tioned in the passage lately quoted (page 247) from the ninth book of the Laws. A life of ascetic virtue was the remedy which he would in general propose; although, in the pride of philosophy, he was but little aware how utterly defective is any thing which bears the name of human virtue, when laid by the side of that Holy Law which "pierces even to the dividing asunder of the soul and the spirit, and is a discerner of all the thoughts and intents of the heart." To a Christian mind this silence in regard to an atonement is the second great fault in Plato's theology. The other is his doctrine of an original independent evil principle. This being closely connected with the dogma of the innate evil of matter, through which the soul was tainted, led him naturally to teach an ascetic mode of purification to the exclusion of any external, forensic, and vicarious atonement. He preached much and most eloquently against the lusts of the flesh as the cause and essence of all depravity; but his philosophy contains but slight recognition of those sins of the spirit in which the much-denounced body has no share, and which may be supposed to belong to a purely spiritual being as well as to one who is enclosed in the grossest robes of matter. Hence it is easy to see how these two errors, although apparently so remote, have a common origin and a common seat in depraved and blinded human nature; and how all, whether out of the Church or in the Church, who have endeavoured to rectify it in a manner different from that pointed out in the Bible, have ever stumbled on this same point, namely, the teaching of an ascetic mode of purification, through the penances and mortification of the flesh, not as auxiliary and disciplinary, but as remedial and saving.

In respect to the doctrine of an atonement, the Greek poets are more often in accordance with the Bible, and those traditions which had come down from a remote antiquity, than our philosopher. Even in the very practices

whose superstitious observances he condemns, and justly condemns, there may be manifested that deep sense of the need of expiation which has been felt in all ages—which has formed a part of all false religions, and of all corruptions of the true and which only finds repose in a believing and intelligent view of the doctrine of the cross. His argument, however, is sound, as directed against some of the practices which prevailed in the Greek religion, and which operated equally with atheism in encouraging the most abominable licentiousness; for their great design was not so much to take away sin, or the consciousness of sin, as to avert its consequences.*

*

It is the glory of the Gospel that God is παραιτητός that he can be propitiated; while the awful sacrifice by which it is accomplished levels in the dust all the pride of human virtue, and all the lofty aspirations of human philosophy. It relieves the penitent and believing spirit from that gloomy sentiment of the Grecian poet, which has ever weighed so heavily on the dark heathen mind

Διὸς γὰρ δυσπαραίτητοι φρένες

while yet it gives no countenance to that false, presumptuous belief in the Divine placability, against which Plato is here contending, and on which some in our own day would lay so much stress. With such, whether ancient or mod. ern, it is not the Divine mercy which they would exalt— for that has no meaning separate from the Divine justice— but, rather, that idol attribute of their own imaginations, which is so well expressed, in this very argument, by the Greek word paovuía; that sluggish indolence, indifference, or good-nature, to use a common expression, which constitutes the prime attribute of the Deity of the ancient Epicurean and the modern sentimentalist.

* See remarks on this distinction, note 1, page 4.

+ Eschylus, Prom. Vinct., 34.

XLII.

Highest Proof of the Divine Goodness, the a priori Conviction of the Moral Sense.

PAGE 51, LINE 13. 'Ayalοúç Tε Kaì ȧρíσтovç. The ap peal is here directly to the moral sense. The intelligence and power of the Deity may be matters of inductive reasoning, although even for these, and especially the former, there may be as good a ground of belief in the a priori conviction which every man possesses. But we may safely say that no one really ever resorts to external induction for his own private individual satisfaction in the belief that God is good; although on other grounds, and from other motives, it may sometimes be made the subject of speculative argument. We cannot bear the contrary opinion. Just as by the laws of our minds we are compelled to assert that matter has in itself no inherent property of motion, notwithstanding all mere inductive experience of an ever-restless, ever-moving world is in opposition to such an a priori conviction; so, likewise, are we compelled to believe and feel that God is good, however much inductive argument from all the facts around us, in this world of disorder, might go towards maintaining the contrary dogma. Even those who assert most strenuously that the Divine benevolence is proved from the observation of external nature carry along with them this a priori conviction, without, perhaps, being aware of the fact, that from it is derived, to their own minds and the minds of others, the main force of every argument by which they would sustain their preconceived hypothesis. Let this innate conviction be utterly banished from the soul, and we might then see, if it were possible to put ourselves in that condition, what is the real strength, or, rather, real weakness of the a posteriori proof. Should even the great mass of facts which fall within the sphere of our observa

Y

tion be favourable to such a position, yet what right would we have to extend this to the immense scale of the uni. verse, unless impelled to it by the unconscious working of this innate law of our moral nature? If this world were filled with happiness to overflowing, how could so narrow an induction dare to step beyond its limits? What is our position, with infinite space all around us, and two illimitable eternities, before and behind us, that we should draw any inferences from a mere induction of facts as to the moral attributes of the Deity, unless in the soul itself there is some sure foundation for faith in their existence? If, however, on the other hand, we are actually compelled to reverse the picture, and to assert that misery, in our world at least, forms the rule, and happiness the exception-if the Bible tells us that man is born to sorrow—if Plato declares that our good things are much fewer in number than our evil things-and if the true voice of humanity has responded in all ages to these assertions both of profane and Holy Writ

-on what ground can we yet cling to the belief in the Di vine benevolence, except by relying on the deep conviction of that moral sense, which tells us, and, even though worlds on worlds should exhibit facts to the contrary, would still tell us, that God is good.

If no induction can prove it, neither can any induction strip us of the belief as long as the soul remains true to herself. There is within us something higher than the speculative or the inductive reason, which exclaims, as the spontaneous sentiment of the soul, which she can neither demonstrate nor reject, If there be a God, he must be good, and must delight in goodness. The Judge of all the Earth must do right. In proof of this, Plato does not hesitate to appeal here to the consciences even of his supposed opponents, and therefore he says, Tévte övtes—all five of us, namely, the three parties to the dialogue, and the two imaginary disputants who speculatively deny a providence; as

much as to say, Here we all agree-here there is no need of argument; we all admit that, if there is a God, he must be good, however much we may differ as to that in which his goodness consists.

XLIII.

Sublime Mode in which the Bible represents the Divine Providence and Omniscience as contrasted with all mere Philos ophizing on these Attributes. Analysis of the Greek Word 'Avopeía, as denoting one of the Cardinal Virtues of Soul.

PAGE 52, LINE 2. Δειλίας γὰρ ἔκγονος, κ. τ. λ. By connecting this with what is said, page 46, line 10, ȧpetñs μèv ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ, κακίας, we get the whole argument, which may be thus stated: We admit the Gods to be good; avopɛía is a part of virtue; dɛihíɑ is its opposite; ȧpyía is the offspring of dedía: therefore it cannot be through ȧpyía and pa vpía that the Gods neglect the affairs of men. He had before proved that it could not be from want of power. This is conclusive. As a matter of reasoning, it is admirably stated, and is in itself unanswerable. And yet in a manner how different from all this parade of argument do the Scriptures treat this subject of the Divine providence and omniscience. How sublimely do they assume all these positions, without reasoning at all about them. The Lord looks down from heaven. His eyes behold, and his eyelids try the ways of the children of men. He knoweth our sitting down and our rising up. He understandeth our thought afar off. He never slumbereth nor sleepeth that keepeth Israel. As the mountains are round about Jerusalem, so the Lord is round about his people from henceforth and for evermore. The eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the good. This is the style worthy of a Divine revelation; and how poor aoes our cold philosophizing, even in its best, and loft