individualism in what the sentimental humility of his philosophy might style his subserviency to the interests of the universal life. The proposition, against the abuse of which we are contending, might seem, at first view, to be grounded on more enlarged and comprehensive notions of existence. It has so much to say of the great whole, and of a kind of Strauss-ian immortality, which belongs to the race rather than to the individual parts. It is, however, mainly true in a physical aspect; and when it occupies the mind alone, or the moral importance of the individual is not held up as a corrective, it becomes a cold and speculative fatalism-a physical fatalism, in the worst sense of the term, which would bind both matter and spirit, not by the decrees* of a moral governor, founded on moral reasons, but in the adamantine chain of law viewed as something apart from God-a fatalism which would regard even the Deity himself, should it graciously admit his existence, as included in the machinery of the universe. Such a doctrine possesses but little, if any, superiority over the creed of the atheist.

Akin to this is that profession of abstract benevolence which loses sight of individuality in the contemplation of masses or of the great whole, and affects to regard individual happiness only as contributing to the general happiness of the universe. This, although it may be agreeable to the speculative intellect, or to those whose theology is but a philosophy, is nevertheless most chilling to all the moral and religious affections. Its concrete selfishness is only hardened and rendered darker, while, at the same time, it is more and more concealed from the conscience, by the false warmth and glow of an abstract benevolence. Its love to God is only a pantheistic rapture, instead of a feeling of gratitude to a personal Redeemer.. Its affection to man is not that love to one's neighbour which the Bible en

* This unquestionably was the primitive sense of the word fatum.

joins, commencing with the domestic and social relations, from whence, as from a centre, it radiates on every side, ever filling, but never attempting to overflow the limits of its practical capabilities for good. Those of whom we are speaking-and these declaimers on the greatest good of the greatest number are becoming quite numerous—have really no neighbour, no vicinus, no vicinage. The word is altogether too narrow in its meaning to suit their expanded views. The individual man who fell among thieves would have been too small and too contiguous an object for such as can only aim at promoting some great scheme for higher developments of the race. Children, family, home, country, friends, all are but fetters to that reforming zeal which leads them to pant so earnestly and so incessantly for the welfare of being in the abstract. Such a philosophical theology may make a selfish mystic or pantheist, luxuriating in some fancied vision of universal good; it may make, under certain circumstances, a raving fanatic, furious in denunciation in proportion to the self-righteousness of his abstract philanthropy; but it never has produced, and never will produce, an humble, devoted, and warm-hearted Christian.

Plato does, indeed, teach this doctrine of the parts for the whole, and we have admitted it to be true when rightly qualified by its converse. Other writings, however, of our philosopher, furnish most abundant evidence that he did hold this converse proposition as equally sound with the one he is now presenting, and which was called forth by the peculiar nature of the objection against which he is here contending. He tells the profane scoffer that this Special Providence will not overlook him, because, though small, he is yet important as a part of the great whole. When presenting, however, in other places, the moral aspect of the doctrine, he adopts a very different line of argument. Poverty, sickness, health, life, death, ALL THINGS, he

BB

tells us, are for the righteous man beloved of Heaven. His language possesses a striking resemblance to some parts of the Scriptures : Τῷ δὲ ΘΕΟΦΙΛΕΙ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν ΠΑΝΤΑ γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστα; Οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρὸς ἐάν τε ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται ἐάν τε ἐν νόσοις ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν· ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τἀναντία τούτων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι. Republic, 613, A., B. Physically, he would teach us, man is but an atom, subserving the interests of the great whole; morally, all things, even a universe of mind and matter, is working together for his individual exaltation or degrada. tion. Instead of dwindling into the insignificance of an infinitesimal, he rises in proportion to the magnitude of that universe of which he is a member, or, in other words, becomes of the greatest individual importance as a rational part of the greatest whole.

These apparently opposite yet strictly consistent views are likewise equally true in science. The whole cannot be fully understood without the parts, and it is an axiom no less important, that some a priori knowledge of a whole as a whole, that is, as a unity, and not merely an arithmetical sum, is necessary to an understanding of the parts. It is by the mutual action, reaction, and introaction of such a mental synthesis and analysis, that any true progress is made in science. When either is neglected, or the balance is destroyed, science becomes, on the one hand, an έμπelpía äλoyos,* an irrational empiricism, or evaporates, on the other, into empty a priori speculation.

PAGE 58, LINE 5. Πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημovруòç. The comparison adopted shows that Plato views the doctrine which the present state of his argument requires him to advance, namely, that the parts are made for the whole, rather in its physical than its moral aspect. It * Gorgias, 464, D.

is not the κυβερνήτης, the στρατηγός, the commander, the governor, the pilot-comparisons so often employed by him in illustration of moral and political relations—but the physician, the artist, all of whose efforts are directed to the physical perfection of the work in which they are engaged, or that physical harmony which consists in the subserviency of the parts to the whole irrespective of any moral considerations. This is the order of physical production, and of those arts and sciences that copy from it-μépos éveka öλov. It forms the parts for the whole, and not the whole, in any sense, for the parts.

LINE 6. πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντεῖνον βέλτιστον. Ast and Stephanus would both read žvvTɛívwv in this place, and refer it to the artist. The common reading, however, although the literal version in English is very harsh, seems, on the whole, to be deserving of preference. It more properly has for its subject the work than the workman; as in the example a few lines back-μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει. It may here be taken with ẞéλTIOTOV, and the sentence would be freely translated, doeth all things for the whole, in respect to that best end which aims at the common good; that is, in this case, the physical good, the good of the machine or structure as a structure, moral reasons, strictly such, not being here brought into view. The argument, then, when carried no farther, would be this: God will not overlook you; his special providence is ever directed towards you, because, however insignificant you may be, physically, in yourself, you are wanted to fill up some place or some vacancy in the great structure, for which nothing else is so well adapted. You may therefore seem to be laid aside, but you are not forgotten-his eye is upon you.

LINE 8. ἀγνοῶν ὅπη τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ ξυμβαίνει καὶ σοί. It is somewhat uncertain whether ἄριστον here is to be taken with τὸ περὶ σὲ, or with τῷ παντὶ, οι švubaível. Evμbaível, however, may be rendered, to con

tribute to the good of anything, or to the accomplishment of any purpose, without any such qualifying word as ǎpioтov. It makes but little difference, in the general sense, what view we take of it, and, on the whole, we prefer the following version: You are vexed, not knowing how that, in relation to yourself, which is best for the whole, contributes also to your own good ; or, if we connect ἄριστον with ξυμβαίνει, it may be read, not knowing how that which relates to thee best contributes to the good both of the whole and of thee. At the hazard, then, of a little repetition, we would give the following free paraphrase of the substance of the whole passage; the latter part, however, or converse doctrine, being rather implied than expressed, although it may be clearly found in other parts of the Platonic dialogues: Physically, thou art but an insignificant pebble in the great kтíoμa, or building of the universe (see the comparison of the 200 and oλóуo, page 55), yet forming a necessary part in the joinings and compactness of the whole, even absolutely essential to the whole as a whole, and which the builder and keeper cannot neglect without risking the ruin of the whole morally, the great universe is also all made for thee, and reciprocally for each of its rational parts; it was intended, with all its other parts, to have a bearing upon thy blessedness or misery, according as thou violatest or remainest in concord with its moral harmony; its physical harmony thou shalt ever subserve, whatever may be thy condition or thy course.

LII.

Atheistic Objection drawn from the Extent of the Universe.

PAGE 59, LINE 6. 'Ηιπερ ἂν ἔχοι λόγον ραστώνη θεοῖς τῶν πάντων, ταύτῃ μοι δοκῶ φράζειν—“ I think that I am explaining in what way ease in the administration of the