them, which are arbitrary, accidental, and to be changed at will. Mr. Lund has done wisely to construct his work upon this distinction; for much of the existing "law of procedure" may be safely considered as doomed to speedy abolition, on account of its acknowledged vexatiousness and absurdity; and it would have been useless to load his work with what might, by the time of its publication, have ceased to exist. We cannot, however, accord the same approbation to the purpose which Mr. Lund professes to have in view in publishing his work ; namely, to "prepare (the way) for the consolidation of the substantive law relating to patents for inventions." We are not aware that any such consolidation is wanted, or has been called for. The decisions of the Courts respecting patent rights have been already collected, and the principles deducible from them, presented in forms sufficiently methodical and compendious, by several preceding writers. Need of consolidation implies present dispersion, multifariousness, and confusion, which certainly is not the state of the law of patents at the present time. Although, therefore, we must look upon the professed "purpose" of the work as somewhat idle and superfluous, we are happy to say that there our slight censure stops; for the performance itself is deserving of every praise for the style of its execution, and will have uses which, though not perhaps within the contemplation of the author, are at the present time of the utmost importance. We shall be doing no injustice to former works on the same subject in saying, that this will do more to popularise the law of patents than any one which has yet appeared. Other writers on the Patent Laws have written for lawyers, and like lawyers; Mr. Lund has written for the public at large, and produced a work which the public at large will understand and relish. It is, in truth, not only a very readable, but most entertaining book. Mr. Lund has adopted the happy expedient of making the cases respecting patents decided by the Courts, tell what the law is on every point-skilfully catching in each case its leading features, and eliminating all that is immaterial or irrelevant. The reader's curiosity is first excited by the statement of some interesting prac tical question which is in issue; and then, by seeing how principles are applied to its solution, he has these principles fixed in his mind in a way which no abstract enunciation of them, however distinct or clear, could possibly have accomplished. Among the good effects to be anticipated from this mode of teaching, we may confidently rank thisthat it will make the English people discern a degree of reasonableness and propriety in the existing law, in respect to patent inventions, for which it has hitherto had but small credit in popular estimation. The vicious forms of the law have been confounded with its more essential elements, and much virtuous indignation wasted in denouncing as a whole, a system which, in all else but the outside forms, is excellent, and has served as a model for imitation to the rest of the civilized world. Mr. Lund starts with this general statement of the basis of our present Law of Patents: "The right of the Crown to grant to an inventor, by the issue of letters patent, the exclusive profit, for a limited time, of any improvement in the mechanical or useful arts, rests upon the common law, modified by a statute passed in the reign of James I., and these, again, are explained and illustrated by decisions in the Courts of Law." (P. 1.) We cannot accept this as being at all a correct view of the case. The "common law" of England has from the earliest periods most emphatically repudiated monopolies of every kind. Coke, in his Commentary on Magna Charta, (2 Inst., 63,) states that this is necessarily to be inferred from it, that "all monopolies concerning trade and traffic are against the liberty and freedom (thereby) granted and declared." And by the very statute of James, which Mr. Lund refers to (commonly called the Statute of Monopolies), it is again expressly declared, that "all monopolies, commissions, grants, licenses, charters, and letters patent, heretofore made or granted, or hereafter to be made or granted for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of any thing within this realm . ARE ALTOGETHER CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF THIS REALM.' The same statute does afterwards enact, that "the declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any Letters Patents and grants of privileges for the term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made of the sole working or making of any new manner of manufactures within this realm to the true and just inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of making such Letters Patent and grants shall not use." But this, be it observed, was no modification of the common law, which admitted of no monopolies whatever, even for the shortest periods, but an excellent new piece of statute law, by which, in consideration of the advantage to be gained by the encouragement of "new manner of manufactures," the Crown was (for the first time) authorized to grant Letters Patent for the exclusive use of the same to the "true and just inventors" for the term of fourteen years and under. The import of the word "hereafter," used in the statute, deserves to be particularly noted. If the old common law had had the smallest corner in its toleration for monopolies of new inventions, the statute would not have pronounced all such monopolies, whether for long or short periods, as illegal, but nullified those only which exceeded the modern term of fourteen years. Besides, it must not be forgotten when speaking of the rights of inventors that, according to a well-known decision of the highest legal tribunal in this country, (see the House of Lords case of Becket v. Donaldson, 1774,) inventors are in the same case with authors, and never had any rights at all at common law. Property in inventions, and property in literary productions, are equally the creatures of statute law, and have no existence out of or independent of it. We are aware that the decision just referred to was not unanimous, and that it was opposed to the opinions of some of the ablest and wisest lawyers and statesmen of the time (including Blackstone, himself a host); but it would be useless to discuss now a point which is no longer open to discussion. The law on the subject has been long ago settled, and we but state what that law is. We have thought it of importance in noticing Mr. Lund's book, to place the real history of our Patent Laws thus distinctly before our readers, because it is a book which, for the reasons we have given, is likely to get into extensive circulation, and because very false and extravagant notions are afloat among inventors on the subject of their rights, which have already done much harm, and are likely to do more; tending strongly to produce a re-action among thinking men-of the commercial class especially-bostile to the existence of patents altogether. Inventors and patentees cannot learn too soon that to take their stand on "innate rights," "mind's inalienable birthright," and other such highflown nonsense, is to take the battle-field against not only the common law but the common sense of the country; they have, and can have, no other rights than such as it is for the public interest (that alone) to concede to them; and if ten, five, or even one year's protection (instead of fourteen) would serve the purpose of enlisting the greatest possible amount of inventive talent in the public service, the public would act foolishly if they conceded more. Mr. Lund has not confined himself to the reports of English cases for authorities in support of the legal propositions he lays down, but judiciously had recourse to the reported decisions of the Scotch Courts, which are fully as remarkable as any to be met with in English law books, for clearness and largeness of view. We quote a striking example: "Precisely the same view of the right to a patent for an applied principle, or for the spirit or substance of an invention, and not merely for the particular form or mode of the application, was very ably pressed upon the jury by Lord Justice Clerk Hope, in an action brought by Mr. Neilson, the patentee of the hot-blast patent, in the Court of Sessions in Scotland, against the Househill Coal and Iron Company for infringements of his patent (Webs. Cases, 683-85): 'It is quite true that a patent cannot be taken out solely for an abstract philosophical principle-for instance, for any law of nature, or any property of matter, apart from any mode of turning it to account in the practical operation of manufactures, or the business and arts and utilities of life. The mere discovery of such a principle is not an invention, in the patent-law sense of the term. Stating such a principle in a patent may be a promulgation of the principle, but it is no application of the principle to any practical purpose: and without that application of the principle to a practical object and end, and without the application of it to human industry, or to the purpose of human enjoyment, a person cannot in the abstract appropriate a principle to himself. But a patent will be good, though the subject of the patent consists in the discovery of a great, general, and most comprehensive principle in science or law of nature, if that principle is by the specification applied to any special purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical result and benefit not previously attained. "The main merit, the most important part of the invention, may consist in the conception of the original idea, in the discovery of the principle of science, or the law of nature, stated in the patent, and little or no pains may have been taken in working out the best manner and mode of the application of the principle to the purpose set forth in the patent. But still, if the principle is stated to be applicable to any special purpose, so as to produce any result previously unknown, in the way and for the objects described, the patent is good. It is no longer an abstract principle. It comes to be a principle turned to account, to a practical object and to a special result. It becomes, then, not an abstract principle, which means a principle considered apart from any special purpose or practical operation, but the discovery and statement of a principle for a special purpose; that is, a practical invention, a mode of carrying a principle into effect. That such is the law, if a well-known principle is applied for the first time to produce a practical result for a special purpose, has never been disputed. It would be very strange and unjust to refuse the same legal effect, when the inventor has the additional merit of discovering the principle as well as its application to a practical object. The instant that the principle, although discovered for the first time, is stated, in application to, and as the agent of, producing a certain specified effect, it is no longer an abstract principle; it is then clothed with the language of practical application, and receives the impress of tangible direction to the actual business of life. Is it any objection then, in the next place, to such a patent that terms descriptive of the application to a certain specified result include every mode of applying the principle or agent, so as to produce the specified result, although one mode may not be described more than another; although one mode may be infinitely better than another; although much greater benefit would result from the application of the principle by one method than by another; although one method may be much less expensive than another? Is it, I next inquire, an objection to the patent, that, in its application of a new principle to a certain specific result, it includes every variety of mode of applying the principle according to the general statement of the object and benefit to be attained? You will observe, that the greater part of the defenders' case is truly directed to this objection. This is a question of law, and I must tell you distinctly, that this general claim, that is, for all modes of applying the principle to the purpose specified, according to or within a general statement of the object to be attained, and the use to be made of the agent to be so applied, is no objection whatever to the patent: that the application or use of the agent for the purpose specified, may be carried out in a great variety of ways, only shows the beauty, and simplicity, and comprehensiveness of the invention. But the scientific and general utility of the proposed application of the principle, if directed to a specified purpose, is not an objection to its becoming the subject of a patent. That the proposed application may be very generally adopted in a great variety of ways is the merit of the invention, not a legal objection to the patent. "The defenders say; you announce a principle, that hot air will produce heat in the furnace; you direct us to take the blast without interrupting, or rather without stopping it; to take the current in blast; to heat it after it leaves the blast, and throw it hot into the furnace. But you tell us no more; you do not tell us how you are to heat it. You say, you may heat it in any way in any sort of form of vessel; you say, I leave you to do it how you best can. my application of the discovered principle is, that if you heat the air, and heat it after it leaves the blowing engine (for it is plain you cannot do it before), you attain the result I state; that is the purpose to which I But I apply the principle. The benefit will be greater or less. I only say, benefit you will get; I have disclosed the principle; I so apply it to a specified purpose by a mechanical contrivance, viz., by getting the heat when in blast, after it leaves the furnace; but the mode, and manner, and extent of heating I leave to you, and the degree of benefit, on that very account, I do not state. The defenders say, the patent on this account is bad in law. I must tell you, that taking the patent to be of this general character, it is good in law. state to you the law to be, that you may obtain a patent for a mode of carrying a principle into effect; and if you suggest and discover, not only the principle, but suggest and invent how it may be applied to a practical result by mechanical contrivance and apparatus, and show that you are aware that no particular sort, or modification, or form of the apparatus is essential, in order to obtain benefit from the principle, you may take your patent for the mode of carrying it into effect, and are not under the necessity of describing and confining yourself to one form of apparatus. If that were necessary, you see, what would be the result? Why, that a patent could hardly ever be obtained for any mode of carrying a newly-discovered principle into practical results, though the most valuable of all discoveries. For the best form and shape or modification of apparatus cannot, in matters of such vast range, and requiring observation on such a great scale, be attained at once, and so the thing would become known, and so the right lost, long before all various kinds of apparatus could be tried. Hence you may generally claim the mode of carrying its principle into effect by mechanical contrivance, so that any sort of apparatus applied, in the ways stated, will, more or less, produce the benefit, and you are not tied down to any form.' This part of the learned judge's summing-up was not objected to, on the subsequent appeal to the House of Lords." Mr. Lund might much enrich the future editions of his work, by extracting as freely from the decisions of the American judges as he has done from the Scotch. We have been often much struck with the ability shown by the American judges in their charges on patent cases; and have transferred not a few of them to our pages, as equally deserving attention on both sides of the Atlantic. MR. HODGES'S PATENT POWER ACCUMU. LATORS. Sir, - In No. 1375 (December 15, 1849,) of your Magazine, some diagrams with description, were given of some of my patent applications of India. rubber, and amongst others as an accumulator of power in the hands of a single man. You there state: "According to our calculations, a thousand of such tubes as he describes (viz., 1 foot long and three-quarters of an inch in diameter,) would weigh no more than 250 lbs., and would pack in a space equal to six cubic feet, and if placed on board of a ship of war would, in many cases, be equal to an additional force of 1000 men. The accompanying sketch illustrates the form of a power accumulator equal to 4 tons, 7 cwt., and 71 lbs. It contains within an area of one foot superficial, 151 simple accumulators, each a foot long, and equal to 65 lbs. when stretched to its working maximum; viz., 6 feet stretched to 7 feet, its power would be about double, or 130 lbs., and to 8 feet (which is close upon the breaking point), its power would again be doubled, or 260 lbs. It will be perceived that these compound accumulators may be serviceable for many purposes, as they can be made of any required power, and to work through any distance, and the caoutchouc being vulcanised, has become permanently elastic, and unaffected by climatic temperature or moisture. Besides, they float in water, and their weight per ton of power would not exceed 10 lbs. To move heavy bodies, as hauling off a stranded ship, the crew, with capstan and windlass, could extend accumulators of (say) 10 tons power each, until the object was attained, or the supply of anchors and cables exhausted. In erecting and fitting machinery, or in bedding masonry, an accumulator of proper power may be attached to the hook of the usual lifting chain, and again made fast to the body to be so fitted or bedded; and supposing this body to be a stone of a ton weight, the mason, with his assistant, could depress it at will by the mere weight of their bodies, and effect quickly a perfect bedding. The application to relieve the strain, or rather sudden jerk, on ships' cables, standing rigging, and tow-lines, can be are less weighty and bulky than the ordinary appliances, and may be made of any power, and to work through any distance. If required, one or more ropes made fast at D, and pressed to, and again made fast at D1, fig. 2, would serve as a guard or check to prevent the accumulator being stretched beyond its working power. I am trespassing rather freely on your pages, but would make one remark, in conclusion, on the chief peculiarity of this new mechanical power, and in which it differs from the general appliances for moving bodies. It is, that it enables us to accomplish the quick and sudden removal of bodies, by accumulating the power at convenient times, and keeping it in a state of tension until attached to the body to be moved, when the attaching rope is eased off, and the body lifted or moved. This, indeed, is the principle of my patent projectors for throwing the harpoon, spears, arrows, ball, shot, &c., which you noticed in No. 1375, of your Magazine, before referred to. Your obedient Servant, R. E. HODGES. 44, Southampton-row, London, Oct. 25, 1851. COLT'S REVOLVER AN ENGLISH INVENTION. Sir,-A great deal has been said lately respecting the claims of Mr. Colt to the invention of the revolving pistol; it will, perhaps, throw a further light upon the subject when we state that in the year 1822, between the months of February and September, we made the barrels of 200 muskets and 200 pistols, upon precisely the same principle as those exhibited by Mr. Colt, for a gentleman named Collier, of Fountain-court, Strand, upon which occasion the lubricating fluid, now so universally used by engineers, viz., soap and water, was first introduced by us; one of these very barrels was, we are informed, exhibited in the English Firearm department of the Exhibition. We have one also in our possession, and can easily prove our assertion by our books, which we shall be happy to show to any gentleman upon application, so that the matter may be set at rest as to Mr. Colt being the original inventor. We are, Sir, your obedient Servants, Engine Lathe and Tool Manufactory, |