Clement v. Bank of Rutland. 66 to to the location of the east-and-west line between their lots; and the chief object of that survey was, as shown by the report, determine the width of the bank lot." As the result of his examination and survey, Randall judged, as shown by the report, that Quinn's north line was two inches south of the south face of the south wall of the bank building, and said that if Quinn was to pay for the land between the center line of said wall and his north line, he should pay for eight inches in width. The parties seem to have acquiesced in Randall's conclusion, for on July 22, 1879, by its deed of that date, the bank duly conveyed that eight inches to Quinn, together with that portion of the bank building thereon standing, which deed was duly recorded on the day of its date; and the question is, Does the description in the plaintiff's deed from the bank include all or any part of that eight inches? If the first description in plaintiff's deed is to govern, it is obvious that the north line of Quinn's lot, wherever located at the time the deed was given, is the north boundary of the land conveyed. Defendant's counsel claim that that description is to govern; that it cannot be presumed that the bank intended to convey more than it owned; that the most that can be claimed for Randall's report is, that it contains a description by courses. and distances that is inconsistent with the description by metes and bounds, and that therefore the description by metes and bounds must govern; that it does not follow that a particular description is to be enlarged by a subsequent general description by way of reference to another instrument; that said report does not fix the line with definiteness, but is at best mere conjecture, and shows that the true line of the lots in that section cannot be ascertained, as Quinn's original south line cannot be found, and that said report was referred to in plaintiff's deed and delivered to him, not for the purpose of more definitely locating the south line of the land conveyed, but for the purpose of giving him all the information the bank had in respect to its location, and that he must have understood that he was to take his deed and the report, and find his land as best he could between the land of Quinn on the south and that of Chaffee on Clement v. Bank of Rutland. the north. While it is true that the intention of the grantor must govern, yet that intention must be gathered from the language of the deed, and cannot rest in mental purpose alone; for if the description really covers the strip in question, it must for present purposes be taken that the defendant intended to convey it. If the deed was mistakenly drawn in this respect, it cannot be corrected here. To the argument that the report was referred to and delivered to the plaintiff for the purpose named, it is a sufficient answer to say that the bank did know just where its south line was, for it was definitely fixed by its deed to Quinn as the center line of the south wall of its bank building; but for some reason the plaintiff's deed seems to have been drawn without any regard to Quinn's deed, and as though it never had been given, and with reference to things as they were at the time Randall's report was made, else why refer to the report at all, for it had no reference to what the bank then owned, and would not help to fix the then southern boundary, but it would help to fix its southern boundary as it was before the deed to Quinn, and reference to the report could only serve to deceive the plaintiff in respect to the true location of that boundary as it then was. The whole tenor and effect of the report is, that the bank lot, at best, lacked about an inch and a half of being full width, and to fix the south line of the lot to within about that distance of exactness, and at a point two inches south of the south face of the south wall of the bank building; and when the report is considered as written into the description of the deed, it amounts to nothing less than a representation by the bank that the south line was then as the report showed it to be; and unless that representation is to be nullified by something else in the deed, it must stand, and be effective as matter of description. But suppose we treat these descriptions as irreconcilably conflicting, as is claimed we should, then the rule comes in, that less certainty of description yields to greater certainty. This is why courses and distances yield to monuments. But this is not a case of courses, and distances and monuments; but a case of Clement v. Bank of Rutland. both general and special description of the same boundary by reference to other boundaries and to monuments. The general description is by reference to the limits of another's land, without any particular description or mention of any known or certain object, which is an uncertain description, and was felt to be by the bank, for it went on to make more particular description by reference to said report, whereby it described its southern boundary, not by reference to the limits of Quinn's land, but by reference to the south wall of its bank building, a prominent monument, and located its line two inches south of the south face of it, thereby making certain what before was uncertain, as far as the deed disclosed, without investigation and perhaps survey. In Bennedict v. Gaylord, 11 Conn. 332 (s. c. 29 Am. Dec. 299), the first description in the deed was by reference to known, visible, and well ascertained monuments, the most important of which were natural and permanent, and corresponded with reasonable precision with the courses and distances given and ascertained by actual survey, while the second description was by reference to the limits of the lands of others without more, and included twenty-one acres more than the first description. The second description was said to be of a very uncertain kind, and the first description prevailed because more certain. But it is said that the deed expressly limits the operation of the conveyance to whatever title and interest the bank had, and declares that nothing more is conveyed, and that the covenants are thereby limited accordingly. But precise description cannot be limited by such general words of intent. Gilman v. Smith, 12 Vt. 150; Wilder v. Davenport, 58 Vt. 642. Nor will such language restrict the covenants to the grantor's title and interest, when the land itself is the subject matter of con veyance. The result is, we hold that that part of the description in the plaintiff's deed consisting of the report, covers the eight-inch strip deeded to Quinn, and that that description must prevail over the more general description. Judgment reversed and cause remanded. Rutland v. Pierpoint et al. TOWN OF RUTLAND v. EVELYN PIERPOINT ET AL.* Equity; will Correct Mistake in Awarding Land, Damages. E. owned jointly with the other defendants certain land, of which he was in apparent possession, and which he had authority to manage in all ordinary matters without consulting the others, but not to sell. The selectmen of the orator laid a highway across the same, and E. appeared before them as the owner with reference to damages. The selectmen, supposing him to be the sole owner, awarded to him alone full damages. Held, that a court of equity should decree that the mistake of the selectmen be corrected, and said award paid to the several owners in proportion to their respective interests. This was a bill in chancery brought by the orator against the defendant Evelyn and his two sisters, Julia Pierpoint and Susan S. Pierpoint. The subject matter of the bill sufficiently appears in the opinion. The defendant Evelyn made answer. The other two defendants did not appear, and the bill was as to them taken as confessed. The case was referred to a special master, and was heard at the September Term, 1887, of the Rutland County Court of Chancery. Royce, Chancellor, decreed that the bill be dismissed. Appeal by the orator. It appeared from the master's report that the defendants were joint owners of the land over which the highway was laid. As to the authority of the defendant Evelyn with reference to the management of the land generally, and in connection with this particular transaction, the report found : "Evelyn Pierpoint had the possession and general management of said real estate, and had had for many years. He was accustomed, and was authorized to represent all the owners in ordinary matters relating to the property; but was not authorized to conclude agreements to sell without consulting the others. He had no authority to represent his sisters in highway proceedings, unless such authority is covered by the findings above made. "It was the intention of Evelyn Pierpoint, in his conference with the selectmen, mentioned hereafter, to secure the allowance of full damages. He gave the selectmen permission to commence work on the land before the matter of damages was set(* Heard, January Term, 1888.) دات L Rutland v. Pierpoint et al. tled. He had no conversation with his sisters about the business before the making of the award, but did have after. Nothing further appeared as to knowledge, objection or approval on the part of the sisters. "Under these circumstances the selectmen awarded two hundred dollars. Their award appears in the report as follows: To Evelyn Pierpoint we award the sum of two hundred dollars damages.' This sum was intended by the selectmen as damage to the whole property, and the failure of the report to award it in accordance with that intention is undoubtedly the result of an error. "After the award was on record, and had come to the knowledge of Evelyn Pierpoint, he had a conversation with some of the selectmen, in which they claimed that the amount given was intended for all, and said Evelyn stated that if the award was for his interest only it was satisfactory, but if for all it was not satisfactory." Lawrence & Meldon, for the orator. The selectmen in awarding the entire damages to Evelyn Pierpoint acted under a mistake of fact as to the ownership of the land. Equity will relieve from the consequences of that mistake. Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195; Spurr v. Benedict, 99 Mass. 464; Willard Eq. Jur. 64-5–70; 6 U. S. Dig. 658, s. 357; p. 659, s. 382; p. 665, s. 514; p. 511; p. 96, s. 190; 89, s. 59; 656, s. 1280-1-4; Davis v. Cilley, 44 N. H. 448; Stone v. Atwood, 28 Ill. 30; Pullman v. Personean, 33 Ill. 375; Williams v. Warren, 21 Ill. 541; 1 Jac. Fish. Dig. 436; Brown v. Lamphere, 35 Vt. 252; Sto. Eq. Jur. ss. 138 (c) 138 (k), 140, 142, 143, 145, 153, 155, 156, 162, 164 e, 164 f, 166, 439, 1451, 1452, 1455, 1456, 1456 a. It is unconscionable to allow a party to take advantage of a mistake into which he has unwittingly lead another. 117 Mass. 195; 6 U. S. Dig. 659, s. 382. W. C. Dunton and Edward Dana, for the defendant, Evelyn Pierpoint. Proceedings for the condemnation of land are in invitum. In this case no notice has been given to any one but Evelyn. If herefore the prayer of this bill is granted, the effect will be to |