CALLS. To an action for calls on shares in a joint-stock company, registered under the Joint-Stock Companies Act, 1856, and having Table B. as the articles of its association, it is no answer that the shares were taken on the faith of a representation in the memorandum of association that the capital was to be a certain named sum, and that the intended capital was not and could not be raised, and only a small and insignificant number of shares taken, insufficient to carry on the business of the company, and that defendant never assented to the business being commenced or carried on with the shares taken. Pollock, C. B. This company has been formed and registered, and it is an existing company. Then, if you take shares in a company, not guarding against the liability to be called on to pay the calls, you are liable to pay them, unless expressly exempted. The question then arises, Does the Act of Parliament create any exemption? I can find none. On the contrary, under Table B., the governing body is entitled to make calls the moment the company is established; and the reason of that is, the subscribers for shares become liable to pay any call upon the shares subscribed for among themselves.-(The Ornamental Woodwork Co. (Lim.) v. Brown, 32 L. J., Ex. 191.)

CHARTER-PARTY.-Declaration on a charter-party, made at Liverpool by the plaintiff as captain and the defendant as charterer,That the ship shall take a full and complete cargo, and proceed to Sydney, and deliver it there in the usual manner, agreeably to bills of lading; in consideration whereof, the charterer shall pay, for the use and hire of the vessel in respect of the said voyage, L.1550 in full, on condition of her taking a cargo of not less than 1000 tons; payment to be made as follows, viz., the captain to receive the freight payable abroad as per bills of lading, and the balance to be paid in cash on delivery.' Averment, that all conditions were performed, and all things happened necessary to entitle the plaintiff to maintain the action. Breach, that defendant did not pay the balance of L.1550, over and above the freight payable abroad as per bills of lading. Plea, that the ship did not, nor could, take a cargo of not less than 1000 tons pursuant to the condition, but could and did only take a very much less cargo. It was held, on demurrer, that if the ship's taking a cargo of not less than 1000 tons was originally a condition precedent, defendant could not plead it in bar to the action, having had a substantial part of the consideration for his promise to pay.—(Pust v. Dowie, 32 L. J., Q. B. 179.)

CHEQUE.-A draft payable to order is not rendered void by being post-dated; the provisions of 55 Geo. III., c. 184, s. 13, and 21 & 22 Vict., c. 20, being applicable only to drafts payable to bearer. The holder without indorsement of a draft payable to order, though taken by him bonâ fide and for value, has no better title than the person from whom he took it; and such holder is affected by fraud, of which he has notice before he obtains the formal indorsement.(Whistler v. Forster, 32 L. J., C. P. 161.)

COPYRIGHT.-If a print, the copyright of which is conferred on the engraver or publisher by the Engraving Copyright Acts, 8 Geo. II., c. 13, and 7 Geo. III., c. 38, be copied by the process of photography, this is a copying for which an action may be maintained under the 17 Geo. III., c. 57. Quære-whether single copies by hand, or a transfer of the design to an article of manufacture, would be within the 17 Geo. III., c. 57. Semble-per Willes, J., that this statute only applies to a production of copies by some process capable of multiplying the number of copies indefinitely. Erle, C. J.-The question is, whether a photographer who has taken photographic copies of a print is within the meaning of the Act. The very statement of the question makes the answer self-evident. The object of the statute was to secure to the inventor the commercial value of his article, as a reward for making an object of attraction, and as a stimulant to others to do likewise. A photographic copy is as good, if not a better copy than any other, whether it be on a large or on a small scale. It is not the extent of the paper, but the design placed upon it, and the ideas which that design conveys, that are the source of pleasure. Nor does it appear to me that it

makes any difference that the copy is produced by a process not known at the time the statute was passed. It is still a copy, and copying in any manner is prohibited by the statute.-(Gambart v. Ball, 32 L. J., C. P. 166.)

GAME. If wild rabbits be both started and killed on the same estate, they are the absolute property of the landowner, and not of the captor-so held by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Common Pleas. Wilde, B.-It has been argued in this case, that an animal feræ naturæ could not be the subject of independent property; but this is not so, for the common law has affirmed a right of property in animals, even though they were feræ naturæ, if they were restrained either by habit or enclosure within the bounds of the owner. But the right of property is not absolute, for if deer, fowls, etc., attain their wild condition again, the property in them is said to be lost. The principle of the common law seems, therefore, to be a very reasonable one; for in cases where, either from their own induced habits or the confinement imposed by man, there has been brought about in the nature of wild animals the character of having a fixed abode in a particular locality, the law does not refuse to recognise in the owner of the land which sustains them a property co-extensive with this state of things. . . . It is, I think, too late now for the Courts of law to meet this change of circumstances by declaring property in live game. —(Blades v. Higgs, 32 L. J., C. P. 182.)

LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT.-Plaintiff was lessee of certain houses erected and in course of erection, situate on a high road; and defendants, a railway company, being authorized by their Act, made an obstruction and deviation in the road near the houses, so that that part of the road running by the houses was no longer used as a high road, and the access to the houses was made less convenient, and the number of persons passing them was much reduced, and the houses were rendered less suitable for shops, and their value was greatly diminished. It was held, in error, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench, that plaintiff had received such a special damnification beyond the rest of the public from the railway works, that he was entitled to compensation under 8 Vict., c. 18, s. 68, and 8 Vict., c. 20, s. 6.—(Chamberlain v. The West-End of London and Crystal Palace Rail. Co., 32 L. J., Q. B. 173.)

MARINE INSURANCE.-Plaintiff effected a policy of insurance on 6500 bags of coffee, warranted free from capture, seizure, and detention, and all the consequences thereof, or of any attempt thereat, and free from all consequences of hostilities, riots, or commotions. At the time the vessel set out on her voyage from Rio de Janeiro to New York, a war was raging between the Northern and Southern States of the United States of America, and as an act of hostility, persons in the military service of the Southern States had extinguished a light which had up to that time been kept burning at a lighthouse at Cape Hatteras. The captain, from ordinary causes, got out of his reckoning, and in consequence ran ashore on Cape Hatteras. If the light had been burning, the captain could have seen it, and could have avoided the damage. When the ship went aground, she was boarded by two officers in the military service of the Southern States, with some show of taking possession of her and her cargo. Certain persons acting in the employ of the Northern States as salvers then commenced taking the cargo out of the ship; they took out 120 bags, when the soldiers of the Southern States again interfered, and prevented more being taken out. If this interference had not taken place, 1000 bags, in addition to the 120, but not more, could have been saved. From the first there was no hope that the ship could be got off. It was held that the insurers were liable as for a partial loss. That as the 1000 bags would have been saved but for the direct act of the soldiers, the loss of these was covered by the exception. But that for the loss of the remainder the insurers were liable, as they were lost by the perils of the sea; and the putting out the light, though an act of hostility, was too remotely connected with the loss to be considered as the cause of it, and so bring it within the exception. It was also held, that if a ship and cargo be reduced to

such a state by the perils of the sea as that there is no hope of recovery, but, while they still exist in specie, they are nominally taken possession of by persons in the military service of a belligerent state, this is a loss by perils of the sea, and not by capture.-(Ionides v. The Universal Marine Association, 32 L. J., C. P. 170.)

MEDICAL ACT.-T. and S. were in partnership as surgeons and apothecaries. At the time when the services were performed and the goods supplied, for which the present action was brought, T. was duly registered under the 21 & 22 Vict., c. 90, but S. was not. S. was registered on the morning of the day on which the cause was tried. It was held, the requirements of section 32 were complied with, and that it was not necessary that both S. and T. should have been registered at the time the services were performed, or when the writ was issued. Also, per Erle, C. J., and Byles, J., that even if S. had not been registered at all, T. being duly registered, the action was maintainable.(Turner v. Reynall, 32 L. J., C. P. 164.)

MEDICAL ACT.—The 21 & 22 Vict., c. 90, gives a physician who is registered under the Act a legal right to recover fees without a special agreement for remuneration.-(Gibbon v. Budd, 32 L. J., Ex. 182.)

NEGLIGENCE.-Defendant, being owner of premises within the area of the Metropolis Local Management Act, and having authority under section 77 to construct a drain from thence to the common sewer, contracted with H. to do the work. It became necessary to cut a deep trench from the premises across the footpath of the public highway; and the drain having been laid, the earth, etc., were so insufficiently reinstated under the footway, that a subsidence took place, and plaintiff passing along during the night fell into the hole, and was injured. It was held, that by the general rule applicable to such cases, H., and not defendant, was liable for the negligence, and that there was nothing in the 110th and 111th sections of the Act (which makes it imperative, under a penalty of so much per day, on persons breaking up the streets by authority of the Act substantially to reinstate them with all convenient speed) to alter the respective liabilities of employers and contractors, and render the defendant personally liable.—(Gray v. Pullen, 32 L. J., Q. B. 169.)

NEGLIGENCE.-Defendant, a builder, contracted in writing with local commissioners to make a sewer. He verbally underlet to N. the excavation and brickwork at a fixed price per yard, including fencing, watching and lighting, defendant supplying the bricks in his own carts and removing the surplus clay from the cutting. N. employed men under him by the day. Defendant's name as contractor was over the door of an office near the works, but the commissioners employed the clerk of the works. Defendant stated that if the work were not done to his satisfaction he should have dismissed N. Owing to the insufficient lighting, plaintiff fell into an unfenced part of the excavated trench, and was injured. After the accident N. put up a fence and a light. It was held, that on these facts, the defendant was liable.-(Blake v. Thirst, 32 L. J., Ex. 189.)

POOR-RATE. The property of a gas company lay in five townships, of which the respondent township was one, and consisted of lands and buildings, with retorts and furnaces, and pipes attached thereto, used for the making of gas; of buildings used as storehouses and offices; and of land occupied by mains and pipes. The property in the respondent township consisted of the lands and buildings, and apparatus for making the gas, and of part of the mains and pipes, which passed through the respondent township into the other townships. It was held, that the rateable value of the whole of the property of the company might be ascertained, by taking from the latest published accounts of the company the sum of the annual gross receipts for sale of gas, and of the residuary products from the materials after the gas had been made, and for the hire of gasmeters and fittings, and work done; from this amount, by deducting the gross

expenditure, the net receipts might be obtained, and a proper sum would then have to be deducted for tenants' profits, and for interest on capital, rates and taxes, the cost of renewal, repairs and insurance of buildings and plant, and renewal of the mains. It was held also, in accordance with The Queen v. Mile End Old Town, and The Queen v. The West Middlesex Waterworks Company, that the stations, works, buildings, etc., ought to be valued as fixed property, deriving some additional value from their being used as part of the gas-works. It was held, also, that the rateable value of the mains and pipes, which would be the residue, after deducting the net rateable value of the stations, works, buildings, and lands within the respondents' township from the value of the whole rateable property of the company, must be apportioned among the different townships, not simply according to the extent of the mains contained in each, but keeping in view also the fact, that part of them contributed directly, and part only indirectly, to the profits, as had been held in The Queen v. The West Middlesex Waterworks Company.-(R. v. The Sheffield United Gaslight Co., 32 L. J., M. Ca. 169.)

POOR-RATE.-The E. C. Railway Company were rated to the poor-rates of the parish of A., in respect of their line of railway running through the parish. The company made a gross charge to their customers for goods carried over their line, such charge including not only the carriage along the line, but also the various services rendered at the stations in loading, unloading, etc. No appropriation was made in the books or accounts of the company of such last portion of the amount charged for the carriage of goods; but according to the clearing system mentioned in the Railway Clearing Act, 1848, 13 & 14 Vict., c. 28, the appellants calculated the terminal charges upon L.6036, the gross parochial earnings in A. to be L.2829, and they contended that the gross amount of parochial earnings was the difference between those two sums. It was held, the stations were to be treated as only indirectly contributing to the profits of the line; that the amount of the terminals, and the amount of the expenses incurred in earning them, were parts of the general earnings and expenses of the line, and were to be treated as any other part of the gross receipts and outgoings, and therefore, that the appellants were wrong.-(R. v. The Eastera Counties Rail. Co., 32 L. J., M. Ca. 174.)

TRUCK ACT.-If an artificer, engaged in an employment which comes within 1 & 2 Will. IV., c. 37, receives of his own accord goods at a shop kept by his employer, and a corresponding amount is deducted by his employer from his wages at their next settling, this is a payment of wages in goods within the meaning of section 3, and subjects the employer to the penalties of section 9. If payment of wages has, been made in goods, no subsequent payment of the wages in cash can purge the offence so committed; the provisions of the Act which declare the payment void, and also illegal and punishable, being cumulative.-(Wilson v. Cookson, and Fisher v. Jones, 32 L. J., M. Ca. 177.)

COMPANY.-A Company cannot covenant not to oppose a bill, which, if passed, would deprive the shareholders of the protection afforded by the Wharncliffe order. Wood, V. C.-Though a public company may apply for an Act of Parliament, it cannot legally covenant with a third party to do so, since it would thereby render its funds liable in the event of its not applying. Share holders in a company, the directors of which have affixed the company's seal to an agreement, some of the provisions whereof are illegal, are entitled to have the agreement set aside, so far as it is ultra vires, leaving the operation of the rest of the agreement to be adjusted by litigation or otherwise between the contracting parties.-Maunsell v. The Midland Great Western (of Ireland) Rail. Co, 32 L. J., Ch. 513.)

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE.

A General View of the Criminal Law of England. By James Fitzjames Stephen, M.A., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-atLaw, Recorder of Newark-on-Trent. Macmillan and Co. 1863.

THIS book has already attained to a high position both in the legal world and in the estimation of the general public. It is not a specimen of the ordinary stamp of English law books. Such books are usually written, either for the use of students and practitioners in courts of justice, in which case they are so crowded with matters of detail and reference as to be unreadable by the public, -or they are written by men who are waiting for business, as advertisements of efficiency on the part of the author in some special department of law, and, as such, are addressed to solicitors and agents, from whom the writer looks for his reward. Books written with either of these objects have their own value; and if they are good they are appreciated, but the numbers of their readers must necessarily be limited to the members of that profession for whom they are intended. They do not appeal to the reading public; and if they did, the public would not listen to them. Mr Stephen, however, does appeal to the public. His book is addressed to it as well as to the legal profession, and it has met with appreciation on both sides. It is intended neither for practical use, nor for an introduction to professional study. Its object is to give an account of the general scope, tendency, and design, of an important part of our institutions, of which surely none can

VOL. VII. NO. LXXXIV.—DECEMBER 1863.

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