In support of his title, the only writ he produced or founded on was a disposition dated on 24th September last, a few days before the Sheriff disposed of his claim by rejecting it; but it was pleaded that the disposition bears that the claimant's term of entry was at Whitsunday 1853. The Sheriff, however, held, I think rightly, that this was not enough to satisfy the requirements of section 7 of the Reform Act, as the claimant could not be held to have been in law the owner (whatever may have been his possession) of the subjects, so long as he was not in a situation to be able to found on writing of some sort as his title. The decision of the Sheriff in this case will therefore fall to be affirmed. 2d Class-In this class are the cases of Adam Black and William Nichol. These contain a statement of some facts, but so mixed up with the setting out of the argument or pleading of the parties, and the opinion or pleading of the Sheriff, and, above all, with notes of evidence, that I find it impossible to understand upon what the Sheriff actually proceeded, or upon what this Court could now with safety proceed. It rather appears to me that the Sheriff's judgment is rested partly on what is stated ascertained facts, and partly on his notes of evidence; but as this Court, for the reasons explained in disposing of the Linlithgowshire appeals, is not entitled to review evidence for the purpose of ascertaining facts, I feel myself compelled to come to the conclusion that these two appeals, forming Class 2d, must be dismissed as not containing a special case in terms of the statute; and in regard to the questions of law which are said to have been decided by the Sheriff in these two cases, I am of course precluded from giving any opinion. 3d Class-In this class, the cases in which, as presented to this Court, appear to me to be plainly and indisputably disconform to the statutory requirements, are the appeals of George Melville, Sir John Forrest, Robert Scott, William R. Park, and Robert Paton. In these cases, besides other defects, we have no statement of the facts at all, there being nothing but a short note of the argument or pleadings of the parties, and the opinion thereon of the Sheriff. For the reasons stated by me in disposing of the appeals from Linlithgowshire, I think the Court has no alternative but also to dismiss these appeals from Selkirkshire, in respect that no special case has been prepared and presented in terms of the statute. In regard to the questions of law which are said to have been decided by the Sheriff in the cases which I propose should now be dismissed, I neither offer nor can offer any opinion.

Lord Mackenzie concurred in the opinion given by Lord Ormidale.

English Cases.

LEGACY DUTY.-Testator gave the residue of his personal estate to trustees upon trust to set apart L.10,000 consols, and pay the dividends to his sister for life, and after her decease to retain so much of the said sum of L.10,000 as should be sufficient to realize the clear yearly income of L.150; and he directed the trustees to pay the dividends and other income of the stock so directed to be retained by them to his nephew. It was held, the nephew took the annuity subject to legacy duty.-(Banks v. Braithwaite, 32 L. J., Ch. 35.)

SALE. To an action for goods bargained and sold, for goods sold and delivered, and upon accounts stated, defendant pleaded, that the claim of plaintiff was in respect of L.721, 17s. 6d., the price of 500 bags of rice, agreed to be sold by plaintiff to defendant, to be equal to sample; that a difference arose as to whether or not the rice was equal to the sample, and that in consideration that defendant would at once pay L.681, 17s. 6d., being the whole of the price, and the whole of the claim of plaintiff, except L.40, which defendant claimed as a deduction in consequence of the alleged inferiority of the rice, plaintiff agreed that the said sum of L.40 should be deposited in the hands of B. and Co., to be held by them in trust for plaintiff and defendant, until the said difference was adjusted between the parties. That defendant performed his agreement, and paid to plaintiff the said sum of L.681, 17s. 6d., and deposited the said sum of L.40 in the hands of B. and Co., awaiting the adjustment of the difference, which was still pending. That defendant had always been ready and willing to do and concur in all acts and matters necessary to bring the said differences to an adjustment according to the said agreement. This was held a good plea, as amounting to a special plea of payment. Wightman, J.: There may be some technical difficulty in holding that this is a good plea; but it seems to me that as far as the original cause of action is concerned, it amounts, by necessary implication, to a plea of payment. The defendant has paid the whole amount of money which was due to the plaintiff himself, and partly to the trustees. I do not speak without some doubt; but although there may be a different cause of action, in case of any difficulty in getting the money, I think that the plea amounts to a special plea of payment.-(Page v. Meek, 32 L. J., Q. B. 4.)

PATENT.-A patent having been granted for an invention for the purification of gas by means of precipitated or hydrated oxides of iron, the specification stating the mode of obtaining such oxides, the use of a natural substance containing precipitated oxide of iron was held not to be an infringement of the patent; but upon this substance being revivified in the manner described in the specification, an injunction to restrain the use of the substance so revivified was granted.-(Hills v. the Liverpool United Gaslight Co., 32 L. J., Ch. 28.)

LARCENY.-It was the duty of a postman, on returning from his round, to bring back to the post-office any letters which he had failed to deliver. A letter with coin in it having, on one occasion, been given to him with other letters to deliver, he detained the money letter with the intention of stealing it. On his return from his round, he brought back to the office the pouch containing some letters which he had been unable to deliver, but said nothing about the money letter. Shortly afterwards, it having been ascertained that the money letter had not been delivered, inquiry was made of the postman, and he produced it unopened from his trousers pocket. It was held, the postman was guilty of stealing the letter.-(R. v. Poynton, 32 L. J., M. C. 29.)

LARCENY.-A boy having found a cheque that had been lost, the prisoner by some pretence got it from him and retained it, in hopes of getting a reward; but the owner not offering a sufficiently large reward, he refused to deliver it either to the owner or the boy; and it was held the prisoner was not guilty of larceny. (R. v. Gardner, 32 L. J., M. C. 35.)

LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT.-A railway company having taken land which was the subject of a suit, and paid the money into court, the parties obtained an order for re-investing a large portion of the money in land. They then applied by petition for a small portion of the remaining fund to be invested, and they served all the parties to the suit. The Court considering this purchase to be for the benefit of the parties, and neither capricious nor unnecessary, it was held, the railway company must pay the costs.-(Brandon v. Brandon, 32 L. J., Ch. 20.)

LEGACY DUTY.-Testator, who died in 1811, by his will, gave all his freehold and copyhold lands to his three nieces, as tenants in common in fee simple, sub

ject to certain provisos in case of marriage, with the further proviso that his nephew should have the option of becoming the purchaser of the whole in fee simple at the rate or price of L.10,000 L.3 per cent. consols; and that upon his said nephew investing the sum of L.10,000 consols in the names of himself and other trustees to be appointed by his said nieces, that then and from thenceforth the use in the said will before limited to his said nieces in the said lands should absolutely cease and determine, and the said lands should forthwith be and enure to the only absolute use of his nephew; and that then and from thenceforth his said nieces should, on request of his said nephew, convey the said lands to the use of his said nephew. And the testator further declared that his said nephew and such other persons should thenceforth stand possessed of the said L.10,000 L.3 per cent. consols in trust for his said three nieces, and that after the marriage of all of them, or the death of the survivor of them, the said trustees should transfer the said principal L.10,000 to his said nieces and their respective executors, administrators and assigns, in three equal shares. The nephew, in the year 1812, having exercised the option given him by the testator's will, entered into the possession of the estates, and forthwith thereupon transferred the sum of L.10,000 consols into the names of himself and two others as trustees for the testator's said nieces. The said nephew survived both his co-trustees, and died, leaving the defendant, his only son and heir-at-law and executor under his will, him surviving, who proved his father's will, and thereby became sole trustee of the said L.10,000 consols upon the trusts declared by the testator's will. It was held, that a duty at the rate of L.2, 10s. per cent. upon the said sum of L.10,000 consols became payable upon the transfer thereof into the names of the trustees as directed by the said will, and that the defendant was liable for that duty.-(The Attorney-General v. Wyndham, 32 L. J., Ex. 1.)

PAYMENT OUT OF COURT.-Where a petition is presented for payment of money out of Court merely, and similar successive applications will have to be made, leave will be granted to make such future applications to the Judge in chambers.-(Winkworth v. Winkworth, 32 L. J., Ch. 40.)

SHIP AND SHIPPING.-Bags of meal, 1670 in number, all marked S.S.C.M., Some weighing 12 stones, some 8 stones, were shipped on board defendant's ship, and stowed indiscriminately. Defendant, the master, signed two bills of lading in respect of two different portions of this cargo, one of which described the property intended to pass under it thus: 467 bags meal, gross 35 tons 9 cwt., under the subjoined marks, S.S.C.M.' It also added, 'Contents unknown, and not responsible for weight,' etc. It was held by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment below, that under this bill of lading defendant was bound to deliver 467 of the 12-stone bags, as the description of the weight given in the bill of lading could only be satisfied by all the bags delivered being of the larger size. Wightman, J.: It may be that the weight of those bags would not be exactly that mentioned in the bill of lading, and that the provision in the memorandum would protect the captain from being responsible, if the bags were not full weight; but the mention of the weight in the contract is important, for the purpose of indicating to which bags the contract applied.-(Bradley v. Dunipace (Ex. Ch.), 32 L. J., Ex. 22.)

BANKRUPTCY.-By section 184 of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, no creditor having security for his debt shall receive upon such security more than a rateable part of such debt, except in respect of any lien upon any part of the property of such bankrupt, before the date of the fiat or the filing of a petition for adjudication of bankruptcy. The defendant, in an action upon a bill of exchange, obtained an order for a commission to examine witnesses abroad. It was made a condition that he should pay L.100 into court, which he did, and subsequently a petition for adjudication of bankruptcy was filed against him. The plaintiff went on with the action, and recovered a verdict for more than L.100. It was held, that plaintiff was entitled to have the L.100

paid out to him, for that he was not a creditor having security for his debt within the 184th section, and by Blackburn, J., and Mellor, J., that he had a lien upon the L.100 within the meaning of the section.—(Murray v. Arnold, 32 L. J., Q. B. 11.)

BILL OF EXCHANGE.—Where an indorser of a bill of exchange, who has had no notice of dishonour, on being told that the holders are about to take proceedings against him on the bill, says he will pay it if they will give him time,that is evidence from which a jury may infer that he has waived the right to notice. Blackburn, J.: Where a promise to pay is made by an indorser of a bill, with full knowledge of the facts,-being, I mean, aware that he has had no notice of dishonour,-that is equivalent to saying he will not take advantage of the want of notice; in other words, is a waiver; and this I take to be the established law, subject to the qualification given in the text-books.-(Woods v. Dean, 32 L. J., Q. B. 1.)

RENUNCIATION OF EXECUTOR.-An executor cannot renounce after he has taken probate. An executor under the will of a testator domiciled in Portugal accepted the executorship in that country, and also obtained probate in England. Becoming afterwards, through age and infirmity, incapable of acting, a competent Portuguese tribunal permitted him to renounce the executorship, and appointed A. to act as executor in his stead. Upon application for a grant to A. of administration de bonis non, with the will annexed, it was held, the renunciation of the executor, though sanctioned by the law of Portugal, could not be recognised in this country, and that A. therefore was not entitled to the grant prayed. (In the goods of Veiga, 32 L. J., Pr. and M. 9.)

.

SHIP AND SHIPPING.-Plaintiff was charterer of a ship under a charter-party, by which the ship was placed at the disposal of plaintiff for a certain time; the owners to appoint, victual, and pay the master and officers of the ship; the cargo 'to be taken on board and discharged by the charterers, the crew of the vessel rendering customary assistance, so far as they may be under the orders of the master, and the charterers are to have liberty to appoint stevedores and labourers to assist in the loading, stowage, and discharge thereof, but such stevedores and labourers being under the control and direction of the master; the charterers are not in any case to be responsible to the owners for damage or improper stowage.' And by another clause, the master and the owners of the ship shall devote the same attention to the cargo, shall use the same endeavours to promote despatch, and shall in every respect be and remain responsible to all whom it may concern, as if the said ship was loading and discharging her cargoes and performing her voyages for account of the said owners and independently of this charter-party.' It was held, that under this charter-party the owners were responsible for improper stowage. Williams, J.: At first I thought that this case was very like that of Blaikie v. Stembridge, and was governed by it. But I am satisfied now that that case ought to have no influence at all in deciding this. In that case it was stipulated that the stevedore should be appointed by the charterer, but that he should be paid by and act under the master's orders. It was there held, that the master was not liable for damage to the cargo arising from the negligence of the stevedore, notwithstanding the clause that the stevedore was to be under his orders.' But between that case and this there is this important distinction, that here a clause is added, that 'the charterers are not in any case to be responsible for improper stowage.'— Sack v. Ford, 32 L. J., C. P. 12.)

FIREWORKS.-A person who manufactures and keeps fog-signals, being tin cases filled with gunpowder, and fitted with nipples and percussion caps, upon premises within the distances specified by 23 & 24 Vict., c. 139, s. 6, and for which premises he has not a licence under section 11, is liable to the penalty imposed by section 7. And, by Wightman, J., fog-signals come within the term 'fireworks' in the Act (Bliss v. Lilley, 32 L. J., M. C. 3.)

THE

JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE.

INSANITY AS A DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. THE recent trial of Alexander Milne for murder has attracted a good deal of attention, both on the part of the public and of the legal and medical professions, to the plea of insanity as stated in defence to a prosecution for crime. We propose to consider the plea shortly from all these points of view, and shall endeavour, in the first place, to show how the law of Scotland now regards it; and in the second place, to make some suggestions which the state of the law appears to demand for the public protection.

In the first place, the plea of insanity may be stated generally to be, that, in respect of the pannel's state of mind at the time of the commission of the act complained of, he was not responsible for having committed it. We are aware that this carries the matter but a very small way. It is, however, exceedingly important to start from a point in regard to which there can scarcely be any dispute.

Let us now consider, 1. the state of mind which will ground this plea; and, 2. the proper time and manner of proving it.

1. The state of mind which will ground the plea of insanity.Our great institutional writer, Baron Hume, does not, it must be confessed, give any very certain sound in his well-known passage as to the nature of this plea. To serve the purpose of a defence in law,' he says (Hume i. 37), 'the disorder must therefore amount to an absolute alienation of reason,-"ut continua mentis alienatione, omni intellectu careat;" such a disease as deprives the patient of the true aspect and position of things about him, hinders him from distinguishing friend from foe, and gives him up to the impulse of his own distempered fancy.' He then goes on to consider whether

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