:

wag

and Spens; for Hope, Todd, and Kirk, Edinburgb, and Hugh Reid Buchanan, Glasgow ; Walker, Marlineau, and Co., for Morton, Smart, Macdonald. and Prosser Edinburgb, and Craig and Henderson, Glasgow.)

COURT OF APPEAI. Annuity-Charge on Easements and Chattels-Deed of Grant-Con.

struction-Whether real or personal Estate-No Rentcharge created -Special Aot—Statutory Undertaking-By an indenture dated the 14th Aug. 1827, R. B., who appeared to have been tenant for life of one eighth sbare in certain realty and personalty constituting the old waterworks at C., establisbed pursuant to a special Act of Parliament, joined with the owners of the other seven shares in conveying such waterworks to the waterworks company of that city. The indenture contained a recital to the effeot that the consideration for the grant had been agreed at the annual sum of £500 to be payable for ever by, quarterly payments to be secured as therein mentioned and to be divided between the grantore, their respective executors, administrators, and assigns, according to their sbares and io terests in the waterworks. The indenture further contained provisions for enforcing payment of the £500 per sonum by entry on the property constituting the undertaking for the time being of the company, with power to carry on such undertaking. It was clear that the property granted consisted mainly of easements, or rights in the nature of eatements, and of personal chattels; but it was not clear that it comprised any corporeal, as opposed to incorporeal, hereditamente, though there were words sufficiont to pass such corporeal hereditaments (if any) as formed part of the old waterworks at C. A summons was taken out by a trustee aad fexecutor of the testator R. B. for the determination of the question whether the annual sum payable by the water. works company was real or personal estate. It was decided by Parker, J. (103 L. T. Rep. 427) that tbe indenture according to its true construction was intended to create and, so far as it operated at all, did in fact create an annuity oharged on the statutory undertaking of the company, and was not intended to create and did not create a rentcharge arising out of such corporeal hereditaments (if any) as were comprised therein, and such an annuity was persooalty, and not realty descendible to the heir. Oo appeal, the authority of Ramsay v. Thornton (16 Sim. 575) was relied upon Held, that the judgment of Parker, J. and the grounds upon wbich be based his deoision were perfectly right; that there was no ground whatever for saying that the iodenture created a perpetual fee farm rent or rentcharge; and that there was no foundation for the argument that the apnual sum anything else but personal property of the testator R. B. and it did not form part of his real estate. Appeal dismissed.

[Re Baxter's Trusts ; Malling v. Addison. Ct. ot App. : CozensHardy, M.R., Buckley and Kennedy, L.JJ. May 2:—Counsel: for the appellant, Romer, K.C. and Maugham ; for the respondents, Martelli K.C. and P. 8. Stokes. Solicitors: for the appellant, Busk, mellor, and Norris, agents for Brown, Dobee, and Rogers, Chester; for the respondents, Maples, Teesdale, and Co., a gents for

Wright and Son, Sunderland ] Bailment- Furniture deposited with Warehouseman-Claim to Furni

ture by Person other than Bailor - Magistrate's Order for delivery up of Goods to Claimant-Liability of Bailee to true Owner-Metropolitan Police Act 1839 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 71), 8. 40.-Appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of the Divisional Court (Darling, Phillimore, and Buckpill, JJ), reported 103 L. T. Rep. 839. Tho plaintiff deposited with the defendant, who was a warehouseman, a quantity of forniture, and, on making the deposit, sbe left with him the address at which she was to be found. Some time la'er the plaintiff's busband, from whom she was separated, came to the defen. dant's premises and demanded the goods. The defendant's manager deolined to part with the goods without the plaintiff's authority, and gave bim the address at wbich sbe was living. Subsequently the plaintiff's husband stated that he had been to the address given, and that bis wife was not known there. He again demanded the goods, but was told that they would not be given up except under a magistra te’s order. The plaintiff's husband thereupon applied to a magistrate uoder 2 & 3 Viot. o. 71, 9. 40, for an order for the delivery up of the goods, and a summons was isgued against the defendant. At the time when the summons was 188ued a repreBeatative of the defendant was in court and informed the magi. strate that the reason why the goods were not delivered up wag because they were warehoused in the plaintiff's name, and they could not give them up without her authority. When the summons was heard the plai tiff's busband swore that his wise was not koown at the address to wbich he bad gone, that the goods were his and that their value was about £10, and the magistrate made an order for delivery on payment of the defendant's charges. A representative from the defendant's firm was present in the police-court at the bearing of the summons, but was acked no question in relation to the matter and volunteered no joformation connerning the plaintiff. An action was subsequently brought by the latter against the defendant for the return of the goods or their value. The County Court judge directed the jury that an order properly obtained under 2 & 3 Vict o 71, 8. 40, would protect the delen. dant, but that he would be liable for the loss of the goods if he by his negligence allowed the order to be made witbout giving notice to the plaintiff, whose address he knew, or asking the magis. trate to summon the plaintiff before bim so that she might be heard. The jury found that the order had been obtained owing to the negligence of the defendunt, and the County Court judge thereupon

gave judgment for the plaintiff. The Divisional Court held, om appeal, that the decision of the County Court judge was wrong, on the ground that there was no duty on the part of the defendant to do more than bring to the notice of the magistrate that there was another claimant to the goods, and that, this having been done, the defendant was under no liability to the plaintiff in respect of them. The plaintiff appealed. Held, that there was a duty on the part. of the defendant (the bailee) to give notice to the plaintiff (the bailor) before the summons was heard that a claim was made against her goods, the custody of wbich bad been accepted by the bailee. Held, further, that the bailee could not rely on the magistrato's order for his protection unless he could show that he was acting upder compulsion, and that he was estopped by his conduct from relying on that order. Appeal allowed.

(Ransom v. Platt. Ct. of App. : Vaughan Williams, Fletcher Moulton, and Farwell, L.JJ. April 26 and 27.-Counsel: for the appellant, C. A. Russell, K.C. and W. R. Warren ; for the respon. dent, Leslie Scott. K.C. and Heber Hart. Solicitors : fortbe appell.ot, Oswald Hanson and Smith; for the respondent, L. W..

Taylor.) Market-Statutory Market Market Rights-Disturbance - Rival Market

- Warehouse — "Shop”-Sale in own Shop-28 Geo. 2,c. 123, 8. 430 Geo. 2, c. 31, 8. 10. — By certain statutes a market was established in the borough of S., and carried on as from 1756 on lands purchased pursuant to the statutes. By an Act 28 Geo. 2, c. 123, 8. 4, it wils provided that it sbonld not be lawful for any. persons to hold any other market in the borough. By an Act 30 Geo. 2, c. 31, s. 10, it was provided that if any viotualler, fruiterer, or other person should sell any fruits, herbs, or other provisions in any private house, warehouse, street, stall, or other place within 1000 yards of the market, “but only in his own sbop or in the publio market place, every such person being thereof convicted should be liable to a fice. F. recently took some premises in the immediate vicinity of the market and there cold wholesale not only his own goods of a nature identical with those sold in the market, but those of other persons on commission. The premises were in the nature of a ware house and counting-housewith four floors on which goods were stored and also exposed for Ealo by samples, and a fifth floor was reserved for residential purposee. Held, that F. was not carrying on a rival market within the probibition of sect. 4 of the Act 28 Geo. 2. o. 123, and that his premises were a "shop" within the meaning of sect. 10 of the Act 30 Geo. 2, c. 31. Decision of Neville, J. (ante, p. 290 ; 104. L. T. Rep. 16) affirmed.

(Haynes v. Ford. Ct. of App. : Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Buckley and Kennedy, L.JJ. April 25.-Counsel : Astbury, K.C., Macmorran, K.C., and Bischoft; Buckmaster, K.C., Peterson, K.C., and

Sargant. Solicitors : Simpson, Palmer, and Winder; C. J. Parker.] Real Estate Conversion-Order by Court for Sale-Part of real Estate

unsold-Order operating as absolute-Conversion of unsold real Estate into personally.--By his will, dated in Sept. 1872, a testator who died in Oct. 1872, after directing payment of bis debts, &c., and declaring that his personal estate pot specifically bequeathed should be the primary fund for payment thereof, and after appointing executors and trustees of his will and making certain bequests, dei ised and bequeathed to his trustees all bis freehold estate in B. and all the residue of his real and personal estate upon trust to sell certain real estate in the counties of M and 8. and to convert and get in his personal estate not specifically bequeathed and out of the proceeds to pay all his debie, &c. (other than the mortgage debt on the B Estate), and as to the B. Estate the testator directed bis trustees out of the rents thereof after payment of interest on the mortgage to pay to each of his four children an annuity of £200 for ten years after his death and to aocumulate any surplus rente, and, subject to the payment of the mortgage debt on bis B. Estate, the testator directed his trutees to stand possessed of that estate and the accumulations of income thereon, after providing for payment of the annuities, in trust for bis four children in equal shares as tenants in common, but so that the shares of his children should not be conveyed until the expiration of the term of ten years; and the testator declared that if from any cause the net income of that estate should be insufficient after payment of the mortgage debt and interest to pay the four aonuities, the annuity to his daughter M. should not abate, but the ano uities to his three other children sbould abate pro rata. Io Nov. 1873 a deoree was made for the administration of the testator's real and persona estate. The period of ten years fixed by the testator in his will expired in Oct. 1882. By an order dated in Feb. 1883 it was ordered that the B. Estate should be sold with the approbation of the judge, and that the proceeds of such sale sbould be paid into court. In pursuance of that order the B. Estate was put up for sale by auction in twelve lots, and six thereof wore sold. The testator's daughter M. having died, her one-fourth share in the rents and profits of the testator's estate remaining unsold was claimed by S, a person who claimed through the heir-at-law of M., from whom be had purchased the property. Held, affirming the decision of Warrington, J., that the order of Feb. 1883 operated as an absoluta conversion of the unsold real estate of the testator into personalty as from the date of that order, and that therefore the claim of S. to be entitled to receive the one-fourth sbare of the testator's daughter M. in the rents and profits of the testator's real estate remaining unsold was not maintainable. Appeal dismissed.

[Fauntleroy v. Beebe. Ct. of App. : Cozens. Hardy, M. R., Buckley and Kennedy, L.JJ. April 28.- Counsel: for the appellant, Henri

а

were

Terrell, K.C. and W. H. Gover; for the respondente, Cave, KC. and H. E. Wright. Solicitors: for the appellant, Henry Gover and Son; for the respondents, Edmund Ward Oliver and Son]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Company-Winding.up-Debenture - Floating Charge within three

Months of Winding.up-Solvency of Company-Companies (Consolida. lion) Aci 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69), s. 212.-On the 15th Nov. 1909 a limited company, carrying on a licensed restaurant business, issued to W. E M. and I. H. two first mortgage debentures for £3800 and £2250 re pectively. As to the fret. £3000 was paid over to the company at the time. The second was issued wholly to secure previous debt owing by tbo company. The debentures were similar in form, and constituted a floating charge upon the undertaking or property of tbe company for the amounts stated, together with interest thereon at 5 per cent. On the 4th Jan. 1910 a petition was presented for the compulsory winding.up of the company, and an order made for that purpose on the 6th April 1910. On the 6th Jan. 1910 a receiver and manager was appointed on behalf of the debenture-bolders. On tbe 3rd Jap. 1910 à debepture-bolders' action was commenced to enforce the charge on the ground ibat te security was in jeopardy, the company being insolvent. The liquidator alleged that the debentures

invalid by virtue of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (8 Edw. 7 c. 69), 9. 212, wbich provide that “a floating charge created within three months of the commencement of the winding-up sball, unlegg it is proved that tbe company immediately after the creation of the obarge was solvent, be invalid. except to the amount of any cash paid to the company at the time of or subsequently to the creation of and in consideration for tbe charge, together with interest ... at 5 per cent. per annum.” The balance-shert drawn up at the time the debentures were created showed that the company's assets on capital account then exceeded its liabilities. On the other hand, these assets were difficult to realice, and the company could not in fact then satisfy its trade creditorg. Held, that upon either con. struotion the company was jnsolvent and the debentures invalid except to the amount of £3000, cash paid at the time. Held, also, that under sect. 212 (ubi sup) a floatiog charge oreated within three months of the winding up is invalid unless the company's business was actually solvent at the time, apart from the value of the fixed assets.

(Hodson v. Blanchards (London) Limited. Ch. Div. : Neville, J. May 3.-Counsel : Jenkins, K.C. and C. J. Matthew ; Peterson, K.C.

and Stamp. Solicitors : Giddins, Cohen, and Dunn.) wicensing—Compensation—Business and Premises bequeathed to different

Persons— Licensing Act 1904 (4 Edw. 7. c. 23), 6. 2-Ry his will dated the 24tb June 1886 W. S. who died on the 22nd March 1887 appointed bis wife M. A S. bis executris and after her death bis two sons W. S. and G. J. S. executors, and devised after bis wife's death the copybold premises, koown as the S. and G. to W. S, and as to the residue including the trade and business of a retailer of beer, the testator bequeathed the same after his widow's death to bis sons W. S and G. J. S. io equal parts. G. J. S. died in estate on ihe 5th Nov. 1888 and the plaintiff was bis widow and legal representative. W. 8. junior, son of W. S., died on the 29th June 1897, and the infant defendant G. P. S. was his son, and his guardian had been admitted tenant of the copyholds. The lease of the S. and G., by the tenant for life, M. A. S., uoder the Settled Land Acts was, at the bearing vested in a firm of brewers, the widow having let the premises for twenty-one years from the 29th Sept. 1897 at the yearly rent of £40. M A. 8. died on the 11th Dec. 1906 having by her will appointed the defendant M. A. C. her sole exeou rix. The licensing justices refused renewal of the lioence of the 8. and G. beerhouse, and on the 29th Oct. 1910, the compensation committee awarded £2500, of which £1482 was in respect of the copyhold interest apportioned to the infant defen. dant G. P. S., £270 to the licensee, and £748 to the brewers, the lessee8. The plaintiff by her originatiog summons claimed that the componsation iundw is a portion of the residuary estate of W. S. For the customary beir it was said that the £1482 awarded to the copybolder did not include the goodwill or reversionery interest in the good will. Held, that in 1910 the estate of G. J s. bad ro continuing interest in the business or the premises. Since 1897 the business had not been the business of the testator's estate, but the business of the lessoes or their tenants. The plaintiff had therefore no right to participate in the compensation fund.

(Rs 8purge ; Calver v. Collett Ch. Div.: Evo, J. May 3.Counsel : Howard Wright ; Mulligan; Montague 'Shearman, jun. Solicitors: Pattinson anu Brewer ; Charles Robinson and Co. ; J. M.

Haslip.) Palent-Expiration-Application to prolong-Insufficient Remunera

tion-Separate Claims for distinct Inventions-Power of the Court to prolong certain Claims and reject others—Patents and Designs Aci 1907, 8. 18.—The patent of an important system of wireless telegraphy was granted in 1897, but, owing to difficulties in working the system, the patentee was unable to profit by his invention. He applied for a prolongation of the patent, the application being divided into a number of claiming clauses, each dealing with different parts of the invention, or different modes of applying the general principle of the diecovery to the instru. mento used. In opposition to the application, by the Comptroller. General of Patents, it was contended that the patent must be treated as a whole, and that as several of the claiming clausee relat d to appliances which were common to other systems of wireless telegraphy the extension could not be granted. Held, that

certain of the claiming clauses related to distinct inventions by tho patentee, and that for these clauses an extension for seven years should be granted.

[Re Lodge's Putent. Ch. Div.: Parker, J April 4, 5, and 28 – Coungel: Walter, K.C. and J. Hunter Gray ; the Solicilor-General and C. H. Surgant. Solicitors : Farrar, Porter, and Co., Solicitor to the Board of Trade.] actice-Sequestration-Indian Civil Service Annuity--Assignability-(Indian) Pensions Act (No. XXIII. 01) 1871, 88. 11, 12-East India Annuity Funds Aci 1874 (37 Vic. c. 12).—Ihe defeodant entered the Madras Civil Service in 1877, and in the eame year he executed a deed of covenant made between himself and the Secretary of State for India in Council by which in effect) he agreed to subscribe to, and to conform to the rules of, the Madrag Civil Service Annuity Fund. This was a fund originally established by Madras Civil Servants, and maintained by their own contributions and by a subvention from the East India Company, continued by the Government of India. It was vested in trustees until 1871, when the subscribers in general meeting agreed to transfer it to the Secretary of State; and this arrangement was confirmed by the East India Annuity Funds Act 1874. The defendant became entitled to his annuity on his retirement in 1903. In 1907 be assigned it to trustees as security for the payment of an allowanoe to his wife ; and the assignment was recognised (28 assigoments of these annuities have always been recognised) by the India Office. In 1910 the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant which he sought to enforoe by a writ of sequestration, and this was a summons in the same action to decide (in effect) whether the annuity was assignable and liable to sequestration. The defen. da t raised the point that the (Indian) Pensions Act 1871 rendered it inalienable. By sect. 11 of that Act : “ No pension granted or continued by Government on political considerations, or on account of past services or present infirmities, or as a compassionato allowance, and no money due or to become due on account of any such pension or allowance, shall be liable to seizore, attachment, or sequestration by process of any court in British India, at the instance of a creditor, for any demand against the pensioner, or in satisfaction of a decree or order of any such court”; and by sect. 12: “ All assignments, agreements, orders, sales, and securities of overy kind made by the person entitled to any p nsion, pay or allowance mentioned in sect 11, in respect of any money not payable at or before the making thereof, on account of any such pension, pay, or allowance, or for giving or assigning any future interest thereid, are null and void.” Held, that the defendant's annuity was pot & “pension granted or continued by Government" within sec. 11 of the Indian Act, and was therefore assignable and liable to sequestratioo, the question of how far the court would give effect to that section in a relevant case being left undecided.

[Knill v. Dumergue. Ch. Div.: Joyoe, J. Feb. 22, 23, April 25 and 26.— Counsel : Younger, K.C. and Beebee ; Hughes, K.C. and Whitmore Richards ; E Beaumont. Slicitors : Billing, Thomp8on, and Co., for Fairfax 8 pofforth, Bristol ; Valpy, Peckham, and

Chaplin; Edward Downes.] Trade Union Funds-Levy for political Purposes- Meaning of " volun.

tary Levy”—Levy for Election of Labour Members on Local Public Bodier-Boards of Guardians.--A registered trade union, raised “ voluntary levies " from its members, for the purpose of electing or support ng Labour representatives in Parlia ment or on local publio bodies. On behalf of one of the members it was contended that tho lovies were in fact not voluntary. Any member wishing to avoid payment had to object in a manner dictated by the trade union, and under certain arbitrary conditions, and his so objecting had the effect of making bim a marked man in the society. In the event of his not paying and not objecting in the prescribed form, be was debited with the amount of the levy, as against the benefits which he was entitled to reoeive from the trade union. It was further conteaded that although the judgment of the House of Lorde in_ Amalgamaled Society of Railway Strvanls v. Osborne (101 L. T. Rep. 787; (1910) A. C. 87) was confioed to levies for Parliamentary representation purposes, the principle applied, with equal force, to collections for the representatioo of labour upon public bodies of all descriptions. Held, that the mode of collection made it, io effect, a compulsory levy, and that the principle of Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne (sup.) must be extended o make guch levies illegal in the case of elections for muoioi pal and local goveroment authoriti”, boards of guardians being expressly excluded.

Wilson v. Amalgamated Society of Engineers and others. Ch. Div.: Parker, J. April 27.— Counsel: Spencer Bower, K C. and Stuart Bevin ; Buckmaster, K.C., Ellis Griffith, K.C., and I. C. Davenport.

Solicitors : 0. T. Wilkinson; Mills, Lockyer, and Mills.) z'rustee-Inves:mentMoneys arising under Settled Land Acts—"Socks

or Securities of any British Colony or Dependency”- Power to invest in Stocks of Provinces of Canada.-By the 'will of Sir S. M. M..W., Bart., dated the 1st Aug. 1896, who died on the 3let Dec. 1897, and which will bad been duly proved, he gave a power to bis trustees that capital mon ye arising under the Settled Land Acte might be invested in, amoogst oi bers, the following investments as well as in vt stments for the time heing authorised by any general public Act--that was to say, “ the stock or securities (not payable to bearer) of the Government of India for the time being or of any British colony or dependenoy," or in the purchase of debenture stook of any railway, dock, gas, water, or other company incorporated by Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of lodia" or of such other de pon. denoy or colony as aforesaid.' The question arose on an originating

Fourth Shoot

execution debtors. The sheriff's officers seized on the 11th May at 2 p.m., but at 10 a m. there had been a resolation to wind-up the company voluntarily. On the 19th May & Bummons was issued by the company and its voluntary liquidator asking for an order that the execution creditors should be restrained from attempting to sell the goods and effects of the company which had been seized. On the 21st May Hamilton, J. made an order restraining the sale or removal of the goods until after the bearing of a summons returnable on the 26th May. On the 30th May Buckoill, J. con. tioned the injunction in the terms of the summnos, and on the 3th June be amended his order by directing the sheriff to withdraw, and accordingly the sheriff at the request of the execution creditors did withdraw. The sheriff was not served with the summons or made a party to the order, and it appeared that prior to his with. drawal the sheriff bad been expressly directed by the execution creditors to remain in possession. After the sheriff bad withdrawn he applied to the execution creditors for the payment of his fees, and, upon their repudiating liability, he brought an action against them in the County Court. The learned judge decided in favour of the eberiff as to part of his clajm, and against this decision both parties appealed, the sheriff contending that the execution oreditors were liable for the whole of his fees, and the execution creditors by a cross-appeal contending that they were liable for no part of them. The question turned upon the meaning and effect of the order as to fees made by the judges under the Sheriffs Act 1887. That order provides (inter alia) that where the fees cannot be levied because the execution is withdrawn satisfied, or "stopped," they are to be paid by the person issuing the execution or the person at whose instance the sale is stopped, as the case may be.” The sheriff contended that this order did not alter the previously existing law as to the person liable for the sheriff's fees, and that accordingly the execution creditors were liable for such fees. The execution creditors contended that tbe order altered the previously exieting law, and not only prescribed the amounts the sheriff was entitled to obarge, but defined the persons from whom alope he was entitled to demand them, and they further contended that under the order the only persons liable for the sberiff's fees were the voluntary liquid.tor and the company. Held, that the order did not alter the existing law as to the liability for the sheriff's fees, and that the sberiff either completes bis execution or withdraws, excopt in the one case where the official receiver or trustee in bankruptcy stop- & sale, and that accordingly in the circumstances of this case the execution creditors were liable.

[Montague v. Davies, Benachi, and Co. K. B. Div.: Phillimore, and Baokes. JJ. March 29, 30, and April 12. --Counsel: Holman Gregory, K.C. and Hanbury A998 ; Greer, K C. and A. T. Miller. Solicitors; Bell, Brodrick, and Gray, for R. W. Shoesmith, Halifax ;

Burn and Berridge, for Josiah Dean and Son, Liverpool.] Friendly Society-Action in County Court to recover Benefit —Jurisdic.

lion of County Court Judge-Friendly Societies Act 1896 (58 & 60 Vict. c. 25), s. 68 (6).-Appeal from the decision of His Honour Judge Steavenson, sitting at the Cockermouth and Workington County Court. An action was brought by the plaiotiff, the widow of a member of a friendly society, against the defendant, who was the statutory officer of the society, to recover a benefit to which she claimed to be entitled under the ruleg. Rule 20 of the society's rules of 1908 provided that disputes between members or persons claiming through or on account of a mamber and the society should be decided by arbitration, and prescribed certain formalities to be observed. It further provided that each dispute should be decided by three arbitrators, the first elected by the claimant, the second by the society, and the third to be a County Court judge or other person agreed on by the parties, wbo should act as umpire. The Friendly Societies Act 1896. 8. 68 (6), provides tbat:" Where the rules (of a friendly society) contain no direction as to disputes, or wbere no decision is made on a dispute within forty days after the application to the society . . . for a reference under its rules, the member or person aggrieved may apply either to the County Court or to a court of summary juri-diction and the court to which application is so made may bear and determine the matter in dispute.” On the Ilth March 1910 the plaintiff applied for benefit under the rules. On the 2nd April the society passed & resolution refusiog the plaintiff's application as being contrary to rule. On the 18th April the plaintiff made applics. tion for arbitration under the rules. This was

assented by the society, but the parties were unable to agree ag to an umpire, and, after the expiration of forty days, the plaintiff in Jan. 1911 commenced proceedings in the County Court by virtue of sect. 68 (6) of the Friendly Societies Act 1896. Before such proceedings were taken, but after the plaintiff's right to take them bad vested, new rules had been made by the society regulating di-putes between members and those claiming under them and the society with the requirements of which the plaintiff had not complied. It was contended before the learned judge that, the plaintiff not baving complied with these regulations, he had no jorisdiction to entertain the action. To this contention he gave effect and declined to hear the case. Held, that the learned judge was wrong, and that the alteration in the rules could not a ffect the right of the plaiutiff, which had become vested, to go to the County Court, and that the learned judge accordingly had juris. diction to try the case.

(Ritson v. Dobem. K. B. Div. : Pickford and Lush, JJ. May 1.Counsel : Ellis lill; Louenthal. Solicitore : Raule, Johnstone, and Co., for Paisley, Falcon, Skerry, and Highet, Workington ; Stanley Evans and Co., for Dix and Harle, Newcastle.]

Local Government -- Rural District Council-Parochial Elector-Threa

of Litigation-Counsel's Opinions—Right to inspec- Local Govern. ment Act 1894 (56 & 57 Vict, c. 73), 8. 58, sub-s. 5.-Rule on behalf of one H. calling on the respondent rural district council to show cause why a mandamus should not issue to compel them to permit H. to inspect and take copies of and extracts from all cases for the opinions of counsel and all opinions of counsel, with documents and plans accompanying, and all minutes of the meeti..gs of the council and committees held between the 2nd Feb. and the 31st Dec. 1910, belonging to or under the control of the council, with reference to the repair of and the liability to repair a road known as W..lade, in the parish of Lingfield, pursuant to the Local Government Act 1894, 8. 58, sub-s. 5, and the rule was obtained on the ground that inspection was refused contrary to the statute. It appeared upon affidavit that the applicant A. was a landowner and a parochial elector in the district of the respondent council. lo that district there was a certain highway which the applicant found it convenient to use. It had fallen into a bad state of repair and be requested the council to repair it. The coupoil refnsed to do anything in the matter, and the applicant then threatened them with legal proceedings to compel them to repair the road in accordance with what he alleged was their duty. There was eoma doubt as to whether the road was or wae not one for which the counoil were legally responsible, and they accordingly took counsel's opinion as to their liability. The applicant having discovered tbat they had taken couogel's opinion, then asked the council to show him the opinion of counsel 80 taken, but they réfused to disclose it, alleging that the document was & confidential document obtained by them in view of their probable litigation with him. Thereupon the applicant obtained the above rule for a mandamus, and claimed a right to inspect the opinion under seot. 58, sub-sect. 5, of the Local Government Act 1894. That sub-section provides that: “Every parochial elector of a parish in a rural district may, at all reasonable times, without payment, inspect and take copies of and extracts from all books, accounts, and documents belonging to or under the control of the district council of the district." The applicant claimed the inspection under that sub-section as being a parochial elector of the parish. The respoodent coupoil assented to tbe ios peotion of their minutes, but they refused to give the cases for opinion of counsel and the documents other than their minutes. Two main points were taken on behalf of the council in sbo wing causo against the rule. It was first contended that the words ** booke, accounts, and documents " in the sub-section did not include such documents as those referred to in the rule, but were confined to books, accounts, and documents which would be brought before the auditor for purposes of audit under the earlier sections of the Act. Secondly, it was contended that these cases for the opioion of counsel and other doruments were called into existence in consequence of a claim and threat of legal proceedings by the applicant to compel the council to repair the road alleged by him to be a public highway, and that the sub-section did not give the applicant the right to inspect such doouments. For the applicant it was con. tended that the sub section was not so limited, and that as a parochial elector the applicant had a right to the inspection. Cur. adv. vult. Held, that the words • all books, accounts, and documents” would include cases submitted to counsel and counsel's opinions thereon, and that ratepayers as such would have a right to inspect such documents, but that as the applicant did not desire to inspect the documents as & ratepayer, but as a litigant and with a view of obtaining evidence in support of his claim, the writ ought not to be granted, and the rule was discharged up in that ground.

(Rex v. Godstone Rural District Council. K. B. Div. : Lord Alverstone, C.J., Bray and Bankes, JJ. May 1.-Counsel : Macmorran, K.C. and W. Mackenzie'; Danckwerls, K.C. and Hansell. Solicitors : Turner and Evans, for E. A. Head, East

Grinstead ; Hasties.) Negligence-Catlle on Highway-Open Gate-No Evidence as to by

whom opened - Primâ facie Evidence of Negligence-Burden of Prooj, Appeal from the decision of His Honour Judge Tindal Atkinson, sitting at the Romford County Court. The plaintiff, & domestic servant, was riding on a bicycle at 10.30 p.m along a highway adjoining a field in which the defendant kepi 100 cows. The field in question communicated by a gate with the highway, and at the time when the plaintiff was passing the gate was open, and she saw some cows coming through it. A little further along were other cows which had come from the field, some of which threw the plaintiff down and injured her. At the trial no evidence was given as to by whom the gate bad been opened. The learned judge held that in the circumstances the fact that the defendant's gate was open and that his cows had strayed on to the road through the open gate and bad caused the accident to the plaintiff atforded evidence of negligence, and that it was for the defendant to displace this evidence by showing that the gate was not left open by reason of any negligence on his part or on that of his servante. Upon the evidence he held that the defendant had not displaced this primâ facie case, and gave judgment for the plaintiff for £75. The defendant appealed. The court (Pillimore and Horridge, JJ.) differed. Held, by Horridge, J., that the fact that the defendant's gate was open at 10.30 p.m. and that big cows strayed on to the bighway, afforded some evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, and that, this not having been displaced by the defendant's witnesses, the decision of the learned judge was right. Held, per Phillimore, J., that the learned judge was wrorg in holding

an

to

was

:

that the fact that the defendant's gate was open imposed the burden upon him of showing that it was not 90 open owing to his negligence or that of bis servants, and that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove that such was the case. The court having disagreed, the appeal was accordingly dismissed.

[Elis v. Banyard. K. B. Div. Phillimore and Horridge, JJ April 7 and 27.--Counsel : C. E. Jones; E. B. Charles. Solicitors : R. H. Bentley, for Albert H. Symons, Romford ; Griffith and

Gardiner.] Public Health–Unsound Meat - Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39

Vict. c 55), 88. 116, 117-Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 59), 8. 28.-Case stated on an information preferred by the respondent against the appellant under sect. 117 of the Public Health Act 1875 charging ibat one piece of veal-to wit, fillot--sold for the food of man on the 8th Oct. 1910 in the district of Loog Eaton was on the 10th Oct. 1910 lawfully seized by the respondent, the inspector of nuisances for the district, it then appearing to the respondent to be unsound and upwholesome and unfit for the food of man, and that the piece of real-to wit, illet-was afterwards on the 10th Oct 1910 in due course of law adjudged by one of His Majesty's justices of the peace for the county of Derby to be unsound and unfit for the food of man and condemned by him and ordered by him to be destroyed or to be disposed of as to prevent it from being used for the food of man, and tbat sbe the appellant unlawfully was the person to wbom the meat belonged at the time the meat was 80 sold. Upon the bearing of the information the following facts were proved or admitted : -About 8 p.m. on Saturday, the 8th Oct. 1910, one S. K., a married womad, residing at Long Eaton, purchased from the appellant, at her shop at 25, S.-road, Long Eaton, a piece of veal weighing 3lb. or thereabouts for the sum of 23. On Sunday, the 9th Oct., S. K. began to cook the piece of veal for dinner, and, while she was so cooking, came to the conclusion that the piece of veal was not in proper condition. Thereupon S. K. took the partly cooked piece ot veal to the medical Officer of health, Dr. A. B. C., who formed the opinion that it was unfit for food. Dr. C. sent for the respondent, who is inspector of nuisances for the Long Eaton Urban District Council. On bis arrival at 3.30 p.m. on the same day the respondent inspeoted the piece of veal and, being of opinion that it was upsound and unfit for food, thereupon seized it and carried it away. On Monday, the 10th Oct. 1910, the piece of veal was condemned by one of His Majesty's justices of the peace for the county of Derby. and by him ordered to be destroyed and it was in fact accordingly destroyed. The piece of veal was in fact unsound and unfit for the food of man at the time of its sale to the said S. K. and the seizure thereof by the respondent. The justices were of opinion that the above fants constituted an offence by the appellant under sect. 117 of the Public Health Act 1875 as amended by sect. 28 of the Pub ic Health Acts Amendment Act 1890, and therefore they convicted the appellant. Held. that the conviction was rigbt.

[Salt (app.) v. Tomlinson (resp). K. B. Div. : Lord Alverstone, C.J., Pickford and Lash, JJ. April 26 -Counsel : H. A. McCurdie ; Disturnal. Solio tors : Hamlins, Grammer, and Hamlins, for B W.

Moore, D rby; J. H. Lee and Watts, for E. Williams, Long Eaton.) Railways-Carriage of Goods— Rates— False Account of Goods with

Intent to avoid Payment of Tolls-Misdescription of Goods in ('onsignment Note-Offence- Railways Clauses Consolidution Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c 20), 8. 99.-Case stated by justices for the county of Warwick. At the petty sessions at Aston Manor an information was preferred by the respondent, who was an official of the Midland Railway Company and was acting on their behalf, agai st the appellants, under sects. 98 and 99 of the Railways Clavees Conso. lidation Act 1845, charging that the appellants on the 15th Sept1910, then being the owners of certain goods—to wit, an eleotrio stator in two parts—then beiog about to travel upon the Midlind Railway, unlawfully and wilfulli did give a false account of such goods by falsely descriting the same 88°• two cases bearers," with intent thereby to avoid payment of certain tolls payable in 108 peot thereof. The appellants were found guilty by the justices and ordered to pay to the Midland Railway Company the sum of £20 of penalty and £10 108. costs. The facts proved were as follows: The appellants carried on business in a large way pear Birmiogbam as madu'acturers of electrical maohinery and fittings, and in Sept. 1910 were under a contract with a firm at Bedford to supply for the 090

of the corporation certain electrical machinery and (inter alia) a single.phase alternator generator. On the 15th Sept. 1910 the appellante consigned from their works per the Mid. land Railway Company, rid L. Station, Birmingbam. to Bedford a portion of the goods forming the subjeot of the contract, which consigoment consisted of the stator forming part of the singlephase alternator. The stator consisted of a large ring-like casting about 7ft. in diameter bearing or carrying upon it iron laminations and metal cores with their windings of wire. The stator at the time it was consigoed was complete, but was divided into two parts and packed in two cases weighing together about 8 tons 150wt. The two parts only required to be bolted together to make the stator complete. At the time the stator was so consigned a consignment note was handed by the appellants to the railway company describing the gouds as being two cases bearere," and ibat the goods were sent at “owners' risk,” the senders paying the carriage. According to the classification of rates made in pursuance of the Midland Railway Company Rates and Charges Order 1891, “bear 18 chargeable in clasa C, while electrical machinery or a generator in parts were chargeable at a higher rate under olugs 2. At the time

of the consigoment there was published in the rate book of the company kept at the L. Station the following rates between Bir. mingham and Bedford : (1) An exceptional rate of 93. 2d., which

& station to station rate at owner's risk and applicable to “ bearers” in clase C in lots of not less than 4 tons; and (2) a rate of 229. 9d., wbich was a C and D rate at company's risk and applica ble to machinery and generators in parts under class 2. There was no rate published in the rate book or in foroo payable in respect of consignments at owner's riek between Birmingham and Bedford of electrical machinery or generators in parts. The goods were in fact consigned as two cases bearers at owners' risk and were so accepted, and the rate of 9s. 2d. per ton was charged upon them as if the description were correct. Sect. 99 of the Rail. ways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 imposes a penalty upon the owner of goods he gives a false account of the goods with the intent to avoid payment of any to ls payable in respect thereof. The justices found that there was a false account given in order to avoid payment of the tolls, and that there was evidence in law of an offence within the section, and they held that the appellant wae. guilty of the offenoe charged. Held, tbat the view taken by the justices was right, and that there was evidence upon wbich they could come to the conclusion that an offence under sect. 99 had been committed.

(General Electric Company Limited (apps.) v. Evans (resp.). K. B. Div. : Lord Alverstone. c.J., Pickford and Lush, JJ. April 27.Counsel : Disturnal ; Sir Alfred Cripps, K.C. and Macassey. Solicitors: 1. G. Kenyon, for T. W. Robinson, Birmingham; Beale and Co ] ating-Provisional List- Appeal to Quarter Sessions—Jurisdiction.Case stated by quarter sessions on an appeal against & general rate for the metropolitan borough of s made on or about the 18t April 1910 and based on a provisional valuation list dated March 1910. The appellants are occupiers and owners of certaid tramways in the borough of S. The tramways a peared in a. provisional valuation list dated the 7th April 1909 as finally approved by the assessment committee of the metropolitan boroogh. of 3. at gross value £9200, ratea ble value £5000. In the aforementioned provisional list dated March 1910 the tramways were: inserted at gross value £10, 200, rateable value £6000. The appellants contended and said that they were prepared to prove that between April 1909 and April 1910 there had been no alteration: in the tramways or the tramwaje connected therewith save the construction of a new curve in the borough for the purpose of relieving congestion of traffic and the opening of the lines outside the borough in M.-street, Hackney, which had been reconstructed for electric traction. The appellants stated and tendered evi. dence to prove that these alteratio 8 bad not resulted in any increase of the earnings of the tramways, and that there had not been before the overeeers or a88088ment committee of the borough, any evidence of any increase in tbe value of the tramways within the meaning of seot. 47 of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 or at all, and contended that the respondents bad no power to insert the tramways in any provisional ligt in March 1910 at the sum of £6000 rateable value or at any other figure, and that the list was (80 far as it related to the tramwaye) oull and void, and that the rate appealed against was bad and ought to be quashed. The respondents, by way of preliminary objection, contended : (1) That by sect. 45 of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 the valuetion list for the time being in force must be deemed to have been duly made and was conclusive evidence of the gross and rateablevalue of the several hereditaments included thereiu for all or any of the purposes of that section, and that by seot. 47, sub-sect. 10, of the Act a provisional list during the time that it is in force must be deemed to form part of the valuation list for the time being in force, and that every rate and tax in rispect of which the valuation list is conclusive whiou are respectively made and obarged as provided in that scheme must be levied accordingly, and that therefore ihe afore-mentioned provisional list dated Maroh 1910 was conclusive evidence of the gross and rateable values of the soveral hereditaments included therein for the purpose of lovying the rate appealed against ; (2) that the appella ats' appeal was in substance and effect an appeal against the afore-mentioned provisional list of March 1910; (3) that no appeal to quarter sessio 18 lay against any provisional list on the authority of the decision in Mulham Union v. Wells (59 L. T. Rep. 103 ; 20 Q. B. Div. 749) ; (4) that the appellants' remedy, if they conteoded that tboy were over-assessed, was to obtain repayment of the amounts o erpaid under seot. 47 (10) of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869; and (5) that the London Quarter Sessions in the circumstances bad no jurisdiotion to hear the appeal. The Court of Quarter 8 ssions were of opinion that in the ciroumstanoes they had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Held (dismissing the appeal), that the Court of Quarter Sessions was right.

(London County Council (apps.) v. Shoreditch Borough Council (respo). K. B. Div.: Lord Alverstone, CJ., Pickford and Lush, JJ. April 25.-Counsel : Ryde, K.C. ; C. A. Russell, K.C. and Courthope-Munroe. Solicitors : E. Tanner ; H. Mansfield Robinson,)

WARNING TO INTENDING LESSEES OF Houses.—Before purchasing or renting a house it is very important to get an independent report on the drainage, sanitary fittings, & water supply by an expert from the Sanitary Engineering Co., 65, Victoria-st., S.W. estab. 35 years. Tel. Sanitation London." Phone : 316, Westminster. Apply for prospectus. Advt.)