« EelmineJätka »
or licence of nations, that foreign public ships coming into their porta, and demeaning themselves according to law, and in a friendly manner, shall be exempt from the local jurisdiction. But a man of-war or public vessel, when within the ports of another country and enjoying its hospitality, must refrain from any acts which imperil its peace and good order. It should not bring into the country conspirators bent on civil strife, nor should it harbour criminals or other non political offenders. Custom, however, seems to sanction the right of a manof war to take on board a political refugee who appear uninvited at the side of a vessel and asks protection; and the country within whose territory the vessel is has no right to demand that such refugee be surrendered, or that the vessel be expelled because of a refusal to surender. The only remedy for refusal to surrender either a common criminal or a political offender is by direct representation to the country to which the vessel belongs through the ordinary diplomatic channels; except, perhaps, expulsion would be justified if the vessel were being made a centre of conspiracy dangerous to the State. During the disorders in Naples in 1849, Lord Palmerston said that while it would not be right to receive and harbour on board of a British ship-of-war any person flying from justice on a criminal charge, or who was escaping from the sentence of a court of law," yet a British man-of-war had always been regarded as a safe place of refuge for persons fleeing "from persecution on account of their political conduct or opinions," whether the refugee was escaping from the arbitrary acts of a monarchial Government or from the lawless violence of a revolutionary committee."
While this country has occasionally, from motives of humanity, granted refuge on board its public vessels to political offenders, yet it has always done so sparingly so as not to encourage rebellion the 15th Aug. 1894 the Secretary of the Navy issued the following regulation on the subject of asylum: "Th right of asylum for political or other refugees has no foundation in international law. In countries, however, where frequent insurrections occur, and constant instability of government existe, local usage sanctions the granting of asylum, but even in the waters of such countries officers should refuse all applications for asylum except when requested by the interests of humanity in extreme or exceptional cases, such as the pursuit of a refugee by a mob. Officers must not directly or indirectly invite refugees to accept asylum."
ASYLUM ON MERCHANT SHIPS.
As a general rule merchant ships are not exempt from the territorial jurisdiction of the country whose waters they enter. They cannot, therefore, grant asylum. This doctrine was recognised in the diplomatic correspondence in the case of Sotelo. In 1840, the French Vessel L'Ocean, when making its regular voyage from Marseilles along the coast of Spain to Gibraltar, when at Valencia, took on board one Sotelo, a Spanish ex-Minister under prosecution for a political offence, without the knowledge of the Spanish authorities. Ön entering the harbour of Alicante, Sotelo was taken off the vessel by the Spanish authorities in spite of the protests of the captain, who invoked both the doctrine of asylum and of extra-territoriality.
The country has not admitted the right of asylum on merchant vessels or other private ships. Thus, Mr. Buchanan, when Secretary of State, said that "in case an American citizen charged with a crime in the city of New York should seek an asylum in a British merchant vessel, our authorities. I presume, would not hesitate to arrest him on board of such vessel whilst she remained within waters under our exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. In such a case the flag of Great Britain would afford no protection against the process of the law." As to offences committed on board a merchant vessel, the rule is thus stated in the Wildenhus case: The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorders which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the Sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine to which of the two jurisdictions & particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in a regular way the consul has no right to interfere o
PASSENGERS IN TRANSIT.
On the 20th March 1844 Lord Aberdeen gave an opinion for the benefit of the Secretary of the Admiralty, that if a British veseel plying between Lisbon, Portugal, and England should stop at Spanish port en route, that the Spanish authorit es would have a right to take off a Spanish subject who had embarked at Lisbon for England. A similar ruling was made in the case of Gamez, a political fugitive, by Secretary Bayard in instructing Mr. Hall, Minister to Central America, the 12th March 1885; and though a contrary ruling wae made by Secretary Blaine in the case of Barrundia, it has been the subject of some criticism.
THE OLD AGE PENSIONS ACTS 1908 AND 1911. THE Local Government Board bave issued new regulations which have been made under sect. 10 of the Old Age Pensions Act 1908 as amended by the Old Age Pensions Act 1911. The new regulations supersede the regulations of 1908 and 1910, which are revoked.
The regulations are substantially the same as those hitherto in force, but some alterations have been found to be necessary in consequence of the new Act, and the opportunity has been taken to make a few other amendments in points of detail which experience of the administration of the Act of 1908 has shown to be necessary. The board desire to draw attention to some of the points in which the new regulations differ from those hitherto in force-
Regulation 9 (1).--As regards the conditions under which a pension officer is not bound to investigate a claim, it may be pointed out that the period of four months in proviso (a) has now been extended to six months.
Regulation 11 (1).-In order to obviate delay in dealing with claims, provision has been made for the holding of adjourned meetings when a quorum of the committee is not present at an ordinary meeting.
Regulations 13 and 14-These regulations correspond to the regulitions numbered 13 and 14 in the series of 1908. Some alterations, however, have been made in order to facilitate the procedure of committees, and to give a claimant or a pensioner an opportunity of being heard at the earliest possible moment.
Regulation 17.-It will be observed that the language of this regulation differs somewhat from that of the corresponding regulation 17 in the 1908 series. The alterations are mainly consequential on sect. 6 of the new Act.
Regulation 18 (3).-Under this regulation, it will in future be the duty of the committee to send notice to the pension officer of an appeal brought by any other person.
Regulation 19 (2).-It will not be necessary in future that the committee should send to the pension officer information as to the board's decision on an appeal.
Regulation 23 (4).-Appointments of clerks to committees are to be notified to the Commissioners of Customs and Excise as well as to the board.
Regulation 34.-Provision has now been made requiring the pension committee to supply on demand, at a fee not exceeding sixpence, a copy of any decision of the committee.
It will no doubt be observed that the new regulations contain no provision similar to that contained in regulation 29 of the 1908 series. Any such regulation has become unnecessary in view of sect. 3 (2) of the new Act.
It will be observed that the new regulations are to be deemed to have had effect as from the 17th Aug. 1911.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE IN RYLANDS v. FLETCHER.
(From the Can dian Law Times.)
THIS well-known case established the rule which, after the lapse o over forty years, has come to be generally regarded as a principle firmly embedded in our legal system, and a rule founded, to use the The rule as finally language of Lord Cranworth, "in good sense." determined in the House of Lords, on appeal, may be briefly formulated thus : The occupier of land who brings or keeps upon it anything likely to do damage if it escapes is bound at his peril to prevent its escape, and is liable for all the natural and probable consequences of its escape, even if he has been guilty of no negligence." A double duty, therefore, rests upon the owner or occupier of land, a negative as well as a positive one. While it is his duty to refrain from active injury, at the same time it is equally his duty to guard and protect his neighbour, lest he suffer harm by reason of possible danger in consequence of what he brings or keeps upon his land. such a case he becomes an insurer of his neighbour, as has been aptly said, against all harm independently of the existence of either wiltul intent or negligence. Formerly it has been held by many able judges that the duty in such a case was merely a duty to take all reasonable and prudent precautions in order to safeguard his neighbour from all The decision, injurious effects its presence might cause, but no more. however, of the House of Lords settled the question, once and for all, that it was an absolute duty to be observed at his peril.
This, like many good rules, is subject to exceptions. These exceptions we will proceed briefly to recapitulate.
If the act done which causes the injury is that of a stranger, the owner or occupier of the premises is not liable. In the case of Box v. Jubb et al. (1879, 4 Ex. Div. 76) it was held defendants were not liable under the following statement of facts. The defendants possessed a reservoir with sluices connected with a watercourse. The plaintiff's premises were flooded by reason of the overflowing of the defendants' reservoir. The overflowing was caused by the emptying of a large quantity of water from a reservoir of a third party into the watercourse at a point some distance above defendants' premises. The defendants' reservoir was constructed and maintained in a proper manner so as to prevent the overflowing of the reservoir under all ordinary circumstances. No wrongful act or negligence was attributable to defendants.
In reversing the judgment of the County Court in favour of plaintiff, Chief Baron Keily said: "The matters complained of took place through no default or breach of duty of the defendants, but were caused by a stranger over whom and at a spot where they had no
It seems to me to be immaterial whether this is called vis major or the unlawful act of a stranger; it is sufficient to say that the defendants had no means of preventing the occurrence. 1 think the defendants could not possibly have been expected to anticipate that which happened here, and the law does not require them to construct their reservoir and the sluices and gates leading to it to meet any amount of pressure which the wrongful act of a third person may impose. The judgment must be entered for the defendants."
In commenting upon the case of Nichols v. Marsland (1875, L. Rep. 10 Ex, at p. 259). Baron Bramwell is reported, in referring to the water in the defendants' reservoir, in manner following: Suppose a stranger let it loose, would the defendant be liable? If so, then if a mischievous boy bored a hole in a cistern in any London house, and the water did mischief to a neighbour, the occupier of the house would be liable. That cannot be."
Baron Pollock, in his judgment in Box v. Jubb, remarks that the case of Rylands v. Fletcher is distinguishable. In that case the water that caused the injury was collected by the occupier. Here the water was not accumulated by the defendants, but came from elsewhere and added to that which was properly and safely there. For this the defendants, both on principle and authority, cannot be held liable. The overflow, which in this case caused the injury, did not proceed from the act or default of the defendants, but from that of a stranger over which they had no control.
Another exception arises in the case where water is brought or kept upon his premises by the defendant, not exclusively for his own purpose, but with the consent of the plaintiff, and likewise for his benefit. In such a case the defendant is only liable for negligence. It usually finds its application in the stories of a building in the Occupancy of different tenants, where water escapes from an upper atory. In like cases the water is brought upon the premises for the mutual benefit of the different occupants and with their express or implied consent.
In Carstairs v. Taylor (L. Rep. 6 Ex. 217) the plaintiff hired of the defendant the ground floor of a warehouse, the upper part of which was occupied by the defendant himself. The water from the roof was collected by gutters into a box, from which it was discharged by a pipe into the drains. A hole was made in the box by a rat, through which the water entered the warehouse and wetted the plaintiff's goods. The defendant had used reasonable care in examining and looking to the security of the gutters and the box. In an action for the damage to caused, it was held that the defendant was not liable, either on the ground of an implied contract or on the ground that he had brought the water to the place from which it had entered the warehouse. The court held the defendant could only be liable in case he was guilty of negligence, since the roof was the common protection of both, and the collection of water running from it was also for their joint benefit.
In a New Brunswick case-that of Tennant v. Hall (27 N. B. Reports, p. 499)-the question underwent careful consideration. The plaintiff in this case leased from the defendant the ground floor of a building. The upper part of the building was occupied by the defendant. The roof was flat or nearly so. In the centre was a box sunk into the roof into which the water drained. The water thus accumulated was conveyed by a pipe to the cellar and thence into a sewer in the street. During a severe rainstorm, the pipe proving insufficient to carry off the water, it backed up and ran down through the building, and injured plaintiff's stock of goods. Verdict was found for defendant. On motion for a new trial, Mr. Justice King, after referring to the rule laid down by the House of Lords in Rylands v. Fletcher, said: "This case is within the class of cases already alluded to, where a landlord in possession of part of the leased premises does an act for the benefit of plaintiff, as one of his tenants, as well as for the benefit of himself and others of the tenants. In such case he is excused by the mere absence of wrongful act, or negligence, in the construction and maintenance of the work through which the damage is caused. Now here there can be no doubt that the water was led away from the roof for the benefit of all the tenants (the plaintiff amongst others) as well as of the defendant. The roof was a common protection for all, and all were interested in the safe carrying away of the water naturally falling upon it. Then, as to the absence of negligence in the construction and maintenance of the cistern and pipes, there was evidence on which the jury might indeed have found either one way or the other, but they have found in favour of the defendant, and no question is made as to the terms in which the learned judge left to the jury such question of negligence; nor indeed do I perceive that any valid objection could be taken to the way in which it was so left. I therefore think that the verdict should not be disturbed."
The rule does not apply when the damage is the result of vis major or, as is generally expressed, the Act of God. Difficulty has frequently arisen as to the interpretation of the phrase, Act of God." Mr. Justice Brett's definition of what is termed the Act of God" is f equently referred to as a model of precision and accuracy. He defines it as such a direct and violent and sudden and irresistible act of nature as could not by any amount of ability have been foreBen, or, if forceen, could not by any amount of human care and skill have teen lesi-ted."
Chief Justice Sir John Allen of New Brunswick, in Tennant v. Hall, defines vis major as a violent and irresistible act of nature which
could not have been guarded against by any ordinary exertions of human skill and prudence."
In the case of Nichols v. Marsland (L Rep. 10 Ex. 255), affirmed on appeal in 2 Ex. Div. 1, where the defendant for.ned ornamental pools by damming up with artificial banks a stream which flowed through his land and which was allowed to escape from the pools by weirs into its original course, and an extraordinary rainfall caused the stream to swell so that the embankments were carried away by the pressure of the water, and injured the plaintiff's adjoining property, it was held that the action was not maintainable; the jury having found that the escape of the water was caused by the Act of God, and that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant in the construction or maintenance of the embankments.
Lord Justice Mellish, in delivering judgement, said: "The remaining question is, Did the defendants make out that the escape of the water was owing to the Act of God? Now the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great that it could not reasonably have been anticipated, although, if it had been anticipated, the effect might have been prevented; and this seems to us in substance a finding that the escape of the water was owing to the Act of God. However: great the flood had been, if it had not been greater than floods that had happened before and might be expected to occur again, the defendant might not have made out that she was free from fault; but we think she ought not to be held liable because she did not prevent the effect of on extraordinary act of nature, which she could not anticipate. In the late case of Nugent v. Smith (1 C. P. Div. 423) we held that a carrier might be protected from liability for a loss occasioned by the Act of God, if the loss by no reasonable precaution could be prevented, although it was not absolutely possible to prevent it.
It was indeed ingeniously argued for the appeliant that at any rate the escape of the water was not owing solely to the Act of God, because the weight of the water originally in the reservoirs must have contributed to break down the dams as well as the extraordinary water brought in by the flood. We think, however, that the extraordinary quantity of water brought in by the flood is in point of law the sole proximate cause of the escape of the water. It is the last drop which makes the cup overflow."
In Nield et al. v. London and North-Western Railway Company (1874, L Rep. 10 Ex. 4) defendants were held not liable, under the following statement of facts. They were the owners of a canal near a river. The canal, however, was not supplied with water from the river. Fearing an overflow of a flood of water from the river, during an extraordinary rainfall, they erected a barricade of planks in the canal above their premises. The overflow from the river broke into the canal at a point above the barricade, and at a point opposite the plaintiffs premises, which were likewise situate on the banks of the canal above the premises of the defendants. The water being penned back by the obstruction flooded plaintiff's premises. The court, on appeal, found the defendants were not liable, since they had nothing to do with bringing the water to the place where it did the injury complained of, and they were justified upon the principle of self-preservation to guard themselves the way they did against sudden and extraordinary casualties. Baron Bramwell said: fore, on the ground that the defendants in no sense brought the water, or caused it to come to the place where the damage happened, but that it came by natural causes, that is, by a heavy fall of rain, and the overflowing of the river, the defendants had the right to protect themselves against it, and the plaintiffe cannot complain although what the defendants did in so protecting themselves suggested the damage to them."
In Hodgson v. Mayor of York (1873, 28 L. T. Rep. 836) it was held the owner of land was not liable for damage done his neighbour in consequence of the overflow of a stream, running through it, caused by the growth of weeds or the deposit of silt in its bed.
Where the owner of a coal mine, in his operations, caused a sub idence of the surface, and a consequent flow of rainfall into an adjacent lower coal field, the injury arising from gravitation and percolation is not a valid ground for any claim of damages. See Wilson v. Waddell (1876, L. Rep. 2 App. Cas. 95).
In Giles v. Walker (1890) 24 Q. B. Div. 656) it was held no duty was cast upon an owner or occupier of land to cut thistles naturally growing thereon to prevent their seeding. If he do not cut them and the seeds were carried by the wind upon his neighbour's land and damage thereby caused he was not liable.
1. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, which renders one liable for accidental harm regardless of negligence or wrongful intent, is said to be one of the most important cases of absolute liability recognised in our law.
2. Under this rule the occupier is not only liable for the acts of the members of his family, his servants, his guests, or licensees permitted to use his land, but, in addition, he is vicariously liable for the acts of an independent contractor, even though he acts in excess or disregard of his authority. See Black v. Christ Church Finance Company (1894) A. C. 48).
3. This rule of absolute liability extends to damage done by the trespass of the cattle of the owner or occupier of the land upon the adjoining property of his neighbour. See judgment of Chiet Justice Lord Coleridge in Ellis v. Loftus Iron Company (1874, L. Rep. 10 C. P.
10): "It has been held again and again that there is a duty on a man to keep his cattle in, and if they get on another's land it is a trespass; and that is irrespective of any question of negligence, whether great or small."
4. It likewise applies to the case of one who brings upon a street or public highway anything dangerous or interferes with any dangerous thing already there which causes damage to adjoining property, and this apart from any proof of negligence. See Midwood v. Mayor of Manchester (1905) 2 K. B. 597).
5. In the case of Hargroves Aronson and Co. v. Hartopp et al. (1905) 1 K. B., 472) defendants were held liable upon the following facts: Plaintiffs were tenants of the ground floor in a building of which the defendants were landlords. The rain water from the roof was carried off by a gutter, the possession and control thereof being in defendants. The gutter having become stopped up, notice was given by plaintiffs to defendants that it required cleaning. Defendants neglected to act upon this notice. After the lapse of four or five days from receipt of the notice, plaintiffs suffered damage by reason of the rain water having found its way into their premises in consequence of the stoppage. Verdict was found for plaintiffs on the ground of negligence.
6. In Miller v. Hancock (1893) 2 Q. B. 177) the defendant, a landlord, was held liable to a person not a tenant for allowing the common stairway of rented premises to get into a defective condition, whereby the plaintiff suffered damage.
7. Formerly, for the accidental escape of fire from the premises of an occupier, or in the case of setting fires in clearing land or destroying brushwood, in case of damage to neighbouring property, the liability was the same as for the escape of any other dangerous thing. The common law rule, however, is now virtually overborne by statutory enactments, the rules and regulations of cities, towns, and municipalities, with respect to keeping, setting, and guarding fires. See Filliter v. Phippard (1847) 11 Q. B., p. 347). At p. 354 Chief Justice Lord Denham is thus reported: "The ancient law, or rather custom of England, appears to have been that a person in whose house a fire originated, which afterwards spread to his neighbour's property and destroyed it, must make good the loss. And it is well established that when the fire was occasioned by a servant's negligence, the owner, the master of the house where it began, is answerable for the consequences to the sufferer.'
8. A landlord is liable for damage done for a nuisance existing at the time of the letting of the premises without taking any covenant from the tenant to prevent or discontinue it.
9. If a private nuisance has been in existence for twenty years continuously, a prescriptive right to continue it is acquired as an easement appurtenant to the land. It is otherwise in regard to a public nuisance which lapse of time cannot legalise.
10. Where a nuisance is caused in the exercise of statutory powers no action will lie if done without negligence. An action, however, will lie for doing that which the Legislature has authorised if it cause damage and is done negligently. In Canadian Pacific Railway v. Parke (1899) A. C., 535) the court held: Whether an act amounting to a nuisance is justified or not by statute is a question of construction in each case. When the terms of the statute confer an absolute power, which is exercised without negligence, the nuisance is justified. When the terms are permissive merely, the proper inference is that the power must be exercised subject to the common law rights of other persons. SILAS ALWARD.
APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT STOCK
NOTICES OF APPEARANCE AT HEARING MUST REACH THE SOLICITORS BY 6 PM ON TIR
AERIAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND LIMITED. Petition for winding-up to be heard Oct. 17, at Royal Courts of Justice. F. V. Robinson, 14, Bedford-row, W.C., sol. for pet. Notices of appearance by Oct. 16.
BORNEO RUBBER AND TRADING COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Oct. 28 to J. Baker, Eldon-st House, Eldon-st. Curwen and Carter, 1, Gray's-inn-sq, W.C., sols. to liquidator.
BEVAN LOCKNUT COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Oct. 17, at Royal Courts of Justice. E. Flux, Leadbitter, and Neighbour, 144, Leadenhall-st, agents for Slater and Co., Darlaston, sols. for pets. Notices of appearance by Oct. 16, to E. Flux, Lead bitter, and Neighbour.
CASTARA ESTATES LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Oct. 17, at Royal Courts of Justice. Robbins and Co., 218, Strand, W.C., agents for Wilding, Son, and Bonney, Blackburn, sols. for pets. Notices of appearance by Oct. 16.
ELSWICK AUTOCARS LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Oct. 17 (previously advertised for Aug. 16), at Royal Courts of Justice. Mills, Curry, and Gaskell, 11, Queen Victoria-st, E.C., sols for pets. Notices of appearance by Oct. 16.
JOHN MILES AND CO. LIMITED. Petition for winding-up to be heard Oct. 11, at Brentford County Court, at 10. Bischoff, Coxe. Bompas,
and Bischoff, 4, Great Winchester-st, E.C., sols. for pet. Notices of appearance by Oct. 9. MYERS (ACCRINGTON) LIMITED.-Creditors to send in by Oct. 9, to E Hope, 20, Willow-st, Accrington. WARRINGTON STEEL FOUNDRY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Oct. 16, to A. Taylor, 23, College-hill, Cannon-st, E.C. A. J. Greenop and Co., Bush Lane House, Cannon-st, E.C., sols. for liquidator.
CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. LAST DAY OF CLAIM AND TO WHOM PARTICULARS TO BE SENT ARMITAGE (Lucie), Brixton-hill. Oct. 28; Heath and Eckersall, Cheltenham.
BALL (James), Rochdale. Nov. 21; D. Thompson, Rochdale.
BURSILL (Louisa), Hove. Nov. 1; Stacpoole and Co., 7, Union-ct, Old
BETTS (Jannette Wilson), Clifton. Sept. 30; Page and Thompson,
BARKER (Emma), Bournemouth Oct. 7; Walker, Martineau, and Co., 36,
BURNETT (Alice), South Shields. Sept. 24; Grunhut, Gill, and Ruddock, South Shields.
BURN (Helen), Liverpool. Nov. 3; Lloyds Bank Limited (Trustee Department), 71, Lombard-st, E.C., or the sols, Rogers and Birkett, Liverpool.
BATTERS (Mary Ann), Ilford. Oct. 16; Pettiver and Pearkes, 21, Collegehill, E.C.
CARR (Arthur), Blackpool. Oct. 28; C. H. Beech, Manchester. Cox (Maria Goodenough), Staplegrove. Nov. 15; Channer and Channer, Taunton. DAVIS (Robert) and DAVIS (Harriett), Milverton. Claims against their estates in respect of the carrying on of Preston Farm by H. Davis, and the trustees James Davis and George Skinner in respect of their carrying on the farm since the death of H. Davis. Oct. 12; G. H. Kite, of Kite, Broomhead, and Kite, Taunton. DEAR (John), Baldock. Oct. 15; Reynolds and Miles, 70, Basinghall-st. DEEKS (Harry Thomas), Sudbury. Nov. 1; Steed and Steed, Sudbury, Suffolk.
DUCK (Edward George), Bournemouth, Bath, and Clifton, Bristol. Nov. 6; Simmons, Collins, and Co., Bath.
FLAXMAN (Samuel George), South Woodford and Stratford. Oct. 20; Prestons, The Grove, Stratford.
FAZAKERLEY (Edward), Liverpool. Oct. 16; W. H. Fazakerley, at the offices of A. M. Hannay and Horton, Liverpool. FAULDING (Ann), Tenterden.
Oct. 16; Sharp and Benest, 60, Watling-st,
GILMORE (Mary Caroline), Wilmington, Haywards Heath. Oct. 24; W. D. Mercer, 27, Chancery-la.
GRIGSON (Edward Snape), Westminster, S.W. Oct. 20; Allen and Son, 17, Carlisle-st, Soho-sq, W.
GOODMAN (Harris), Tipton. Oct. 4; Hooper and Fairbairn, Dudley.
HARDY (Elizabeth), Alvaston. Oct. 14; W. Hollis Briggs, Derby.
HODDER (Abraham), Portland. Oct. 12; Andrews, Son, and Huxtable,
HAYMAN-JOYCE (John), Eastbourne. Oct. 16; Coles, Sons, and Tilburn, Eastbourne.
HUTCHINSON (Thomas), Clitheroe. Oct. 17; G. J. Holme, Clitheroe. HARPER (Frances Elizabeth), South Kensington. Oct. 13; C. R. Freeman, at the offices of Freeman and Son, 30A, George-st, Hanover-sq, W. HCLMES (George Augustus Mortimer Leigh), Chelsea. Oct. 21; H. G. Barnard, 160, York-rd, Lambeth, S.E. 14;
HAUGHTON (Elizabeth Susan Celeste Durant), Kensington. Oct.
HIGHAM (Henry), Mincing-la, E.C., and Piccadilly Oct. 31; W. Car-
JEBOULT (Caroline), Taunton. Oct. 12; G. H. Kite, of Kite, Broomhead,
KAY (James), Higher Bradshaw. Nov. 1; T. Y. Ritson, Bolton.
KENNEDY (John), Tyne Dock, South Shields. Sept. 28; Grunhut, Gill, and
LLOYD (David), Swansea and Ilston. Oct. 31; Collins and Woods, Swansea.
LEWIS (Thomas), New Tredegar. Oct. 16; Lewis, Jones, and Co., Merthyr Tydfil.
LIAS (Mary), Bermondsey. Oct. 9; Wilkinson and Son, 141, Bermondseyst, S.E.
LONGLEY (Ezra), Stockton-on-Tees. Oct. 20, Faber, Fawcett, and Faber, Stockton-on-Tees.
LEWIS (Philip), Bordesley. Oct. 21; Bickley and Lynex, Birmingham. LISCOMBE (John), Sutton. Oct. 24; London and South-Western Bank Limited, 170, Fenchurch-st, E.C. Sol., J. Warburton, 70, Gracechurch-st, E.C.
LOVELL (Alfred Edmund), Ilford. Nov. 1; McKenna and Co., 31-34, Basinghall-st, E.C.
MAKIN (Sarah), East Fulwood. Oct. 14; Turner and Sons, Preston. MCNEILL (William), Ellesmere Port. Oct. 14; F. R. Wilson, Ellesmere Port.
MILLS (Mary Maria Elizabeth), Bishop's Hall. Nov. 15; Channer and
MOORE (Sarah), West Hampstead, for some time resident in Shanghai.
OLIVER Edward), Haverstock Hill. Oct. 25; E. E. Brook, 4. King s
PEREIRA (Emily), Sanatorium de Collonge Commune des Planches. Montreux, Switzerland. Oct. 23; Farrer and Co., 66, Lincoln's-innflds, W.C.
PROCTER (George), Dresden and Longton; or PROCTER (Ellen), Dresden.
ROBERTS (Charles Robins), Upper Tollington Park and Holborn. Oct. 16;
REDHEAD (Edward), Wallsend. Oct. 31; W. Webb, Morpeth.
ROBERTSON (Margaret), Wallington. Oct. 17; Bridgman, Willcocks,
Cowland, Hill and Bowman, 4, College-hill, Cannon-st, E.C. RAINFORD (Ann), Shrewsbury. Oct. 31; Sprott and Morris, Shrewsbury. REED (John Hellins). Swansea. Sept. 27; C. V. Price, Swansea. RAVENSCROFT (Edward William), Torquay. Oct. 20; G. H. Hext, Torquay. STARKIE (Richard Stringer), Strand and Charing Cross. Oct. 31; Hamlins, Grammer, and Hamlins, Legal and General-chmbrs, 9, Fleet-st, E.C. SMITH (Emily), Hendon. Oct. 21; E. W. Hobbs and Young. Brighton. SWANSTON (Charlotte Hannah), Worthing. Oct. 15; Knapp-Fisher and Sons, 27, Buckingham-gate, Westminster, S.W. STANDING (Elizabeth), West Bowling. Oct. 31; S. Wright, Morgan, and Co.. Bradford.
SCOTT (Edmund), Greenhithe. Oct. 19; G. S. Scott. Dartford.
VINE (Michael), Hartland.
(Fanny Rosetta), Leamington. Sept. 29; Field and Sons, Leamington. Oct. 16; Hole, Peard, and Seldon, Bideford. WARD (Annie), Sydenham. Oct. 3; Humphreys, Nimmo, and Phillips, 38, Cranbourn-st, Charing Cross-rd.
WATTS (David), Chesterton. Oct. 31; H. Copley, St. Ives, Hunts. WALTERS (William), Fynone, Swansea. Oct. 31; Collins and Woods, Swansea.
WOODWARD (Amelia Adams), Folkestone. Oct. 15; Manby and Brevitt, Wolverhampton.
WALL (Maria Sarah), Kenilworth. Birmingham.
Oct. 20; Thomas, Guest, and Pearson, WOODHAM (Henry). Twickenham, trading in partnership with Henry Charles Woodham as Woodham and Son. Creditors or creditors of executors and the said H. C. Woodham in respect of their trading at the Red Lion Hotel, Twickenham. Oct. 27: H. E. Adams, Belgravia-chmbrs, 72, Victoria-st, Westminster, S.W. WOODLAND (James), Leicester. Oct. 20; G. Stevenson and Son, Leicester. WALKER (Henry), St. Bridgets. Oct. 31; Atkinson and Bennett, White
On Wednesday the reading and discussion of papers will be resumed at 11.30 a.m.. as follows:
An Imperial School of Law. Walter G. Hart, LL.D. (London). The Land Transfer Scandal " J. S. Rubinstein (London). Proposed Amendments in the Law Relating to County Courts. Thomas Marsden (Blackburn).
On the Desirability of giving Better Facilities to Claimants as Heirs-at-Law or Next of Kin. G. E. Moser (Kendal).
His Majesty's Commission of the Peace. J. A. Howard. Watson,
The Maritime Conventions. Sanford D. Cole (Bristol).
The meeting will close at 4.30 p.m.
N.B. It is notified that the president may make such alteration in the order of the papers as he may think convenient.
LEGAL EDUCATION IN WALES.
THE first annual meeting of the Joint Board of Legal Education for Wales was held at Llandrindod Wells, on the 18th inst., Mr. R. S. Cleaver (Liverpool) presiding. Mr. R. S. Cleaver was unanimously appointed president, Alderman Lewis Morgan vice-president, Mr. E. W. Jones (Swansea), treasurer, Mr. D. Lleufer Thomas, secretary. The following were co-opted: Mr. H. W. Spowart (Llanelly). Mr G. L. Stokes, jun. (Tenby), Mr. William George (Criccieth), Mr. Francis Nunn (Colwyn Bay). The executive committee was appointed as follows: Mr. Llewelyn Jones, Mr. A. C. Mackintosh, Mr Dauncey, Mr. Hopley Pierce, Principal Roberts, Mr. G. F. Colbourne, Mr. W. W. Meredith, the officers to serve er officio,
The meeting approved of a statement setting forth an application to be submitted to the council of the Law Society in accordance
with provisions of a scheme adopted in 1910 for the establishment of the board in association with the Law Society and the University of Wales in its constituent colleges. Tre statement dealt with the provision of legal education during 1911-12 and appealed for a special grant from the council. It was realised that the grant made in September last to South Wales was in advance for 1911-12 and before the joint board came into existence, the first meeting of the latter being held in April 1911. Consequently other centres desirous of establishing legal teaching for the current year had been prejudiced through no fault of their own. A a result of correspondence between the joint board and the Swansea Board, the latter, with the approval of the Law Society, had paid over to the joint board the grant of £200 received by them on condition that the number of lectures to be given at Swanses in 1911-12 should be not fewer than in previous years, and that the summer course at Aberystwith should be continued. Further, the Aberyst with and Swansea centres guaranteed the sum of £121 and the Cardiff centre about £100, which with the Law Society's grant of £200 makes an approximate total of £420, thus enabling the board, in addition to continuing the instruction previously given at the Aberystwith and Swansea centres, to provide for courses of law lectures during 1911-12 at Cardiff. In view of the special effort which is being made by the various centres as just mentioned, the board desire to indorse the appeal contained in an application of the Cardiff centre for a special grant for 1911-12.— Times.
This department being open to free discussion on all Professional topics, the Editor does not hold himself responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.
PUNCTUATION IN LEGAL DOCUMENTS.-An interesting subject for the consideration of conveyancers is that of punctuation in legal documents, and particularly in wills. One was informed, at a very early period of one's legal training that stops should not be used in legal documents. So far as regards deeds, Williams' Principles of the Law of Real Property eays: "No one would wish the title to his estates to depend on the insertion of a comma or semicolon." "By the aid of capitals" (ie, capital letters)" the practised eye at once collects the sense; whilst at the same time the absence of stops renders it next to impossible materially to alter the meaning of a deed without the forgery being discovered." In another passage the same learned writer speaks of "that repetition which is often necessary to exactness without the dangerous aid of stops." In Hayes and Jarman's Concise Forms of Wills, 10th edit., p. 116, one reads: "It is well known that from legal instruments punctuation and parentheses are excluded; or, if admitted, that they are disregarded in the construction of the instrument" But the writer adds: "It would seem, however, that, in construing wills, marks of punctuation occurring in the original, parentheses, capital letters, &c., may be taken into consideration. But it is from the words and the context, not from the punctuation, that the testator's meaning is to be collected; though, where the words are of doubtful meaning, the punctuation and other circumstances may be referred to for the purpose of assisting in the explanation." In the footnotes the writer refers to a number of cases. It is submitted that if it be dangerous for the draftsman to use stops when drafting deeds, it is equally dangerous for him to use stops when drafting wills; as in the copying of a will a stop might easily be omitted which even a careful examination of the document might not detect. drafting a will, however, if one avoids the use of stops, one must, of necessity, make a judicious use of brackets or parentheses and capital letters; otherwise the meaning of a clause may be difficult to ascertain, or it may be capable of more than one construction. It the use of stops should be avoided in wills, why do the clauses in many books of precedents contain stops stops which seem to make
the meaning of the clauses much clearer? Who inserts these stops in the clauses in the precedents? If they are not intended to be used by the draftsman, why do they appear in the forms in the books of precedents; and, if they are intended to be used by the draftsman, would it not be better if the clauses of the forms could be made so clear, by the frame of the sentences and the judicious use of parentheses or brackets and capital letters, as to make the clauses carry out the intentions of the draftsman without the dangerous aid of stops? G. LAYCOCK BROWN.
DISENDOWMENT.-I have only just seen Mr. Tilby's letter in the LAW TIMES of the 29th July. He upbraids me because, in an article exclusively dealing with the Church of England, I did not write the history of various other Churches a somewhat fatuous criticism. He points out that the political opinions of many early Nonconformists were different from the political opinions of many presentday Nonconformists as to the desirability or otherwise of a State Church-which is true, but irrelevant. He further makes the astounding assertion that Free Church property is held on the same terms as State Church property. Here he is hopelessly incorrect. Methodist property, for instance, is held for the benefit of Methodists; and the rest of the community have no interest in the property and no legal claim on the services of Methodist ministers. But all State Church property, whether of ancient origin or only given whether yesterday, and bestowed by the State or by private individuals, is held for the benefit of the whole public as territorially divided into parishes, dioceses, and provinces. Every parishioner (altogether apart from creed confirmation) has a legal right to claim the services of the parish clergy man, and a legal right to a seat in the parish church as long as the church is not full Until Mr. Tilby makes himself acquainted with the elementary points of the difference between the Established Church and the Free Churches, I am afraid that his well-meant efforts will be of little service to your readers.
THE WRITER OF THE ARTICLE.
LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.
To SECRETARIES.-Reports of meetings should reach the office not later than st post Thursday morning to ensure insertion in the current number.
COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION. PROSPECTUS OF LECTURES DURING MICHAELMAS EDUCATIONAL TERM 1911.
THE attention of students is particularly requested to the following resolution of the Council of Legal Education:
"All lectures will begin not later than five minutes after the appointed time as stated in the prospectus of lectures. At the expiration of five minutes after the appointed time the attendance book will be olosed and handed to the lecturer, and no further entry will be permitted to be made therein except by special leave of the lecturer obtained on application to him at the close of the lecture."
ROMAN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW-
Reader, Mr. J. PAWLEY BATE; Assistant Reader, Mr. S. H. LEONARD. During Michaelmas Term the Reader proposes to deliver lectures as follows:
I. ROMAN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.-On Wednesdays and Thursdays (at twelve o'clock) he will deliver a course of lectures on these subjects. The first lecture will be given on Wednesday, the 18th Oct. This course is so arranged as to cover in the educational year the topics ordinarily treated of in commentaries upon the Institutes of Justinian, more attention being paid to the developed Roman law than to the antiquities of Roman legal history. In particular the Reader compares the Roman with the English law, and shows the effect of Roman law upon legal systems of the present day; and in the course of the lectures the leading ideas and terms of legal systems in general will be explained and analysed. The following topics will be discussed in Michaelmas Term: (1) The main epochs of Roman legal history--Modern importance of Roman law; (2) Gaius and Justinian-The Institutes, Digest, Code; (3) Modes of development of law; 4) Status and capacity and family law.
II. FUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW.-On Wednesdays (at three o'clock) he will deliver a course of lectures on this subject. The first lecture will be given on Wednesday, the 18th Oct. The following topics will be dealt with: (1) Nature of subject-Sources; (2) The persons of international law; (3) Territorial sovereignty-modes of extension, &c.
III. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.-On Thursdays (at three o'clock) he will deliver a course of lectures on this subject. The first lecture will be given on Thursday, the 19th Oct. The following topios will be dealt with: (1) Nature of subject-The real and the personal statute; (2) Domicil: general character and importanceDomicil of origin and of choice; (3) Family relations --Marriage— Matrimonial régime as to property-Divorce--Legitimation.
During Michaelmas Term the Assistant Reader proposes to deliver lectures on the Law of Obligations ex Contractu. In connection therewith he will discuss in detail the several titles of Justinian's
Institutes, from Book III., Tit. 13, to the end of Book III., and will deal with the following subjecte: Definition, nature, and source of an obligation; Essential elements of a contract-Pactum, causa; Classification of obligations ex contracta; Contracts re; Standards of carefulness and degrees of negligence; Innominate contracts; The contract verbis-Stipulatio; Origin and antiquity of the Roman contracts; Practical applications of the stipulatio-Surety ship, novation; Grounds on which stipulations or other contracts might be, or become, void or voidable; Contract literis-Expensilatio, cautio; Consensual contracts; Sale-Conditions as to consent, price, object; Duties (.) of seller, (ii) of buyer; Letting and hiring; Mandate; Partnership; Obligations quasi ex contractu; Pacta-(i) Nuda, (ii.) Adjecta, (iii.) Praetoriana, (iv.) Legitima; Natural obligations; Transferability of obligations; Modes in which obligations might be discharged. The Assistant Reader's first lectores will be delivered on Monday, the 16th Oct., at twelve and three o'clock, and the lectures will be continued on subsequent Tuesdays at twelve o'clock and Mondays at twelve and three o'clock.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (ENGLISH AND COLONIAL) AND LEGAL HISTORY Reader, Mr. A. E. W. HAZEL.
During Michaelmas Term the Reader proposes to deliver lectures on Constitutional Law, including the following subjects: The nature and province of constitutional law; The characteristics of the Britfsh Constitution; Constitutional law and constitutional custom; Constitutions written and unwritten, flexible and rigid, unitary and federal; The sovereignty of Parliament and its limits; The privileges of Parliament; The procedure of Parliament; The High Court of Parliament. The first lecture will be delivered on Tuesday, the 17h Oct., at three o'clock, and the lectures will be continued on subsequent Thursdays at three o'clock, Fridays at twelve o'clock, and Tuesdays at three o'clock.
The Reader also proposes to lecture on Legal History, including the early history of the law of real property and of contracts, on Fridays at three o'clock, beginning on Friday, the 20th Oct. The Reader will be glad to see any gentleman who desires to consult him informally as to his reading, at the end of the first lectures or the first class.
EVIDENCE, PROCEDURE (CIVIL AND CRIMINAL) AND CRIMINAL Law. Reader, Mr. W. BLAKE ODGERS, K. C.
During Michaelmas Term the Reader proposes to deliver lectures as follows:
"CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE." On Mondays and Tuesdays, at 2 p.m. (commencing Monday, the 16th Oct.), the Reader will give an elementary couree on Criminal Law. At the conclusion of this course--probably on Monday, the 6th Nov.-the Reader will commence a course on Criminal Procedure, dealing especially with Proceedings before Magistrates, Trial on Indictment, Punishment, Pardon, and the Court of Criminal Appeal.
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING. Reader, Mr. A. F. TOPHAM; Assistant Reader, Mr. W. J. WHITTAKER. During Michaelmas Term the Reader proposes to deliver lectures as follows: On Mondays and Tuesdays," Settled Land Acts." The first lecture will be delivered on Monday, the 16th Oct., at four o'clock, and the lectures will be continued at the same hour on subsequent Tuesdays and Mondays. On Thursdays and Fridays, "Elements of Real Property,' commencing as follows: Future Estates in Land-Reversions-Remainders-Executory interests; Perpetuities; Accumulations. The first lecture will be delivered on Thursday, the 19th Oct., at four o'clock, and the lectures will be continued at the same hour on subsequent Fridays and Thursdays. The Reader will be in his chambers, 3, Stone-buildings, Lincoln's-inn, on Monday, the 16th Oct, from 5 to 6 p.m., and will then, and also at the close of his first or any other lecture, be glad to advise any gentlemen as to their course of reading, &c
During Michaelmas Term the Assistant Reader proposes to deliver lectures on "Wills and Succession on Death." The first lecture will be delivered on Tuesday, the 17th Oct., at twelve o'clock, and the lectures will be continued on subsequent Wednesdays at four o'clock, Thursdays at five o'clock, and Tuesdays at twelve o'clock
Reader, Mr. HUGH FRASER; Assistant Reader, Mr. J. G. PEASE, During Michaelmas Term the Reader proposes to deliver lectures as follows: On Mondays, "Principles of the Law of Contract (illustrated by Leading Cases). Essential elements of a contract; Classification of contracts: Contracts of record and under seal : Simple contracts and consideration; Contracts required by law to be in writing. The first lectures will be delivered on Monday, the 16th Oct., at ten and five o'clock, and the lectures will be continued at the same hours on subsequent Mondays. On Fridays, "Elements of the Law of Tort." Torts distinguished from crimes and breaches of contract; Damoum sine injuria Injuria sine damno; Torts generally; Recovery of land; Trespass