sense, whatever is most odious or an utter abomination. In all lists of great crimes, as presented to us by the poets, one of the worst abodes in Tartarus is ever assigned to offenders of this description, and thus Paul classes those who are guilty of violence towards their parents among the unholy and profane: ἀνοσίοις καὶ βεβήλοις πατραλῴαις καὶ μητραλῴαις. 1 Timothy, i., 9. The holiness of the family relation is intimated, in the ancient mythology, by the worship of Vesta; and the perpetual cherishing of the domestic affections, as affording the vivifying and fructifying warmth by which all social and political institutions must be preserved, is represented in the Eternal Fire. Well did Cicero say, in aris et focis est Respublica. This intimate connexion is set forth by the Greek and Latin poets in almost every form of expression. Virgil presents the holy alliance in one line: Sacra Deûm sanctique patres. Georg., ii., 473. And this seems but a reiteration of the precept, Leviticus, xix., 2, and of the order in which the religious and family duties are there given. Speak unto all the congregation of Israel, and say unto them, Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy. Fear ye every man his father and his mother. I am the Lord your God. The obligation of filial obedience, as the fountain of all moral and political virtues, is thus beautifully set forth in a fragment of Euripides from Stobæus : Ἔγω δ' ὅ μὲν ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΝ ἄρξομαι λέγειν So, also, in a still more striking fragment of the same poet, in which duties to parents are ranked next after those due the Gods, and before mere political obligations: τρεῖς ἐἰσὶν ἀρεταὶ ἃς χρὴ σ' ἀσκεῖν ὦ τέκνον, Eurip. Antiope. We have dwelt the longer on this, because we think that Plato's views here, and in many other places in the Laws and other dialogues, furnish a complete refutation of the charge, which might otherwise be drawn from the fifth book of the Republic; and because, at the present day, even with all the declarations of the Bible, the relation seems to be becoming divested of that sanctity which it anciently possessed. In the theories of some, it is placed even below civil duties. So far from being thought to possess any religious character, it is denied that it forms a subject even for political legislation. It is ranked among imperfect obligations, and is never with us, except in some few cases of pauperism, enforced by law. Why, when so many inferior subjects are made matters of legislation, this fundamental and all-conservative relation should have so little space assigned to it in our jurisprudence, it would be difficult to say. The effects, however, which will inevitably result, in loosening the whole political structure, can be far more easily and with more certainty predicted. The relation and the duties resulting are also attacked by spurious reformers, who, under the name of a cold and hearthardening universal benevolence, or love to being in general, would utterly break up all the family ties, and destroy all the associations connected with that holy word, Our Home. These men sometimes, in their ignorance, make stale secondhand quotations from Plato, and we would wish to rescue him from their profane grasp. II. The Words προοίμιον and παραμύθιον. The Preamble, the Advisory or Argumentative Part of the Law. PAGE 2, LINE 16. Τὸ παραμύθιον ὑποθεμένῳ ῥητέον ἃ Sεi пáоxεiv. "The lawgiver (voμoléтn, understood) must δεῖ πάσχειν. declare what each one must suffer, after having put under, by way of hypothesis or foundation, an exhortation or preamble." Another reading has πрooíμov, which is followed by Ficinus. They both, however, would possess nearly the same significance. IIpooíuov would literally mean "a preface or preamble;" πapaμútov, "an exhortatory exπαραμύθιον, ordium," containing the ground or reason of the law. This the philosopher deemed essentially and peculiarly necessary in those institutions that related to religion. Such an exhortation or argument, by way of preamble, nearly the whole of this tenth book may be considered, as only the last few pages are devoted to the preceptive declaration, and the penal statute founded upon it. In a more limited sense, however, the rapaμvotov here intended is contained in what immediately follows. In like manner, Cicero, in evident imitation of Plato, introduces in his treatise De Legibus a similar πрooíμov, in which he makes religious belief and reverence the only true foundation of law and of every form of civil polity. It may be found in that noble passage, lib. ii., sec. vii.: Sit igitur hoc a principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores Deos, eaque quæ gerantur, eorum geri judicio ac numine, eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri, et, qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate colat religiones, intueri, piorumque et impiorum habere rationem. His enim rebus imbutæ mentes, haud sane abhorrebunt ab utili ac vera sententia. Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in cœlo mundoque non putet? aut ut ea, quæ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet? Utiles esse autem opiniones has, quis neget, quum intelligat, quam multa firmentur jurejurando, quantæ salutis sit fœderum religiones, quam multos Divini supplicii metus a scelere revocarit, quamque SANCTA SIT SOCIETAS civium inter ipsos, Diis immortalibus interpositis tum judicibus, tum testibus. Habes legis PROOEMIUM: sic enim hoc appellat Plato. What a striking contrast between the sentiments of these noble heathen, and those of many modern political theories, constitutions, and boasting bills of rights, from which the very names of God, religion, Christianity, or the least allusion to any bond (religio) by which the visible state is connected with the invisible world, are as carefully excluded, as though they were the deadliest foes to the political happiness of mankind. On this subject we may compare also the sublime πρоοípov in the Timæus, or the Dialogue in which Plato attempts to set forth the universal code of laws which govern both the physical and intelligible universe. The preamble оr πрооíμоv there, is found in that remarkable passage, in which he divides all things into what he styles, Tò "ON μὲν ἀεὶ γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τὸ ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ μέν, ἂν δὲ οὐδέποτε. τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν· τὸ δὲ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον, καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε öv. That which eternally IS and hath never generation, and that which is ever BECOMING or being generated, and never truly IS; the one received by the intelligence with reason, always BEING in the same relations, the other received by opinion with irrational sense, ever becoming, perishing, and never truly, and in the highest sense, having a substantive being.-Timæus, 27, P. This he evidently intends as a preamble to the system of physical and psychological legislation contained in that wonderful dialogue; for after dwelling upon the above distinction at some length, preparatory to the statement of the universal laws of mind and matter, Timæus is thus addressed by Socrates: TÒ μÈV OνV ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου, τὸν δὲ δὴ ΝΟΜΟΝ ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε. "Since in such a wonderful way we have received from you the preamble, next in order propound to us the law." Timæus, 29, C. III. Subjective Sense of the Word ἀληθεύω. 66 PAGE 4, LINE 9. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ἀληθεύοντας λέγειν ὡς ἐισὶ θεοί ; " Does it not, then, seem to be an easy matter to affirm, in all truthfulness, that there are Gods, or that the Gods exist?" "Aλn@evw, although it includes in its signification the utterance of truth, and there are many passages in which it must be so rendered, has yet reference rather to truth of feeling than to truth of expression, to that which belongs to the subjective state of the soul or the moral diathesis, rather than to that which is the result of scientific, or speculative, or casuistical argument-what the Psalmist styles, "truth in the inward parts.” Paul seems to include much of this sense as he uses the term, Ephesians, iv., 15—¿λŋ0ɛúoνтεç έv ȧyáпŋ: not so much "speaking the truth," as our translation has it, but rather, as is shown by the context, and especially by the word ȧyán, "being truthful, or of a true heart in love." So, also, Galatians, iv., 16-ὥστε ἐχθρὸς ὑμῶν γέγονα ἀλη θεύων ὑμῖν ; "Have I become subject to your hatred while I am true (in heart) to you?" It may refer, in this last example, to the declaration of truth, but even if that is supposed to be included, the subjective sense of the word is still predominant. Hence we may best render åλŋ0ɛúovTas, in the passage at the head of these remarks, adverbial |