time immemorial run and flowed as of right, and the plt. and preceding occupiers of the mill and lands had from time immemorial been entitled as of right to have the same run and flow, and the plt. at those times and on those occasions was entitled as of right to have the same run and flow from and out of the cavern into the basin, and from thence through the said lands unto and into the mill in a pure and unpolluted state and of good and proper quality, for the use of the plt. and the preceding occupiers of the mill and lands in their said business of manufacturers of paper, and without and free from fouling and pollution. In the year 1857, the deft. became and has continued to be the possessor and occupier of certain lands and premises called the Priddy Minery, situate on the summit of the Mendip Hills, and at a higher elevation than the mill and the lands of the plt. and the cavern; distant therefrom in a straight line in a northerly direction 1 mile. [Q. B. as the Plantation Swallet and the South Swallet, of which fact the deft., at those times and on those occasions, was aware. A swallet is a rent in the limestone-rock of the Mendip Hills, having an open, funnel-shaped mouth in the surface of the rock on the summit of the hills, and having an underground passage for water running into its mouth, communicating with an outlet, at which the water escapes in an open stream at the foot of the hills. These swallets are found in great numbers in the Mendip Hills, and serve as natural drains to the rainfall of the hills, which, from time immemorial, has run into and through them in greater or less quantities, according to their situation and capacity, and sometimes in considerable streams, to outlets at the foot of the hills. I find that, at the times and on the occasions of the acts complained of, the said two swallets on the Priddy Minery had each of them a passage for water similar At the time the deft. became the possessor and oc- to that described, communicating with the said cavern cupier of the Priddy Minery, the surface soil thereof to at Wookey Hole, and capable of receiving and disthe extent of several feet in depth consisted of an charging, the one from seven to eight gallons of water artificial soil having minute particles of lead and also a minute, and the other rather more, and that water pieces of lead ore called slags intermixed with it, which passing into the said swallets at those times and on soil had before the time of living memory been brought those occasions, ran through these respective water from distant parts and deposited there by persons de- passages into the cavern at Wookey Hole, and from sirous of availing themselves of the water power ex-thence mingled with the stream flowing through the isting there to extract the slags from the soil and to smelt them. said cavern into the basin in the said lands of the plt. as its outlet, and from thence through the lands untoand into the mill of the plt.; and I further find that the deft, in the course of working the machinery so established by him, did, on various occasions and during considerable periods of time in the latter part of 1859 and in the early part of 1860, and subsequently, discharge large quantities of the muddy streams from thesaid pits through the said drains into the two swallets, and did by so doing on those occasions and during those These slags had before the time of living memory been smelted but partially only; and from about the year 1815 down to a period of ten years before the deft. became the possessor and occupier of the Priddy Minery, the Priddy Minery had been occupied by several persons in succession who were engaged in extracting these slags from the soil and smelting them over again. For ten years before the deft. became the possessor and occupier thereof the Priddy Minery had been un-periods foul and pollute the water running and flowing occu pied. Before the deft. became the possessor and occupier of the Priddy Minery the slags only had been extracted from the soil, and no process had been employed on the Priddy Minery for extracting from the soil the minute particles of lead intermixed with it; but in the years 1858 and 1859 the deft. for the first time established and subsequently worked on the Priddy Minery machinery for extracting from the soil the minute particles of lead intermixed with it. This machinery was of the following description, and was established and worked by the deft. at the following times and in the following manner : About Midsummer 1858 the deft. constructed six buddles on the Priddy Minery, and about the autumn of 1859 he constructed two other buddles on the Priddy Minery. These buddles consisted of circular pits, made in the surface of the ground, surrounded by a circular framework of wood of sufficient height to retain the water poured into the pits, with an upright post fixed in the centre of the pit, to which were attached horizontally revolving blades of wood, worked by hand or horse-power. The soil containing the particles of lead intermixed with it were brought to these buddles, and streams of water brought to the buddles, for this purpose, through artificial cuts made by the deft., were there poured upon the soil, and the soil and water were then stirred round the pits within the circular framework of wood by the action of the revolving blades of wood until the greater portion of the particles of lead contained in the soil was gathered to the centre of the pits, and there retained and extracted, and the refuse soil and water, having a small portion of lead intermixed with it, was discharged from the pits, in muddy streams, into drains outside the pits, which drains, at the times and on the occasions of the acts complained of, communicated with and led into two swallets on the Priddy Minery, known respectively from and out of the cavern into the basin in the landsof the plt., and from thence through the lands unto and into the mill of the plt., and render the same unfit for the use of the plt. in his business of a manufacturer of paper. The deft. had notice from the plt. and others, before he commenced working his said machinery, that the probable effect of his discharging the muddy streams from the said pits into the swallets of the Priddy Minery, would be to foul the waters running to the plt.'s lands and mill, and to render the same unfit for the use of the plt. in his business. It was contended on the part of the deft. that in the course of certain processes employed in the Priddy Minery for extracting the slags from the soil before the deft. became the possessor and occupier thereof, muddy water had from time immemorial been discharged into the said two swallets by those engaged in the said processes, and that, assuming the deft. to have fouled the water ruuning to the plt.'s lands and mill in manner herein before mentioned, a prescriptive right so to do had been acquired by the owners and occupiers of the Priddy Minery; but I find as a fact that muddy water had not been so discharged into the swallets or either of them in the course of the said processes, and that no such prescriptive right had been acquired, and that from time immemorial and during all the times the processes were so employed, and until the deft. established and worked the machinery, the water ran and flowed from and out of the cavern into the basin in the lands of the plt. and from thence through the lands unto and into the mill of the plt. in a pure and unpolluted state, and of good and proper quality for the use of the plt. and the preceding occupiers of the mill and lands in their business of paper manufacturers, and free from any fouling or pollution whatever. The point of law required by the parties to be stated for the opinion of the court is, whether under the cir Q. B.] Dimsdale v. LONDON, BRIGHTON AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY COMPANY. cumstances set forth this action is maintainable in law. [Q. B. cause an injury to his neighbour. The result of what he has done is that the polluted water did come and mingle with the stream of the plt., and thereby contaminated the water which the plt. had a right to have pure and unpolluted. This is both damnum and injuria for which an action will lie. I entirely agree in the distinction between the abstraction of water which would otherwise go to your neighbour and the pollution of water, as pointed out during the argument. Karslake (H. Lloyd with him) for the plt.-The plt. is possessed of an ancient mill, and entitled to the flow of a stream of water in a pure and proper state, which has a defined course from Wookey Cavern, and the deft. has no prescriptive right to do what he bas done. The question is, does it make any difference that the foul and polluted water finds its way from the swallet by natural underground channels into the stream which the plt. has a right to enjoy in its pure MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. Chaseand unpolluted state, and so fouls it? It is submitted more v. Richards and Smith v. Kenrick are distinguishthat it does not, and that the plt. is entitled to main-able. A man may be perfectly willing to receive on tain this action. Coleridge, Q.C. (Bere with him) for the deft. The plt. has no right of action. This case is within the principle of Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. of L. 319. The surface owner is entitled to that which is under the soil, and may dig to any extent he likes, though he thereby injures his neighbour by cutting off the supply of water that would otherwise come to his land. A riparian proprietor is only entitled to the water as it comes in its natural course to his land. [BLACKBURN, J.-This case is quite independent of the doctrines as to the rights of riparian proprietors and prescriptive rights to water.] If what the deft. has done amounts to a nuisance, or this stream be an ordinary watercourse from the cavern, it is admitted that the deft. cannot justify what he has done. [MELLOR, J. referred to Reg. v. The Metropolitan Board of Works, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 238.] It is submitted that the foul water having got into the stream by percolating through the intervening lands, the plt. has no right of action. [BLACKBURN, J. referred to Tennant v. Goldwin, 1 Salk. Is there not a great difference between cutting off water which has not reached your neighbour's land, and fouling water which will reach it? What the deft. did was a lawful user of his own. [MELLOR, J.-Is not this case like emitting offensive vapours into the air?] If part of the course which the foul water takes is percolation, the fouling is not actionable. If the injury is not done to the water quâ watercourse, it is not actionable. Smith v. Kenrick, 7 C. B. 515; Gale on Easements, 369. COCKBURN, C.J.-This differs from the case of Chasemore v. Richards, and falls within the class where the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas applies. In Chasemore v. Richards it was decided that, until the water rises to the service, the law gives no right to the party who would have had a right to it if it had come upon his land in the condition of a body of water either flowing or standing. But in this case the right of the plt. to the water cannot be disputed, and there is no doubt that it has been fouled and polluted by the act of the deft. It does not follow that, because after the water has been polluted it passes only for a short space over the surface and then percolates underneath, the same rule does not apply. The plt. was clearly entitled to have the water flow in its accustomed quantity and quality, and by the act of the deft. the plt.'s right to have the water so flow has been injuriously affected. I am clearly of opinion that that injury gives a right of action to the plt. BLACKBURN, J.-I am of the same opinion. Mr. Coleridge was right in saying that the deft. had a right to the water to wash the lead in, but then he had the dirty water to dispose of; and I take it that the law as laid down in Tennant v. Goldwin, 1 Salk. 361, applies that you must so use your own property as not to injure your neighbour; or, as it is there quaintly put, "he whose dirt it is must keep it, that it May not trespass." It was the duty of the deft. to see hat the foul water did not flow in such a way as to his premises pure water, but not polluted water. There appears to me to be a great distinction between this case and the abstraction of water as pointed out. Judgment for the plt. Thursday, May 28. DIMSDALE V. THE LONDON, Brighton and South Costs-County Court Acts-Detinue for a chattel. This was an action of trover and detinue for a portmanteau. At the trial, before Cockburn, C. J., at Guildhall, it appeared that the plt.'s wife, on coming up from Brighton to London by the defts.' railway with a small dog, was desired by a porter to pay for the dog, and as she had no money with her, but only a cheque, the porter offered to lend her 2s. 2d. to pay for the dog if she would leave her portmanteau to be sent up by the following train. This was agreed to, and the portmanteau was sent up by a later train, but in consequence of some mistake the portmanteau was not sent to the plt. for some days, when it was forwarded to the plt.'s residence, and a demand made of 3s. 8d., 2s. 2d. for the dog and 18. 6d. for warehouse rent and porterage. The plt. refused to pay this sum, and commenced an action against the company. The company afterwards offered the portmanteau on payment of 28. 2d. alone, but the plt. refused to take it. The jury found that the charge made by the company was unauthorised. The plt. was prepared with evidence to prove the value of the portmanteau, estimated at 25., but the portmanteau being in court, it was agreed between the parties, by their counsel, that it should be given up to the plt., and it was so given up on the contents being found all right. A verdict for the plt. for 40s. was then returned. The counsel for the plt. then asked the learned judge to certify for the plt. under 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 12, so as to entitle him to the full costs in the Superior Court, but the learned judge declined to do so. The plt.'s counsel then asked to have the value of the portmanteau found by the jury and added to the verdict, but it was too late, as some of the jury had left. Q. B.] CHARTERED BANK OF INDIA v. RICH. Bovill and Hannen showed cause, and contended that the plt. was not entitled to costs: [Q. B. A rule nisi having been obtained to tax the plt.'s | if that circumstance had been attended to at the time costs, the verdict would have been entered for a larger sum; but the question is, whether on this verdict of 40s. the plt. can get his costs. The case of Crosse v. Seaman is quite different. In that case money was paid into that the plt. got more than 20l. That being so, we I can only give the plt. the costs if his case comes Hatch v. Lewis, 7 H. & N. 367. Coleridge, Q.C. and J. O. Griffits in support of court, and consequently it appeared upon the record the rule : Crosse v. Seaman, 11 C. B. 524; Leader v. Rhys, 10 C. B., N. S., 369; 4 L. T. Rep. within the 4th section of 15 & 16 Vict. 54. This is N. S. 330; not a case where there is concurrent jurisdiction under Attorneys for the plt., Howard and Co. CHARTERED BANK OF INDIA v. RICH. Inspection of documents—Communications with a view to the action. 4 party in a cause is not entitled to inspect and take copies of correspondence between the opposite party and his agents, written with a view to the getting up of the opposite party's case. Rule nisi on the part of the deft. for leave to inspect and take copies of certain letters and answers written and received by the plts. to and from their agents. 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, ss. 11, 12; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 54, s. 4. COCKBURN, C. J.-I am of opinion that the rule must be discharged, upon the ground that this case does not come within the 4th section of the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 54, which alone gives the court jurisdiction to make the order sought for. I regret very much the miscarriage which has, practically, taken place, because, had it been present to my mind at the time that the verdict, although nominally a verdict for 40s., was in substance a verdict for 40s. plus the 251., the value of the portmanteau, I should have given the certificate. I refused to certify at the trial, because I felt, as every-penses in the Superior Court. Rule discharged. body must have felt who heard the case, that it was a most frivolous action. The whole matter in dispute between the plt. the owner of the portmanteau and the company was the sum of 1s. 6d. I do not know which party is most to blame, the plt. for bringing this action in the Superior Court practically for the sum of 1s. 6d., for he could have had the portmanteau at any time for the payment of that sum; or the company who drove him to this action, instead of giving up the portmanteau, and if they had any claim going into the County Court to recover it. If it had been then present to my mind, as it was afterwards brought to my notice, that the plt. might have taken a verdict for the value of the portmanteau (for he had a count in trover, and the conversion was not disputed at the Action against the deft., the late manager of the trial), but that, yielding to my suggestion, instead of branch of the deft.'s bank at Bombay, for breaches of taking the money value of the portmanteau and its duty while manager, and for giving credit and lending contents, he had put himself into the position of money to persons whom he ought not to have trusted, having a verdict for 40s. only, I should have felt that for advancing moneys and diccounting and renewing he ought not to be put in a worse position in conse-bills of exchange without taking proper securities, and quence of having taken so reasonable and proper a course. The company would have been in a much worse position if they had had a verdict against them for the value of the portmanteau, and had had the portmanteau with its contents, which would have been of no use to them; and I do not think it is gracious on their part, but quite the reverse, to take advantage of their position so acquired. But the question which we have to consider is, whether we can now interfere to prevent this miscarriage. The plt. might have had a new trial; but then he would have been in no better position, because he would have been condemned in the costs of the first trial. But I think we cannot assist him upon this rule, because the power is given to the court only in case the court is of opinion that there is sufficient reason for bringing the action in the court in which the action is brought. The defts. have given a proof of their opinion, by having the case tried by a special jury. But we cannot say that it is justifiable to bring an action in the Superior Court to determine when there is no question beyond a demand of 1s. 6d. It is impossible to say that this case comes within the 4th section of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 54, and therefore I think we cannot make this order. WIGHTMAN, J.-I am of the same opinion. BLACKBURN, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think that the case falls within the 11th section of 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61. It was argued on his behalf that, inasmuch as he got back his portmanteau, he recovered more than 40s.; but I think that it is impossible to say that, within the meaning of that section, he recovered anything beyond the amount of the verdict. It is true that the portmanteau was given up at the trial, and contrary to the orders of directors, and for the making incorrect and untrue returns respecting the business, &c., &c. The deft. entered into the plts.' service in 1857, and left it in April 1861. After this action had been commenced, and in due course, the deft. applied to the court, upon an affidavit stating that it was material for his defence that he should be furnished with the names of the persons alleged to be "unsubstantial," and particulars of the classes of persons to whom it was alleged that he advanced sums. of money in violation of the directions and orders of the company, and of the sums so advanced; and further, that during the time he was the agent of the company he made many advances to merchants in Bombay, and made many reports and statements and received and wrote many letters, and that he was necessarily ignorant of the precise matters to which the alleged misconduct related; that he had written. many letters to the company's manager and secretary in London, and in particular one so lately as March 1861; that certain other correspondence had also passed between him and Mr. A. Morrison, the present agent of the company in Bombay, especially a letter to Morrison in July 1861 (after the deft. had left the service of the company), and that in order to support his defence he required inspection of these documents and of the company's books of account, &c. The company's London manager made an affidavit in answer, stating that the action had reference to loans by the deft. of moneys of the bank to certain natives known as Womourow Ramchunder and others, and that deft. was well aware of this, and had copies of Q. B.] REG. v. WILLIAM WRIGHT. [Q. B. all letters on the subject; that Morrison had suc- | be tried in it, and it seems also that he should depose ceeded the deft. as the company's manager at Bom-in his affidavit to his having just ground to maintain bay, and that any correspondence between him and the deft. could not affect the defence in this action, as it was after the deft. had left the company's service, and after the matters in question; that the books, &c., containing entries relating to the deft.'s employment were in no way material to the defence. The secretary of the company also made an affidavit, setting forth in one schedule documents in their possession, the dates of which were prior to the deft. leaving their service, and in another schedule, documents dated after that time, and submitting to inspection as to the former, but disputing it as to the latter, though admitting them to relate to the matters in dispute," on the ground that they consisted of correspondence between the company and their present agent at Bombay (most of it under the advice of their attorney in the suit), relating to the evidence to be obtained in support of the action, and subsequent to the time when the deft. left the company's service. A rule nisi having been obtained for the deft. to inspect and take copies of the documents referred to in the affidavit of the plts.' manager, Lush and Watkin Williams showed cause against the rule. It is conceded that the deft. has a right to inspect and take copies of the affidavits in the first schedule, and no opposition will be offered to so much of the rule. But as to the documents in the second part of the schedule, the letters and answers seeking and giving information with the view of supporting the plts.' claim against the deft. in this action, it is submitted that the deft. is not entitled to their inspection. There is no precedent for such an inspection. The cases in Chancery stop short of allowing an inspection of documents or correspondence procured for the litigation. The deft. states no particular question of fact for which he desires an inspection: The London Gaslight Company v. Chelsea, 28 Flight v. Robinson, 8 Beav. 22; Madden v. Bean, 7 Beav. 729; Glynn v. Caulfield, 3 Mac. & Gor.; or defend it; secondly, the affidavit ought to state WIGHTMAN, J.-I am of the same opinion. BLACKBURN, J.-I am of the same opinion. I do not agree with Mr. Bovill that the deft. is entitled to an inspection of these documents unless they fall within privileged communications to the solicitor in the Lafone v. Falkland Islands Company, 4 Kay & case, or within some other rule which privileges them Johns. 34; Reid v. Langley, 1 Mac. & Gor. 627. Bartlett v. Lewis, 12 C. B., N. S.; 6 L. T. Rep. Mansell v. Phene, 2 Johns. & Hem. 320; 4 L. T. 3 Sim.; Parr v. Gillespie, 7 Beav. 572; Coleman v. Trueman, 3 H. & N. 871; Wigram on Discovery, 217, 2nd edit. COCKBURN, C. J.-I am of opinion that this rule should be discharged. The true doctrine as to discovery is very clearly and admirably stated by Pollock, C. B., in Hunt v. Hewitt, 7 Ex. 236. He says: “The right of a plt. in equity is limited, first to a discovery confined to a question in the cause; secondly, to such material documents as relate to the proof of the plt.'s case on the trial. It does not extend to the discovery of the manner in which the deft.'s case is to be established, or to evidence which relates exclusively to his case. The party applying therefore, who is in the same situation as a plt. in equity, must show, first, what is the nature of the suit and of the question to from inspection. The section in the C. L. P. A. does not mean that the courts of common law shall make the same order as a court of equity would. The common law courts are to consider whether the inspection is just and proper for the purposes of the cause, and they are to see whether they tend to elucidate some of the facts in the cause in the case of the party requiring inspection. We are to look then at the substance of the thing, and see if it is just for us to order the inspection in this case. We are not confined precisely to the facts stated in the affidavits; we may look at the nature of things, and see what must have been the facts, and exercise our discretion in determining whether the inspection will further the ends of justice in the particular case. I think that the communications in this case amount to rough instructions, from which the statement is to be gathered that is to be laid before the attorney to prosecute the action, and that it would be indiscreet to allow the deft. to inspect them. I therefore think that this rule should be discharged. Rule discharged. May 30 and June 3. REG. on the prosecution of PARISH OF FRANT (resps.) v. WILLIAM WRIGHT, Surveyor to Tonbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners (app.) Highway-Diversion-Local Act-Jurisdiction. This was an appeal from an order of quarter sessions confirming an order or certificate of two justices, for the diversion of a footway near Tonbridge Wells. The Wednesday, June 3. THE CHURCHWARDENS, &c. OF WELLINGTON (apps.) Under sect. 1 of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, an absence for Q. B.] CHURCHWARDENS, &c. OF WELLINGTON v. CHURCHWARDENS, &C. of Whitchurch. [Q. B. certificate showed, on the face of it, that the new footway was rather longer than the old way, but it was found that the new way was more commodious. The jury impannelled by the sessions, under sect. 89 of the General Highway Act, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, found that the new way was more commodious, and that the app. would not be aggrieved by the diversion; but the question of nearness was not found by them, and the chairman refused (although requested) to leave that question to the jury. The app. contended, first, that the question of nearness ought to have been left to the jury; and, secondly, that the certificate was bad on its face, because the reasons given for the commodiousness were speculative, and only affected a portion of the public; and, thirdly, that the justices had no jurisdiction, because the old way was within the limits of the Tonbridge Wells local Act, and the justices had been set in motion by the vestry of the parish of Frant. The quarter sessions overruled the two first objections, and granted a case for the Q. B. on the third objection. This case was then (by arrangement) stated under Baines's Act (12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 9), and the costs of the appeal (if the quarter sessions were bound to award costs) were to follow the event. The two first points were abandoned on the argument; but it may be observed that the Court (Cockburn, C. J., Blackburn and Mellor, JJ.) were quite prepared to overrule the case of R. v. Shiles, 1. Q. B. 919, on which the first point was grounded. Lush, Q. C. (with him Hurst and Conolly), for the resps. as to the third point, argued that as the old way was within the ambit of the Tonbridge Wells Local Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. cccxlix.), and the new way was without that ambit and within the parish of Frant; and that as the commissioners under the local Act (to whom the app. was the surveyor) had no power under their Act to divert ways, or to summon a meeting of the inhabitants of the district comprised within the Act, that therefore the power of diversion must remain with the justices, and that the vestry of Frant were the proper body to consent under sect. 84 of the General Highway Act. Bovill, Q. C. (with F. Russell and Thrupp), for the app., relied first, upon the 113th section of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, and pointed out that, by sects. 70, 72, 75, 77, 86, 87 and 88 of the Tonbridge Wells local Act, the old way was taken out of the parish of Frant, and put within the ambit or limits of that Act, and made repairable by the inhabitants of the Tonbridge Wells district created by that Act, and that the commissioners under that Act, and not the parish of Frant, were liable to be indicted in case of its non-repair; and that if the commissioners had no power to divert the way in question, was not for the court to rectify a casus omissus in the General Highway Act.(a) And secondly, he contended that under the 5th section of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, the inhabitants of the Tonbridge Wells district, and not the vestry of Frant parish, ought to have originated the proceedings before the justices, and that as by sect. 92 of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, the new way would have to be repaired by the district and not by the parish, the latter had really no interest whatever in the matter. Lush, in reply, contended that the 113th section was to be read reddendo singula et singulis, and only applied where the way could be diverted under the local Act (citing Reg. v. Paynter, 13 Q. B. 399), and that no machinery existed for adopting the construction of the 5th section contended for by the other side. The COURT, however, quashed the order upon the grounds that the app. had brought his case within both the 5th and 113th sections of the general Act. Order quashed. (a) This is now rendered immaterial by the new High way Act, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 61. 4A. B., who was residing with his family in a house in the parish of C. D., entered into a contract with certain parties to go to Cuba, and work in a mine there for three years. He accordingly went, and was absent two years and a-half, when he returned to his family, who were still residing in the same house. During his absence his family were regu larly supplied with money for their support out of his earnings: Held, that his absence under these circumstances constituted a break of residence. This was a case stated by consent under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, upon an order of removal of William Brooks and his family from the parish of Whitchurch, Devon-shire, to the parish of Wellington, Somersetshire. The case stated as follows: "The pauper William Brooks is by occupation a miner, and is now about thirty-six years of age, and in Nov. 1847 he married Elizabeth his present wife, by whom he has six children. At the time of the pauper's said marriage he resided in the parish of Buckland Monachorum, in the county of Devon, and he continued to reside in that parish about five years after his said marriage, and then, namely in or about the year 1852, removed from Buckland Monachorum with his wife and children into the parish of Whitchurch, in the county of Devon aforesaid, to reside, and took a house and premises at a place called Horrabridge in that parish, and resided and inhabited therein with his wife and family continuously until the month of May 1859, a In the month of April period of about seven years. 1859 the pauper William Brooks entered into an engagement, by contract or agreement in writing, with a London company to go to the Cobre mines in the island of Cuba, to work for them there for a period of three years, a copy of which contract or agreement accompanies this case, and is to be taken as part thereof. It was part of his agreement with the company that they should allow his wife and family 5. per month, as will be seen from the 6th paragraph of the contract. The pauper states that it was always his intention to return to England to his wife and family at the expiration of such three years. pauper went to Cuba, according to his agreement, in the month of May 1859, leaving his wife and children at Horrabridge aforesaid inhabiting the same house wherein they had resided during the previous seven years, and his said wife and family received their allowance from the said company according to the stipulations contained in the contract or agreement regularly for about one year and five months. The pauper became ill whilst in Cuba, and was admitted into a hospital there, for a period of about four months, and about the month of Oct. 1860 a disagreement arose between him and the manager of the mine, in consequence of which the allowance to his wife and family in England was discontinued, and no more money was sent to her by the company at all, but in the following month of Feb. 1861 the pauper himself The made a remittance to his wife of 20%. out of his own money, and she received it in April 1861, and this was the last money she received either from her husband or company. In the month of Sept. 1861, the wife the |