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Sect. 7 enacts that every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority: (1) Uses violence to or intimidates such other person or his wife or children, or injures his property; or (2) persistently follows such other person about from place to place; (3) hides any tools, clothes, or other property owned or used by such other person, or deprives him of or hinders him in the use thereof; or (4) watches or besets the house or other place where such other person resides or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place; or (5) follows such other person with two or more persons in a disorderly manner in or through any street or road, shall on conviction thereof by a court of summary jurisdiction or on indictment be liable either to pay a penalty not exceeding £20, or to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three months, with or without hard labour.
The picketing of the works or place of business of an employer for the purpose of persuading people, whether masters or men, not to work for him, is a "watching or besetting" with a view wrongfully and illegally to compel persons to abstain from doing a lawful act, within the meaning of sect. 7, sub-sect. 4, of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875. The defendants, officers of a trade union, ordered a strike against the plaintiff manufacturers, and also against S., a person who made goods for the plaintiffs only, and their pickets by their direction watched and beset the works of the plaintiffs and of S. for the purpose of persuading work people to abstain from working for the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeal held that this kind of picketing and the strike against S. for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiffs were illegal acts, and they granted an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants and their agents from watching or besetting the plaintiff's works for the purpose of persuading or otherwise preventing persons from working for him, or for any purpose except merely to obtain or communicate information; and also to restrain the defendants from preventing S. or any other persons from working for the plaintiffs by withdrawing his or their workmen from their employment: (J. Lyons and Sons v. Wilkins, 74 L. T. Rep. 358; (1896) 1 Cb. 811).
The law as laid down by Russell Gurney, the Recorder of London, in his charge to the grand jury, at the Central Criminai Court, in R. v. Hibbert (13 Cox, 82) (printed in an address to the House of Commons, dated the 22nd June 1875), was to the effect that if the defendants merely watched the employer's premises for the purpose of informing all comers of the existence of a strike, and endeavouring to persuade them to join the men on strike, that would be lawful so long as it was done peaceably, and without anything being done to interfere with the perfect exercise of free will on the part of those who were otherwise willing to work on the terms proposed by the employer. When the defendants and others had continually watched and walked up and down before the prosecutor's business premises, and had followed him through the streets to his private residence, it was held in R. v. Wall (21 Cox, 401) that if the acts of " watching and "persistently following were done with the intention of coercing the prosecutor to take back a dismissed employee, the defendants ought to be found guilty.
Sect. 2 (1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1906 provides that it shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their own behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of an individual employer or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carries on business, or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose of peaceably obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working.
NOTEWORTHY DECISIONS OF THE JUDICIAL YEAR. (Continued from page 358.)
An important accession to the law relating to FIXTURES has been made by the decision of Mr. Justice Joyce in Re Lord Chesterfield's Settled Estates (103 L. T. Rep. 823; (1911) 1 Ch. 237), where the question turned on the right to remove carvings as between executor and devisee or heir. The carvings in question were by Grinling Gibbons, and were affixed by means of pegs driven through into stiles built into the structure of the walls. By the will of the ninth earl certain estates were settled to certain uses under which the tenth earl was tenant for life. Certain chattels were bequeathed as heirlooms, and the tenth earl was given absolutely all the ninth earl's general effects and goods in the mansion-house; amongst these were the carvings in question. In 1909 the tenth earl sold the house, expressly reserving the carvings, which he removed, and subsequently, as regards a portion of them, sold and claimed the proceeds. It was held that the carvings did not pass under a general gift of chattels, but, inasmuch as they were fixed to the inheritance, the proceeds of sale must be treated as capital subject to the trusts of the settlement.
Two cases on the STATUTE OF FRAUDS may be usefully mentioned. Both were concerned with the matter of contracts not to be performed within a year. Prested Miners Company Limited v. Gardner Limited (103 L. T. Rep. 750; (1911) 1 K. B. 425) decides that sect. 4 of the statute (so far as it affects agreements not to be performed within that period) applies with full force to agreements for the sale of goods, and is not repealed by the Sale of Goods Act 1893. In consequence, such an agreement is hit by the Statute of Frauds although there has been an acceptance and actual receipt by the purchaser of a portion of the goods sold.
Ilanau v. Erlich (104 L. T. Rep. 494; (1911) W. N. 31) was concerned with an agreement. It was one for the employment of the plaintiff for a period of two years, subject to six months' notice on either side; no memorandum of the same had been drawn up. This was held by Mr. Justice A. T. Lawrence to be an agreement impossible of fulfilment within the year, for, although there was a power to end it by notice within a year, that determination of the contract could scarcely be deemed a performance of it.
HUSBAND AND WIFE cases are nearly always alike numerous and important, and during the past twelve months a number of decisions have been arrived at upon this branch of law. The thorny subject of marriage with a deceased wife's sister before 1907 (the date of the legislation dealing with deceased wife's sister's marriage) had to be considered by Mr. Justice Warrington in Re Thomas Green; Green v. Meinall (1911) W. N. 137). The summons was to determine whether children of a second marriage could participate with those of a first as next of kin of G., who had died intestate and a bachelor. His father had married" twice, the second ceremony being performed with the sister of the deceased wife. G. was a child by the second marriage. Mr. Justice Warrington thought that brothers and sisters, alike of the whole and the half blood, were entitled to share. The learned judge thought that it would be inconsistent with the words of sect. 1 of the Deceased Wife's Sister's Marriage Act 1907 to hold that the Act did not apply because by the death of the father in 1900 the second marriage had ceased to exist before the date of the Act and there was nothing upon which the Act could operate. With regard to the argument that but for the Act the children of the first marriage would alone have been entitled to share as next of kin and that there was thus an interest in expectancy protected under sect. 2, Mr. Justice Warrington held that such a spes successionis was not an interest in expectancy, and, as already stated, children of both marriages were deemed entitled participate. Re Whitfield; Hill v. Mathie (103 L. T. Rep. 878; (1911) 1 Ch. 310) turned on the same Act, but under widely different circumstances. W., dying in 1902, gave his property on trust to pay the income to his widow for life, with a gift over on her death or second marriage. In 1904 she purported to marry her deceased husband's brother, a thing invalid according to the civil and ecclesiastical law of the day. The trustees therefore paid the income as before, as she had not ceased to be the testator's widow. Then came the 1907 Act, and the trustees took the view that she was now no longer a widow and stopped payment. She thereupon took out a summons for a declaration that she was still entitled to the income. Mr. Justice Parker paraphrased the Legislature as saying, "Though we are rendering valid as a civil contract a previous marriage which was not valid at the time of its being entered into, we do not intend to alter or interfere with any rights of property depending on the marriage not being valid. Those are to remain unaffected, but as a civil contract the marriage is to be deemed to be valid." The learned judge thought that the Act did not prejudicially affect the widowhood estate given to the plaintiff, and he regarded this as only reasonable, since the parties to such marriages were not consulted when the Act was passed, and cases could be readily imagined in which the whole provision for a family might be swept away, though the husband might be dead. The lady therefore obtained the declaration sought. Re Charleton; Bracey v. Sherwin (130 L. T. Jour. 460; (1911) W. N. 54) turned on a different point. The trustee of a will here sought the court's direction to settle a dispute whether a disposition in favour of the testator's daughter during such time as her husband should be living apart from her (with a clause directing that the benefit should cease in the event of the married pair living again together) was valid or wholly or in part invalid. The facts of the case showed that the husband was not satisfactory, and that he had deserted his wife. Mr. Justice Joyce thought that there was nothing contrary to public policy in these provisions, and he accordingly held them to be good and valid. A Canadian case heard in the Privy Council also is of importance as showing the views entertained as to undue marital influence. Bank of Montreal v. Stuart (103 L. T. Rep. 641; (1911) A. C. 120) was an action where a married woman living with her husband sought to compel the bank to set aside a series of transactions into which she had been dragged at her husband's instance for his own and other people's benefit. The husband was impecunious, and offered his wife as security to the bank for advances, and in the end the lady transferred to it everything she possessed. The Privy Council thought that the law laid down by Vice-Chancellor Parker in Nedby v. Nedby (5 De G. & S. 377) was good law, and that in cases of husband and wife those who allege undue influence must prove it, and in this case the facts may usefully be scanned to serve as illustrations of what satisfied the Privy Council as to undue influence.
A case on INFANCY worth a word of brief review may be cited in Re Abrahams; Abrahams v. Bendon (103 L. T. Rep. 532; (1911) 1 Ch. 108). A testator had bequeathed a contingent legacy. There was a sum given to each son living at his death who attained twenty-four years of age, and a further sum at thirty. The trustees were directed to stand possessed of three fourteenth parts of the net residue in trust for the son Frank in case and when he attained twenty-one, and provided that the share should not vest absolutely in him, but should be held in trust for him for life, and after his death in trust for his children. When the father died Frank was thirteen years of age. The trustees asked the court for directions as to whether the legacies carried interest. The general rule
is, of course, that a contingent legacy does not carry interest while it is in suspense, with the exception where a legacy of a contingent nature is given by a father to an infant child, and then interest is This payable from the death until the contingency happens. exception, Mr. Justice Eve observed incidentally, would, as stated, extend to every case where the legatee is an infant, irrespective of the question whether the contingency is the attainment of twenty-one or the happening of any other event. grounds were relied on as against the legatee's right to interest(a) that the exception should only extend where the contingency is the attainment of twenty-one, or marriage where a female is concerned; and (b) that the legatee in this case was within the doctrine that no interest should be allowed, since the testator had provided another fund for maintenance. It was held by Mr. Justice Eve that, inasmuch as the contingency had no reference to infancy, the general rule applied whereby contingent legacies do not carry interest while in suspense, and neither of the legacies carried interest.
The subject-matter of INSURANCE naturally subdivides itself into several distinct branches, and in most of these the courts have had Thus, as some more or less important points to determine. regards burglary, we find in Saqui and Lawrence v. Stearns (1911) The 1 K. B. 426) a valuable decision by the Court of Appeal. policy contained the common exception of theft by a member of the insured's business staff. The facts showed that a servant entered into a plot with members of a gang of thieves whereby facilities were afforded for entering the premises while the servant was absent. In consideration of these facilities the servant was to have a share in the plunder. The plaintiffs, the insured, sought to make the underwriters liable on the ground that the theft was not actually by the servant, although he was undoubtedly an accessory before the fact. Cozens-Hardy, M.R. held that the servant was not merely an accessory, but was himself guilty of theft, and that the loss had been occasioned by the servant's theft; Lord Justice Farwell thought that the crime would never have taken place but for the servant's connivance; and the whole court agreed that the proviso applied. Shaw v. Royce Limited (103 L. T. Rep. 712; (1911) 1 Ch. 138) was a case where the plaintiff held certain debentures of the defendant company which formed a portion of an issue secured by a trust deed. This deed provided that the debentures should be guaranteed by the ill-fated Law Guarantee Society. When the society collapsed resolutions were passed by the debenture-holders of the defendant company releasing the society from the guarantee and making sundry other changes. A supplemental trust deed was drafted accordingly. The plaintiff declined to accede to these arrangements, and his action sought to obtain a declaration to restrain the defendant company from proceeding with them. Mr. Justice Warrington held that the guarantee amounted to an insurance as well as a contract of suretyship, and that it was not destroyed by what had taken place. The learned judge further held that the arrangements made were such as the debenture-holders could pass and the court could sanction, and the whole scheme was declared to be binding on the plaintiff. A rather curious marine insurance case was brought to light in Hutchins Brothers v. Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation (130 L. T. Jour. 361; (1911) W. N. 135), where certain shipowners sued their underwriters for loss of or damage to hull. The policy contained the "Inchmaree" clause, by which the insurance is to cover loss through latent defect. It seemed that the sternpost in the case of the ship in dispute had been put in by the builders from foreign goods supplied, and it contained a defect of a nature impossible to discover by reasonable inspection until made visible by wear and tear. Lloyd's surveyors at last discovered and condemned it, and the plaintiffs, being compelled to renew it, sought to recover the expense, but both Mr. Justice Scrutton and the Court of Appeal thought the loss fell outside the ambit of the policy.
Two LAND TRANSFER cases may be briefly mentioned. Re Voss and Saunders' Contract (103 L. T. Rep. 493; (1911) 1 Ch. 42) arose on a vendor and purchaser summons in which the purchaser asked that certain requisitions might be held to be insufficiently answered. Mr. Justice Warrington by his decision shows that where there is an owner of London leaseholds (subject to a mortgage by subdemise executed before the Land Transfer Acts made registration of title compulsory) who is registered as proprietor with a possessory title, the mortgagee selling under his power of sale, such mortgagee is not the vendor of registered land" within the Land Transfer Act 1897, s. 16 (2), and the purchaser cannot compel him to register the charge before completion, or to procure a transfer from the registered proprietor. Pantlin v. Evans (1911) W. N. 80) was a case of some complexity in the facts, but they may be shortly stated thus: The plaintiffs were assignees of a lease of premises in London. In 1909 they granted an underlease to the defendant E. for sixty-seven years, and the title of E. was registered. In 1910 the plaintiffs received notice of a transfer of the lease to the defendant D., and the rent was duly paid by D. Later D. assigned to P. for £200, and next day P. gave D. a charge for £190. The assignment to P. and the charge were both registered. Rent due to the plaintiffs got into arrears. P. surrendered the term for sixty-seven years granted by the underlease to the plaintiffs to the intent that it should merge in the reversion. At this time, the rent being in arrears and sundry breaches of covenant having taken place, the plaintiffs were entitled to re-enter. The plaintiffs requested the Land Registry to
strike off the underlease so as to free their title, but the registrar refused, on the ground that he had no power to get rid of the registered charge to D. Thereupon the plaintiffs sued E., D., and P., claiming (1) possession, (2) a declaration that they had re-entered, and (3) an order on the registrar to notify on the register that the underlease had determined and all incumbrances were cleared off. Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady made a declaration that the plaintiffs could re-enter, and gave judgment for possession, and directed the rectification of the register by declaring the determination of the underlease. The charge was left on the register, so that the mortgagee could claim for relief under the Common Law Procedure Acts 1852 and 1860.
LANDLORD AND TENANT cases have been, as usual, numerous, and some care has to be exercised in picking out those decisions which, seem chiefly to possess points of amongst a large number, practical importance. A rural case may first be lightly reviewed. Re Kedwell and Flint and Co. (104 L. T. Rep. 151; (1911) 1 K. B. 797) raised the point whether sect. 61 of the Agricultural Holdings (England) Act 1883, as to tenancies from year to year, is to be read into sect. 4 of the Market Gardeners' Compensation Act 1895 so that a tenancy from year to year under a contract current on the 1st Jan. 1896 is to be deemed for the purposes of the latter Act to continue to be a tenancy under a contract of tenancy current on the 1st Jan. 1896, until the first day on which the landlord or tenant could by notice determine it, and thereafter to be deemed to be a tenancy under a contract beginning after the 1st Jan. 1896. The Court of Appeal have settled it in the affirmative. The general scope of the legislation is that the question whether the holding is to be treated as a market garden or not is to be a matter of agreement, but cases of tenancies from year to year under contracts of tenancy current at the date of the commencement of the Act are, subject to certain conditions, to be treated as if there were such an agreement, as the Act contemplates, up to the time the parties could determine it by notice, and thenceforward the parties are left to make their own bargain. In Angel v. Jay (103 L. T. Rep. 809; (1911) 1 K. B. 666) an interesting point was determined by Mr. Justice Darling and Mr. Justice Bucknill. The plaintiff, the tenant of a house, sued the defendant, the lessor, for damages for a misrepresentation made to him when the parties were negotiating for the house; the defendant was alleged to have represented that the drains were in good order, whereas in point of fact they A County Court judge found misreprewere seriously defective. The value of the freehold sentation, and rescinded the lease. interest in the property was over £500, but neither the plaintiff's It was nor the defendant's interest exceeded in value that sum. decided that the County Court had no jurisdiction, for the "value of the property" (within sect. 67 (4) of the County Courts Act 1888) meant the value of the whole fee simple. Another point decided was that in equity there is no jurisdiction to rescind an executed contract on the ground of misrepresentation unless the same is fraudulent. Upfill v. Wright (103 L. T. Rep. 834; (1911) 1 K. B. 506) raised a most important and, it would seem to be, a novel woman who had taken a point. A landlord discovered that a tenancy of a flat was an immoral person, being a kept mistress. The agent of the landlord in letting the flat knew the facts, and was aware that the man would pay the rent. A notice was given to quit, but a half-year's rent was unpaid, and in respect of it this action was brought. The defendant raised the plea that the rent as the flat was taken for immoral purposes. was irrecoverable The plaintiff sought to urge the distinction that the general line of authorities on the irrecoverability of the price of articles sold to immoral persons affected common prostitutes and not the case of a mistress. The Divisional Court did not sanction any such distinction, and they dwelt on the broad fact that the flat was let for the purpose of committing fornication, and, as the rent was to arise out of the letting, the landlord was to participate in an illegal and immoral series of acts and in the defendant's immoral gains. The case therefore was deemed to fall within the rule that out of a forbidden or immoral act no cause of action could arise. Mr. Justice Bucknill incidentally alluded to an argument that this decision might hit persons living together under void marriages such as those contemplated in the Deceased Wife's Sister's Marriage "That seems to me to be Act 1907. The learned judge remarked, Browne v. Flower (103 L. T. Rep. 557; wholly unlike this case." (1911) 1 Ch. 219) turned on the point whether a certain act by a sublessor was within the principle that a derogation from a grant constituted a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. The act in question was the erection of an openwork iron staircase situated so as to overlook the plaintiff's bedroom, thereby diminishing the privacy enjoyed by the plaintiff, the lessee of a flat on the ground floor. There was no material diminution in the access of light, unless in so far as the plaintiff, to shut out the people using the staircase, saw fit to use curtains. The plaintiff asked for the removal of the staircase or damages. Mr. Justice Parker observed that under certain circumstances there is implied on the part of a lessor obligations restricting the user of land retained by him further than can be explained by the implication of any easement known to the law, but he goes on to warn purchasers against assuming that vendors undertake restrictive obligations preventing them from using their retained land for any lawful purpose merely because in so doing the amenities of property sold would be affected. A purchaser must always bargain for those rights which he deems indispensable to his comfort. There was held to be no material derogation from the grant, and no breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. The principle was laid down that to infringe the latter
covenant there must be some physical interference with the enjoyment of the demised premises, and a mere interference with the comfort of persons using them by the creation of a personal annoyance such as arose from noise, loss of privacy, or otherwise is not enough. West v. Gwynne (104 L. T. Rep. 759; (1911) 2 Ch. 1) may be briefly noted as a recent accession to the long line of authorities on covenants not to underlet without consent. A condition to receive half the increased rental was held to be wrong, and Mr. Justice Joyce further held that sect. 3 of the Conveyancing Act 1892 was intended to apply retrospectively to leases made before the Act. The Court of Appeal agreed, and added that these covenants are not to be made sources of profit to lessors. It was further held that if a lessor refuses consent except on payment of a fine, the lessee may disregard the covenant and underlet without licence, and he is also entitled to a declaratory judgment to that effect and to his costs. There are one or two very practical cases on the subject of repairs. Thus the Court of Appeal in Rose v. Hyman (104 L. T. Rep. 619; (1911) 2 K. B. 234) was concerned with a long lease of land containing a covenant to build a chapel and to keep it in repair. The lease was assigned to the defendants and the premises used for a cinematograph show. Many alterations were made to suit it for the purpose, and the lessor served a notice to repair and finally sought possession. Mr. Justice Ridley refused to grant relief from the forfeiture, and the Court of Appeal by a majority affirmed this. Cozens-Hardy, M.R. and Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton thought that waste had been committed of such a nature as the court would have restrained the lessees from committing, and that there had been breaches of the covenant to repair, and that the relief could only be granted on the terms of reinstating the premises. Lord Justice Buckley dissented from this. Clare v. Dobson (103 L. T. Rep. 506; (1911) 1 K. B. 35) was heard by Mr. Justice Coleridge. There a lessee sued a sublessee in respect of repairing covenants contained in the sublease in terms similar to those in the head lease. The underlease showed clearly that the reversion was a leasehold reversion. The head landlord had notified his lessee as to a breach of the repairing covenants, and the lessee had duly notified the sublessee, who disregarded the warning. The head landlord thereupon sought possession and the lessee obtained relief, the repairs being executed. The lessee sued his underlessee on the covenants, and Mr. Justice Coleridge held that on existing authority a lessee cannot recover from a sublessee the costs he has had to pay in respect of proceeding for relief, for the trouble was due to the plaintiff's own disregard of covenants, and there was no clause of indemnity. Lurcott v. Wakely and Wheeler (104 L. T. Rep. 290; (1911) 1 K. B. 905) dealt with the repairs of an old building, and it raised some useful dicta on the quantum of a tenant's obligations under repairing covenants. A London house, subject to a covenant to repair on the tenant's part, being some 200 years old, became the object of a dangerous structure notice. It called for the demolition of the front external wall. plaintiff, the assignee of the reversion, acted upon it, and sought to recover the cost of demolition and renewal under the covenant. The defendants urged that the condition of the premises was brought about by age, that it could not have been repaired at any material time, and as constructed could not have endured longer. The Court of Appeal held that the lessees were liable. Cozens-Hardy, M.R. said that in all these cases the courts are driven to consider whether what has happened is of such a nature as to change the character of the house demised. The facts here showed that the front wall was 24ft. in length, and was a subsidiary portion of the outside skin of the house, which went back more than 100ft. The court regarded the matter on much the same lines as if a chimney had become defective, or rafters had given way, or a corner of the roof had collapsed. It was held that it would be narrowing to a dangerous extent the effect of repairing covenants if it were held that a lessee could escape liability in a case of this kind. The result is largely to modify the older decisions, which seemed to promise indulgence to those who live in old houses.
(To be continued.)
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THE Bill which has been introduced on behalf of the Irish Party for the purpose of nullifying the decision of the majority of the House of Lords (four to three) in the Lough Neagh case proposes to enact as follows: "It is hereby declared that Lough Neagh is a public and common navigable inland sea, and that there is and shall be a general public right of fishing therein, and every subject of His Majesty may exercise such right, subject to any enactment regulating the fishing in the said lough." The Bill then proposes to confer on the Department of Agriculture, as the fisheries authority in Ireland, the power of making by-laws under and by virtue of sect. 91 of the Fisheries (Ireland) Act 1842. Clause 3 proposes to make it lawful for fishermen to enter upon all such beaches, strands, and wastes on or adjoining the lough or any of its bays as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying on any fishing, and also to draw up and spread their nets and land their fish upon such placee.
THE annual report of the Land Commission to the 31st March 1911, which has just been issued, contains the usual details of the fifteenyearly litigation between landlords and agricultural tenants in Ireland as to the fixing of "fair rents." The report shows a large falling off in this class of work during the year, owing to the operations under the Land Purchase Acts. The total number of statutory terms that were fixed was only 3145, including 1844 first, 1273 second, and twenty-eight third statutory terms. In view of the fact that since the passing of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1881 the average number of cases dealt with annually was 13.555, the figure for last year has great significance. The entire number of rents fixed for first statutory terms since 1881 was 377,400, representing a total rental of £7,452,129. The aggregate judicial rent fixed in respect thereof was £5,908,090, the result being an average reduction of 20.7 per cent. over the entire country. The entire number of rents fixed for a second statutory term was 139,094. the rental dealt with being £2,498,095, and the aggregate rent fixed being £2,010,635, representing an average reduction of 19.5 on first-term rents. The report gives Bome interesting details as to the twenty-seven cases in which judicial rents were fixed during the year. In these twenty-seven cases the aggregate original rent was £895 188. 63. The rent fixed for a first statutory term was £695 93. The rent fixed for a second statutory term was £522 53. 1ld. The rent now fixed for a third term is £433 11s. 6d., representing an average reduction on second-term rerts of 17 per cent. In these cases the aggregate rent has been reduced since 1881 by nearly 52 per cent. During the year the Land Commission heard 1198 appeals from the Civil Bill Courts and the Sub-Commission Courts at twelve sittings held in Dublin and thirty-eight in the country. During the same period 750 appeals were lodged as against 1135 lodged in the previous year. The total number of appeals disposed of since 1881 was 98,626. The total number pending on the 1st April 1907 was 5975; on the 1st April 1908, 3520; on the 1st April 1909, 2235; on the 1st April 1910, 1280; and on the 31st March 1911, 657. The land purchase work of the Land Commission during the year was very small, as that branch is now being carried out under the Act of 1903 by the Estates Commissioners, who issue a special report of their own. During the year there were only 720 applications received from tenants in respect of sales, the purchase money being £104,099. The Land Commission sanctioned provisionally 1036 applications for £154,386, and 1215 loans amounting to £190,694 were made. The rest of the report deals with the work of the Land Commission under the Labourers (Ireland) Acts and the Church Act 1869 (the Land Commission now administers the temporalities of the late Established Church).
ALTHOUGH the distinction between trusts and powers has lost some of its importance since the Conveyancing Acts 1881 and 1882, it is thought that practitioners sometimes give themselves unnecessary trouble by not bearing in mind such distinctions. As stated in Lord Justice Farwell's well-known work on Powers, 2nd edit., p. 9: "Powers are never imperative; they leave the act to be done at the will of the party to whom they are given. Trusts are always imperative, and are obligatory upon the conscience of the parties intrusted: (per Chief Justice Wilmot, Wilmot, 23)." Another great difference between trusts and powers is that as a rule, and apart from statutory enactment, a power can only be exercised by the persons who are, either expressly or by reference, designated as donees of the power. Thus at common law a bare power given to two or more by name could not be executed by the survivor. In Montefiore v. Browne (7 H. L. Cas. 241) it was held that a power of revocation to be exercised by A. and B. could not be exercised by the survivor of them. It will be the same if the power be merely to consent. By the Conveyancing Act 1881, s. 38, however, it is provided that where a power or trust is given to or vested in two or more executors or trustees jointly, then, unless the contrary is expressed in the instrument, if any, creating the power or trust, the same may be exercised or performed by the survivor or survivors of them for the time being. The section applies only to executorships and trusts constituted after, or created by instruments coming into operation after, the commencement of the Aot-that is, after the 31st Dec. 1881. And by the Conveyancing Act 1882, s. 6. it is provided that a person to whom any power, whether coupled
with an interest or not, is given may by deed disclaim the power, and after disclaiming shall not be capable of exercising or joining in the exercise of the power; and that on such disclaimer the power may be exercised by the other or others, or the survivors or survivor of the others, of the persons to whom the power is given, unless the contrary is expressed in the instrument creating the power. This section is retrospective. The marginal note to it is disclaimer of power by trustees, but this cannot affect the generality of the section: (see Attorney-General v. Great Eastern Railway Company, 40 L. T. Rep. 265; 11 Ch. Div. 461). Another point of difference, and perhaps the most important, between a trust for sale and power of sale is that the former never comes to an end until it has been executed, or has been put an end to by all the beneficiaries having become absolutely entitled and electing to take the property as real estate; whereas the atter comes to an end as soon as the whole estate is vested in possession in the person or persons entitled thereto, unless it is a power of sale for the purpose of division. Thus in Re Tweedie and Miles (27 Ch. Div. 315) real property was vested in trustees upon trust at the request of A. and B, and the survivor, and after their death at discretion, to sell and hold the proceeds upon trust for A. and B. successively for life, and then for the children equally. After the deaths of A. and B. there were three adult children, and it was held that the trust for sale was not spent, but was exercisable by the trustees without the concurrence of the beneficiaries. In Peters v. Lewes and East Grinstead Railway Company (45 L. T. Rep. 234; 18 Ch. Div. 429, C. A.). where a testator devised his residuary estate to trustees in trust for his wife for life, and after her death to assure the game to his two married daughters in equal shares for their separate use as tenants in common, with a gift over in favour of their issue in events which did not happen, and "for the purpose of division" he empowered his trustees to sell his residuary estate, it was held that the power of sale did not determine on the death of the tenant for life, but might be exercised within a reasonable time afterwards for the purpose of dividing the property. Jessel, M.R. in the course of his judgment said: "No doubt you cannot have a power of sale to change the nature of the interests limited by the instrument so as to exceed the limit of time prescribed by the rule against remoteness or perpetuity. Supper, for instance, a man having a dozen children gives his real and personal estate to trustees in trust to divide amongst his twelve children, and, for the purpose of making the division, he empowers the trustees to eell, that is not, in my opinion, an invalid power. The trustees are bound to make a division within a reasonable time. In fact, as we know, it has been decided that if they postpone very long, without express power to postpone, they are guilty of breach of trust. Does it make any difference if there is a preceding life estate? If the limitation is to a person for life, and after the death of the tenant for life upon trust to divide amongst my twelve children, with power for the purpose of division to sell, why should that be void? .. I agree that if all the children being free from disability concur in calling upon the trustees to convey, that puts an end to the trust and, of course, to the power also. It puts an end to the trust to divide. They might call upon the trustees, instead of dividing it, to convey to a purchaser, but, subject to that, it does not appear to me that there is any objection to the power-that is, that it is limited from the nature of the purposes for which it is to be used. In my opinion it is as good a limitation of the period within which the power was to be exercised as the limitation of the period ascertained from the nature of the limitations when the power is exercisable during the existence of the limitation." There is an intermediate kind of power -namely, an imperative one-or a power coupled with a trust. Thus, if there is a power to appoint among certain objects, but no gift to those objects, and no gift over in default of appointment, the court implies a trust for, or a gift to, those objects equally if the power be not exercised: (see Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves. 504). It is sometimes a very difficult question whether a trust or a power has been created. Re Hotchkys; Freke v. Calmady (55 L. T. Rep. 110; 2 Ch. Div. 408) is a good example of this. There a testatrix gave all her real and personal estate to trustees upon trust at their discretion to sell all such parts thereof as should not consist of money, and out of the produce to pay her debts and funeral and testamentary expenses, and invest the residue, and to stand possessed of such real and personal estate, money, and securities upon trust to pay the rents, interest, and dividends and annual produce thereof to T. during her life, with a clause of forfeiture on alienation, and after the decease of T. the testatrix devised and bequeathed her said real and personal estate and the securities on which the same might be invested unto and to the use of V. C., his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns for ever according to the nature and quality thereof respectively; and it was held on appeal that the will did not create a trust for conversion, but only gave a power of sale. The decision appears to have turned principally on the terms of the ultimate trust for the remainderman, which was of the real and personal estate.
fifth part. WHEREAS under or by virtue of an indenture of settlement dated the and made between O. P. (who died on the 187) of the first part Q. R. (who died on the 190) of the second part the said C. D. (then C. B. spinster) of the third part S. T. and U. V. of the fourth part W. X. and Y. Z. of the fifth part X. X. and Y. Y. of the sixth part and the said S. T. and Z. Z. of the seventh part and under and by virtue of an order made in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice by Mr. Justice on the day of 190 (190) in the matter of the Estates situate in the counties of settled by the said setttlement and in the matter of the Settled Land Acts 1882 to 1890 and under and by virtue of an indenture (being an appointment of new trustees) dated the day of 190 and made between the said E. F. of the first part the said C. D. of the second part the said G. H. and I. J. of the third part and the trustees of the fourth part the manor of in the county of and divers other hereditaments now stand settled to the use in the events which have happened that the said C. D. may receive during her life the yearly rentcharge of £ (charged upon the said manor of and other the said hereditaments) and subject thereto to uses under which the said A. B. is tenant for life thereof within the meaning of the Settled Land Acts 1882 to 1890 and the trustees are the trust es of the settlement for the purposes of the said Acts. AND WHEREAS at the date of the indenture of mortgage next hereinafter recited the said M. N. held to him and his heirs of the said A. B. lord of the said manor of as of his said manor the several hereditaments
and premises comprised in the first column of the first and second parts of the schedule hereunder written by the services due and of right accustomed videlicet fealty suit of court and heriot (that is to say, the best live beast for a heriot on every death or clear alienation or for want thereof 58. for a dead herict) and also a relief on every death or clear aliena. tion being one-fourth of a year's quit rent and by the yearly rents set opposite to each of such hereditaments respectively payable on the feast day of St. Michael the Archangel in every year. AND WHEREAS by an indenture of mortgage dated the day of 190 and made between the said M. N. of the one part and the said K. L. of the other part the said hereditaments comprised in the first column of the first part of the said schedule were (among other hereditaments) assured by the said M. N. to the said K. L. in fee simple by way of mortgage to secure the principal sum of £ together with interest thereon but the said indenture did not in fact affect the hereditaments comprised in the second part of the said schedule hereto which are still held by the said M. N. in manner aforesaid. AND WHEREAS the said M. N. has contracted with the said A. B. for the enfranchisement of the said hereditaments for the sum of £ AND WHEREAS the said C. D. being satisfied that the other hereditaments comprised in the said indenture of settlement are a sufficient security for the said rentcharge has agreed to join in these presents in the manner hereinafter expressed. Now THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH that in pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the sum of £ to the trustees
as such trustees as aforesaid now paid by the said M, N. (the receipt whereof the trustees do hereby acknowledge) the said A. B. in exercise of the power for this purpose given to him by the Settled Land Act 1882 and of all other powers (if any) him hereunto enabling by the direction (hereby testified) of the said M. N. and AS BENEFICIAL OWNER doth hereby release enfranchise and convey and the said C. D. by the like direction hereby releases unto the said K. L. the fee and seigniory of and in first all those the hereditaments and premises comprised in the first column of the first part of the said schedule hereto and all those the said quit rents heriots reliefs and other services issuing out of or due or payable in respect of the said several hereditaments and premises To HOLD the same unto and to the use of the said K. L. his heirs and assigns for ever to the intent that the said hereditaments and premises may for ever hereafter be held and enjoyed freed and discharged from all payments fines rights of seigniory quit rents heriots reliefs and services whatsoever to which according to the custom of the said manor of said hereditaments and premises have been at any time liable or subject as freehold holden of the said manor and also freed and discharged from the said yearly rentcharge of £ and all powers and remedies for securing the same but subject to such right or equity of redemption as the said hereditaments are now subject to by virtue of the herein before recited indenture of the day of 190. AND THIS INDENTURE ALSO WITNESSETH that in further pursuance of the said agreement and for the consideration aforesaid the said A. B. in exercise of the said powers and AS BENEFICIAL OWNER doth hereby release enfranchise and convey and the said C. D. hereby releases unto the said M. N. the fee and seigniory of and in ALL those the hereditaments and premises comprised in the first column of the second part of the said schedule hereto and all those the said quit rents heriots reliefs and other services issuing out of or due or payable in respect of the same several hereditaments and premises TO HOLD the same unto and to the use of the said M. N. his heirs and assigns for ever to the intent that the same hereditaments and premises may for ever hereafter be held and enjoyed freed and discharged from all payments fines rights of seigniory quit rents heriots reliefs and services whatsoever to which according to the custom of the said manor of the said hereditaments and premises have been at any time liable or subject as freehold holden of the said manor and also freed and discharged from the s&id and all £ and yearly rentcharge of powers remedies for securing the same. AND the sald C. D. hereby covenants
with the said M. N. that she the said C. D. has not at any time executed or done any deed or thing whereby she is prevented from releasing the said hereditaments respectively in manner aforesaid. PROVIDED ALWAYS that as respects the reversion or remainder expectant on the estate of the said A. B. in the said premises the covenants for title on his part in these presents implied shall not extend to the acts deeds and defaults of any person or persons other and besides himself and his own heirs and persons claiming or to claim through or in trust for him them or some of them. IN WITNESS &C.
The Judicial Committee of the House of Lords will sit on Monday, the 16th Oct., at 10.45, when the case of London and North-Western Railway Company v. Bristol Vacuum Cleaning Company will be taken. The September sessions at the Central Criminal Court will commen: e on Tuesday, the 5th prox., at 10.30.
The August adjourned general sessions for cases arising on the north and south sides of the Thames will commence on Tuesday, the 29th inst., at the Sessions-house, Newington, at 10.30.
The September sittings at the Mayor's Court will commence Wednesday, the 27th prox., at 10.20.
By the death of Lord James of Hereford, Lord Lindley now becomes the senior Bencher of the Middle Temple.
By the death of His Honour Judge Willis, K.C., the Recorderships for Maldon and Saffron Walden become vacant.
The Attorney-General has left London for Marienbad.
Mr. Justice Phillimore left for Canada on Saturday last, and expects to be back in England about the 10th Oct.
The annual dinner of the Surrey Bench and Bar will take place on Thursday, the 14th Dec. next, at the Grand Hotel, at 7.30.
Mr. Charles Simpson Samuell, barrister-at-law, who died in July last, in his ninety-second year, left an estate of the gross value of £19,526.
The funeral of Lord James of Hereford took place on Wednesday at Breamore, Hants. A memorial service, at which representatives of the King and of Queen Alexandra were present, was held at St. Margaret's, Westminster.
Mr. Alexander Henry Clarke, of Warwick-road, Earl's Court, S.W,. and of Messrs. Clarke, Rawlins, and Co., solicitors, of Gresham House, Old Broad-street, E.C., who died on the 25th ult., aged seventy-two years, left estate of the gross value of £57,139, (with net personalty £56,918.
Mr. G. R. Askwith, K.C., has this week added to his long list of successes by settling disputes between capital and labour. Mr. Askwith, who is fifty years old, and was called by the Inner and Middle Temples in 1886, has achieved more success than any man living in bringing about the settlement of disputes between masters and servants.
His Honour Judge Parry at the Lambeth County Court last week announced that he had arranged to have special poor men's days, when he would deal with cases in which poor people were not legally represented, whilst he would also have counsel's deys for those cases in which members of the Bar were appearing. This arrangement will be much appreciated by both sides of the Profession.
The Paris police magistrates have a new sort of offence to deal with. It is known as pompage, and is an operation by which taxicab drivers defraud their fares. Pompage can only be applied during a wait, for it would be detected if the fare were in the cab. The method consists of tapping the meter or agitating the little flags. Some chauffeurs have recently been dealt with for pompage. They have all been fined and sentenced to imprisonment, but in only one was the imprisonment enforced. It seems that the men implicated drove a bridal party to a church, and the pompage was put into operation during the service. The fare demanded was eo excessive that the bridal party refused to pay, and the drivers accepted the amount tendered. Of course the dial has to be set back to the amount that the driver intends to hand over, and the men in question understood that process. One, while carrying out the "de-pompage"-we invent the word-unfortunately for himself and his companions, broke the glass of the meter, and it was owing to this mishap that the employers were enabled to detect the fraud.
Colonel Augier, an officer of French Engineers, has been called to the Bar of Paris (prété serment comme avocat). The colonel, who is no longer a young man, has had a distinguished career in the army. In 1895 he obtained the degree of Doctor of Law, and his thesis received commendation from the Faculty in Paris. During the past two years he has discharged duties somewhat analogous to those which fall to the Judge-Advocate-General in this country.
The Seine Tribunal of Commerce has just had a case before it of great interest to aviators, although, unfortunately, the decision has left things just as they were. Métrot, the aviator who achieved some success at Heliopolis and Nice, was the victim of a somewhat serious accident at Lyons. He attributed his mishap to the faulty repairs which had been carried out by Messrs. Voisin Brothers, the constructors of the machine, and reclaimed from them the sum of 31,695 francs, or £1267 16. The Tribunal in its decision expressed the view that in the present state of the science of aviation it is impossible, if an accident occur to an aeroplane, to estimate with precision whether it be due to a fault of the apparatus, a false manoeuvre of the pilot, or to an air current (remous de l'atmosphère). In consequence the Tribunal entered a non-suit.
We are informed, says the Times, that the arrangements for the forthcoming International Maritime Law Conference, which will be held in Paris from the 9th to the 13th Oct. next, have now been practically completed. The conference will be opened by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the foreign members will be the guests of the Municipality of Paris, the Paris Chamber of Commerce. and the French Association of Maritime Law. On the agenda paper of the conference are the questions of limitation of shipowners' liability in respect of loss of life and personal injury. On this matter it is expected that serious efforts will be made to bring the British and foreign views into line. The second question on the agenda is the consideration of the international code on affreightment and carriage by sea, the general outlines of which were prepared by a sub-committee, of which Lord Justice Kennedy (London), Dr. Sieveking (Hamburg), Louis Franck (Antwerp), R. B. D. Acland, K.C. (London), and other gentlemen were members, and which met in London at the beginning of this year.
An exceptional state of affairs came to light on Thursday, in the City of London Court, when Messrs. Jones and Marsh, lately trading as J. B. Butt and Co., moneylenders, 19, St. Dunstan's-hill, sued Mr. William Dow, 214, Victoria-road, Lower Edmonton, for £15 108., the balance of various moneylending transations. Mr. Ratto appeared for the plaintiffs, and Mr. J. Castle for the defendant. Marsh, one of the plaintiffs, said he was a Civil Servant employed in the Inland Revenue department, and he and the defendant were in the same office. He carried on a moneylending business among some of the other clerks, and he was registered as a moneylender. Mr. Castle said that some of the moneys were lent by Butt. Plaintiff said that Butt was his clerk, although Butt was registered as a partner of Jones and Marsh. Mr. Castle added that the present plaintiffs were not registered at the time the money sued for was advanced. Defendant never had any money from the plaintiffs. He declared that the interest charged was 100 per cent. Jones, one of the plaintiffs, said it was about 55 per cent. to 60 per cent. They only had five "clients" in Somerset House, and they had stopped lending money to Civil Servants at Somerset House. Dow said he paid money to Marsh for Butt because he did not want the heads of the department to know he was borrow. ing money. Judge Lumley Smith said that the plaintiffs were not the right people to sue. He non-suited the plaintiffs and gave defendant his costs. He believed the defendant and not the plaintiffs.
Judge Lumley Smith, K.C., gave a decision of much importance under the Workmen's Compensation Act, on Tuesday, in the City of London Court. Charles Smith, potman, 40, Hawkin-street, Jubilee-street, E., claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, against F. Morrison, publican, Bleeding Heart public-house, 19, Charles-street, Farringdon-road, for a broken thigh which occurred to him while working for the defendant. Mr. J. Duncan appeared for the applicant, and Mr. Harold McKenna for the defendant. Smith was over seventy years of age, and, besides being a boot repairer, he was employed as a potman by the defendant for some months at 53. a week and his food, valued at 103. a week. He worked for thirteen hours a day, and on Saturdays fourteen to fifteen hours. In March he said he was sent to buy a postal order for 253. The post-office to which he was sent was shut, and he was told by a uniformed official that if he went to the General Post Office he would procure the postal order. On his way in Little Britain he slipped on a banana skin, fracturing his thigh. He had been unable to do any work since, and was permanently disabled. He claimed 7s. 6d. a week. He was an old-age pensioner. Defendant said he only told the plaintiff to go to Coworose-street Post-office, and he went of his own accord to the General Post Office when the accident occurred. Plaintiff's food was not worth more than 7s. 6d. a week. He was not insured at the time of the accident, although he was now. Plaintiff had had a drooping foot for many years, and it was that which caused the accident, not the slipping. Judge Lumley Smith said he thought it would be improper to hold that compensation should be given for an accident arising through a worker like the plaintiff putting his foot on a banana ekin. It was a risk that happened to anybody who walked in the streets. Where a man was sent across a particularly dangerous street full of traffic there might be special circumstances by which it might be said it was an unreasonable risk, and the employer might then be liable. But he could not find for the plaintiff in the case before him. Judgment for the defendant with costs. If the Court of Appeal reversed his decision, he assessed the amount of damages at 63. a week.