second, ἀλλοίωσις (or change), the third, increment and diminution." The scholiast on the passage of Plato before us has a much better division; first, into corporeal and

psychical, and then into the subdivisions of space, quality, quantity, and essence, on the one hand, and into the last two enumerated by Plato, and here called the ninth and tenth, on the other: Τῆς κινήσεως ἡ μὲν σωματική, κατὰ τόπον, κατὰ ποιότητα, κατὰ ποσότητα, κατ ̓ οὐσίαν· ἡ δὲ ψυχική, ἢ ἄλλο κινοῦσα ὑπ ̓ ἄλλον δὲ κινουμένη, ἢ ἑαυτήν τε κινοῦσα καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη. Compare, also, Aristotle, Phys. Auscult., v., 3, viii., 7; De Generat. et Corrup., i., 1, 4.

In this last-cited treatise Aristotle endeavours to present the distinction between γένεσις and ἀλλοίωσις. His general statement is clear enough : 'Αλλοίωσις μέν ἐστιν, ὅταν ὑπομένοντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, αἰσθητοῦ ὄντος, μεταβάλλη ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσιν· οἷον τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει καὶ πάλιν κάμνει, ὑπομένον γε ταὐτό· καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς στρογγύλος, ὁτὲ δὲ γωνιοειδὴς, ὁ αὐτός γε ὤν. ὅταν δὲ ὅλον μεταβάλλῃ, μὴ ὑπομένοντος αἰσθητοῦ τινος, ὡς ὑποκειμένου τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ ̓ οἷον ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ, ἢ ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ, τοῦ μὲν ἤδη γέ. νεσις τὸ τοιοῦτον, τοῦ δὲ φθορά, μάλιστα δὲ ἂν ἡ μεταβολὴ γίνεται ἐξ ἀναισθήτου εἰς αἰσθητόν. “Alloiosis takes place when the subject (some object of sense) remains the same, while there is a change in its passions. As, for ex. ample, the body is healthy, and again is sick, yet remains the same body; or the brass is at one time round, and at another angular, yet still the same. But when there is an entire change, the subject no longer remaining the same, but it being as though from water air, or from air water should arise, such a change is, in respect to the one thing, a generation, and, in respect to the other, a φθορά, or corruption,” &c.

In applying this, however, it will be found to be only a matter of degrees, unless it is determined what constitutes totality, or an entire change, as also what is meant by ποι

óτns, property, or quality. This must be viewed in reference to two theories, one of which, or the atomic, considers all πoιóτητaç, or qualities of bodies, as arising from the site, figure, motion, and order of the atoms of which they are composed (ὡς Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππός φασι, θέσει καὶ Tážel toútwv ¿§ év εioɩ, Arist., De Gen. et Cor., i., 1), and the affections they produce in us; according to which, all change of quality is ultimately to be resolved into topical motion, producing a change in the situation, order, and numerical combination of the particles; such as modern chemistry shows when, the constituent atoms remaining the same in kind, a new substance arises from the difference in their arrangement and proportion; so that, for example, what once was common atmospheric air becomes nitric acid, &c. The other was the theory of occult qualities, in which Aristotle was a believer. This maintained that the figure, site, motions, and order of parts or particles remaining the same, or being identically the same in two respective bodies, they might differ greatly in their properties; and there being nothing in the matter in respect to locality, number, proportion, magnitude, motion, or any sensible phenomena, to which this difference could be assigned, it was styled occult. Hence, in one place, Aristotle endeavours to show that two bodies might both be absolutely full, or a plenum, and yet one might have a property of heaviness or weight, the other of lightness; one might have a property of hardness and the other of softness, and that the one might even be compressible while the other was incompressible; since the phenomena of thinness (uavóτns) or density (πvkvóTηs) were no proof of a vacuum, or the contrary.

In this view, ἀλλοίωσις and γένεσις can only be regarded as differing in degree, κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, unless γένεσις is tam ken for the change kaтà тò TOLÓv, or a change of the occult quality itself, which was entirely independent of the disposition and motions of the parts of the matter. On the

other theory, there is a marked distinction between them, as the one (aλλoiwois) would refer to such a change of particles as would only affect the aggregate sum, the other (yévεois) to such a change in site, order, motion, and combination, as would destroy the former ğıç, and give rise to a new one, constituting a new law or nature. 'Aλλoiwois would be a change in the alo@nrá, addressing itself solely to the sense; yévɛoɩç, a change in the voŋτóv, or idea, addressing itself to the intelligence, and constituting the object of science.

The atomic theory has been charged with being atheistical, because atheists have held it. Cudworth, however, very conclusively shows that it is, on the contrary, most favourable to theism, because, allowing to matter nothing but atoms, figure, site, &c., the mind that thinks rigidly is compelled to bring in something to set these atoms in motion, and, since it discards all occult qualities as unmeaning, it is obliged to resort to Spirit as the direct author of all those original impulses of matter which are generally styled properties. See The Intellectual System, chapter i.,` 38-45. On the other hand, this other doctrine, which, at first view, seems more spiritual, as apparently maintaining the existence of a secret something besides the matter, and, therefore, as more favourable to religion than the dry theory of atoms, is, in reality, the great hot-bed of atheism, ever dispensing with the presence of the Deity, as long as these blind occult qualities can be brought in to justify what would fain seem a jealous reverence for the Divine honour.

Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus.

This doctrine seems to have given rise, in the minds of Aristotle and others, to this distinction between тоTIKỲ μεταβολή, local change, or change in space, and μεταβολὴ κατὰ TOLÓV, or change of quality, as the two great and distinct orders embraced under the term kívŋois, or motion in its largest sense; whereas, if the other view be correct, the

second is as much local motion as the first, that is, local motion internally, although there may be no departure from the circumscribing space in which the whole body is contained; so that all change would be motion in the modern sense of the word, and there would remain only the two genera which Plato numbers as the ninth and tenth, and which the scholiast has styled σωματική and ψυχική; all the rest being mere differences arising from direction, degree, separation, or concretion. Plato's division, although somewhat affected by this doctrine of occult qualities, is far less dependent upon it than the others we have mentioned, and what he says of the καθεστηκυία ἕξις and its change savours most strongly of the other theory. On other grounds, we are persuaded that Plato's view was more in accordance with the atomic doctrine, which resolved all TOLÓTηTαs into the motions, figures, sites, &c., of ultimate particles. This seems to agree best with the spirit of the Timæus ; and, indeed, there are some parts of that dialogue which are unintelligible on any other supposition. Cudworth maintains that Plato, as well as Aristotle, was a believer in the occult theory; and that he was led to adopt it because he saw that the other had been held by atheists. We are satisfied, however, from a very careful examination, which cannot be here presented, that this is a mistaken view of his philosophy. It is sufficient to say, that nothing would be so fatal to his main argument in this very treatise, as the admission of any occult quality, which is neither to be resolved into the combination and disposition of the particles, nor into the higher power of spirit ultimately moving upon them. The atheist would ask for no better auxiliary, to resist, successfully all that might be advanced about the necessity of that older and self-moving essence, soul. "Give me a place to stand," said Archimedes," and I will move the world." "Give me occult qualities," the atheist might say, “and I ask the aid of no God in constructing a universe.”

XXVI.

Avtokívηois, or Self-motion of Soul. longs to the Essence of the Deity.

Energy or Action beWhether on this View

God must have created Worlds from Eternity. Aristotle's Misrepresentations of Plato on this Point. His own Doc

trine.

PAGE 26, LINE 9. Πασῶν ἐῤῥωμενεστάτην καὶ πρακτικὴν διαφερόντως. Such strong expressions as these gave occasion to Aristotle to assert, that Plato taught the doctrine that the first cause was an eternal energy or activity ever employed, that is, ¿vépyɛla, in distinction from dúvapic. He even most unjustly seeks to confound Plato's Eternal Spiritual Mover with the everlasting agitation of the self-moving atoms of Democritus and Leucippus : Acò ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων. ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί φασι κίνησιν· ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, καὶ τίνα, οὐ λέYovov. "Some make it an everlasting activity, as Leucipγουσιν. pus and Plato. For they say that there is an eternal motion, but by reason of what, and what, they do not tell us." Aristot., Metaph., xi. (xii.), c. 6. This disparagement of Plato, by associating him with the atheists, Leucippus and Democritus, is merely done to set off his own dogma, that "the first essence was immoveable:” öтi áváykŋ ɛivaι ảiδιον τινὰ οὐσίαν, ἀκίνητον ; in which proposition, taken in its true sense, we shall see that Plato most fully agreed with him. In another part of this same chapter, he infers, that if there be an eternal kívnois, its very essence must be activity (¿vépyɛla), in distinction from power (dúvaμıç): Ei γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις· ἔτι οὐδ' εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ' οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀίδιος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν, μὴ εἶναι. Δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια — For if it should not energize, there will be no motion; neither if it should energize,