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ROBERTS, EMMA SEGRUE, Penryn, fancy shopkeeper. Ct. Truro. May 4.
SMITH, HERBERT, Waterloo, plumber. Ct. Liverpool. May 5.
THOMAS, THOMAS, Рorth, insurance agent.
fodwg, and Porth, May 5.
Ct. Poole, Ct. Pontypridd, Ystrady
WARD, MARY, High Green, farmer, widow. Ct. Barnsley. May 4. WINDER, JOHN, Parkgate, carting contractor. Ct. Sheffield. May 4.
Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, May 2. JOHNSON, JACK, Kew Bridge, fruit salesman. Ct. Brentford. April 26. RECEIVING ORDER RESCINDED AND PETITION DISMISSED. GAZETTE, MAY 5. ELPHINSTONE, LESLIE, Byward-st, editor. Ct. High Court. Feb. 10.
ADJUDICATIONS, GAZETTE, MAY 5.
ASKEW, THOMAS, Sedbergh, grocer. Ct. Kendal. May 2.
BRIDGES, GEORGE, St. James'-st, gentleman.. Ct. High Court. May 2.
CASEMORE, JAMES (trading as Casemore and Sons), Victoria-rd, Kilburn,
COHEN, ARTHUR, late Regent-st, managing director of the American Film Trading Corporation. Ct. High Court. May 2.
COATES, JOHN WILLIAM FALCONER, Boroughbridge, boot dealer. Ct. York.
COOPER, WILLIAM JOHN, Bradford, painter. Ct. Bradford. May 2.
GORDON, ELLIS, Kingston-upon-Hull, cabinet maker. Ct. Kingston-uponHull. May 3.
HART. JOHN, Shaftesbury-rd, Hammersmith, accounts clerk. Ct. High Court. May 1.
HAWKEY, REGINALD CHARLES, New Cross-rd, Deptford, house furnisher.
HANDLEY, WILLIAM, Frodsham, farmer. Ct. Warrington. May 3.
Ct. Canterbury. May 1.
Ct. Pontypridd, Ystrady
KASSINGER, JOHN HERMAN, late Saint Leonards-st, Bromley-by-Bow,
baker. Ct. High Court. May 3.
LOTINGA, WILLIAM, late Strand, journalist. Ct. High Court. May 1. LAWTON, WILLIAM HARVEY, Glossop, schoolmaster.
Lyne and Stalybridge. April 28.
MCCRUM. WILLIAM, Surbiton. Ct. Kingston, Surrey. May 2.
MOORE, THOMAS MARRIOTT, Manchester, builder. Ct. Manchester. May 3. OPPERMANN, EMIL LAURENCE, late Ashworth-mansions, Elgin-at. Ct. High Court. May 1.
PRATT, JOHN ACTON, Builth Wells, watchmaker. Ct. Newtown.
ROGERS, WALTER MOORE, Bristol, fruiterer. Ct. Bristol. May 2.
SELFE, TOM EAGLES, Highworth, seedsman. Ct. Swindon. May 3. SAALER, ADOLPH, St. George's-rd, West Hampstead, wine merchant. High Court. May 1.
SHEPHARD, FREDERICK CHARLES, Great Grimsby, glass merchant. Great Grimsby. May 2.
WILLIAMS, THOMAS GRIFFITH, Ystalyfera, grocer. Ct. Neath and Aberavon. May 2.
WERTHEIMER, MAURICE, Stirling-mansions, Canfield-grdns, Hampstead, commercial traveller. Ct. High Court. May 2.
GAZETTE, MAY 9.
ASTON, EDWARD, West Bromwich, grocer. Ct. West Bromwich. May 4. APPLEBY, THOMAS PERCY, late Cardiff, brickworks manager. Ct. Newport, Mon. May 2.
BATTEN, ROBERT EDWIN, Llanrwst, innkeeper. Ct. Portmadoc and Festiniog. May 6.
BURBIDGE, PERCY FRANK, late Paignton, proprietor of skating rink. Ct.
CHANTREY, ALFRED, and CHANTREY, WILLIAM HENRY (trading as Chantrey
GALLOWAY, ROBERT ALEXANDER, Drive-mansions, Fulham-rd. Ct. High
GINN, HENRY WILLIAM, late Bloomsbury, cyclists' outfitter. Ct. Kingston, Surrey. April 29.
HENSON, THOMAS, Peterborough, pig dealer. Ct. Peterborough. May 6. HARTLEY, WRIGHT, Bradford, commercial traveller.
JACKSON, FRANK SAGAR (late trading as F. S. Jackson and Co., and as
KETTLEWELL, CHARLES, Great Coates, farmer. Ct. Great Grimsby.
PUGSLEY, HENRY (trading as Thomas Pugsley and Co.), Newport, ship
STANLEY, WILLIAM, Calstock, licensed victualler. Ct. Plymouth and East.
SERCOMBE, GEORGE, Dunsford, licensed victualler. Ct. Exeter. May 4. SHORROCK, JOHN ISHERWOOD, Carmarthen, surgeon dentist.
fodwg, and Porth. May 5.
THOMAS, F. G., late Sidcup, licensed victualler. Ct. Croydon. May 3.
Jan. 4, 17, and 18.
Judgment March 2.
Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), Order 41, rr. 5-6— Execution, Stay of-Sufficient Cause - Onus of ProofSecurity, Enforcement of which doubtful if should be accepted.
HELD, that the security could not be accepted as sufficient.
Mr. Sinha, Dr. Rash Behary Ghose, and Babus Ram Chandra Mitra and Mohini Mohan Chatterjee for the petitioners.
Mr. B. C. Mitra and Babus Provash Chandra Mitra, Monmatha Nath Mukherjee, and Norendra Chandra Bose for the Opposite Party.
Mr. G. H. B. Kenrick, K.C. (Advocate-General) for the Secretary of State for India in Council (amicus curiæ).
The judgment of the Court was as follows:
MOOKERJEE, J.-This rule was granted upon an application under Order 41, r. 5. . . . In so far as the first branch of this contention is concerned, I am unable to uphold it as wellfounded. As pointed out in "The Laws of England,' edited by Lord Halsbury, Vol. 13, sect. 537, a party cannot by representation any more than by other means raise against him an estoppel so as to create a state of things which he is under a legal disability not to do. No person can by his conduct or otherwise waive or renounce a right to perform a public duty or estop himself from insisting that it is his right to do so.
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LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE....
LEGAL OBITUARY.-Mr. E. Herbert
The Law and the Lawyers
NEARLY eighteen months ago judgment was delivered in the Missouri Courts prohibiting the Standard Oil Company and some of its subsidiary companies from continuing an illegal combination in restraint of trade contrary to the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890. Under that Act all contracts and combinations in restraint of trade are made illegal, and anybody who monopolises or attempts to monopolise any industry is declared guilty of a misdemeanour. The Supreme Court of the United States has now, with one dissentient, upheld the decision of the court below, and has declared the operations of the Standard Oil Company and its subsidiary companies to be a violation of the statute. From the reports published in this country at present of the decision of the Supreme Court it would seem that the present judgments of that tribunal do not go as far as some of their rulings in the past, where it had been laid down that the law of 1890 covered every contract or combination in restraint of trade. The present decision, however, seems to show that whether or not any contract or combination is within the purview of the prohibition created by the statute must depend upon its reasonableness.
WHETHER or not this decision will have any wide practical effect, so far as the huge trust created by the Standard Oil Company is concerned, may be open to considerable doubt. Since 1865 the heads of this combination have set to work slowly, but surely, to acquire this oil monopoly. How many subordinate companies are under the control of the parent company incorporated in New Jersey it is difficult to say, but it is clear that the combination thus existing is practically unique, and its operations and power of control exist throughout the civilised world. No doubt the Government of the United States, fortified by the present decision of the Supreme Court, will be able to prevent any open violation of the anti-trust law; but, as the Times points out, "every
country has tried its hand at putting down monopolies and maintaining or restoring competition, and generally with indifferent success"; or, as another of our contemporaries has tersely stated the point, the State can put down monopolies, but it cannot compel competition. It will be interesting to see in the future the ultimate result of this decision of the Supreme Court.
AN important decision for the guidance of justices was given on Wednesday last by the Divisional Court in Rex v. Martin. A defendant had pleaded guilty at petty sessions to six charges of obtaining money by false pretences, and thereupon he was sentenced to six months' imprisonment on each of the first two charges, and three months' imprisonment on each of the other four charges, all the sentences to run consecutively. In 1867 it was laid down in Reg. v. Cutbush (16 L.T. Rep. 282; L. Rep. 2 Q. B. 79) that under certain circumstances justices in petty sessions had power to pass such a second sentence, and, as that decision had been acted on ever since, the court stated that they did not feel justified in refusing to follow it. They refused, however, to extend the principle of that case in any way, and quashed the four remaining sentences. In giving justices at petty sessions power to deal with cases of this kind, we do not believe it was ever intended by means of consecutive sentences to extend their power of inflicting imprisonment. In proper cases it is doubtless right that consecutive sentences should be imposed, making in the aggregate a lengthy period of imprisonment; but a power of this nature ought not to be intrusted to petty sessions, and we are glad that the Divisional Court has declined to extend the principles laid down in Reg. v. Cutbush,
WHEN the Education (Provision of Meals) Act 1906 was before Parliament we observed upon the tendency of such legislation to grow in extent, and this criticism is again to be made now that the Labour Party have introduced a Bill to amend this Act. The idea now is that children should be fed during holidays as well as during term time, and it is argued that as children's physical conditions improve during school attendance and deteriorate again in the holidays the taxpayer must feed them throughout the year. The argument can with equal force be carried further and the same children should be clothed and housed by the aid of resources other than those of their parents. No responsible person can view without indignation anything which can cause suffering to childhood, but it is perfectly plain to those who (to use a homely phrase) do not allow their "hearts to run away with their heads" that such concessions would create greater national evils than they mitigate, and would only develop further the trait whereby persons look to others to shoulder their burdens and perform their, dutics. From such stock no nation will raise up a generation capable of continuing traditions of manliness and self-respect. generation capable of continuing
THE aphorism of Mr. Justice LAWRANCE to the effect that libel actions are becoming quite an art, and that the profits derivable from them exceed those earned by hard work, has attracted much attention, and it is not possible, unfortunately, to overlook the fact that the history of the last sittings gives much ground for the observation. There were some thirty cases of libel entered, and the damages awarded in some of these were very substantial. Sir JOHN BENN's appeal against a verdict for £12,000 was successful, but the further appeal to the House of Lords is still pending. Passing this by, there are, however, actions against newspapers in which very substantial sums-in one case £5000-have been recovered. Then certain "society heavy damages. In West v. West the plaintiff got £1250, cases have resulted in subject, however, to appeal. The interest in other actions for defamation turned more on the personalities involved
[May 20, 1911.
and the interest of the facts in issue than on the financial outcome. In this category would fall the proceedings against MYLIUS for his gross defamation of His Majesty, the revelations in ex-Sergeant EDMONDSON's action against the Times, Mr. CHURCHILL'S action against Mr. SPENCER, and that in which Baron DE FOREST was concerned. These and other sensational cases have occupied a lot of valuable time, and in very many of them it is easy to see that the point underlying the dicta of Mr. Justice LAWRANCE was closely in the minds of the parties, and that they were striving to make money by the exercise of a new art, the success of which would represent many months of the work ordinarily required by average individuals of the class concerned.
TESTATORS, Who be minded to bestow some benefit upon a friend by way of annuity, are not infrequently wishful to avoid the possibility of the capital sum being lost by the premature death of the annuitant. Where the annuitant is a person in years or in an unsatisfactory state of health this possibility frequently weighs heavily on a testator's mind. The expedient is not unfamiliar of coupling with the gift of the annuity a direction to trustees to appropriate a certain sum for the purpose of meeting it, either naming such sum explicitly or else wording the direction in such a way as to make the trustees the arbiter of the sum necessary for the purpose. The annuity will then be declared to be charged on the appropriated sum, and, so far as the income thereof does not provide the annuity, the trustees will be empowered to resort to the capital, and should there be a surplus it will become income of residue. The appropriated sum, or so much of it as remains, on the cesser of the annuity will revert to and form a portion of the residue and be treated on that footing. In the writer's experience some difficulties have arisen out of these expedients, especially where the annuitant has lived to an unexpected age, and where the trustees in making the original appropriation have erred on the side of economy. It is conceived that the growing dislike of mortgage England considerable numbers of these appropriated sums investments, so noticeable of late years, will in practice rather tend to increase these difficulties. In the north of have been absorbed in bygone years in mortgages at comparatively high rates of interest. The position has changed and trustees have been calling in these loans, and, with a priated. It would be interesting if some of our solicitor drop in the rate of interest, the resort to capital has very often resulted in extensive reductions in the sum approreaders would kindly state what their experiences have been with these annuities out of appropriated funds, and whether on the whole they find this system more advantageous to all parties than the simple purchase of an annuity from the Government or some public company. It is a common frequently desires to give annuities to old friends and at the experience that it is the testatrix of small means who most same time to do nothing to deprive her relations of the family funds. It is not easy to reconcile both aspirations.
SIMILARITY OF THE NAMES OF COMPANIES. company is permitted to carry on its business under a name so similar to that of a company previously established, and carrying on a business of the like description, as to be calculated to deceive the public. As was said by Lord Watson in the well-known case of North Cheshire and Manchester Brewery Company Limited v. Manchester Brewery Company Limited (79 L. T. Rep. 645, at p. 647; (1899) A. C. 83, at p. 87); the prior company are exposed to every possible inconvenience which can arise to their trade from the fact of a rival company starting afresh in the same trade in the same locality and under substantially the same name with themselves." But notwithstanding the privilege intended to be afforded by sub-sect. 1 of sect. 8 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69)—which is a considerably wider measure of protection
than that enjoyed by individuals-various companies appear to have succeeded, from time to time, in obtaining registration in defiance of its terms. That the protection is wider is plainly manifested by what was said by Mr. Justice Joyce in the case of Fine Cotton Spinners and Doublers' Association Limited and John Cash and Sons Limited v. Harwood, Cash, and Co. Limited (97 L. T. Rep. 45; (1907) 2 Ch. 184). His Lordship there laid down that a new company, with a title of which a personal name forms part, has not the natural right of an individual born with that name to trade under that name, where there is a possibility of confusion with an old company. The law is that an individual cannot be absolutely restrained from carrying on business in his own name. He can only be restrained from so doing without taking reasonable precautions to prevent his business or goods being confounded with those of another person: (see J. and J. Cash Limited v. Joseph Cash, 86 L. T. Rep. 211).
The sub-section above mentioned provides as follows: company may not be registered by a name identical with that by which a company in existence is already registered, or so nearly resembling that name as to be calculated to deceive, except where the company in existence is in the course of being dissolved and signifies its consent in such manner as the registrar requires." Substantially the sub-section is a reenactment of the provisions contained in sect. 20 of the Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), so that the protection thereby conferred has been in operation for almost half a century. It is, therefore, somewhat singular that, despite the prohibition against registration, many cases should have come before the courts in which it has been decided that the name adopted by a company, and not objected to by the registrar, so nearly resembles that of an existing company as to be calculated to deceive.
It is true that the oversight can easily be remedied by causing the name to be changed, pursuant to the power given by sub-sect. 2 of sect. 8 of the Act of 1908, which contains the following provisions: "If a company, through inadvertence or otherwise, is, without such consent as aforesaid "-that is to say, the consent referred to in sub-sect. 1-" registered by a name identical with that by which a company in existence is previously registered, or so nearly resembling it as to be calculated to deceive, the first-mentioned company may, with the sanction of the registrar, change its name." But the disadvantages of introducing any such alteration after a company has once started business are so obvious that they render the expediency of avoiding the necessity for so doing very clearly indicated. The promoters of a company having selected an appropriate name under which it is to carry on its business, and then caused the company to be duly registered by that name, it is highly important that it should not be liable to be disturbed in its possession thereof because of the name being subsequently discovered to be calculated to deceive on account of its similarity to that of another company. Too much reliance on the caution exercised in the office of the registrar to obviate that inevitable consequence is, therefore, unadvisable. Consideration of the decisions of the courts on this subject whenever they have been reported-seldom as it happens to be-is most essential. For sect. 8 of the Act of 1908 contains merely a direction to the registrar not to register a company by a name calculated to deceive. Should similarity of names escape his vigilance, and a name be allowed per incuriam to pass as unobjectionable, then, after registration thereof, the matter depends on common law rights. The circumstance that a new company has been registered by a name so nearly resembling that of a company already in existence as to be calculated to deceive will not preclude that prior company from obtaining an injunction to restrain the new company from carrying on business under and using the name so adopted and registered. By reason of its similarity to the name of the prior company the court will interfere. All that it has to be satisfied is that the name is " calculated to deceive."
The court is careful, however, to regard what has been done in former cases, in order to secure consistency, while taking as a guide the spirit of sect. 8 of the Act of 1908, as can be seen from the words of the Master of the Rolls (Cozens-Hardy) in one of the latest, if not the latest, of the cases—namely, Ouvah Ceylon Estates Limited v. Uva Ceylon Rubber Estates Limited (103 L. T. Rep. 416). The first duty of the court, said Lord Justice Second Sheet.
Farwell in the same case, is to look at the words and see if the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur applies. Acquaintance with the reported decisions, no less than with the statutory provisions, becomes, therefore, a sine qui non when a company's name is being chosen by its founders; and a brief examination of some of the more recent of the cases may not be without interest.
As is pointed out in Buckley on the Companies Acts (9th edit., p. 14), the jurisdiction of the court rests either upon fraud or upon property; not that there is property in a name, but that the use of a name in which another carries on business will deceive and will affect property by diverting customers to the person taking the name. Where this is not the case there is no jurisdiction. Several authorities are cited in support of that proposition, among others, Street v. Union Bank of Spain and England (53 L. T. Rep. 262; 30 Ch. Div. 156). The principles applicable in the determination of the question whether the name of a company is likely to deceive, having regard to the existence or use of another name, are closely analogous to those applicable in cases of the passing off of goods, when the court has to determine whether a trade name or description or a description of a particular class of goods is likely to deceive, though it is possible that for certain purposes the application of the principles may vary: (per Mr. Justice Parker in British Vacuum Cleaner Company Limited v. New Vacuum Cleaner Company Limited, 97 L. T. Rep. 201; (1907) 2 Ch. 312).
In the case referred to above of North Cheshire and Manchester Brewery Company Limited v. Manchester Brewery Company Limited, two brewery companies named the "Manchester Brewery Company Limited" and the "North Cheshire Brewery Company Limited" were in 1888 carrying on business at Manchester and Macclesfield respectively, but their districts, to some extent, overlapped. In 1897 a new company was formed with the name of the North Cheshire and Manchester Brewery Company Limited" to take over and carry on the business of the North Cheshire Company Limited. It was held by the House of Lords, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal, that the Manchester Brewery Company Limited was entitled tɔ an injunction to restrain the new company from using or carrying on business under its proposed name, as being calculated to deceive, although there was no evidence of fraudulent intention, and the word "Manchester" was not used as the first word of the new company's name. Similarly, in the case of Standard Bank of South Africa v. Standard Bank (25 Times L. Rep. 420; 26 Rep. Pat. Cas. 310), an injunction was granted restraining the defendant company from carrying on business under its then name or any other name so nearly resembling the plaintiff company's name as to be calculated to deceive.
So likewise an injunction was granted in the case of Ouval Ceylon Estates Limited v. Uva Ceylon Rubber Estates Limited (ubi sup.). The plaintiff company, whose business was that of growing tea and rubber, was registered in 1896. The defendant company, in ignorance of the existence of the plaintiff company, was registered in 1910 for the purpose of acquiring and developing a rubber estate. Although the name of the defendant company was not spelt in the same way as the name of the plaintiff company, the pronunciation of both was. identical, each name indicating that of the same province in Ceylon. Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of Mr. Justice Joyce on the ground that the similarity of names was calculated to deceive, notwithstanding the slight variation therein by the interposition of the word" rubber."
Another case where an injunction was granted was Panhard et Levassor (Société Anonyme Anciens Etablissements) v. Panhard Levassor Motor Company Limited (85 L. T. Rep. 20; (1901) 2 Ch. 513).
Turning now to cases where an injunction has been refused, they mostly related to companies which had incorporated into their names words descriptive of the articles in which they dealt. On that ground, they were held not entitled to claim a monopoly of the use of such words, and ran the risk of having the articles similarly described in the names of rival companies. It is because no such monopoly can be secured that a descriptive name may be registered. Such was the effect of the decision of Mr. Justice Parker in British Vacuum Cleaner Company Limited v. New Vacuum Cleaner Company Limited (ubi sup.).
The learned judge acted on what was said by Lord Justice Farwell in the case of Aerators Limited v. Tollit (86 L. T. Rep. 651; (1902) 2 Ch. 319)-that is to say, that a company registered by a name which represents a word in common use at the date of registration, and which represents an article of commerce, cannot claim a monopoly of that name so as to prevent another company taking the word as part of its name, unless it is obvious that persons will be in fact deceived as to the identity of the two companies. The facts in the case of the British Vacuum Cleaner Company Limited (ubi sup.) were these: In 1903 the plaintiff company was registered for working a patent for the cleaning of carpets, &c., by means of a pipe, suction, and vacuum. In 1906 the defendant company was registered for working a patent which, in respect of pipes and vacuum, was the same as that of the plaintiff company, and was not an infringement of it. Mr. Justice Parker decided that " vacuum cleaner" had not acquired a secondary or subsidiary meaning; and that the word "new sufficiently distinguished the name of the defendant company from that of the plaintiff company.
The proposition enunciated in that case has been illustrated in others more recently decided, notably in that of Electromobile Company Limited v. British Electromobile Company Limited (98 L. T. Rep. 258), where electrically propelled carriages were the plaintiff company's manufacture. It was admitted that at the formation of the company, and subsequently, the word "Electromobile" was a generic word and formed part of the language used in this country, and meant a motor-car propelled by electricity. But it was contended that the evidence showed that the word had since acquired a secondary meaning denoting the motor-cars dealt in by the Electromobile Company Limited, which had consequently become known in the trade as Electromobiles." This view, however, was not accepted either by Mr. Justice Warrington or by the Court of Appeal.
That the plaintiff's trade name of "Trade Extension Company" had not acquired a secondary meaning, as denoting the plaintiff's business, and that, therefore, the name of the defendant company, "Expansion of Trade Limited," was not calculated to deceive, was the conclusion arrived at by. Mr. Justice Eve in the case of Elliott v. Expansion of Trade Limited (54 S. J. 101). And where in the case of Scottish Union and National Insurance Company Limited v. Scottish National Insurance Company Limited (1909, S. C. 318; 26 Rep. Pat Cas. 105) the plaintiff company carried on general insurance business, but not marine insurance, although by its articles it had power to do so, and the defendant company carried on marine insurance only, although by its articles it had power to undertake other insurances, it was decided by the Court of Session in Scotland that, as the businesses of general insurance and marine insurance were very different, the similarity of the names was not likely to deceive. A further Scotch case, in which the question as to what was the effect of the name of an individual having been embodied in the name of a company, was Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v. Dunlop Motor Company Limited (8 F. 1146).
The foregoing, while not purporting to be an exhaustive epitome of the modern authorities, is probably sufficiently "complete to convey to the reader a fairly adequate notion of what has to be borne in mind when the choice of a suitable name for a new company comes up for deliberation.
-THE Easter Sittings in Dublin ended on Thursday, the 18th May, and the Trinity Sittings will open on the 1st June. It is to be feared, however, that those sittings will be very much broken up. First of all, Monday, the 5th June, being Whit Monday, is a holiday. Then, the judges leave Dublin for London for the Coronation on Wednesday, the 21st June, and they will be absent till Monday, the 26th June. So far as the Common Law work is concerned, the Trinity Sittings end on the 1st July, on which date the circuits ordinarily go out; so that there will only be about twenty days available for this class of work in the courts' next sittings. It is probable that in view of His Majesty's visit to Ireland, which begins on the 8th July and ends on the 12th July, the summer assizes will not go out till the latter date. An arrangement of this kind would give an additional week's sittings in Dublin, and would obviate the necessity of the judges coming back from circuit for the purpose of being in Dublin while His Majesty is there.
MR. JUSTICE BOYD made a strong complaint in his court on the 12th inst. as to the noise of the traffic in the streets outside the court, and as to the failure of the Dublin Corporation, notwithstanding representations made to them on more than one occasion, to put down a wood pavement in the streets in the vicinity of the courts. In summer, when the windows of the courts are opened, this inconvenience is particularly great. In fact, in one or two of the courts it is an intolerable nuisance. A wood pavement has already been put down
in Green-street, opposite the court-house there, and it is intolerable that the same course should not have been adopted with reference to the four courts. The Incorporated Law Society of Ireland has already made representations to the corporation on the subject, but without result. The corporation is the body which has the control of the streets, and is the only body which can incur the costs of providing this much-needed accommodation.
THE House of Lords on the 12th inst. dismissed the appeal in Murphy (Suppliant) v. The King, which raised an interesting question under the Old Age Pensions Act 1908. It is understood that the Treasury were anxious to have the question settled by the final Court, of Appeal, and, accordingly, the entire costs of the appeal were paid by the State. A woman had been allowed an old age pension by the local pensions committee on the basis that she was seventy years of age, and no appeal was brought within the prescribed time against the decision. Subsequently the pension officer raised a question to the effect that the pensioner had not fulfilled the statutory conditions inasmuch as she had not attained the age of seventy years. The Local Government Board on appeal decided that she was not entitled to receive the pension. It was held by the Court of Appeal on the 16th Jan. that the board had jurisdiction to enter upon the reinvestigation not withstanding the words of sect. 7 (2) of the Act that the decision of a committee if not appealed from shall be final and conclusive. The Irish court decided further that if a person is not seventy when the application is made, the jurisdiction upon which the procedure depends does not exist, because the statutory conditions (including the condition of age) apply to the receipt as well as to the granting of a pension. It was held that a question as to the fulfilment or the continuance of the fulfilment of this condition might be raised at any time. The House of Lords unanimously upheld this decision and dismissed the appeal without calling upon the respondents. The argument for the appellant substantially was that, in the absence of fraud, 66 once seventy always seventy."
ANOTHER important decision was given by the Court of Appeal on the 11th inst., in the case of Sharples v. Eason and Sons Limited and others, on the question of the issue and service of writs out of the jurisdiction in actions founded on tort. It has already been decided in Ross v. "Winning Post" and others (see L. T. Jour., April 29, p. 619) that where in an action for damages for libel a newsvendor within the jurisdiction is joined as a defendant with the printer and publisher of the newspaper, who resides outside of the jurisdiction, and where it is shown that the newsvendor within the jurisdiction is not an agent of the printer and publisher of the paper which is alleged to contain the libellous statement, an order giving liberty to `issue and serve a concurrent writ out of the jurisdiction will be set aside. In Sharples' case the writ had been issued against two defendantsnamely, Eason and Sons Limited, who are newsvendors in Dublin, and the proprietor of the Racing World, who resides outside of the jurisdiction. It was proved that Messrs. Eason were not the agents of the London publishers, and that they had sold the Racing World in Dublin merely as ordinary news vendors. Both defendants entered appearances in Ireland, and the pleadings in the case were closed. The plaintiff then discontinued the action against Messrs Eaton and Sons Limited, and served a notice of trial on the other defendant, who thereupon moved to stay the proceedings on the grounds that they were an abuse of the process of the court and that Messrs. Eason had been joined merely as a colourable defendant and for the purpose of giving jurisdiction. The court, notwithstanding the fact that the publisher of the Racing World had entered an appearance, stayed the action, holding that the plaintiff had aamitted, by discontinuing the proceedings against Messrs. Eason, that they had been joined merely for the purpose of bringing the English defendant into the jurisdiction. The court regarded the procedure as an evasion of Order XI. of the Irish Rules of Court.
THE decision of the Court of Appeal in Rex (Cloherty) v. Galway County Council represents another stage in a dispute between the local authorities in Ireland and the Imperial Exchequer. Previously to this case the county councils had been in the habit of paying, at the request of the various clerks of the peace, the expense of printing lists of quarter sessions, advertisements of dates of quarter sessions, lists of applicants for licences, advertisements of appointments of civil bill officers, notices of applications for compensation for criminal injuries, and lists of civil bill appeals. The expense of this printing hitherto has been incurred by the clerk of the peace of each county, and was paid without demur by the county councils. Recently the Galway County Council refused to pay these sums, and the Crown applied for a mandamus to compel them to do so, chiefly on the ground that the payments had become a national custom. The county council declined to make the payment, on the ground that there was no authority for doing so, and that any ratepayer could come forward and object to the same. The case came before the King's Bench Division in February last, and it was decided that these