English Cases.

LEGACY.-Testator bequeathed a legacy to M. V. in case she should be in his service at his decease. Testator was shortly afterwards removed to a lunatic asylum; and M. V., who was a yearly servant, voluntarily quitted the house, receiving from the family her wages up to the end of the year, which did not expire till after the death of the testator. It was held, she was not entitled to the legacy.-(Re Serres's Estate; Venes v. Marriott, 31 L. J., Ch. 519.)

REVOCATION. The signatures of the attesting witnesses to a will being an essential part of the will, the tearing them off by the testator animo revocandi revokes the will. Where a will, of which the testator has the custody, is found so mutilated after his death, the presumption is, that the mutilation was the act of the testator, done animo revocandi.—(Evans v. Dallow; and In the goods of Dallow, 31 L. J., Pr. and M. 128.)

REVOCATION.- -A testator destroyed his will, believing that it had already been revoked by a later will, which was, in fact, invalid; and the only evidence of his object in destroying it was a declaration made at the time that it was no use to keep it, as he had another. It was held that the will was not revoked. Sir C. Cresswell: According to the statute 1 Vict., c. 26, sec. 20, a will may be revoked by the burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the same by the testator, etc., with the intention of revoking the same.' The act done without the intention is ineffectual. Here the intention was wanting; for, according to the evidence, he imagined that the revocation had been already accomplished, and because it had been accomplished, and not for the purpose of accomplishing it, the act of destruction was done. For this reason, I pronounce for the draft propounded.-(Clarkson v. Clarkson, 31 L. J., Pr. and M. 143.)

PATENT. The construction of a specification, as the construction of all other written instruments, belongs to the Court; but the explanation of the words or technical terms of art, the phrases used in commerce, and the proof and results of the processes which are described (and in a chemical patent the ascertainment of chemical equivalents) are matters of fact upon which evidence may be given, contradictory testimony may be adduced, and upon which it is the province and right of a jury to decide. In the comparison of two specifications, each of which is filled with terms of art, and with the description of technical processes, the duty of the Court is confined to giving the legal construction of such documents taken independently; but the comparison of the two instruments, and ascertaining whether the words as interpreted by the Court, and contained in one specification, do or do not denote the same external matter as the words, as interpreted and explained by the Court, contained in the other specification, is a matter of fact, and within the province of a jury.—In a question of the novelty of a patent, the antecedent statement in the prior patent must be such that a person of ordinary knowledge of the subject would at once perceive, understand, and be able practically to apply the discovery without the necessity of making further experiments and gaining further information before the invention can be made useful.-(Hills v. Evans, 31 L. J, Ch. 457.)

BOTTOMRY BOND.-To render valid a bottomry bond where communication is practicable between the port of distress and the owner, it is not sufficient that the owner should be made aware of the disaster which has happened to his ship; he should also be informed of the intention to hypothecate.-In considering an objection to a bottomry bond on ship and cargo, by owners of cargo, upon the ground that the master had not communicated with the owner of the cargo before giving the bonds, the Court will consider the probable effect of the delay arising from such communication, and not only whether it was possible, but also whether it was reasonable and practicable, for the master or the lender of the money to have any such communication with the owner or consignee of the cargo before entering into the bond. Where money has been advanced upon bottomry of a British ship and her cargo, the owner of the cargo so hypothecated has his right of action for all costs and charges against the owner of the ship. (The Olivier, 31 L. J., Pr. M. and A. 137.)

BILL OF EXCHANGE.-The acceptance of a bill of exchange per pro.' acts as an express notice to the party taking the bill that the authority of the agent is limited, and the holder of such a bill cannot maintain an action against the principal, if the agent has exceeded his authority. Byles, J.: The words 'per pro.' are an express statement by the person using them, that he acts under a limited authority, and a person taking a bill so accepted takes it at his peril. This was solemnly decided in Alexander v. Mackenzie in this Court, and that decision was recognised by the Lord Chief-Justice Jervis, in the case of Grant v. Norway, 20 L. J., C. P. 93. This mode of signature is recognised by mercantile persons, both in this country and elsewhere, as the legitimate way of informing a person that the bill is accepted by virtue of a special authority.-(Stagg v. Elliott, 31 L. J., C. P. 260.)

NEGLIGENCE.-Defendants, proprietors of certain docks, for the use of which they were entitled to tolls, opened them for public use to all vessels of a certain size before the low-water basin was completed, and while a bar of earth remained across a large part of it, dangerous to navigation, not visible at high tide, not in any manner marked by buoys, and which, by the exercise of reasonable care on the part of defendants, might have been removed before. Plaintiffs' yessel, which was under the size limited, and had entered the docks and loaded her cargo, on coming out into the basin, was driven upon the bar and wrecked, without any negligence or mismanagement on the part of plaintiffs or of the crew, or of the pilot who had been engaged to take the vessel out. The pilot knew of the bar, but plaintiffs did not. Defendants held to be liable for the injury to the ship, as they were guilty of negligence in not having taken reasonable care, while they kept the basin open for the public use, that those who chose to navigate it might do so without danger. And held, further, assuming the knowledge of the pilot to be the knowledge of the plaintiffs, that knowledge of the existence of the bar did not disentitle plaintiffs to recover, as it was not found by the jury that it was an act of imprudence on their part, if they had such knowledge, to attempt to navigate the vessel out.—(Thompson v. The NorthEastern Rail, Co., 31 L. J,, Q. B. 194.)

BANKRUPTCY.-A deed of partnership contained a proviso, that a withdrawing partner should not be entitled to credit for the value of the lease of certain mines vested in a trustee for all the partners in shares, according to the capital contributed by them respectively, but that the account to be taken should consist only of his share in the assets of the partnership other than the value of the lease, and that, in the event of bankruptcy of any partner, an account should be taken of his share and interest in the mines, except the value of the lease, which was not to be taken into account. One of the partners having become bankrupt, it was held that such a stipulation was a fraud upon the Bankrupt Laws, and void as against the assignees in bankruptcy.—(Whitmore v. Mason, 31 L. J., Ch. 433.)

SETTLEMENT.-By a marriage settlement, a provision was made for the wife out of real and personal estate, and it was declared that such provision was in lieu of dower or thirds. The husband having died intestate, it was held that the provision was in satisfaction of dower out of real estate and thirds of personalty, and the wife could claim nothing under the Statute of Distributions.— (Thompson v. Watts, 31 L. J., Ch. 445.)

TRUSTEE, LIABILITY OF.-The liability of a trustee as a contributory will not be limited to the extent of the trust estate. A transferee of shares, having taken upon himself the character of owner, cannot rely upon any irregularities in the transfer to escape liability, whether the shares belong to him beneficially or as trustee. Ex parte Hall distinguished. Wood, V. C. The question is, whether the trustees are properly on the list of contributories at all, and I think, by accepting dividends, they have waived any irregularity by reason of the non-execution by them of the deeds; and by signing the receipts as trustees, they have admitted themselves to be owners of the shares, and not mere agents for the receipt of the dividends. The word trustees' on the register merely shows that they had no beneficial interest. In Hall's case, Lord Cottenham held, upon the facts, that nothing had been done to fix the character of assignee upon the person it was sought to make a contributory. A deed professing to assign the owner's interest was executed, but there was no transfer; and though the fact of the assignment was communicated to the company, it was sworn that this was only done for the purpose of cautioning them against paying the dividends to the party to whom they might otherwise have been paid. This clearly establishes a distinction between Hall's case and the present, and at the same time shows that if he had signed as trustee he would have been considered the owner. In this case these gentlemen have accepted the position of legal owners, and have been treated as such by the company. They cannot, after accepting dividends, take advantage of the irregularity by reason of the non-execution of the deeds; and I hold that their names must be put upon the list of contributories without qualification. -(Re the Phoenix Life Assurance Co.; Hoare's case, 31 L. J., Ch. 504.)

CHILDREN.-Ruled by the House of Lords, that though the word 'children' in its primary sense is to be read as a word of purchase, and to be confined to issue in the first degree, yet the interpretation of the word is subordinate to the intention to be collected from the rest of the will, and it may be converted into a word of limitation, and interpreted heirs of the body.' The Lord Chancellor: I find the word children' has been established by decision to be a word of flexible meaning. It is treated as such in Wylde's case, for there the meaning to be attributed to the word is made to depend upon extrinsic circumstances existing at the time of the devise. If there be children in existence, it is held primarily to indicate those children. If there be no children in existence, then it is held to quit its character of a word of purchase, and so become a word of limitation. But the operation of the word, by the effect of external circumstances, may be equally produced by the effect of other language contained in the instrument.-—(Byng v. Byng (House of Lords), 31 L. J., Ch. 470.)

INFANT. Where a Roman Catholic father (who lived till his eldest child was seven years old) allowed the mother, who was a Protestant, to have the exclusive charge of the education of the children during his life, and they were with his full knowledge brought up in the Protestant faith, he was held to have abnegated his right to direct the religious education of his children; and the Court, in ordering a scheme to be settled for their education, disregarded a direction in his will, that they should be brought up in the Roman Catholic faith.-(Hill v. Hill, 31 L. J., Ch. 505.)

MARINE INSURANCE.-Plaintiffs shipped at London for Bombay certain iron rails, freight to be paid here, ship lost or not lost.' They paid the freight;

and by a policy in the common form insured for the voyage the rails, ' valued at L.4500,' etc., warranted free from particular average unless the ship be stranded, wrecked, or burnt.' The policy contained the usual clause, that the assured might sue, labour, and travail for and about the defence, safety, and recovery of the goods insured at the charge of the underwriters. The ship sailed, but owing to storms at sea, was forced to put into Plymouth, so much injured as to be unable to continue her voyage, and to be not worth repairing; but she was neither stranded, sunk, nor burnt.' The rails were landed safe and uninjured, and plaintiffs then sent them on to Bombay in other ships, for the freight of which they had to pay L.825. It was held, that the underwriters were not liable to pay this sum, as by the policy they were exempt from particular average, which included it; and that it could not be recovered under the labour and travail clauses, as that was limited in its application to expenses incurred when the goods insured were in peril to save them from loss, and the expenses in question were incurred when the goods were in no peril at all, but safe in the owner's hands.-(The Great Indian Peninsular Rail. Co. v. Saunders, 31 L. J., Q. B. 206.)

LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT.-Unfinished houses standing upon a piece of land, which, when they were completed, was to be apportioned between them as gardens, are within the 8 & 9 Vict., c. 18, s. 92, and a railway company cannot compulsorily take a part of the land without bringing themselves under a liability to purchase and take the whole of the land and the unfinished houses. (Alexander v. The West End of London and Crystal Palace Rail. Co., 31 L. J., Ch. 500.)

TRUST AND TRUSTEE.-Testator directed his trustees out of the rents and profits of his estates to keep insured and to repair all the messuages, buildings, and erections upon the hereditaments previously limited, in trust for his wife for life, during the continuance of her interest therein, and also during the same period to pay and defray all taxes, parliamentary, parochial, and otherwise, affecting the same hereditaments or any of them. It was held, that, under this clause, the trustees were bound to pay the property and income tax. Kindersley, V. C. There is nothing illegal in a direction by will, that certain persons having control over the property shall defray all the taxes, and it is a provision capable of being carried out. If this is not the right view, then the words used in the will would not exempt the defendant from any other tax than the land tax, which I do not think the testator could have intended; and the only way, therefore, of carrying out his intention is, to hold that the trustees are liable to pay the income and property tax. The defendant is exempt from whatever tax a landlord would be liable to pay, and also from whatever is paid for the value of the occupation. Whatever is payable in respect of her beneficial interest in the lands in question, is payable by the trustees.-(Lovat v. The Duchess of Leeds, 31 L. J., Ch. 508.)

GUARANTEE.-Defendant, having recovered judgment in the County Court against plaintiff's brother, and a fi. fa. having issued against the goods of the latter, requested a clerk in the Registrar's office to write to the High Bailiff, that he (defendant) would contest any claim that might be made by any third person claiming the goods at the address given on the back of the execution, and that he (defendant) desired the High Bailiff should be so informed, in order that the officer who levied would not in any way be deterred from putting the warrant in force by reason of any party setting up a claim. The officer having seized some of plaintiff's goods, besides those belonging to plaintiff's brother, at the address given on the back of the execution, plaintiff, without giving notice, under section 138 of 9 & 10 Vict., c. 95, brought his action against the defendant for damages for trespass and conversion; and it was held, the letter written by defendant's request to the High Bailiff of the County Court was merely a direction to the officer to do his duty, and did not render defendant

liable to plaintiff for a mistake of the officer who levied.—(Cronshaw v. Chapman, 31 L. J., Ex. 277.)

GUNPOWDER.-Under section 11 of 12 Geo. III., c. 61, which provides, that no person shall have or keep at any one time, being a dealer in gunpowder, more than 200 lb. of gunpowder, and not being such more than 50 lb. in any house, warehouse, etc., occupied by the same person, the mere having in possession, for a temporary purpose, more than the specified quantity of gunpowder, does not necessarily bring the case within this section.-(Biggs v. Mitchell, 31 L. J., Q. B. 169, M. C. 163.)

ARBITRATION-By a judge's order, after issue joined, an action was referred to a lay arbitrator, who by his award ordered that there should be a verdict for plaintiff for L.7, 9s. 11d.' It was held, that although there was no power to enter a verdict, the award was good, and an action maintainable upon it; for the award must be read as an expression of the arbitrator's opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to the sum mentioned, and not as an award that a verdict should be entered for that sum.-(Everest v. Ritchie, 31 L. J., Ex. 350.)

RAILWAYS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT.-The owner of land, granting to a railway company the right to make and maintain a tunnel through his land, is in the same position, with respect to his right to work mines under the 77th and 78th sections of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1815, as if the company had actually purchase i the land; and the rule that a grantor cannot derogate from his own grant does not apply.-(The London and North-Western Rail. Co. v. Acroyd, 31 L. J., Ch. 588.)

EQUITABLE LIEN.-Where A. B., in consideration of a sum of money to be advanced to him by C. D., to enable him to complete a railway contract, agreed to give C. D. a share in the profits of the contract, and C. D. advanced a portion only of the stipulated sum, he and those claiming under him were by one of the Vice-Chancellors declared to have a lien on the profits derived by A. B. under the contract for the amount of the money advanced and interest; but, upon appeal, this decision was reversed, and the bill, which was filed by the assignee of C. D., was dismissed, with costs.-(Twynam v. Hudson, 31 L. J., Ch. 577.)

CONTRACT. On the 9th of July, B., by his agent, contracted to carry goods for A. by his ship, the shipment to commence on the 1st of August. On the 21st of July, B. wrote to A. denying the authority of his agent to make the contract. A. answered that he should hold B. responsible for breach of contract, and that if he did not next day withdraw his letter, A. would make other arrangements for carrying the goods. B. reiterated that there was no contract made, and proposed another contract, and stated that if that was not acceded to he should send his ship on another voyage. On this, A. made arrangements. with C. to carry his goods, but did not sign any contract with C. until the 2d of August. On the 1st of August, B. wrote to A. stating that the ship was ready to receive A.'s goods, but A. declined then to send them. Held by the Ex.-Ch., that B. having absolutely refused to perform the contract before the time for performance came, it was at the option of A. to treat that refusal as a breach of contract; that A. might sue B. for the damage received by such breach; and that B. had no cause of action against A. for the refusal to send the goods by B.'s ship.-(The Danube and Black Sea Railway and Kustendjie Harbour Co. v. Xenos; and Xenos v. The Danube and Black Sea Railway and Kustendjie Harbour Co., 31 L. J., C. P. 284.)

TRUSTEE, LIABILITY OF.-A box, containing securities of the Spanish Government, the property in which passed by delivery, was deposited at a bank, in the names of three trustees. The Spanish Government having afterwards made proposals for a change in the securities, one of the three trustees, who was a