and the orator jointly, and closing up their partnership business. The defendant charged five hundred dollars for his services, in settling up the partnership business, rendered after the dissolution. The master reports that there was not sufficient evidence as to the amount of labor performed by him in excess of the orator's to enable him to make any finding on this item. If he performed no more labor than the orator did in the same matter he is not entitled to any allowance. He fails to show that fact and the item was prop erly disallowed. 4. As to the items of five hundred dollars for services in building Riverside, two hundred dollars for the care of it after itsconstruction and supervising alterations in it, and one hundred dollars for services in collecting the Brigham notes, it is necessary to consider the relations of the parties in respect to this property. It was not strictly partnership property, in respect to which, their partnership had been dissolved. Their co-partnershipembraced simply the practice of the law and ceased before Riverside was built, and the Brigham notes were purchased as an investment, whether with partnership funds or not does not appear; but neither the ownership of the Riverside, nor the Brigham notes were within the scope of the partnership business they were joint owners; tenants in common of the property; and their right to charge each other for their personal services in the care of their joint property must be governed by the well known rules applicable in such cases. Freeman on Co-tenancy, s. 260, states the rule as follows: "Compensation for his services in managing or taking care of the property is never awarded to a co-tenant, except as a result of a direct agreement to that effect; or unless, from all the circumstances of the case, the court is satisfied of the existence of a mutual understanding between the parties that the services rendered by one should bo paid for by the others. In this respect the law of co-tenancy is Redfield v. Gleason. Aike that of partnership. A partner in taking care of and managing the property of the concern is performing no more than his duty, and is therefore entitled to no compensation from his partners." And the exception to this rule is where one co-tenant performs services which neither the law, nor his partnership obligations, nor the relation of co-tenancy imposed upon him. Fuller v. Fuller, (Fla.) 2 So. Rep. 436; Lewis v. Moffett, 11 Ill. 392; Levi v. Kerrick, 13 Iowa 344; and see numerous cases cited in Freeman on Co-tenancy, s. 260. These items should not be governed by the law relating to the services performed by a partner after the dissolution of a firm. Applying the rule above stated to the items under consideration, it is clear that the defendant should be allowed the item for superintending the construction of Riverside. It was agreed that he should perform the services, and that the orator should do what was right about it; it must have been the mutual understanding of the parties that the defendant should be paid, and the master properly allowed the item. It is equally as clear that the items for the care of Riverside and the Brigham notes should be disallowed. The orator never agreed to pay for the services, and the defendant performed none except such as were required of him as a -co-tenant; rendered none except such as were imposed upon him by law; such as renting the property, looking after the repairs, collecting the rents, notes and other like duties. 5. The orator never paid the item of fifty dollars charged by him for expenses, on the occasion of an interview with Smith Ely in the city of New York. The master properly disallowed it. No other questions are insisted upon by the parties. The orator therefore is entitled to a decree that upon payment by the defendant of the sum of fifteen hundred and fifty-nine dollars and ninety-seven cents, with interest since the second Tuesday in September, 1886, within such time as may be fixed by the chancellor, the orator shall convey to the defendant, free from encumbrance, an undivided half of the Riverside property, described in the bill and in default of such payment, the orator to dave a decree according to the prayer of the bill. Decree reversed and cause remanded with mandate. Whitney Wagon Works v. Moore. WHITNEY WAGON WORKS v. SAMUEL L. MOORE.. Evidence. False Representations. Copy of Letter. 1. Plaintiff claimed that defendant obtained possession of property sued for under color of purchase by false representations and without intending to pay for it. Sale was made by agent of plaintiff, March 10th, subject to its approval, and was approved April 12th. The alleged false representation by defendant was that he owned his stable and stock. March 25th, defendant wrote plaintiff a letter containing this clause: "I have got a little stable and got it most paid for." Plaintiff and defendant were then corresponding with reference to other matters, and defendant claimed that this language was used with reference to such matters. Held, that the clause might go to the jury, leaving them to determine in what connection it was used. 2. When clause was offered, defendant did not elect to have the whole letter read on his attention being called to it. Held, that he could not object to its admission on that ground after the testimony was closed. 3. Plaintiff was allowed to show that at time of sale defendant's stable and stock were mortgaged to its full value, and that he was insolvent, and that upon the receipt of this property he immediately mortgaged it to secure, among others, a fictitious debt. 4. Defendant claimed that he had been ready to pay this debt when he could. obtain a certain discount as to freight. Held, that the defendant might be asked if the plaintiff's attorney had not proposed to allow this discount in full. 5. Agent of plaintiff was allowed to testify in rebuttal that he would not. have sold the property to defendant if defendant had given him such information relative to his financial condition as he had testified om trial that he did give. 6. To prove the contents of a certain letter, plaintiff offered letter-press copy. There was no direct evidence that such a letter was ever written or mailed to defendant. It did appear that plaintiff kept copies of all letters sent out in the course of business in a book where this one appeared in regular order. It was dated March 23d, and would reach the defendant March 25th. On that date defendant wrote plaintiff, acknowledging the receipt of its letter that morning. Plaintiff had written the defendant no other letter about that time. Held, admissible. Trover for two buggy wagons. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury at the December Term of the Caledonia County Court, 1887, Taft, J., presiding. Verdict for the plaintiff. Exceptions by the defendant. Whitney Wagon Works v. Moore. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had obtained possession of the wagons through fraudulent representations as to his financial ability. The sale was effected through the plaintiff's agent, Phillips, who took the written order of the defendant subject to the subsequent approval of the plaintiff. The evidence of the plaintiff tended to show that at the time of making the contract the defendant represented to Phillips that he owned his stable and stock substantially, and that Phillips so reported to the plaintiff, and that it relied thereon in approving the contract and delivering the wagons. The contract with the defendant was made March 10. It was approved and the goods shipped April 12. Pending the consideration of the order by the plaintiff, and on March 25, the defendant wrote the plaintiff a letter which contained this clause, "I have got a little stable, and got it most paid for." The parties had corresponded with refence to other matters, and the defendant objected to the introduction of this letter or clause on the ground that it referred to those other transactions. The court admitted this clause and left it to the jury to say whether it referred to the matter in suit. The plaintiff was also permitted to show, against the defendant's exception, that, at the time of the sale by Phillips and the making of the alleged representations by the defendant, the defendant was hopelessly insolvent, that his entire property was then covered by mortgages, one of which secured a fictitious debt to one Atwood for $850, that upon the receipt of the wagons he at once re-mortgaged his property, including those wagons, to secure, among other claims, the aforesaid note of $850, and another fraudulent note of $250. The defendant claimed that he had always been ready to pay for the buggies, when the plaintiff would allow a claim which he made about freight. Against the defendant's exception the plaintiff's counsel was permitted to ask him this question : "Did I not tell you that you might take out your freights as . you claimed them to be, reckoning interest on the balance, the Whitney Wagon Works v. Moore. freight on goods not to be included but just pay that debt and interest and close the matter up?" Answer. Yes, sir. The other exceptions sufficiently appear in the opinion. Bates & May, for the defendant. 1. As to the letter of March 25, the whole letter should have gone to the jury. This was the readiest way in which the jury could determine what it referred to. As it was left, the court virtually held that the clause admitted referred to the matter in dispute, and the effect of this holding could not be done away with by the charge. Dennis v. Barber et al., 6 Sarg. and R., 427; Boon v. Danville, 53 Vt. 183. 2. The letter press copy was improperly admitted. Delaney v. Erickson, 10 Neb. 492; Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138; Dennis v. Barber, 6 Sarg. & R. (Pa.) 420-5-6; Lewis v. Harris, 40 Conn. 361; 1 Phillips Ev. 413, ante 121, Camp's and Hill's notes; State v. Hopkins, 56 Vt.; State v. Horn, 43 Vt. 20; Robertson v. Lynch, 18 Johns, (N. Y.) 451-7; Smith et als. v. Carrington et als., 4 Cranch, (U. S.) 61; 4 McLean, 378; Foster v. Leeper et al., 29 Ga. 294; McCully v. Barr, 17 Sarg. & R. (Pa.) 445. Evidence of prior or subsequent mortgages on the property. of the defendant should not have been admitted. It had no tendency to support any issue made by the plaintiff. Morris v. Talcott, 96 N. Y. 100; Artman v. Bell, 9 Phil., (Penn.) 237; Hard v. Brown, 18 Vt. 87; Richardson v. Hitchcock, 28 Vt. 757; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 307; Edwards v. Warner, 35 Conn. 517; Fisher v. Brown, 1 Tyler 387. 4. It was error to allow the plaintiff's counsel to inquire of the defendant in regard to an interview between them as to a compromise. It has been uniformly held that offers of compromise are not admissible. Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. 346; Doon v. Ravey, 49 Vt. 293; Knowles v. Crampton, 11 At. Rep. 593; Stephen's Dig. of Ev., 72 and notes; Clapp v. Foster, 34 Vt. 580; Daniels v. Woonsocket, 11 R. I. 4; Strong v. |